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ABSTRACT
3
The thesis focuses on the making of spending cuts in local 
government in the mid-1980s. It examines how four English 
local authorities - Bedfordshire County Council, Kent 
County Council, Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council, and 
Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council - made spending cuts 
in the financial year, 1984/85.
The research is based on a comprehensive set of interviews 
of the significant actors in each of the four local 
authorities and an examination of the relevant documents 
produced by the local authorities, plus an extensive 
literature survey.
After exploring the significant methodological problems in 
defining and measuring local authority spending, the thesis 
examines to what extent the four local authorities cut 
their spending, why they curbed their spending, and how 
they made spending cuts. Furthermore, it looks at specific 
case studies where local authorities cut their spending, 
including, for example, decisions to contract-out school 
cleaning, to terminate grant funding of sheltered housing, 
and to work with a voluntary organisation in providing day 
care for the elderly.
The thesis outlines the major findings of the research, 
compares the research findings with those of other research 
projects, and constructs a theory of cutback management in 
local government. This theory challenges many of the 
conventional wisdoms surrounding cutback management. Both 
the dominant rationalist and incremental models of cutback 
management are explored and tested in light of the research 
evidence. The thesis finds that both models provide only 
limited explanations of cutback management in local 
government. As a result of their theoretical shortcomings 
a refined model is formulated, which provides a far more 
plausible basis upon which to understand cutback management 
in local government.
The thesis offers both new empirical and theoretical 
analysis of the making of spending cuts in local 
government.
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PART A; SETTING THE SCENE
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
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Before the 'IMF Crisis* of 1976 Tony Crosland, the 
Secretary of State for the Environment, announced to local 
authorities:1
"The party * s over."
With the election of the Thatcher Government in 1979 
Michael. Heseltine, the Secretary of State for the 
Environment, proclaimed in September 1981 that it was 
"closing time" for growth in local authority spending.2 In 
July 1982 Leon Brittan, the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury, appealed for "local authority spending to be 
contained within limits set by what the nation can 
afford."3 In 1988 Nicholas Ridley, as Secretary of State 
for the Environment, wrote "it has been essential to 
constrain the growth of local authority expenditure".4 In 
February 1991 Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, 
demanded that "local authorities of whatever political 
complexion should strain to keep down their public 
expenditure."5 In October 1992 John Redwood, as minister 
for local government, claimed it "is important that local,
1 Taken from Crosland (1982) p295. See also Cochrane 
(1993) p29; Henney (1984) p56; Page A (1980) pp31, 44;
Taylor-Gooby (1985) p71; and Warman (1975) pi. There is
considerable confusion over when Tony Crosland made this 
speech. For example, Kenneth Baker, the former Secretary of 
State for the Environment, believed the speech was given in 
1976 ((1993) pill). Blunkett and Jackson, Chandler, Deakin 
and Kingdom also claimed the speech was given in 1976 
((1987) pl49; (1991) p74; (1985) p221; and (1991) pl74
respectively). Furthermore, other writers did not cite 
their sources in citing the speech - see Butcher, Law, 
Leach & Mullard (1990) p56; Byrne (1990) p266; Pliatzky 
(1985) p68; and Stoker (1988) pl3. His speech, now rooted 
in local government folklore, was made on 9 May 1975 at a 
luncheon in Manchester Town Hall (see Warman (1975) pi).
2 Taken from Byrne (1990) p266.
3 Brittan (1982) p61.
4 Ridley (1988) p7.
5 Taken from Travis (1990) p3.
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like central, government does its best to control costs”.6 
There has been a sustained period of fiscal pressure facing 
local authorities from the mid-1970s to the present day. 
For nearly two decades central government has attempted to 
curb local authority spending. Local authorities, 
especially Labour-controlled local authorities, and trade 
unions have attempted to resist these spending curbs. They 
have argued spending cuts have been translated into cuts in 
services, thus denying many people of essential services.7 
As a result of this confrontation local authority spending 
has dominated relations between central and local 
government. Arguments over the incidence and impact of 
spending cuts have been central in local government 
circles, raising questions whether central government’s 
rhetoric of cuts has been converted into local authority 
spending cuts and whether spending cuts have adversely 
affected local authority services.
AIMS OF THESIS
6 Taken from Hutton (1992) p8.
7 For example, see Association Of Directors Of Social 
Services (1983); Association Of Directors Of Social 
Services (1985); Blunkett & Jackson (1987); Bundred (1986); 
Community Action (1975); Cook (1991) p24; Cossey (1984); 
Cuts Monitor (1985); Cuts Monitor (1986a); Cuts Monitor 
(1986b); Douglas & Payne (1983); Geldart (1994); The 
Guardian (1993) pp6-7; Hewton (1986); Jacobs (1979); Labour 
Party Research Department (1979) ppl3-25; Labour Research
(1988); LGIU Briefing (1993) ppl-2; London Voluntary 
Service Council (1980); Lunn (1990); Mobbs (1980); National 
Book Committee (not dated); National Confederation Of 
Parent-Teacher Associations (1985); National Council Of 
Women Of Great Britain (1985); National Steering Committee 
Against The Cuts (1977) pp22-34; National Union Of Teachers
(1982); Personal Social Services Council (1979); Pinkham & 
Platt (1980); Preston (1984); Priscott (1980); Rayner & 
Conway (1981-2); Research Group Of The Higher Education 
Finance Executive (1984) ; and Services To Community Action 
And Trade Unions (1990) pp2-6.
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The focus of the thesis is upon the making of spending cuts 
in local government. The research conducted in completing 
the thesis was based on an examination of how four English 
local authorities - Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, Knowsley MBC 
and Stockport MBC - made spending cuts in the financial 
year of 1984/85.8 The fiscal pressure facing local 
authorities unleashed rounds of spending cuts in local 
authorities. The research examines the making of spending 
cuts in the four local authorities. It adopts a decision 
approach, in that spending decisions are examined to 
explain why and how spending cuts were made in the local 
authorities.9 The research focuses on the making of local 
authority spending cuts in one financial year, thereby 
allowing comparison between the four local authorities in 
the way they cut spending.10 There are three aims of the
8 The systems of local government in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales is slightly different from that in 
England. On the making of spending cuts in local 
authorities in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales see 
Elcock & Jordan (1987) ppl53-242; Midwinter (1984); 
Midwinter (1988); and Midwinter & Page (1981).
9 Decisions involve choice between different courses of 
action (see Hogwood (1987) p79; McGrew & Wilson (1982) pp4- 
6; and Simon (1957a) p46). Bachrach and Baratz argued not 
all issues reach the decision-making agenda, and some 
issues not on the agenda are 'non-decisions* (see (1963); 
and (1970) pp39-51). They claimed when "the dominant
values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power 
relations among groups, and the instruments of force, 
singly or in combination, effectively prevent certain 
grievances from developing into fully-fledged issues which 
call for decisions, it can be said that a nondecision­
making situation exists" ((1963) p641). Though this idea 
"seems intuitively plausible" there are considerable and 
perhaps insurmountable problems in researching the making 
of 'non-decisions* (Parry & Morriss (1974) p319). While
accepting that structural forces filter issues before 
reaching the decision-making agenda, the research did not 
examine 'non-decisions* because spending cuts are outcomes 
of decisions made and not of decisions not made.
10 This focus, however, prevents a systematic 
examination of the impact of spending cuts - see Hoggart 
(1991). A longitudinal survey of spending cuts is necessary 
to explore their impact, though this survey would be 
fraught with problems of attempting to separate the effects
14
thesis:
(a) On the methodological front, it seeks to 
understand the nature of spending cuts in local 
government.
(b) On the empirical front, it undertakes to 
widen and deepen the pool of observations about 
how local authorities make spending cuts, by 
examining the making of spending cuts in four 
local authorities.
(c) On the theoretical front, it intends to test 
existing theories of how local authorities cut 
spending, and to construct a new theory of how 
local authorities make spending cuts.
In writing about central government Heclo and Wildavsky 
observed:11
"... the expenditure process is an immense window 
into the reality of British political 
administration. A peek through that window 
reveals a fascinating glimpse of how our 
governors actually govern.”
Similarly, the exploration of how local authorities make
spending decisions reveals many insights into how local
authorities make decisions. Debates about spending cuts in
local government tend to be emotive. Decision-makers in
local government often do not use the language of 'cuts',
preferring instead the managerialistic language of
'efficiency savings1. For example, spending cuts were
'reductions1 in Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC; 'lower
expenditure options1 in Knowsley MBC; and 'options' in
Stockport MBC. Debates have become confused with managerial
anodyne, polemical claims and rhetorical posturing. It is
important that the thesis disentangles this methodological
confusion, and understands the nature of spending cuts. The
examination of spending cuts in the four local authorities
will provide empirical findings that can be compared to the
of spending cuts from the effects of other factors. Though 
the research did not involve a longitudinal survey, the 
impact of the spending cuts examined will be noted, 
wherever possible, throughout the thesis.
11 Heclo & Wildavsky (1981) plxii.
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findings of other research projects. It extends the
knowledge on cutback management in local government, from
which existing theoretical interpretations can be tested
and new theoretical interpretations developed. In the words
of Hogwood and Gunn:12
"We are all model builders, in the sense that we 
need to see some sort of pattern in the world 
around us and tend to interpret events in terms 
of that perceived pattern. We create 'reality* 
rather than simply observe it."
The empirical findings of how local authorities cut
spending require interpretation and explanation. The thesis
uses existing theories to make sense of how local
authorities made spending cuts, and develops a new theory
of cutback management in local government.13 The thesis
aims to provide empirical and theoretical analysis of the
way local authorities make spending cuts.
STRUCTURE OF THESIS
There are three parts to the thesis, which are further sub­
divided into eight chapters. Part A consists of chapters
12 Hogwood & Gunn (1984) p42. On modelling see Fiorina 
(1975); Hogwood & Gunn (1984) pp42-64; Kingdom (1985); and 
Nagel & Neef (1979) ppl77-196.
13 Given 'everything connects* it is important to 
clarify what the thesis attempts to explain. It seeks only 
to explain how local authorities make spending cuts. Local 
authorities do not operate in a vacuum, and are subject to 
many outside pressures, such as governmental pressures (eg 
central government), political pressures (eg pressure 
groups), economic pressures (eg national and world economy) 
and ideological pressures (eg ideological shifts from 
Keynesianism to monetarism, and from state to market 
provision of services). The theories examined and developed 
in the thesis seek to explain how local authorities made 
decisions to cut spending, taking into account how these 
wider pressures affected decision-making in local 
authorities. It cannot explain changes in the environment 
surrounding local authorities.
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one, two and three. It gives background required to 
understand how local authorities make spending cuts. This 
chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. Chapter two 
looks at the methodological difficulties in defining, 
observing and measuring spending cuts in local government. 
Chapter three explores the pressures facing local 
authorities in making decisions to cut spending. This part 
sets the scene for the subsequent empirical and theoretical 
analysis of spending cuts in local government.
Part B consists of chapters four and five. It provides 
empirical analysis of how Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, 
Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC cut spending. Chapter four 
examines how the four local authorities made spending cuts 
in the financial year of 1984/85. Chapter five dissects one 
spending cut in detail, the contracting-out of school 
cleaning in Kent, and analyses why and how it was made.
Part C consists of chapters six, seven and eight. It offers 
theoretical analysis of how local authorities make spending 
cuts. Chapters six and seven examine the empirical findings 
identified in Part B within existing theoretical 
frameworks. Chapter six looks at the rationalist view, and 
chapter seven the incremental view of cutback management in 
local government. Chapter eight assesses the plausibility 
of the rationalist and incremental theories of cutback 
management, and puts forward a new theory of cutback 
management in local government.
Though the research focuses on the making of spending cuts 
in four local authorities in 1984/85, the empirical and 
theoretical analysis is still highly relevant because 
spending cuts remain on the local government agenda. The 
changes that have occurred in local government since. the 
mid-1980s do not invalidate the empirical and theoretical
17
findings outlined in the thesis.14 There are three areas 
where the thesis provides original contributions to debates 
on the making of spending cuts in local government. First, 
it outlines a distinctive methodological approach to 
understanding spending cuts in local government. Second, it 
offers new empirical observations on how four local 
authorities cut spending. Third, it constructs a new theory 
of cutback management on examining how local authorities 
managed cutbacks and on testing existing theories of 
cutback management.
METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH
The thesis looks at the making of spending cuts in 
Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC. 
This selection of local authorities allows generalisations 
to be made on the basis of the findings collected from the 
four local authorities. The local authorities were selected 
on the basis of satisfying the following criteria:
(a) the ability to make comparisons between local 
authorities on the making of spending cuts
(b) the need to compare local authorities under 
different party political control
(c) the need to compare local authorities from 
different regions in England
(d) the willingness of local authorities to grant 
access for research
14 The major changes in local government that have 
taken place include the merger of the Liberal Party and 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) to form the Liberal 
Democrats, new systems of financing and controlling local 
authority spending (eg replacement of domestic rates with 
the poll tax and later the council tax), and the merger of 
the Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE), 
National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) 
and National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) to form 
UNISON.
Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC are county councils; and 
Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC are metropolitan district 
councils. These types of local authorities provide a 
similar range of services, thus facilitating meaningful 
comparison between them.15 Bedfordshire CC was 'hung' with 
no majority party group in control of the local authority; 
Kent CC was Conservative-controlled with the Conservative 
Group having a clear majority of seats on the Council; 
Knowsley MBC was Labour-controlled with the Labour Group 
occupying nearly all the seats on the Council; and 
Stockport MBC was Conservative-controlled with the 
Conservative Group having only a narrow majority of seats 
on the Council, though by the end of 1984/85 it had lost 
control and the Council became 'hung'. Bedfordshire CC and 
Kent CC are located in the South, and Knowsley MBC and 
Stockport MBC are located in the North of England.16 All 
four local authorities promised access in terms of 
documentation and interviews.17 The four local authorities 
satisfied the given selection criteria.18 The table below 
profiles the four local authorities selected for research.
Table 1.1; Profile of Bedfordshire CC. Kent CC.
Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC. 1984/85
15 The major exception is housing, which is a district 
not a county council responsibility.
16 The geographical spread of the four local 
authorities is important given that the financial health of 
local authorities varies between regions (see Bennett 
((1982b)).
17 However, the Labour councillors of Knowsley MBC 
later refused to be interviewed for this research.
18 Furthermore, the Institute of Public Finance 
undertook cluster analysis of all local authorities in 
England (Davies & Griffin (1986)). The four local
authorities belonged to different clusters of local
authorities, thus facilitating comparison between different 
kinds of local authorities.
Population 
('000, 1983)
Area
('000 hectares)
Persons under 20 
(% of population)
Persons over 75 
(% of population)
Owner-occupied 
dwellings (% of 
dwellings)
Council-owned 
dwellings (% of 
dwellings)
Total Expenditure 
(£m)
Grant-Related 
Expenditure (£m)
Expenditure 
Target (£m)
Block Grant 
,(£ m)
Rate-borne 
expenditure (£m)
Beds Kent
512.9 1,486.3
123.5 373.1
4.0
7.6
31 28
5 7
65 n/a
23 n/a
192.8 475.3
187.5 506.4
189.0 470.2
60.1 219.2
126.2 258.8
Population 4.2
density (population 
per hectare)
Unemployed 7.3
persons (% of 
working population)
Knowsley
170.8
9.7
17.5
22.
33
4
31
65
71.0 
66.2
69.0
37.7
32.2
Stockport
288.9
12.6
22.9
8.
28
6
75
18
90.0
90.8
90.0
38.8
49.3
Staff employed 11.1 28.7 5.8 6.8
(*000, full-time)
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Source: Audit Commission For Local Authorities In
England And Wales (1984b); Audit Commission For Local 
Authorities In England And Wales (1984c); Audit 
Commission For Local Authorities In England And Wales 
(1984d); Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1984e); and Bedfordshire CC's 
Annual Report And Statement Of Accounts 1984-1985
A variety of methodologies were deployed in conducting 
research for the thesis. They involved both the analysis of 
primary and secondary data, and of quantitative and 
qualitative data. Primary data were collected by interview, 
telephone conversations, letters, questionnaire and perusal 
of local authority documentation. Over 140 interviews were 
conducted as part of the research.19 The interviews were 
open-ended, and not structured around the same set of 
questions for each interviewee. Secondary data were 
collected by an extensive literature survey.20 The 
literature surveyed was vast, mainly because the thesis 
impinges on areas upon which vast amounts have been 
written, such as public expenditure, central-local 
government relations, local government finance, local 
government spending, contracting-out, budgeting, cutback 
management, decision-making and policy analysis. For the 
thesis to make a contribution to understanding how local 
authorities make spending cuts, it is necessary to read 
existing literature to see what others have written and to 
link in with existing debates. The data collected for the 
research were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. 
The quantitative analysis of data involved primarily 
examining spending figures collected by the four local 
authorities and other bodies (eg Chartered Institute of 
Public Finance and Accountancy, the Treasury and Department 
of the Environment). The qualitative analysis of data
19 See appendix A.
20 See bibliography.
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involved mainly interviews and a literature survey, which 
were undertaken to interpret the data collected and to 
construct explanations of how local authorities cut 
spending.
The research methodology and subsequent analysis of data 
were complicated by the problematical relationship between 
fact and theory. This relationship has forever troubled 
researchers in the social sciences.21 It begs the question 
whether facts precede theory, or whether theory determines 
facts. Many studies of local authority spending adopted the 
bottom-up approach, by observing what happened in local 
authorities and then constructing a general theory to 
explain what happened.22 This common approach has been 
attacked because it assumes there are 'facts' out there to 
be collected, measured and observed. In the words of 
Saunders:23
"It is now generally agreed that knowledge cannot 
be the product of unmediated experience through 
the senses, but that the way in which we come to 
'see' the world is in some way dependent upon the 
theoretical assumptions and conceptual frameworks 
that we apply to it.... If observation is theory- 
dependent, then resort to empirical evidence to 
arbitrate between competing theoretical 
explanations is clearly problematic.... The point 
is not simply that theory determines where we 
look, but that it to some extent governs what we 
find."
This criticism has given licence to several writers to 
construct theory without any serious attempt to test it 
through empirical observation. These top-down accounts have 
started explicitly from a theoretical position, and shaped 
their empirical findings around its theoretical
21 See Lukes (1981) .
22 For example, see Elcock & Jordan (1987); and Elcock, 
Jordan & Midwinter (1989).
23 Saunders (1986b) pp352-353.
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requirements.24 The observed findings are the product of a
generalised theory, rather than the theory constructed in
light of observed findings. This top-down approach is
flawed because it treats theory as axiomatic truth.
Dunleavy captured this dilemma when he wrote:25
"The options available to urban researchers on 
the fundamental explanatory units in their 
analysis are the set of general methodological 
positions on a continuum whose extremes are 
marked by pure methodological individualism, on 
the one hand, and by sociological holism on the 
other.”
The research on the making of spending cuts in four local 
authorities takes a dualistic methodological approach, in 
that empirical findings are observed and interpreted to 
construct theory but are also reinterpreted within existing 
theoretical frameworks. Though this approach cannot remove 
the methodological dilemma facing all social scientists, it 
recognises at least the pros and cons of the bottom-up and 
top-down approaches by embracing 'methodological 
pluralism1 .26
24 For example, see Cockburn (1977) .
25 Dunleavy (1980) p25.
26 See Rhodes (1991a) pp551-552.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ANATOMY OF SPENDING CUTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
24
Spending cuts have been firmly established on the agenda of 
local government since the mid-1970s. The New Right have 
consistently sought cuts in local government, believing 
local government to be both wasteful of public money and 
damaging to economic growth. The Left, particularly the New 
Urban Left, have vehemently criticised this position as an 
ideological attack on local government, and have paraded 
the damaging consequences of spending cuts in local 
government. Both sides have placed spending cuts at the 
forefront of debates on local government.1 However, this 
chapter shows that these debates are largely confused and 
even misleading, not least because each side is not 
interested in an empirical assessment of the record of 
local government spending but only in finding ideological 
ammunition to attack the other side. Even academics have 
been tainted by these highly partisan and polarised 
debates, and much of their work on local government
spending has not been rooted in empirical analysis. The aim 
of this chapter is to explore the methodological problems 
in defining and measuring local government spending. First, 
this chapter assesses the manner in which the debates on 
local government spending have been misunderstood. Second, 
it examines the many ways in which local government
spending can be defined and measured. Finally, the chapter
outlines the anatomy of spending cuts in local government,
which is necessary to understand fully the making of 
spending cuts in local government.
MISUNDERSTANDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING
1 See Boddy & Fudge (1984); Butcher, Law, Leach & 
Mullard (1990); Gyford (1985); Holliday (1991a); King
(1989); Lansley, Goss & Wolmar (1989); Manton (1993); 
Newton & Karran (1985); Page (1990); Seyd (1987) ppl41-158; 
and Stoker (1988) ppl51-214.
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Spending has often been at the heart of conflicts between 
central government and local government irrespective of 
what party was in power nationally and locally.2 Indeed, 
Stevenson noted that the ongoing battles between the 
present Conservative Government and local authorities "are 
very similar to those between the wars."3 From Poplar in 
the 1920s to Clay Cross in the 1970s there have been many 
important battlegrounds where central government has fought 
with local authorities over spending.4
Over the last two decades conflicts over spending have 
become particularly pronounced and entrenched in relations 
between central and local government. Since the late 1960s, 
following sterling and oil crises, successive Conservative 
and Labour Governments have attempted to control and curb 
the level of public expenditure.5 This pressure to reduce 
public expenditure was quickly translated into pressure to 
reduce local government spending.6 In the 1970s central 
government, through ministerial speeches and government 
circulars, urged local authorities to curb their spending; 
and later it co-opted local government representatives into
2 See Ashford (1980a); Heclo & Wildavsky (1981) pp232- 
233; Hepworth (1976) pi; Jackman (1985); Robson (1933); 
Robson (1968); Stevenson (1984) ; and Travers (1986b).
3 Stevenson (1984) p219.
4 See Branson (1979); and Mitchell (1974).
5 See Pliatzky (1982) pp98-175.
6 See Benington & Stoker (1989) pll5; Brittan (1982); 
Butcher, Law, Leach & Mullard (1990) pp55-77; Donnison
(1983) p4; The Economist (1979a); Greenwood (1981);
Greenwood (1982a); Greenwood (1982b); Greenwood, Hinings, 
Ranson & Walsh (1980) pp32-36; Heald, Bailey, Jackman,
Midwinter, Page & King (1981); Heclo & Wildavsky (1981) 
pp232-233; Hepworth (1976); Jackman (1979); Jones & Stewart 
(1982b): Jones & Stewart (1984); Kingdom (1991) ppl72-193; 
Meadows (1985); Midwinter & Page (1981); O'Higgins (1983) 
pl63; Riddell (1983) pl27; Short (1984) pp92-95; Stoker
(1991) ppl61-178; Travers (1984a); Travers (1985b); Travers 
(1986b) pp80-81; and Turner (1984).
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its decision-making processes in the hope that local 
authorities would restrain their spending. The Labour 
Government established the Consultative Council on Local 
Government Finance in 1975, which was set up to promote 
consultation and cooperation between central and local 
government on common economic and financial matters.7 
However, by the 1980s central government had firmly 
abandoned this strategy of persuading local authorities to 
cut spending, and instead attempted to impose spending cuts 
upon local authorities.8 Though the 1980s saw a concerted 
attempt by the Thatcher Government to cut local authority 
spending by diktat rather than by exhortation, there were 
signs in the 1970s that the Callaghan Government was unable
7 See Chandler (1991) pp66-68; Chartered Institute Of 
Public Finance And Accountancy (1984c) pp50-52; The
Economist (1976); Goldsmith & Newton (1983) pp220-221;
Greenwood (1982a) pp253-254; HM Treasury (1976) pl2; HM
Treasury (1978) pp7-8; Jones (1990/91) ppl99-200; Rhodes
(1986a); Rhodes (1988) pp378-379; Taylor (1979); and Wright 
(1977) ppl62-165.
8 See Association Of London Authorities (not dated); 
Blunkett & Jackson (1987); Boddy (1984); Bulpitt (1983) 
pp200-233; Burgess & Travers (1980); Butcher, Law, Leach & 
Mullard (1990) pp55-77; Byrne (1990) pp215-282; Chandler
(1991) pp57-112; Community Action (1984a); Cook (1993)
pplO-12; Davies (1987a); Dawson (1983); Duncan & Goodwin 
(1988); Dunleavy & Rhodes (1986); The Economist (1980); The 
Economist (1983); The Economist (1989); Flynn (1990) pp43- 
46; Gibson, Game & Stewart (1982); Gilmour (1992) pp212- 
220; Goldsmith & Newton (1983); Greenwood (1981); Greenwood 
(1982a); Greenwood (1982b); Gurr & King (1987) ppl50-184; 
Hampton (1991) pp93-113, 173-189; Horton (1990); Howells
(1982-3); Jackman (1984) pp96-106; John (1990); Jones
(1988); Jones (1990/91) ppl93-199; Jones & Stewart (1983c); 
Jones & Stewart (1985); Jones, Stewart & Travers (1983); 
Kingdom (1991) ppl72-193, 228-242; Kirwan (1984); Leach & 
Stoker (1988) pp99-104; Lee (1987) pp44-61; Letwin (1992) 
ppl59-198; Livesey (1987); Loughlin (1986) ppl9-62; Lowndes 
(1993) ppl40-145; Marsh & Rhodes (1992a) pp43-47; Meadows 
(1985); Meadows (1987); Midwinter (1984); Midwinter & Page
(1981); Newton & Karran (1985) ppll4-129; Page (1986);
Parkinson (1988a); Rhodes (1984); Rhodes (1985a); Rhodes 
(1988); Rhodes (1991b); Rhodes (1992a); Rhodes (1992b); 
Rhodes (1992c); Self (1982); Short (1984) pp92-95;
Stallworthy (1989); Stewart (1987); Stoker (1988) ppl53- 
172; Stoker (1990); Stoker (1991) ppl61-204; Travers
(1983a); Travers (1986b) pp79-191; and Travers (1987d).
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to rely on local government to make sufficient spending 
cuts. In 1976 the Labour Government applied cash limits to 
much of their spending programmes as a way of securing 
public expenditure cuts, and these cash limits were 
eventually extended to cover the aggregate level of grant 
given to local authorities.9
After the general election of May 1979 the incoming 
Conservative Government, armed with its ideological 
commitment to roll back the frontiers of the state and its 
monetarist baggage of economic policies, intensified the 
pressure upon local authorities to reduce their spending.10 
The Government changed the grant system to penalise local 
authorities which exceeded their spending targets; it 
controlled tightly local authority capital spending; it 
outlawed the levying of supplementary rates; it established 
the Audit Commission for Local Authorities in England and 
Wales to monitor local authority spending; it rate-capped 
selected local authorities; it abolished the Greater London 
Council and the six Metropolitan County Councils in part to 
curb so-called 'overspending' in local government; it 
introduced and later extended compulsory competitive 
tendering to force down local authority costs in providing 
services; it determined teachers' pay; it controlled the 
level of business rates which were formerly set by local 
authorities; it replaced domestic rates with the community 
charge to impose downward pressures upon local government 
spending, and retained extensive capping powers to prevent
9 See Bevan (1980); Bramley & Stewart (1981) pp51-55; 
Bush (1982) p6; Else & Marshall (1981) pp254-256; Greenwood 
(1982a) p257; Hall (1983) pp49-54; Harrison & Smith (1978) 
pp42-44; Heald (1983) ppl93-195; Healey (1990) p401;
Hepworth (1980) pp8-13; Hepworth (1984) pp28-30; Likierman
(1983); Likierman (1988) pp74-84; Pliatzky (1982) ppl38- 
139, 143-147, 174-175; Pliatzky (1989) pp51-63; Thain &
Wright (1988) pp7-14; Thain & Wright (1990) p2; Thain &
Wright (1992b) ppl98-204; Ward (1983); Wright (1977) ppl57- 
160; Wright (1980a) ppl01-103; and Wright (1982) pp33-38.
10 See Conservative Party (1979) .
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local authorities from 'overspending1; it 'ring-fenced* the 
housing revenue accounts of local authorities; and finally 
it replaced the community charge with the council tax, 
still retaining capping powers and introducing new banding 
controls.11 As a result of these measures and the 
subsequent responses of local authorities, spending cuts in 
local government occupied a central place in the conflicts 
between central and local government. Expenditure cuts in 
local government are of widespread concern to those who 
want to impose such cuts upon local authorities, eg the New 
Right, the Treasury, the Department of the Environment, and 
many of those who pay taxes towards the upkeep of local 
government; those who want to resist making cuts, eg the 
New Urban Left, many local authorities, trade unions and 
professionals engaged in providing local authority 
services, and consumers of these services; and those who 
simply want to understand what is happening, eg academics.
The context of public expenditure
It has often been stated that local government is 'big 
business'.12 In 1988 Likierman observed that local 
authorities "are responsible for about a quarter of.total 
public expenditure, representing about 10 per cent of
11 These measures were introduced by the Local 
Government, Planning And Land Act 1980; Local Government 
Finance Act 1982; Rates Act 1984; Local Government Act 
1985; Teachers' Pay and Conditions Act 1987; Local 
Government Act 1988; Local Government Finance Act 1988; 
Local Government and Housing Act 1989; and Local Government 
Finance Act 1992.
12 This description has been used in two ways - first, 
to argue that local government spends a lot of money (see 
Byrne (1990) p215; Kingdom (1991) pi; Ridley (1988) pl6; 
and Sandford (1984) p242); and second, to see local 
government as the local state serving the interests of 
capital (see Benington (1976)).
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national income."13 Two years later, Byrne noted:14
"Councils spend nearly £60,000 million a year 
(over £1,000 per person). This amounts to 30 per 
cent of all state spending and about one eighth 
of the National Income (GNP)."
The observations made by Likierman and Byrne, and others
could have been added, are striking if compared - either
local government has spent much more between 1988 and 1990,
or they are not observing the same kind of local authority
spending. As will be shown later, it is likely they are not
measuring local government spending in the same way, though
it cannot be ascertained because they, like many other
writers, do not state how they have measured this spending.
Nonetheless, what is also striking is that spending by
local authorities, however measured, constitutes a very
significant proportion of public expenditure.
Governments have always attempted to control public 
expenditure in order to manage the economy.15 Public 
expenditure is a central tool in the political management 
of the economy. Even before the International Monetary Fund 
attached public expenditure cuts as a condition to its loan 
negotiated at the end of 1976 the Labour Government was 
committed to reducing public expenditure.16 These cuts made 
by the Labour Government demonstrate that public 
expenditure cuts "are not the historical prerogative of
13 Likierman (1988) pll4.
14 Byrne (1990) p215.
15 See Ashford (1981) pp97-135; Edgell & Duke (1983) 
pp358-360; Grant (1993) pp43-95; Heald (1983); Heclo &
Wildavsky (1981); Hogwood (1992) p33; Jackson (1982a);
Jordan & Richardson (1987) pp203-232; Klein (1976);
Likierman (1988); Mullard (1987); Mullard (1993); Pliatzky
(1982); and Pliatzky (1985).
16 See Benn (1989); Community Action (1975); Donoughue 
(1987) pp62-63; Healey (1990) pp400-402, 429-433; Ludlam
(1992) pp716-720,v Pliatzky (1982) ppl22-175; and Starie
(1992).
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Conservative governments."17 By 1979 the newly elected
Conservative Government continued this attack on public
expenditure when it stated:18
"Public expenditure is at the heart of Britain*s 
economic difficulties.... The Governments 
economic strategy must be to stabilise public 
spending for the time being. Unless this is done 
there can be no possibility of lower taxes, lower 
borrowing or lower interest rates."
From the 1970s onwards there has been a widespread 
perception that public expenditure has contributed to 
Britain's economic decline.19 This perception was shared by 
both Conservative and Labour politicians, top civil 
servants (especially in the Treasury), 'think-tanks' such 
as the Institute of Economic Affairs, the International 
Monetary Fund, and many academics. The reasons for this 
deeply entrenched belief amongst the political elite 
managing the British economy were varied, ranging from the 
political expedients of the Labour Government in the 1970s 
to the ideological mission of the Conservative Government 
in the early 1980s. Whatever line of argument was used the 
outcome was essentially the same - governments needed to 
control and reduce public expenditure as part of the wider 
project to renew the British economy.
As a result of this preoccupation much has been written on 
whether governments have controlled public expenditure, 
whether governments have cut public expenditure, and 
whether public expenditure has changed the state of the 
economy. There is now a literary maze on public
17 Edge 11 & Duke (1983) p358.
18 HM Treasury (1979) pi. See also Conservative Central 
Office (1976) pp24-27; Conservative Party (1979); and
Lawson (1992) pp36-38.
19 See Gamble (1990); Jackson (1980); Midwinter (1992); 
and Pollitt (1981).
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expenditure.20 There is a bombardment of models and 
theories of public expenditure in this country, on both 
public expenditure growth and public expenditure cuts.21 
Many competing and conflicting positions have been put 
forward within this bewildering array of literature on 
public expenditure. This maze of literature is best 
examined on two fronts - the prescriptive and the 
descriptive.
On the prescriptive front there is a heated debate on the 
desired level of public spending, which peaked in the mid- 
1980s as the Conservative Government drastically diluted 
its commitment to monetarism.22 Margaret Thatcher, the 
former Prime Minister, noted that in the early 1980s the 
"most bitter Cabinet arguments were over public 
spending.1123 There are arguments for both attacking and 
defending government spending. In attack, the New Right 
hold liberalism and monetarism as ideological baggage in 
one hand, and point to the utopia of a free society 
unfettered by government with the other hand.24 In defence,
20 In contrast, Klein claimed in 1976 that public 
expenditure "has been massively neglected by political 
scientists" ((1976) p401).
21 This bombardment has not been confined to Britain, 
and can be traced in almost every industrialised country. 
See Alt & Chrystal (1983); Peters (1989) ppl6-38, 218-249; 
Rose (1984); and Saunders (1985).
22 See Dunn & Smith (1990); Grant (1993) pp50-56;
Jackson (1992); Keegan (1984a); Thain (1985); and Whiteley
(1990).
23 Thatcher (1993) pl23. See also Keegan (1984b) ppl89-
190.
: i r
24 See Adam Smith Institute (1982) ; Bacon & Eltis
(1976); Bow Group Economic Affairs Standing Committee 
(1976); Burton (1985); Confederation Of British Industry
(1981); Conservative Central Office (1976); Conservative 
Party (1979); Conservative Party (1983); Conservative Party 
(1987b); Conservative Party (1992); Eltis (1980); Friedman
(1976); Friedman & Friedman (1980); Green (1987); Harris &
Seldon (1979); Hayek (1960); Horam (1986); Institute Of
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there is a disparate and somewhat 'unholy' alliance 
nominally led by the Left holding on to the post-war legacy 
of Keynesian economics and the welfare state, and dreaming 
of a society run by a caring, enabling and interventionist 
government.25 On the descriptive front, there are two 
recurring but contradictory themes running through the 
jungle of literature on public expenditure. First, there 
has been much written on public expenditure growth.26 And 
second, there has also been much written on public 
expenditure cuts.27 This literature contains enough
Economic Affairs (1976); Institute Of Economic Affairs 
(1979); Joseph (1975); Minford (1984); Ridley (1992) ;
Scruton (1984) ; Seldon (1980) ; Selsdon Group (1980) ; and
Thatcher (1993).
25 See Benn (1992); Blake & Ormerod (1980); Bosanquet
(1983); George & Wilding (1984); Foot (1984); Hattersley 
(1987); Heald (1983); Heseltine (1987); Holland & Ormerod 
(1979); Kinnock (1986); Labour Party (1983); Labour Party
(1987) ; Labour Party (1992) ; Lansman & Meale (1983) ;
Liberal Democrats (1992); National Steering Committee 
Against The Cuts (1977); Owen & Steel (1987); Pym (1985); 
SDP-Liberal Alliance (1983); SDP-Liberal Alliance (1987); 
and Whitfield (1992).
26 See Bacon & Eltis (1976); Birch (1984); Burton 
(1985); Confederation Of British Industry (1981); 
Confederation Of British Industry (1984); Congdon (1985); 
Conservative Party (1979); Dahrendorf (1980); The Economist 
(1979b); Else & Marshall (1979); Flynn (1990) pp24-35;
Habermas (1976); Hamilton (1984); Heald (1983) pp22-32;
Hogwood (1992) pp33-60; Horam (1986); Institute Of Economic 
Affairs (1976); Jordan & Richardson (1987) pp203-232; King 
(1975); Klein (1976); Levitt & Joyce (1987a); Levitt & 
Joyce (1987b); Likierman (1988) ppl-23; Midwinter (1992); 
Mullard (1987) pp35-68; O'Connor (1973); Offe (1984); 
Peacock & Wiseman (1967); Ridley (1992) pp83-85; Rose
(1984); Rose (1985); Sandford (1984) pp45-78; Travers
(1987c); Tullock (1979); Wildavsky (1985); and Wright
(1977) . . '
27 See Abel-Smith (1980); Ashford (1981) pp97-135; Bull 
& Wilding (1983); Community Action (1975); Edgell & Duke
(1991); Glennerster (1977); Gough (1979); Gough (1980);
Hall (1983); Hall & Jacques (1983); Harrison (1985); Hood 
& Wright (1981b); Jackson (1980); Labour Party (1983);
Labour Party (1992); Labour Party Research Department 
(1979); Leonard (1979) ; Liberal Democrats (1992) ; London 
Edinburgh Weekend Return Group (1980); McDonnell (1978);
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argument and evidence to support every conceivable 
standpoint on public expenditure - whether it should be 
falling or rising, and whether it is falling or rising.
Given this variety of views held by writers on public 
expenditure it is not surprising that much of the debate is 
confused and confusing. There are three main reasons why 
the debate is muddled - first, there is a problem of 
perception; second, a problem of aggregation; and third, a 
problem of methodology. These problems will be briefly 
discussed to obtain a clearer picture of what happened with 
public expenditure.
First, the problem of perception is that what many people 
believe to have happened does not correspond to what 
actually has happened with public expenditure. In the words 
of Rose:28
"The disparity between the pattern of actual 
increases in public expenditure and increased 
discussion of 'cuts* in public expenditure is 
great. It is necessary to recognise that there is 
today a fundamental disjunction between the 
practice of political expenditure and the 
psychology of public expenditure. In other words, 
the perception of public expenditure by many 
within as well outside government is a 
misperception. What people see and what is to be 
seen by examining the record are two different 
things."
A vivid illustration of how public expenditure has been 
misperceived, which has plagued election campaigns during 
the 1980s and 1990s, lies in the social services. In spite 
of its rhetoric of cuts the Conservative Government has 
increased its spending on the social services in both cash
National Steering Committee Against The Cuts (1977); 
Poverty (1976); SDP-Liberal Alliance (1983); SDP-Liberal 
Alliance (1987); Walker (1982); Walker, Ormerod & Whitty
(1979); Whitfield (1992); and Wright (1980c).
28 Rose (1980) p9. See also Bramley & Stewart (1981).
and real terms.29 However, many people believe that central 
and local government have cut the amount spent on the
National Health Service and personal social services. 
Despite the record of increased spending there still 
remains a widespread misperception of how much is spent on 
the social services. In the 1980s the Labour Party lamented 
the "damage done to our social services", and the SDP-
Liberal Alliance deplored the "savage cuts in the social 
services" and believed that "people are seeing their 
services cut".30 An attitude survey revealed that nearly 90 
per cent of respondents believed that spending cuts had
been made in the National Health Service, and nearly 50 per
cent believed cuts had been made in the personal social 
services.31 It is likely that the "adverse publicity and 
the oft-repeated use of the word 'cuts* more or less 
convinced the public that these had indeed taken place."32 
These widespread beliefs do not correspond with the reality 
of government spending on the social services, and thus 
constitute a misperception of public expenditure.
A topical illustration of how public expenditure is 
misperceived concerns the record of public expenditure 
itself. There was a highly partisan debate in the 1980s 
over public expenditure cuts.33 From 1979 onwards the 
Conservative Government promised to deliver extensive cuts
29 See HM Treasury (1985) ; and HM Treasury (1987a) .
30 Labour Party (1983) p6; SDP-Liberal Alliance (1983) 
pl7; and SDP-Liberal Alliance (1987) plO.
31 Taken from Edgell & Duke (1986) pp233-234.
32 Ridley (1992) p83.
33 This debate still continues in the 1990s. but is 
conducted more in terms of restraint than cuts. The Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury noted recently that the 
Conservative Government "must be robust in constraining 
public spending" though "reversing trends in public 
spending will take some years", and that it "cannot rule 
out revenue-raising measures" to reduce government 
borrowing (Portillo (1993) pl4).
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in public expenditure as part of its wider economic 
strategy. These promised cuts were widely attacked from all 
sides - the Labour Party, local authorities, professionals 
working in the public sector, public sector trade unions, 
various groups representing client interests, and even 
parts of industry such as the construction industry. The 
debate was largely based on a misperception of public 
expenditure. Table 2.1 below, based on widely used Treasury 
figures, outlines the record of public expenditure during 
this period of heated debate.
Table 2.1: Public Expenditure in Britain. 1974/75 - 
1984/85
1974/75 1976/77 1978/79 1980/81 1982/83 1984/85
Cash (£b)* 42.8 59.4 74.6 108.3 132.6 150.0
Real (£b)** 144.6 141.4 140.7 147.4 153.1 159.0
Share of 48 46 43 46 47 46
GDP (%)
* General government expenditure 
** Adjusted to 1985/86 prices
Source: HM Treasury (1987b)
This table shows that public expenditure had increased in 
both cash and real terms in the ten years between 1974/75 
to 1984/85. This increase occurred despite the Conservative 
Governments commitment to reduce public expenditure. 
Indeed, public expenditure when measured in real terms fell 
only during the Labour Government from the mid-1970s to the 
late 1970s despite the ideological commitment of the 
Thatcher Government to cut public expenditure in the 1980s. 
Since 1979 public expenditure has not fallen in the way
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that the Conservative Government had hoped.34 Writing on 
the Government's now deceased Medium Term Financial 
Strategy, Thain argued that the "Treasury's most 
conspicuous failure during the 1980-84 period was the non­
implementation of the strategy's public expenditure 
plans."35 As a result of the failure to deliver public 
expenditure cuts, ministers talked about cuts in planned 
spending and cuts in planned spending increases in order to 
save face. In 1986 Nigel Lawson, the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, announced to the House of Commons:36
"Public expenditure increased in real terms by 
about 3 per cent a year... over the 10 years 
before 1978-79.... During the first Parliament 
under this Government, we reduced that increase 
to 2\ per cent a year. During this Parliament we 
have reduced it further to 1% per cent a year so 
far. Over the three years to come, we plan to 
reduce it further to 1 per cent a year."
During the early 1980s there was a gross misperception of
public expenditure. The Government's plans to cut public
expenditure never materialised, and consequently the debate
became misperceived and largely rhetorical. A general
examination of the public expenditure record of the
Conservative Government shatters the widely held belief
that there were public expenditure cuts. This misperception
of public expenditure has been described as the 'Big Lie'
by Auberon Waugh in his weekly outpourings. He pointed
out:37
34 See Flynn (1990) pp24-35; Johnson (1991) pp76-106; 
Kavanagh (1990) pp227-229; Lawson (1992) pp36-38; Midwinter 
(1992); O'Higgins (1983); Pliatzky (1982) ppl81-191;
Pliatzky (1989) p29; Riddell (1983) pplll-112; Ridley
(1992) pp83-86; Short (1984) pp84-86; Thain (1985) pp279- 
281; and Travers (1987c).
35 Thain (1985) p279.
36 Taken from Economic Progress Report (1986b) p3. He 
later claimed that the "very low growth in public spending 
in real terms demonstrates that this was a time of genuine 
public spending restraint" ((1992) p730). See also Congdon 
(1987); and Thain & Wright (1988) pp3-4.
37 Waugh (1986) p8. See also Congdon (1985).
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"Nobody wants to know the great central truth of 
our time, that there have been no government 
cuts, and the English voter can go on voting for 
them until he is blue in the face, but he is 
never going to get any."
The Conservative Government promised public expenditure
cuts, and in anticipation many attacked the Government for
making cuts. In the words of Jordan and Richardson:38
"... the government had managed to devise a 
remarkable 'no win1 position for itself. It 
trumpeted cuts while delivering increases - 
managing both to frighten client groups and 
antagonize those who sought real reductions."
Since the mid-1980s the Government has given up on
delivering public expenditure cuts, and is now pursuing the
less ambitious aim of controlling rather than reducing the
overall level of public expenditure.39 Furthermore, it is
now not embarrassed to acclaim the increases in public
spending. In the contentious debate on the funding of the
National Health Service, the Government has claimed rightly
that it "has increased spending on the NHS", and "has
vastly increased the resources available to the NHS."40
Second, the problem of aggregation refers to the dangers of
analysing public expenditure as a whole. Public expenditure
includes monies spent by many different government bodies
on many different programmes. It is an aggregated total. As
Rose warned:41
"To measure the totality of government by one 
undifferentiated observation reduces everything 
to a denominator so common that it tells us 
nothing in particular."
38 Jordan & Richardson (1987) p227. See also Riddell-
(1983) pplll-112; and Ridley (1992) pp83-85.
39 See Conservative Party (1992) p6; Johnson (1991)
pl05; and Portillo (1993).
40 Conservative Party (1987a) pl2; and Conservative 
Party (1992) p27.
41 Rose (1984) p5.
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In analysing the trends of public expenditure it is vital 
that analysis takes place at both the aggregated and 
disaggregated level.42 Analysis of only the whole masks 
changes to its parts. For example, though public 
expenditure increased during the 1980s there were 
significant changes to the programmes which made up the 
total of public expenditure. The amount spent on housing 
has been cut significantly, but this cut cannot be detected 
from observing the aggregate of public expenditure because 
it has been offset by increased spending on other programme 
areas (most notably social security, social services, and 
law and order) .43 This problem of aggregation helps explain 
why the debate on public expenditure contains seemingly 
contradictory positions. Those who look at the aggregate of 
public expenditure can point to its growth; but those who 
look at the disaggregates of public expenditure can see 
both growth and cuts depending where they look. The problem 
of aggregation reinforces the problem of perception.
Third, the problem of methodology, which aggravates the 
problem of perception, comes about because there is no 
agreed definition of public expenditure. There are many 
different definitions of public expenditure.44 Mullard 
noted that public expenditure is "a contestable concept”.45
42 See Glennerster (1980b); Hogwood (1992) pp33-60;
Hood & Wright (1981b); Klein (1976) pp423-432; Mullard
(1987); Mullard (1993) ppl3-20; O'Higgins (1983); Rose
(1984); Rose (1985); and Walker (1982).
43 See Congdon (1985); Economic Progress Report (1990) 
ppl-3; HM Treasury (1987a) p21; Hogwood (1992) pp44-58;
Johnson (1991) pp76-106; O'Higgins (1983); Riddell (1983) 
pplll-115; and Short (1984) pp86-88.
44 See Economic Briefing (1991) p4; Heald (1983) ppl2- 
18; Healey (1990) pp401-402; Hogwood (1992) pp34-37; Lawson 
(1992) p295; Likierman (1988) pp5-16; and Pliatzky (1982) 
ppl61—168.
45 Mullard (1987) p2. See also Rose (1980) p3; and 
Wright (1977) pl45.
Pliatzky argued:46
"... different definitions of public expenditure 
have been used over the years and that the choice 
of definition is anything but an academic 
question. It determines what comes within the 
government's expenditure limits, and...how time 
after time Ministers and Departments have fought 
to get round the limits by arguing that 
particular items should not count as public 
expenditure...."
The annual public expenditure round is a highly politicised
exercise where resources are allocated between government
departments.47 Denis Healey, the former Labour Chancellor
of the Exchequer, noted:48
"I could find it in me to forgive the Treasury 
for the inaccuracy of its forecasts, since none 
of the outside organisations did any better. But 
I cannot forgive it, or those politicians who 
preceded me as Chancellor, for misleading the 
Government, the country and the world for so many 
years about the true state of public spending in 
Britain. Indeed I suspect that Treasury officials 
were content to overstate public spending in 
order to put pressure on governments which were 
reluctant to cut it. Government departments are 
liable to present the facts so as to favour their 
institutional interests in the Whitehall 
jungle...."
Definitions of public expenditure are critical in 
determining public expenditure decisions. The present 
Conservative Government treats monies raised from its 
privatisation schemes as negative expenditure, thus giving 
the appearance of reducing public expenditure and thereby 
helping to achieve a major aim of government policy.49 
Until recently governments included locally-financed 
expenditure in their public expenditure 'planning totals', 
which according to Jones, "created an illusion that the
46 Pliatzky (1982) pl61.
47 See Grant (1993) pp79-95; Heclo & Wildavsky (1981); 
Hogwood (1987) ppl29-155; and Jordan & Richardson (1987) 
pp203-232.
48 Healey (1990) p402.
49 See Heald (1991) pp77-80; and Hogwood (1992) p35.
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centre was in control, and should be in control, of this 
expenditure" and consequently confrontation between central 
and local government was "intensified".50 These two 
examples illustrate that there are significant policy 
implications of whatever definition of public expenditure 
is used. Heald stated it "is easy to deride definitional 
debates as being tantamount to counting the number of 
angels which can dance upon a pinhead", but public 
expenditure definitions "have exerted a major influence 
upon both decision processes and substantive outcomes".51
The problem of methodology is further compounded by the
different ways that can be used to measure public
expenditure, however defined.52 Public expenditure can be
measured in monetary terms - either cash terms or real
terms where inflation is discounted. It can be measured
also as a relationship with another variable such as gross
domestic product.53 Notwithstanding these problems of
defining and measuring public expenditure there is the
problem of collecting the relevant data on public
expenditure. Harrison wrote:54
"The record of the Conservative Government from 
1979 onwards is inconveniently scattered among a 
host of official papers, many of them - 
particularly those concerning local government
50 Jones (1987) p69. See also Heald (1991) pp80-90; and 
Hogwood (1992) p35. In 1988 the Conservative Government
announced that locally-financed expenditure was to be 
removed from the public expenditure 'planning total1. See 
HM Treasury (1988); Lawson (1992) p297; Pliatzky (1989)
pp65-71; and Thain & Wright (1990) pll.
51 Heald (1991) pp75, 90.
52 See Edgell & Duke (1986) p235; Edgell & Duke (1991) 
pl24; Hogwood (1992) pp37-38; Jordan & Richardson (1987) 
p223; and Rose (1980).
53 See table 2.1.
54 Harrison (1989) p278. On the public expenditure
plans of the Labour Government in the 1970s see Hughes
(1978).
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finance - either incomprehensible or, where 
apparently comprehensible, misleading.”
The most widely used source of data on public expenditure
were the annual White Papers on public expenditure produced
by the Treasury until the end of the 1980s. However, these
White Papers do not assist analysis because public
expenditure definitions changed which "makes comparison ...
over time almost impossible".55 In their exhaustive study
of public expenditure Thain and Wright argued that because
of these methodological obstacles "an objective assessment
of what has happened over time to the total of public
spending" is "increasingly difficult to make."56
There is a significant problem of methodology in defining
and measuring public expenditure. There is an armoury of
different definitions of public expenditure and different
ways of measuring public expenditure. It is not surprising
that many writers have different perceptions of public
expenditure. Generally those who advocate public
expenditure cuts are those who have charted the rising tide
of public expenditure, and those who argue for increased
public spending are those who have traced cuts in public
expenditure. Each observed trend reinforces the prescribed
remedy on public expenditure, and each prescribed remedy
determines the observed trend of public expenditure. It is
important to know who is measuring public expenditure, and
why, in order to understand fully the picture of public
expenditure. Following Mullard:57
"The concept of public expenditure is problematic 
because, the concept itself is a contestable 
terrain, representing political positions, where 
definers are seeking to gain legitimacy for a 
specific entrenched interest."
Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling are wrong when they wrote
55 Thain & Wright (1990) pll.
56 Thain & Wright (1990) plO.
57 Mullard (1987) ppl-2. See also Mullard (1993) pl2.
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it "is easy to measure votes and opinions, spending and 
taxation, numbers of civil servants...."58 Precisely 
because there are different ways of defining and measuring 
public expenditure, and significant problems in collecting 
and interpreting public expenditure figures, it is very 
difficult to measure public expenditure.
The problems of perception, aggregation and methodology 
pervade much of the literature on public expenditure, and 
explain why much of the debate is confused and confusing. 
It is now possible to focus more specifically on the debate 
on local government spending, which too is haunted by these 
same problems.
The jungle of local government spending
The arguments raging over public expenditure are mirrored 
over local government spending. These arguments constitute 
a theoretical and empirical jungle. It is a theoretical 
jungle because there are a plethora of theoretical 
positions formulated to explain the trends of local 
government spending. It is an empirical jungle because the 
multitude of empirical studies of local government spending 
have produced a confusing variety of observations.
On the theoretical front the debates focus on the desired 
and actual levels of local government spending. The 
prescriptive debates centre on the desired level of local 
government spending. On one side some advocate that local 
government spending is too high and should be cut.59 This
58 Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley & Ling (1988) p27.
59 See Adam Smith Institute (1989) ; Butler & Pirie
(1981); Conservative Party (1979) p8; Conservative Party
(1983) p36; Conservative Party (1987b) pp62-63;
Conservative Party (1992) pp37-38; Cutler (1982);
Department Of The Environment & Welsh Office (1983b); 
Henney (1984); Ilersic (1975); Institute Of Economic
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camp is often supported by the many reports produced by the 
Audit Commission, which for example, asserted that 
'efficiency savings' of nearly £2 billion can be made by 
local authorities in England and Wales.60 On the other side 
some resist the call for spending cuts, and instead argue 
that spending on services should be substantially 
increased.61 This camp often points to the damaging effects 
of spending cuts upon services. During the 1983 general 
election campaign the Labour Party promised to "reverse the 
Tory government's attacks on local authority services."62 
Although these two sides disagree loudly on the desired 
level of spending, they share an important assumption about 
the role of local government in the wider political system. 
Both assume that local government spending is a matter of 
national choice which should be settled within the 
priorities and guidelines laid down by central 
government.63 This assumption is anathema to the many who
Affairs (1980); Leigh-Pemberton (1983); Letwin (1992) 
ppl59-198; Minford (1984); Ridley (1988); Ridley (1992); 
Taylor (1980); Tory Reform Group ((1979); and Walker
(1983) .
60 Taken from HM Treasury (1987a) p23. The Conservative 
Party cited an Audit Commission claim that "some £500 
million a year could be saved if all councils followed the 
practices of the best..." ((1987b) p63; see also Davies
(1988) p99).
61 See Archbishop Of Canterbury's Commission On Urban 
Priority Areas (1985); Cossey (1984); Elliott & McCrone
(1984); Hall (1983); Labour Party (1983); Labour Party 
(1987); Labour Party (1992); Labour Party Research
Department (1979); Liberal Democrats (1992); National 
Steering Committee Against The Cuts (1977); SDP-Liberal 
Alliance (1983); SDP-Liberal Alliance (1987); Services To 
Community Action And Trade Unions (1990); and Whitfield
(1992) .
. / 1 ' !
62 Labour Party (1983) p30.
63 This idea that the level of local government 
spending should be determined nationally is embedded deeply 
in Treasury thinking. See Barlow (1981); Barnett (1982) 
pp74-79; Brittan (1982); Bush (1982) pp4-5; Harrison
(1980); Heclo & Wildavsky (1981) pp232-233, 334, 349-350;
Jackman (1979); Jackson (1982a); Jones & Stewart (1982a);
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argue that the level of spending should be determined by 
local authorities themselves, since local authority 
spending is a matter of local choice not national diktat.64 
This debate over the prescribed level of local government 
spending is relevant not only for its own sake, but more 
important because its arguments have shaped the actual 
level of local government spending.
The descriptive debates centre on the actual level of local 
government spending. There are conflicting views on the 
direction of local government spending. There are three 
general viewpoints within these debates. The first view is 
that local authority spending has been cut, and many 
explanations have been put forward to explain the cuts in 
local government.65 Though the tone of the language shifts 
gently from cuts to standstill, the overall impression 
given is one of financial restraint in local government. 
The second view is that local authority spending has 
increased, and many theories have been devised to explain
Jones & Stewart (1982b); Jones & Stewart (1983a); Jones & 
Stewart (1983c); Jones & Stewart (1985); and Pliatzky
(1982) ppll7-118, 143-144, 189-190.
64 See Committee Of Inquiry Into Local Government 
Finance (1976); Green Party (1987) pl6; Green Party (1992a) 
plO; Green Party (1992b) ppl6-17; Jackman (1978) pp268-271; 
Jackman (1979); Jones & Stewart (1983c); Jones & Stewart
(1985); Labour Party (1987) pll; Labour Party (1992) p21; 
Liberal Democrats (1992) p49; Owen & Steel (1987) pp76-78; 
SDP-Liberal Alliance (1983) p24; and Tiebout (1956).
65 See Baxter & Platt (1991); Bundred (1986); Clarke & 
Cochrane (1989) p48; Duke & Edgell (1986); The Economist 
(1979a); Edgell & Duke (1986); Edgell & Duke (19$1) pp86- 
116; Foster (1981); Gough (1979) ppl30-131; Hall (1983); 
Jackson (1981); Jones & Stewart (1985) ppll-12; Labour 
Party Research Department (1979); Midwinter (1984); 
Midwinter & Page (1981); National Steering Committee 
Against The Cuts (1977) ; National Union Of Public Employees 
(Scotland) (1983); Pickvance (1986); QueenSpark Rates Book 
Group (1983); Travers (1984a); Travers (1985a); and Wright
(1982).
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the growth of local government spending.66 The literature 
of these two viewpoints offer contradictory accounts of 
local government spending, though to a certain extent these 
views can be reconciled if the methodology of how these 
studies measured local government spending is understood. 
Unfortunately, in many cases the methodology was rarely 
explained, and at best was quietly footnoted. As a result 
a very confusing and vague picture emerges of local 
government spending. To a certain extent whether local 
authority has increased or decreased depends on the 
literature read. The third view is a more sophisticated 
account of local government spending, and looks at the 
increasingly hostile financial environment in which local 
authorities make spending decisions.67 This camp looks at 
the intensifying pressures upon local authorities to both 
increase and decrease their spending. These complex 
pressures are felt differently by different local 
authorities in different services at different times. The 
spending of local authorities is the outcome of these 
competing pressures and not the product of a single upward 
or downward trend of spending. Overall, these three general
66 See Benington (1976) ; Committee Of Inquiry Into 
Local Government Finance (1976) ppl4-16; Confederation Of 
British Industry (1980); Dunleavy (1980) pp57-59; Dunleavy
(1984) pp50-56; Foster, Jackman & Perlman (1980) pp77-128; 
Henney (1984) pp55-104; Jackman (1984) pp89-96; Jackman
(1985); Jackson (1973); Jones (1979); King (1980) pp7-10; 
Letwin (1992) ppl65-167; Meadows (1987) p32; Newton (1985); 
Rhodes (1988) p248; Ridley (1988); Royal Commission On 
Local Government In England (1969) pl30; Sandford (1984) 
pp244-246; Thatcher (1993) p643; Travers (1987a); Travers 
(1987d); Travers (1988); Travers (1992); and Walker (1983). 
Indeed, in its recent general election manifesto, the 
Conservative Government could only boast that it had 
prevented "unjustified rises" in local government spending 
(Conservative Party (1992) p37).
67 See Bennett (1988); Boddy (1984); Boyne (1988); 
Cockburn (1977) pp62-66; Greenwood (1981); Greenwood 
(1982b); Hepworth (1980); Jackson, Meadows & Taylor (1982); 
Newton (1980); Newton (1981a); Newton & Karran (1985); Page
(1986); Rose & Page (1982b); Walsh (1988); and Wolman
(1983) .
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viewpoints provide competing and conflicting observations 
and explanations about local government spending, and the 
picture is one of theoretical confusion.
On the empirical front it is impossible to say precisely 
how much local authorities spend. Following Travers, it ”is 
no longer possible to be precise about what local 
authorities spend, either individually or in total”.68 This 
disturbing state of affairs becomes clear when a comparison 
is made between different observations of local government 
spending. Apart from academics, there are several bodies 
who need to measure how much local authorities spend. The 
Treasury measures local government spending to determine 
its public expenditure plans; the Department of the 
Environment measures local government spending to calculate 
and distribute its grants to local authorities; the Central 
Statistical Office (CSO) measures local government spending 
to record its trends; and the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) measures local government 
spending to provide information to the finance profession 
in local government. The table below outlines how each of 
these four bodies measured the spending of local 
authorities in England in 1984/85.69
Table 2.2: Four Measurements of Local Government 
Spending. 1984/85
Revenue 
£m
Treasury . 25,168
DOE 32,840
68 Travers (1986a) plOlO.
69 The financial year, 1984/85, is chosen because it 
corresponds to the year on which this research focused in 
examining spending cuts in four local authorities.
Capital
£m
3,736
5,852
Total
£m
28,904
38,692
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CSO 36,455 4,728 n/a
CIPFA 25,423 3,628 32,274*
* The amount that local authorities spend in total as 
calculated by CIPFA cannot be measured simply by 
adding the amount of revenue and capital spending.
Source: Central Statistical Office (1987); Chartered 
Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy (1991c); 
Department Of The Environment (1986); and HM Treasury 
(1987b)
These four measurements of local government spending in the 
same year are incredible given the substantial differences 
between them. According to the Central Statistical Office 
local authorities spend well over £10,000 million more than 
that measured by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance 
and Accountancy, and nearly £10,000 million more than that 
measured by the Treasury. Furthermore, the Department of 
the Environment calculated that the revenue spending of 
local authorities in 1984/85 amounted to over £32,000 
million, but a few pages later it cited a figure of over 
£39,000 million.70 This example illustrates the dangers of 
blindly using these widely cited spending figures without 
understanding how these figures have been calculated.71 
This danger perhaps partly explains why Likierman and 
Byrne, cited earlier, provided wildly different figures on 
how much local authorities spend.
If, as Travers maintained, reliable statistics are ”a 
cornerstone of liberal democracy", then whether local 
democracy exists or not in Britain becomes a troublesome 
issue because of the lack of accurate statistics on local , t<*
70 Department Of The Environment (1986) pp6, 38.
71 Hampton's book is one of the few textbooks on local 
government that actually discusses in any depth the vexed 
issue of methodology of measuring local government spending 
((1991) pp93-95).
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government spending.72 The compilation of local authority
spending data is riddled with problems, which raise doubts
over their overall accuracy. Whatever way is used to
measure local authority spending there are considerable
difficulties in collecting the appropriate information.
Furthermore, the reliability of existing spending data is
diminished because some information is simply not
available. Travers noted:73
"...the quality of the information flowing from 
local to central government has badly 
deteriorated. Many authorities' published 
spending figures are quite different from their 
actual expenditure on staff and services. Much 
information is deliberately kept out of sight of 
civil servants."
The Conservative Government's repeated attacks on local
government provoked many local authorities, particularly
Labour-controlled local authorities, to either withhold or
distort information on their spending given to central
government.74 They saw little gain in giving information to
central government if it was used to attack them. They
wanted to provide figures which created "a favourable
financial environment within the Government's rules."75 As
a result, the spending figures produced by the Treasury,
Department of the Environment, and even the Chartered
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy needed to be
treated with extreme caution because there are information
gaps in the way they measure local government spending.76
Travers believed that this "statistical picture is a
72 Travers (1986a) pl012.
73 Travers. (1985b) pl6.
74 For example, Labour-controlled Knowsley MBC, fearing 
government reprisals over creative accounting, refused to 
give information to the Audit Commission (Chief Executive, 
Knowsley MBC).
75 Travers (1986a) pl012.
76 See Edgell & Duke (1991) p99; and Travers (1986a).
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mess."77 These pitfalls of obtaining reliable spending data 
should not be ignored. There is no purpose served by 
minimising these data problems as do Newton and Karran, who 
believed that "local financial statistics in the UK 
comprise a highly reliable and valid data set."78 They do 
not. Instead, the picture of local government spending is 
one of empirical confusion.
There is much confusion over local government spending 
stemming from a jungle of literature which presents a 
muddled and indeed contradictory accounts of how much local 
authorities spend. This confusion is both theoretical and 
empirical, and as a result debates on local government 
spending are often misunderstood. It is important to define 
local authority spending in order to understand what 
happened to local government spending.
DEFINING LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Given the dangers of misunderstanding local government 
spending it is vital that local government spending is 
clearly defined in order to understand the making of 
spending cuts in local government. The questions of what 
constitutes local government spending, and consequently 
what is a spending cut will now be addressed. Local 
authority spending depends on what is being measured, how 
it is measured, and when it is measured. These three 
different but related factors will determine the extent and 
nature of spending cuts in local government.
77 Travers (1986a) pl012.
78 Newton & Karran (1985) pl36.
What local authority spending is measured
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What is being measured is of critical importance in 
calculating whether local authority spending has been cut 
or not. Following Rose, whether "public spending is said to 
be rising or falling is a matter of definition, not 
fact".79 There are many different types of local authority 
spending, and therefore as many different types of spending 
cut. At the time of the financial year, 1984/85, there were 
at least 15 different types of local authority expenditure, 
which were the following:80
(a) gross expenditure - aggregated expenditure on 
the provision of local authority services
(b) net expenditure - gross expenditure less 
specific service income (eg specific and 
supplementary grants, fees and charges for 
services, capital receipts)
79 Rose (1980) p3.
80 Mainly taken from Association Of County Councils
(1985) ppl5-25; Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1985a) pp3-4; Chartered Institute Of
Public Finance And Accountancy (1984a); Chartered Institute 
Of Public Finance And Accountancy (1984b); Chartered 
Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy (1984c) pp85- 
92; Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy 
(1987) ppll9-127; Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And 
Accountancy (1991b) ppl94-202; Chartered Institute Of
Public Finance And Accountancy (1992) pp207-215; Douglas & 
Lord (1986) pp61-65; National Audit Office (1985) pp26-27; 
Newton & Karran (1985) ppl31-133; Pickstock (1993) pp89-92; 
and Travers (1986b). There are sometimes different 
definitions of the same type of local authority expenditure 
- see Edgell & Duke (1991) p98; and Travers (1986a) pl012. 
Some of these types of local authority expenditure have 
been abandoned as local government finance has been 
restructured. For example, in April 1986 the system of 
expenditure targets and grant penalties was disbanded; in 
April 1990 the standard spending assessment replaced the 
grant-related expenditure assessment in the calculation of 
grant to local authorities and the system of capital 
expenditure controls was also changed - however, both 
expenditure guidance, grant-related expenditure and 
prescribed expenditure were prominent features of local 
authority spending during the period upon which this 
research is focused.
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(c) revenue expenditure - expenditure on the day- 
to-day running costs incurred in providing 
services (eg wages and salaries, debt charges)
(d) rate-borne expenditure - revenue expenditure 
financed from rates (and precepts)
(e) grant-borne expenditure - revenue expenditure 
financed from grant
(f) section 137 expenditure - expenditure 
incurred under section 137 of the Local
Government Act 1972 for the benefit of 
inhabitants that is not authorised under other 
statutory powers
(g) capital expenditure - expenditure on the 
acquisition of assets (eg land, buildings)
(h) relevant expenditure - revenue expenditure 
accepted by central government for grant support
(i) current expenditure - relevant expenditure 
less net financing items (eg debt charges, 
contributions to housing revenue account)
(j) total expenditure - relevant expenditure less 
income from specific and supplementary grants and 
other adjustments made by central government
(k) grant-related expenditure - revenue 
expenditure assessed by central government to 
provide a common standard of service
(1) expenditure guidance - expenditure target set 
by central government within which net 
expenditure must fall to avoid grant penalty
(m) expenditure level - maximum legal limit of 
revenue expenditure of a rate-capped local 
authority set by central government
(n) prescribed expenditure - capital expenditure 
as defined by central government subject to 
capital spending controls
(o) non-prescribed expenditure - capital 
expenditure not prescribed by central government 
and not subject to capital spending controls
To examine spending cuts in local government it is 
necessary to, look at only those expenditures which 
approximate the reality and totality of local authority
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spending. Many of the above types of expenditures do not 
correspond to the reality and totality of local authority 
spending. These types will be briefly discussed before 
examining in more detail the remaining types of local 
authority expenditure.
Several types of expenditure do not reflect the reality of 
local authority spending but are versions of a reality that 
central government would have liked to have seen. For 
example, relevant expenditure, current expenditure, total 
expenditure, grant-related expenditure, expenditure 
guidance, expenditure level, prescribed expenditure and 
non-prescribed expenditure were spending constructs made by 
central government, and though they shaped the spending of 
local authorities they had little resemblance to the 
actuality of local authority spending. The Conservative 
Government used these measures of spending to make its 
public expenditure plans; to calculate and distribute block 
grant and capital block authorisations amongst local 
authorities; and, more important, to control local 
authority spending. These expenditure types were 
constructed for purposes other than measuring local 
authority spending. They must be therefore disregarded as 
ways of analysing spending cuts in local government, 
because they did not reflect the reality of local authority 
spending.
Most of the remaining types of expenditure, though 
capturing the reality, do not measure the totality of local 
authority spending. Each of these types captures only a 
partial view of local government spending. Many of these 
expenditure types are defined by the way the expenditure is 
financed. For example, rate-borne expenditure was that 
financed from rates (and precepts); grant-borne expenditure 
from grant; and section 137 expenditure from monies raised 
as if a 'twopenny rate' were levied. These three types of 
local authority expenditure are defined by how they were
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financed, and thus exclude huge chunks of local authority 
spending. These types of local authority should therefore 
be discarded for the purposes of examining spending cuts in 
local government. Similarly, central government used 
current, relevant and total expenditure figures in its 
public expenditure plans and grant calculations, but each 
of these measures disregards particular items of 
expenditure such as debt charges and spending financed by 
specific grants. Again, these types of expenditure capture 
only a partial picture of local authority spending.
One type of local authority expenditure which is commonly 
used is net expenditure. Net expenditure is the expenditure 
of a local authority less its specific income (that is, 
monies received as specific and supplementary grants, and 
monies raised in fees and charges for services) ,81 It is 
used by both central government and local authorities 
because they want to calculate how much local authority 
spending should be financed from national taxation and 
local taxation. At the time of this research, central 
government wanted to know how much rate support grant was 
needed to finance local authority spending, and the level 
of rates and precepts planned by local authorities before 
deciding what local authorities were to be rate-capped. 
Local authorities wanted to know how much they were going 
to receive in rate support grant from central government 
and how much they were prepared to raise by levying a rate 
or issuing a precept before deciding how much they were 
going to spend.82 As a result of these calculations, net 
spending of local authorities is a key determinant of 
financing and expenditure decisions, and therefore features
81 See Danziger (1978b) p59.
82 Under the Local Government Finance Act 1988 the rate 
support grant was replaced by the revenue support grant, 
domestic rates were replaced by the community charge, and 
non-domestic rates were set by central government; and 
under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 the community 
charge was replaced by the council tax.
54
prominently in documentation produced by both central and 
local government. As a result of their prominence net 
spending figures are often mistakenly used by academics as 
measures of local authority spending. For example, Duke and 
Edgell continually use net spending of local authorities in 
their analysis of spending cuts in local government.83 But 
net expenditure excludes those expenditures financed from 
specific service income, and therefore is not a valid 
measure of local authority spending. It is important not to 
focus on cuts in net spending because these cuts would 
include monies raised from increased fees and charges for 
services and extra monies from specific grants.
The four local authorities - Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, 
Knows ley MBC, and Stockport MBC - were more concerned to 
cut their net spending than gross spending, because they 
would receive more block grant from central government and 
keep down the level of rates and precepts. Net spending can 
be cut by either reducing the amount spent or raising extra 
revenue from specific service income. Below is a table 
showing how the four local authorities budgeted to cut 
their net spending in 1984/85.
Table 2.3: Net Spending Cuts of Four Local 
Authorities. 1984/85
Committee Reduced spending Increased income
£k £k
BEDFORDSHIRE CC
Education 860.0
Employment 5.0 -
Environmental Services 15.5 47.5
Leisure 110.0 28.0
Policy & Resources 86.9 45.0
Public Protection 71.3 -
Social Services 217.0 76.0
Other 1940.0 100.0
83 See Duke & Edgell (1986); Edgell & Duke (1986); and 
Edgell & Duke (1991) pp86-138.
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TOTAL* 3305.7 296.5
KENT CC
Amenities & Countryside 17.2
Education 8522.4
Fire & Public Protection 393.0
Planning & Transportation 2392.8
Police 414.3
Policy & Resources 944.8
Social Services 1290.7
285.6 
12.6
401.4
525.7
184.8
983.5
TOTAL* 13975.2 2393.6
KNOWSLEY MBC 
Economic & Development 
Education 
Financial Control 
General Purposes 
Housing & Environmental 
Health**
Leisure
Manpower & Management 
Services 
Policy & Resources 
Social Services 
Technical Services
35.1 
848.5
88.5
49.5
46.1 
30.0
14
8
365
239
27.1
30.0
30.0
18.3
64.1
TOTAL* 1796.1 169.5
STOCKPORT MBC 
Development Services 
Education
Environmental Health & 
Control 
Highways 
Housing**
Policy & Resources 
Recreation & Culture 
Social Services
120.0
7.3
85.2
96.1
47.4 
0.2 
0.4 
2.5
39.5
TOTAL*
GRAND TOTAL*
127.3
19204.3
271.2
3130.8
* The figures may not add up to the total figures 
because of rounding up and down'. Total figures include 
some reductions where one committee transfers a 
spending cut to another committee - one committee's 
spending cut is another committee's extra spending. 
These reductions are few and small, and therefore do 
not change significantly the general picture.
** The figures relating to the housing revenue account 
have been excluded.
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Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and
Stockport MBC
The above table shows the four local authorities together 
cut their net spending by over £22 million. However, over 
£3 million was cut by increased specific service income - 
that is, increased fees and charges for services, and 
grants given to local authorities mainly by central 
government to finance specified services. For example, 
increased fees and charges for services constituted 56 per 
cent of net spending cuts made by Kent CC's Police 
Committee, 75 per cent by Bedfordshire CC's Environmental 
Services Committee, and 100 per cent by Stockport MBC's 
Development Services Committee and Environmental Health and 
Control Committee. Knowsley MBC's Leisure Committee 
received extra Urban Aid monies from central government, 
and thus cut its net spending accordingly (but not its 
gross spending). Overall, increased specific service income 
accounted for about 14 per cent of net spending cuts made 
by the four local authorities. These types of spending cuts 
confuse the reality of local authority spending, because 
they are not cuts in actual spending but increased revenues 
of the local authorities. In order to understand why local 
authorities cut spending it is important to understand how 
their spending is financed, but to understand how much 
local authorities cut spending it is important to examine 
all items of spending regardless of how they are 
financed.84 This research on the making of spending cuts in 
local government focuses on gross spending and not net 
spending of local authorities.
84 Gross spending of local authorities will always 
exceed their net spending; and cuts in net spending will 
always exceed cuts in gross spending. It is important that 
the terms - gross or net - are clarified in order to 
prevent a misleading picture of local authority spending 
being given.
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However, it is not a straightforward exercise to measure 
local authority spending in gross terms. Following Travers, 
"figures showing gross revenue spending by local 
authorities can only be constructed with considerable
effort, and then only at the estimates stage."85 There are
two significant complications in calculating the gross 
expenditure of local authorities - the distinction between 
revenue and capital spending, and the practice of creative 
accounting. These two financing and accounting
complications distort the real picture of local authority
spending, and will now be examined.
First, local authority expenditure can be divided into 
revenue and capital expenditure. Revenue expenditure is 
that spending on short-life items such as wages and 
salaries; and capital expenditure is that spending on long­
life items such as the building of roads. Though this 
distinction is blurred, local authorities must prepare both 
revenue and capital budgets because each type of 
expenditure is subject to different financing and control 
mechanisms. At the time of the research, revenue spending 
was financed from rates, government grants and charges. The 
level of revenue spending was shaped by local authorities 
in determining their level of rates and charges, and by 
central government in controlling the distribution of 
grants to local authorities and in limiting the spending of 
selected rate-capped local authorities. Capital spending 
was financed from loans, capital receipts, grants and 
revenue contributions. The level of capital spending was 
controlled by central government in authorising such 
spending and in restricting the use of capital receipts. 
The different ways of financing and controlling revenue and 
capital spending require local authorities to separate them 
for budgeting and accounting purposes. Nevertheless, it is 
not possible simply to add together gross revenue and
85 Travers (1986a) plOlO.
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capital spending to find out how much local authorities are 
spending. This addition cannot be made because there would 
be much double-counting of certain items of spending. For 
example, debt charges comprise revenue repayments of the 
loans borrowed to finance capital spending, and constitute 
a significant amount of revenue spending.86 It would not be 
very useful to deduct debt charges from revenue spending 
and then add capital spending to calculate the total level 
of gross spending of local authorities. The reason is that 
there is a nebulous link between the amount of debt charges 
paid and the amount spent on the capital programme in any 
given year. Debt charges of one year include repayments for 
loans used to finance capital projects which were completed 
in previous years.
Second, creative accounting was widely practised by local 
authorities in the 1980s.87 Smith noted:88
86 In 1984/85 debt charges accounted for over 7 per 
cent of gross revenue expenditure of English local 
authorities (taken from Chartered Institute Of Public 
Finance And Accountancy (1991b) p8).
87 See Arnold-Forster (1993) ; Audit Commission For 
Local Authorities In England And Wales (1984g); Audit 
Commission For Local Authorities In England And Wales 
(1985a); Bailey & Galloway (1993); Barclay (1985); 
Blackburn (1986); Blunkett & Jackson (1987) ppl89-190, 229- 
231; Brown (1987); Chandler (1991) pp70-71; Clarke &
Cochrane (1989) pp51-56; Cochrane (1993) pp36-37; Cook
(1993) ppll, 78, 158, 159-160; Cope (1987) pp95-96; Cross
(1986); Cross (1990); Cumbria County Council (1985); Davies 
(1987b); Davis-Coleman (1986); Dillon (1985); Douglas & 
Lord (1986) pp38-39; The Economist (1986); Elcock (1991) 
ppl46-149; Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) ppl08-lll; 
Gray & Jenkins (1991) pp457-458; Hale (1988); Hodge (1987); 
Ibrahim & Proctor (1992b) p51; Jacobs (1983); Jacobs
(1984); Jones (1990/91) pl95; King (1993) p201; Letwin
(1992) ppl83-184; Local Government Chronicle (1988);
Loughlin (1990); Loughlin (1991); Midwinter (1988) pp25-26; 
Miller (1987b); Miller (1989); Miller (1991); Morley
(1986); Murray (1987); National Audit Office (1985) ppl6- 
17; Nicholson (1988); Parkinson (1985b) ppll7-120; 
Parkinson (1986); Pipe (1984); Pipe (1985); Platt (1987); 
Platt S (1988); Smith (1987); Smith (1988a); Smith (1988b); 
Stoker (1988) ppl66-168; Stoker (1991) ppl74-176; Taylor
(1987); Travers (1985b); Travers (1986b) pl33; Travis
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"Accountants have by tradition always attempted 
a 'true and fair' representation of the finances 
of an organisation. However, we have recently 
witnessed the rise of 'creative* accounting in 
English local government, in which artificial - 
but perfectly legitimate - accounting devices are 
employed to enhance a local authority*s financial 
position."
Creative accounting cannot be defined by the accounting 
methods used, but by the intentions behind the deployment 
of these methods. It is, according to Pipe, "the 
manipulation of accounting data for political purposes."89 
Creative accounting is a set of lawful accounting devices 
designed to circumvent the spending controls imposed on 
local authorities by central government, thus allowing 
local authorities to maximise their grant entitlement and 
to minimise their rate bills, poll tax bills and now their 
council tax bills. Many creative accounting devices have 
subsequently been outlawed by the Conservative Government 
as part of its policy of curbing local authority 
spending.90 At the time of this research, however, local 
authorities used creative accounting as a highly 
significant way of avoiding making spending cuts. Smith 
observed that the increased grant gained from creative 
accounting was "so large as to dwarf all but the most 
dramatic savings gained from 'efficiency* measures."91 All
(1989); Webster (1985a); Webster (1985b); Wolman (1982a) 
p83; and Wolman (1986).
88 Smith (1988a) pl73.
89 Pipe (1985) pl333. Lehman and Tinker rejected the 
portrayal of accounting as "a passive information service, 
dedicated to faithfully reporting on economic reality" 
((1987) p503). Instead they stressed "the significance of 
accounting as a political activity" ((1987) p519). All 
accounting, then, is creative accounting.
90 See Cook (1993) p78; Hale (1988); Jones (1990/91) 
pl95; Letwin (1992) pl84; Local Government Chronicle
(1988); Loughlin (1990) pp383-388; Miller (1991); and
Stoker (1991) ppl75-176.
91 Smith (1988a) pl83.
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of the four local authorities studied - Bedfordshire CC, 
Kent CC, Knowsley MBC, and Stockport MBC - practised
creative accounting to varying degrees. Creative accounting 
generally distorted the picture of local authority
spending, as can be seen in the following discussion of
three creative accounting techniques.
(i) Special funds - all four local authorities established
special funds as a way of circumventing the spending
controls imposed by central government. For example, in
1983/84 Stockport MBC established the Renewal and Repairs
Fund as a way of maximising grant entitlement in future
years.92 This practice was indeed widespread in local
government in the 1980s. The Audit Commission observed:93
"General use of targets and penalties has brought 
additional uncertainties for members and officers 
to take into account when planning more than one 
year ahead. In the main they have responded 
rationally to these uncertainties by seeking to 
create a financial cushion against them. The 
result has been that rates over the past three 
years have probably been higher than they 
need...."
The reason why the creation of special funds helped local 
authorities to protect their finances is that when money 
was set aside as a fund in one year it was treated as 
expenditure in that year even though the money had not been 
spent in that year. When this money was taken out of the 
fund in subsequent years it was treated as income in these 
years even though the money was being spent, and therefore 
attracted no grant penalties. Thus, monies in one year were 
counted as spending when not spent, but counted as income 
when actually spent. The use of special funds, then, 
allowed local authorities to maximise their block grant 
1 entitlement. Given the financial cushion that funds offered 
it is not surprising that councillors in Knowsley MBC
92 Assistant Director of Finance, Stockport MBC.
93 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1984g) p27.
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referred to them as "cocoa-tins"
(ii) Capitalisation - as mentioned earlier, a distinction 
is made between revenue and capital expenditure because of 
the different financing and control mechanisms that exist. 
Capitalisation is the practice of transferring expenditure 
normally financed on the revenue side to the capital side. 
Many local authorities, including Knowsley MBC, moved items 
of spending from their revenue budgets to their capital 
programmes.95 For example, Knowsley MBC's Technical 
Services Committee cut its revenue spending by transferring 
wages paid to staff working on capital projects amounting 
to £30,000 from its revenue budget to its capital 
programme. As a result of capitalisation the Council was 
able to increase its block grant entitlement because it 
reduced revenue spending and therefore attracted less grant 
penalty, despite the fact that no spending was actually cut 
since what was lost to revenue was gained by capital. 
Capitalisation of revenue spending is possible because of 
the fuzzy distinction between revenue and capital 
expenditure.96 Whether an item of spending is revenue (and 
lasts for a short period of time) or capital (and lasts for 
a longer period of time) is not always clear. Many councils 
argue successfully that spending on repairs, maintenance 
and staff working on capital projects, which has been 
traditionally seen as revenue expenditure, is capital 
expenditure and therefore can be capitalised.
(iii) Rescheduling of debt - another common method of 
creative accounting which reduces revenue spending in the 
short term is the rescheduling of debt. Local authorities
94 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
95 Borough Treasurer, Knowsley MBC; Director of Leisure 
Services, Knowsley MBC; and Principal Officer, County 
Treasurer's Department, Lancashire CC.
96 See Cook (1993) pl58; Hampton (1991) p93; Hepworth
(1984) p9; Jackman (1984) p96; and Travers (1986b) p!41.
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may reschedule their debt so that debt charges are reduced 
in the short term but increased in the longer term. For 
example, both Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC rescheduled their 
debt to reduce their revenue spending in 1984/84.97 Indeed, 
Bedfordshire CC rescheduled its debt and cut its spending 
by £1 million. This rescheduling of debt reduced the amount 
of revenue spending, and therefore maximised block grant 
entitlement and prevented any precept increase.
These three methods of creative accounting blur the real 
picture of local authority spending. The Audit Commission 
argued that "the true level of local government expenditure 
has been obscured" by creative accounting.98 It is 
important when measuring the spending of local authorities 
to be aware of these creative accounting devices which 
generally conceal the reality of local authority spending. 
With special funds it is necessary to disregard 
contributions to and from these funds. Though monies in a 
fund are counted as having been spent for accounting 
purposes it should be counted as income for the purposes of 
this research on spending cuts in local government. With 
capitalisation and the rescheduling of debt these methods 
reinforce the need to separate revenue spending and capital 
spending. Their separation allows the identification of 
these transfers and shifts of money between and within 
their budgets.
Finally, if spending cuts in local government are to be 
fully understood it is necessary to look at budgeted 
spending of local authorities. It is only when budgets of 
local authorities are examined that the decisions to cut
97 Deputy Leader, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC; 
County Treasurer, Bedfordshire CC; and Deputy County 
Treasurer, Kent CC.
98 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1984g) p26. See also National Audit Office
(1985) pl7; Pipe (1984); and Travers (1987b) pl5.
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revenue spending can be highlighted. The financial accounts 
of local authorities record spending under general account 
headings only, and spending decisions are thus bundled 
together. It would be a byzantine exercise to trace these 
decisions within these broad headings. To examine the 
decisions to cut spending it is then necessary to turn to 
the budgeted and not the actual spending figures of local 
authorities. These decisions to cut spending can be traced 
easily by scrutinising the budgets of local authorities. 
Though the spending cuts contained in a budget are only 
planned cuts there is sufficient evidence to show that a 
budget is a close approximation of the actual outturn of a 
local authority. This close approximation should not be 
surprising given that the purposes of budgeting include the 
forecasting and controlling of spending.99 Following 
Wildavsky:100
"In the most literal sense a budget is a 
document, containing words and figures, which 
proposes expenditures for certain items and 
purposes.... Presumably, those who make a budget 
intend that there will be a direct connection 
between what is written in it and future events.
Hence we might conceive of a budget as intended 
behavior, as a prediction."
There was a high correlation between the budgeted and
actual spending in the four local authorities studied, as
can be seen from the table below which compares their
budget and outturn figures of 1984/85.
Table 2 . 4 ;  Budgeted and Actual Spending of Four Local 
Authorities. 1 9 8 4 / 8 5
99 See Audit Commission, Local Government Training 
Board & Institute Of Local Government Studies ( 1 9 8 5 )  p p 3 0 -  
3 4 ;  Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy 
( 1 9 9 2 )  P P 1 1 8 - 1 4 0 ;  Cook ( 1 9 9 3 )  p p 3 3 - 6 4 ;  Hepworth ( 1 9 8 4 )
p p 2 0 9 - 2 2 0 ;  Marshall ( 1 9 7 4 )  p p 4 9 - 1 0 8 ;  and Rawlinson & Tanner
( 1 9 8 9 )  p p 4 8 - 5 7 .
i°° wildavsky (1964) pi.
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Budcret Outturn Variation
£m £m %
Bedfordshire CC 242.0 248.3 +2.6
Kent CC 627.7 647.5 +3.2
Knowsley MBC 124.3 124.9 +0.5
Stockport MBC 172.8 172.6 -0.1
TOTAL 1166.8 1193.3 +2.3
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and 
Stockport MBC
This table shows that there is only a small variation 
between the budgeted spending of the four local authorities 
and their actual spending.101 The variation between budget 
and outturn is best explained by overspending or 
underspending on certain items rather than significant 
failure to implement any decisions to cut spending. In 
particular, Kent CC overspent its budget because it 
increased spending because of "the severe winter 
conditions" and "policing the miners dispute".102 Though 
some quantitative accuracy is lost in looking at budgeted 
spending, this disadvantage is far outweighed by the 
advantage of looking at specific decisions to cut spending. 
Nonetheless, there are two difficulties in measuring and 
comparing local authority budgets.
The first difficulty is the practice of creative budgeting.
Larkey and Smith wrote:103
"Government budgets are premised on forecasts of 
revenues and expenditures. These forecasts are 
subject to both stochastic error and strategic 
manipulation. Circumstantial evidence in the 
budgeting literature and in the popular media 
suggest that government officials routinely bias
101 This close approximation is mirrored by Sharpe and 
Newton's study of 30 local authorities ((1984) p222).
102 Taken from Kent CC's Annual Report 1984-85. p5.
103 Larkey & Smith (1989) pl23.
the forecasts underlying budgets.”
There is some evidence to suggest that local authorities 
manipulate the presentation of their budgets for reasons 
other than forecasting and controlling spending. Smith 
noted:1M
”The budget is supposed to reflect the policies 
and priorities of the authority, as well as 
determining the revenue the authority needs to 
raise from local sources. Yet it now serves a 
crucial additional purpose. It not only 
determines the grant entitlement in the current 
year - it also creates a base for future grant 
entitlement and rate-capping qualification.”
In making a budget a local authority has to make certain
assumptions about its revenues and expenditures - for
example, on how much revenue can be raised to finance
spending, on the demands on service provision, and on the
costs of service provision. There are times when it may be
in the interests of a local authority to make unrealistic
assumptions about these matters. Parkinson observed:105
"Treasurers can ... affect the shape of revenue 
budgets by making more or less optimistic 
assumptions about the way their budgets will 
eventually turn out. In general, for an authority 
facing penalties, it is better to be optimistic 
about the extent to which spending can be 
contained. If it runs beyond the original 
predictions, the Department [of the Environment] 
will eventually claw back the excess grant by 
withholding it in future years when the accounts 
are closed. But since the records may take two 
years to complete, this at least means that the 
authority has had the advantage of the grant and 
the interest earned upon it in the meantime."
An example of an optimistic assumption that was fed into
Kent CC's revenue budget of 1984/85 was the decision by the
Social Services Committee to implement the proposals on
restructuring the Social Services Department put forward by
the management ^consultancy firm, Arthur Andersen. The
101 Smith (1988b) pl3. See also Smith (1987) p897; and 
Stoker (1991) pl77.
105 Parkinson (1986) p29. See also Wolman & Peterson 
(1981) p779.
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Committee assumed that spending would be cut by £80,000 by 
implementing these proposals. However, from the outset the 
Department realised that these savings could never be made, 
but in order to find its share of spending cuts and to 
justify the decision to use management consultants it 
"massaged the figures".106 The budgeted saving was "the 
biggest bit of window-dressing and bullshit in the budget 
proposals".107 Both the Committee and the Department had no 
intention of implementing the Arthur Andersen proposals - 
their implementation was not monitored; and another 
management consultancy firm, Arthur Young, was later
commissioned to make recommendations on the restructuring 
of the Department.108 This budgeted spending cut was based 
on a "highly spurious" assumption, and is an example of 
creative budgeting.109
The second difficulty is the problem of comparing budgets
between services and between local authorities. Local
authorities adopt different ways of presenting budgets.110 
For example, there are differences between local 
authorities on what constitutes 'above-the-line1 and 
'below-the-line1 expenditures which makes comparison 
difficult. Bedfordshire CC treated the spending cuts
106 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC.
107 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC.
108 Chairman, Social Services Committee, Kent CC; 
Chairman, Finance and Review Group, Kent CC; Assistant 
Director of Social Services, Kent CC; and Senior Partner, 
Arthur Young.
109 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC..
i >
110 Since this research there have been moves to 
standardise the accounting and budgeting procedures of 
local authorities - see Chartered Institute Of Public 
Finance And Accountancy (1991a);; Cook (1993) pp64-83; Cook, 
Dunn, Ogley & Beckerleg (1985); Rogers (1984); Tanner
(1984) ; and Whiteoak & Cook (1986) . This problem of 
comparison is also noted in a study of Canadian 
municipalities - see Krause & Price (1986) pp58-59.
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resulting from the rescheduling of debt as 'below-the-line* 
- that is, they were not apportioned between the budgets of 
committees; but Kent CC treated them as 'above-the-line1 - 
that is, they were apportioned between the budgets of 
committees. If, say, the education budgets of the two local 
authorities are compared then it would appear that Kent CC 
was making more cuts than Bedfordshire CC, other things 
being equal.
Notwithstanding these two difficulties of measuring and 
comparing local authority budgets, given that there is a 
minimal 'implementation gap* between the budgeted and 
actual spending of local authorities, it is vital to focus 
on budgeted spending cuts because decisions to cut spending 
can be easily identified and therefore examined. Danziger 
noted:1,1
"There are important research advantages to 
treating the budget as the decisional output: (1) 
the budget is seen as a single statement of a 
complex of interdependent resource allocations;
(2) the output is recorded clearly and publicly;
(3) it is itemized in great detail; (4) its 
recorded form alters little from year to year;
(5) it is serial (the process and output repeat 
in each budget period) ; (6) it is expressed in
terms of a single measurement dimension 
(currency); and (7) the indicators are an 
interval measurement scale."
However, it is only vital to focus on budgeted revenue
spending decisions. Capital spending is different from
revenue spending. As well as being financed and controlled
differently, capital expenditure consists generally of
spending on one-off schemes, such as the building of roads,
but revenue spending consists generally of spending on
recurring commitments, such as the payment of wages and
salaries. Cuts in capital spending involve generally the
postponement and possibly the cancellation of capital
projects. Once a capital scheme has been completed it is
usually financed on the revenue side. A local authority may
1,1 Danziger (1978b) pl5.
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spend capital money on building a home for the elderly, but 
once built it spends revenue money on running the home. 
Thus, capital spending cuts are generally cuts in planned 
and not actual capital projects. Both Bedfordshire CC and 
Kent CC, for example, had to defer their planned capital 
schemes. No capital scheme was actually cut. In contrast, 
cuts in revenue spending are actual cuts because an expense 
that would otherwise have been incurred is no longer 
incurred. Cuts in capital spending are very different from 
cuts in revenue spending. Because capital spending is 
essentially non-recurring it is necessary to examine actual 
capital spending and not budgeted capital spending of local 
authorities.112 With the exception of capital spending, 
therefore, it is necessary to examine budgeted spending of 
local authorities.
The examination of spending cuts in local government, then, 
requires the analysis of gross spending of local 
authorities, of revenue and capital spending of local 
authorities, and of budgeted revenue spending and actual 
capital of local authorities.
How local authority spending is measured
Generally local authority expenditure can be presented 
either in absolute or relative terms, of which the absolute 
form of measurement is more widely used. The most common 
absolute yardstick is money. Notwithstanding the 
considerable problem that what is being measured cannot 
always be converted into money terms, absolute measures are 
not dependent upon other variables for measurement, and
112 Furthermore, capital programmes are notoriously 
- difficult to budget accurately because there are greater 
problems of controlling capital spending of local 
authorities, and therefore budgeted spending is a less 
accurate approximation of actual spending (see Cook (1993) 
pl63; and Cope (1987) pp97-99).
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therefore possess the advantage that any measured change 
can be explained only by a change in the variable measured. 
There are three general ways in which local authority 
spending can be measured in absolute terms - in cash terms, 
in real terms and in volume terms.113 Each of these 
absolute terms of measurement will be discussed in turn.
First, spending of local authorities can be measured in 
cash terms. This method looks at the actual cost of 
providing local authority services at current prices. 
However, the cost of goods and services remain rarely at 
the same value - in times of inflation the price of goods 
and services increases. Consequently, measuring expenditure 
in cash terms makes for meaningful comparisons only at a 
given point in time or in the very unlikely event of 
constant prices. In the words of Edgell and Duke, it ”is 
the least instructive for historical comparisons”.114 The 
usefulness of this method of measuring local authority 
spending is extremely limited.
Second, spending of local authorities can be measured in 
real terms. This method looks at the constant cost of 
providing local authority services, and thus any price 
changes over time are discounted. In order to calculate 
local authority spending in real terms it is necessary to 
deflate (or inflate) the value of spending in one year 
according to the rate of change in prices to make an 
accurate comparison with spending in previous years. There 
are several deflators which can be used to measure local 
authority spending in real terms, ranging from the general 
but less accurate GDP deflator to the specific and more 
accurate deflators for local government and local authority
113 See Edgell & Duke (1986) p235; Edgell & Duke (1991) 
pl24; Hampton (1991) p94; and Hogwood (1992) p37.
114 Edgell & Duke (1986) p235.
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services.115 The rate of inflation experienced by
government generally and local authorities particularly is
often higher than the general rate of inflation as measured
by the Retail Price Index (RPI). This difference is known
as the relative price effect. Hepworth observed:116
"Because of their high labour content, local 
authority costs generally suffer more from 
inflation than costs generally...."
The choice of what deflator to use to measure local 
authority spending in real terms is critical.117 Measuring 
expenditure in real terms makes for meaningful comparisons 
over time. Any changes in spending, then, cannot be 
attributed to price changes. In the previous section it was 
argued that the focus of analysing spending cuts in local 
government should be on the budget and not the outturn 
figures of local authorities, because it is only in their 
budgets that decisions to cut spending can be identified. 
There is another advantage to looking at budgeted spending 
cuts, which is that comparisons in real terms can be easily 
made with the previous year's spending. Local authorities 
present pay and price changes separately as a contingency 
sum for budgeting purposes, and therefore any budgeted 
changes in spending are costed on the same price basis as 
in the previous year. Any changes constitute increases or
115 Under-Secretary, Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy; and Statistician, Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.
116 Hepworth (1984) p24. See also Blore (1987) p76;
Committee Of Inquiry Into Local Government Finance (1976) 
pp26-27; Else & Marshall (1981) pp262-265, 272-273; Heald 
(1983) ppll4-118, 177-186, 200-201; Hepworth (1976) p6;
Hogwood (1992) p37; Levitt & Joyce (1987a) pp7-8; Likierman 
(1988) ppl4-15; Newton (1980) ppl00-108; Newton (i!981a)
pp208-210; Newton & Karran (1985) pp84-89; Peters (1980) 
pp36-37; Pliatzky (1982) pp94, 167-168; Pliatzky (1985)
pl48; and Rose (1985) p22.
117 See Hampton (1991) p94; and Hepworth (1984) pp24-25. 
For example, Edgell and Duke used the GDP deflator which 
diminished the accuracy of their calculation of local 
authority spending ((1986) pp235-236).
71
decreases of spending in real terms. However, the 
measurement of local authority spending in real terms takes 
into account only changes in price. It does not take into 
account any changes in the needs and demands for local 
authority services.118
Third, spending of local authorities can be measured in
volume terms. It is possible that local authority spending
may have increased in both cash and real terms but may not
have kept up with increased needs and demands facing local
authorities.119 Webb and Wistow identified several types of
spending cuts, including "the failure to increase services
to match growth in need."120 They argued that the concept
of need is essential in understanding the nature of
spending cuts in the social services. They wrote:121
"... we need to set a benchmark at a constant 
level of service output. By this we mean a 
situation in which a constant level of a given 
quality of service is maintained relative to 
defined need. It represents a standstill, once 
changing needs have been taken into account."
However, the task of assessing need and demand is riddled
with problems of definition and measurement, which have
forever plagued economists, policy analysts and other
118 The widespread belief, as cited earlier, that 
government spending on the social services has fallen, 
despite the record of real increases of spending, can be 
explained partly by the view that spending has not kept up 
with increasing needs and demands for social services - see 
Schorr (1992); and Webb & Wistow (1982).
119 See Rhodes (1988) p255.
120 Webb & Wistow (1982) p501. Marsh and Rhodes noted 
also that "although expenditure on local services 
increased, none the less such services did not keep pace 
with need" ((1992a) p45). Their observation suffers from 
methodological imprecision because they offered no 
definition of need.
121 Webb & Wistow (1982) p501.
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social scientists.122 For example, Bradshaw developed the 
following useful classification of social need:123
(a) normative need - need of an individual is 
defined by experts (eg professionals, social 
scientists)
(b) felt need - need of an individual is defined 
by what the individual says he or she needs and 
wants
(c) expressed need - need of an individual is 
defined by converting a felt need into an actual 
demand
(d) comparative need - need of an individual is 
defined by a comparison with other individuals
These definitions are problematical. Two examples will be
given to illustrate the problematical nature of these
concepts of need. Central government and local authorities
have both attempted to define and measure spending need.
At the time of this research the Department of the 
Environment undertook a laborious and contentious exercise 
to measure the spending needs of local authorities in the 
calculation of their grant-related expenditures.124 The
122 See Bebbington & Davies (1980a); Bebbington & Davies 
(1980b); Bennett (1980) pp85-lll; Bennett (1982a); Bennett 
(1982c) ppl33-159; Bennett & Stewart (1983); Boaden (1971) 
pp21-26; Bradshaw (1972); Davies (1968); Davies (1977); 
Davies (1978); Davies, Bebbington & Charnley (1990); Davies 
& Challis (1986); Dowding (1991) pp33-35; Doyal (1993);
Doyal & Gough (1984-5); Doyal & Gough (1991); Forder (1974) 
pp39-57; Gough (1994); Hansen (1981); Harvey (1973) pplOl- 
105; Jackman & Sellars (1978); Mellors & Copperthwaite 
(1987) ppl04-107; Nevitt (1977); Page (1990) pp51-57;
Schorr (1992); Thomson (1987); Walton (1969); and Wright 
(1980b) ppl51-152.
123 See Bradshaw (1972).
124 See Association Of County Councils (1985) pp4-12; 
Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England And Wales 
(1984g); Barnett, Levaggi & Smith (1990); Bennett (1982a); 
Bramley & Evans (1981); Chartered Institute Of Public 
Finance And Accountancy (1983); Chartered Institute Of 
Public Finance And Accountancy (1984c) pp26-27; Chartered 
Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy (1987) pp43-47; 
Crispin & Marlsden-Wilson (1986) pp231-239; Crispin,
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indicators of spending need included in the complex formula 
were generally those that could be easily quantified such 
as road mileage and number of school pupils. The formula 
excluded many indicators that could not be easily 
quantified such as local weather conditions. The assessment 
of spending needs using these crude indicators was packaged 
as a comprehensive and objective formula, but in reality 
was little more than an arbitrary and subjective exercise 
of judgement.125 This apparent attempt to calculate the 
spending needs of local authorities was soon made 
superfluous with the introduction of expenditure targets 
and grant penalties. Local authorities which spent over 
their expenditure target were penalised by losing grant 
even if they spent below their grant-related expenditure 
assessment. The Conservative Government was never serious 
in its attempt to measure the spending needs of local 
authorities because many local authorities were given 
expenditure targets lower than their grant-related 
expenditures, which was the Government's assessment of 
their spending needs.126 In the words of Jones and 
Stewart:127
"The Government has made and has published an 
assessment of how much a local authority needs to 
spend to provide a standard level of service for 
a standard rate poundage (the GREA). Yet at the 
same time and on a different basis the Government
Marslen-Wilson & Bridges (1984); Davies (1983); Department 
Of The Environment & Department Of Transport (1983); Gibson 
& Travers (1985); Hepworth (1984) pp59-64; Jones & Stewart 
(1983b); Jones & Stewart (1985) ppl54-155; Livesey (1987) 
pp53-55; Loughlin (1982) pp255-256; National Audit Office
(1985); Newton & Karran (1985) ppll6-117; Raine (1985) 
pp52-54; Smith (1983); Tanner (1986); Travers (1982a) ppl8- 
21; Travers (1983b); and Travers (1986b) pp95-100, 123-136, 
160-165, 183-186. '
125 See Travers (1983b) .
126 Chairman, Social Services Committee, Kent CC. See 
also Cumbria County Council (1985); Gibson & Travers (1985) 
p20; Smith (1983); and Smith & Stewart (1985).
127 Jones & Stewart (1983b) p415.
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has set spending targets for authorities. These 
targets require a cut from those authorities 
already spending less than the Government says 
through GREA that they ought to spend. A local 
authority which the Government says, in effect, 
is spending too little on education will be 
penalised if it fails to spend even less on 
education."
This attempt by central government to measure spending need 
of local authorities was not genuine, and was undertaken 
only to control local authority spending. Grant-related 
expenditure assessments should be discarded as a way of 
calculating the spending needs of local authorities.128
Local authorities also attempt to measure their spending 
needs. In making budgets local authorities generally 
prepare a base budget.129 It is essentially a standstill 
budget. It is the budget required to carry out the existing 
policies of a local authority updated to reflect not only 
changes in price but also changes in defined need. The base 
budgets of local authorities vary as their policies vary. 
In particular, it is possible that the same spending cuts 
will be contained within the base budget of one local 
authority because its policy is to cut spending as the need 
and demand for services diminishes, but outside the base 
budget of another local authority with a policy of 
providing the same service regardless of need and demand. 
For example, some local authorities, such as Stockport MBC, 
have a policy of deducting from their base budgets any 
money savings arising from falling school rolls; but other 
local authorities, such as Knows ley MBC, have no such
128 The same is also true of its albeit much simplified 
replacement, the standard spending assessment (SSA) - see 
Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy 
(1992) pp79-86.
129 See Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And 
Accountancy (1991b) pl20; Chartered Institute Of Public
Finance And Accountancy (1992) ppl24-127; Douglas & Lord 
(1986) p36; Elcock (1987a) p254; Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson 
& Walsh (1976) pp41-43; Hepworth (1984) pp214-215; and
Nicholson (1988) p243.
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policy and any savings are budgeted outside their base 
budgets. The calculation of a base budget represents an 
attempt by local authorities in varying degrees to measure 
their spending needs. Moreover, any local authority when it 
makes a budget believes that it reflects need. It assesses 
both the need to spend and the need not to spend.130 
Following Wildavsky, budgeting "is concerned with the 
translation of financial resources into human purposes.1,131 
Changes in spending need are thus built into the budgeting 
process of local authorities. However, these needs are 
determined by the local authorities themselves despite a 
few tentative moves to find out the needs of their 
consumers, and thus represent a necessarily partisan view 
of what needs to be spent.132 Nonetheless, an analysis of 
budgets generally and base budgets specifically is a useful 
though limited way of assessing the spending needs of local 
authorities.
The above two examples demonstrate the partisan nature of 
defining need. Both central government and local 
authorities have very different ways of defining needs 
which reflect their particular interests. These 
methodological problems of defining and measuring spending 
need are very much echoed in the more general and recent 
debates surrounding local government on the ideas of public 
service orientation and consumerism.
130 Cope (1987) plOO.
131 Wildavsky (1964) pi.
132 The four local authorities studied all claimed in 
varying degrees that the needs of consumers were built into 
their budgets - see Miller (1987a); Penn (1984); Rosenthal 
(1991); and Sabin (1990). Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, and 
Knowsley MBC all commissioned surveys to find out what the 
public thought of their services, and what the public 
wanted from their services - for example, see Market & 
Opinion Research International (1987); and Rosenthal 
(1991).
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The Local Government Training Board, now subsumed as part 
of the Local Government Management Board, pioneered the 
idea of public service orientation. Stewart and Clarke 
stated:133
"The activities of a local authority are not 
carried out for their own sake, but to provide 
service for the public.... The public service 
orientation recognizes that:
- a local authority*s activities exist to provide 
service for the public
- a local authority will be judged by the quality of 
service provided within the resources available
- the service provided is only of real value if it is 
of value to those for whom it is provided
- those for whom services are provided are customers 
demanding high quality service
quality of service demands closeness to the
customer."
Similarly, the National Consumer Council urged local
authorities to become "more consumer oriented.1,134 It
pleaded with local authorities to embrace consumerism in
measuring their performance, and urged:135
"Measurement should attempt to relate service 
provision and quality to consumer and/or 
community preferences or needs...."
What both public service orientation and consumerism have
in common is that the spending needs of a local authority
should be determined by the public - either citizens or
consumers. However, though this view is appealing to those
defenders of local government it ignores or downplays the
problems of measuring need. The public may be unable to
articulate its needs. Even if its needs can be articulated
the public may express competing and conflicting needs.
Even if these conflicts of need can be resolved the public
may be unable to translate its needs into spending plans.
133 Stewart & Clarke (1987) pl61. See also Clarke & 
Stewart (1986); Local Government Training Board (1987); 
Local Government Training Board (1988); Stoker (1989) pp39- 
47; and Walsh (1989b).
134 National Consumer Council (1986) piii. See also 
Fenwick (1989); and Pollitt (1988).
135 National Consumer Council (1986) pvii.
The concept of need is subjective - it is a question of 
whose need. It is consequently difficult to define with any 
precision. The concept of need is also difficult to measure 
with any accuracy. Some writers have used very simple 
indicators of spending need, such as the number of people 
living in a local authority area and clients consuming a 
local authority service.136 However, these indicators are 
crude measures of spending need, and thus empty the 
definition of need of any real meaning. Other writers have 
urged local authorities to develop more sophisticated 
indicators of need, and have preached over time the virtues 
of various forms of Planning, Programming, Budgeting
Systems (PPBS).137 Though these indicators may capture the 
full definition of need, its measurement becomes difficult 
if not impossible. The central problem is who is to define 
need and how is need to be measured. Though there are 
severe problems in operationalising any definition and 
measurement of local authority spending in volume terms it 
is still important to recognise that need and demand, 
however defined and measured, are important concepts in any 
analysis of spending cuts in local government.
As well as three absolute measures of local authority
spending - cash, real and volume measures - it can be
measured in relative terms. This second way of measuring
local authority spending does not in any way measure the 
variable itself, but relates it to another variable. The 
main relative yardsticks are ranking techniques and 
proportion-share calculations. The principal problem with 
these yardsticks is that they often reveal more about the 
variable with which the relationship is being made than the 
variable being measured. For example, the Conservative 
Government ranked local authorities according to how much
136 See Bennett & Stewart (1983) ; and Smith (1985) .
137 See Eddison (1975) pp35-83; Foster & Algie (1985); 
Greenwood & Stewart (1974) ppl55-274; and Stewart (1971) 
pp28—29, 66—68.
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they spent. In the Government's rush to isolate the so-
called local authority 'overspenders' these league tables
say nothing about how much local authorities actually
spent, and are consequently misleading.138 The two most
common forms of proportion-share calculations are to
measure local authority spending in relation to public
expenditure and gross domestic product. However, the
calculation of both public expenditure and gross domestic
product is littered with considerable obstacles.139
Notwithstanding these difficulties, measuring a slice of
the cake as a share of the whole cake often says more about
the size of the cake itself. For example, the Conservative
Government stated:140
"Our policy is therefore to reduce the share of 
national income taken by the public sector. In 
the mid-1970s, public spending peaked at over 49 
per cent of our gross national product. In the 
early 1980s, it peaked at over 47 per cent. In 
this recession, it is peaking at only 43 per 
cent."
This presentation of public expenditure cuts is no more 
than a statistical deception, because though its share of 
gross domestic product fell, public expenditure in this 
period actually increased in real terms.141 This falling 
share relative to the wider economy is best explained by a 
growing economy and not by falling public expenditure. 
Thus, relative measures of spending may raise many 
important questions, but they need to be carefully 
answered.
Overall, there are many ways in which local authority
138 See Smith (1985) ; and Travers (1984b) .
139 The problems of measuring public expenditure have 
already been discussed. On the problems of measuring gross 
domestic product see Hampton (1991) p94; and Ormerod (1992) 
pl2.
140 Conservative Party (1992) p6.
141 See Davies (1993); and HM Treasury (1987b) p32. See 
also table 2.1.
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spending can be measured. These ways are illustrated in the 
table below, which measures local authority spending using 
data compiled by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance 
and Accountancy.
Table 2.5; Local Government Expenditure in Britain. 
1974/75 - 1984/85
1974/75 1976/77 1978/79 1980/81 1982/83 1984/85
Cash 12.6 16.4 18.8 25.0 29.1 34.9
(£b)
Real 15.0 14.0 13.0 12.1 12.2 13.3
(£b)*
Share of
public 32.2 30.4 28.2 27.0 25.7 26.9
sector (%)
Share of 15.9 14.3 12.8 12.2 12.1 12.4
GDP (%)
* Adjusted to 1975 prices
Source: Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And
Accountancy (1980); Chartered Institute Of Public 
Finance And Accountancy (1982); Chartered Institute Of 
Public Finance And Accountancy (1984d); Chartered 
Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy (1989); 
and Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And 
Accountancy (1991c)
The table above shows the spending of local government as 
measured in cash and real terms, and as a share of the 
public sector and gross domestic product. Different 
pictures emerge about the state of local government 
spending depending on the type of measure used. From this 
table it can be seen that between 1974/75 and 1984/85 local 
government spending has increased by 277 per cent in cash 
terms, but decreased by 11 per cent in real terms. Also,
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local government spending has been reduced both as a share 
of the public sector and of gross domestic product, though 
its share of the public sector fell by 16 per cent whereas 
its share of gross domestic product fell by 22 per cent. 
Thus, the type of measurement is critical in measuring 
local authority spending.
When local authority spending is measured
The measurement of local authority spending requires 
comparison in order to make sense of its size. To say that 
local authorities spent £34.9 billion in 1984/85 does not 
mean anything unless it is compared either with previous 
years, other government bodies, local government in other 
countries or another variable. The measurement of spending 
cuts in local government requires a base, from which any 
change can be quantified. The base chosen is crucial in any 
presentation of spending cuts. For example, from table 2.5 
though local government spending has fallen in real terms 
from 1974/75 to 1984/85, it has increased from 1978/79 to 
1984/85. Thus, local authority spending was cut under the 
Labour Government while it increased under the Conservative 
Government, which was committed to curbing local authority 
spending. It is not surprising that Elcock, for example, 
refers to "the Thatcher Government's failure, even after 
seven years of imposing increasing financial rigour, to 
procure reductions in local authority spending."142 The 
choice of the base-year becomes critical in portraying 
whether cuts have taken place in local government.143
142 Elcock (1987a) p255. See also Cochrane (1993) pp33- 
34; Jones (1990/91) pl97; Marsh & Rhodes (1992a) pp43-47; 
Midwinter (1988) p27; Riddell (1983) pl29; Rhodes (1988) 
p248; Rhodes (1992a) p71; Rhodes (1992c) pp58-64; Stewart
(1986) ppl9-20; and Travers (1987c).
143 See Jacobs (1979) pl283.
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Another example illustrating the significance of the base- 
year concerns the Kent CC's decision to reorganise its 
remand facilities. Following a review of its remand 
facilities in the county the Committee decided to close two 
of its remand units providing secure accommodation for 
young offenders, and instead provide restricted 
accommodation at a smaller closed supervision unit.144 In 
Kent CC's revenue budget 1984/85 this decision was 
presented as a spending cut amounting to £140,000.145 Thus, 
compared to the previous year there was a reduction of 
spending. However, it is important to take a longer look at 
this spending cut. The reorganisation of remand facilities 
involved extra spending in closing down the two existing 
remand homes and establishing the closed supervision unit. 
In Kent CC's capital programme 1983-84 this decision was 
presented as increased spending amounting to £90,000.146 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in combining revenue and 
capital spending of local authorities, the decision to 
reorganise remand facilities yielded a saving of only 
£50,000.147 Furthermore, the two closed remand homes were 
later sold, raising capital receipts which could be used to
144 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC; 
Policy Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC; Area 
Manager, Social Services Department, Kent CC; Officer-in- 
Charge, Glebelands Close Supervision Unit, Kent CC; and 
Branch Secretary, National and Local Government Officers 
Association, Kent. Also, taken from Director of Social 
Services' Report to the Social Services Committee, Kent CC 
dated 7 December 1982.
145 Taken from Kent CC's Revenue Budget And Capital 
Programme 1984-85. 16 February 1984, p70.
146 Taken from Kent CC's Budget 1983-84. 17 February 
1983, p67.
147 This saving never fully materialised because of 
delays in setting up the closed supervision unit (Assistant 
Director of Social Services, Kent CC; Policy Officer, 
Social Services Department, Kent CC; Area Manager, Social 
Services Department, Kent CC; and Officer-in-Charge, 
Glebelands Closed Supervision Unit, Kent CC).
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finance Kent CC's capital programme.148 Thus, this decision 
either reduced spending by £140,000 or £50,000 depending on 
what base-year is chosen. At the time the Social Services 
Committee made this decision, it incurred extra spending - 
an example of spending more now to save later.149 The 
decision to reorganise remand facilities illustrates the 
significance of the base-year in measuring local authority 
spending.
A spending cut can be perceived when spending is measured
against a future projection, and even an expectation of
future spending. Nicholas Ridley, a former Conservative
minister, wrote bluntly:150
"Eventually I discovered the meaning of the word 
'cuts' in a conversation with some left-wing 
teachers from my constituency who used the phrase 
as a sort of war-cry. What they meant went like 
this: 'This year my budget is £100 million; next 
year I want £150 million. You have offered me 
£120 million. Therefore I have had a cut of £30 
million.' A purist would call this an increase of 
£20 million...."
He observed that increased spending can be presented as
spending cuts. For example, Bedfordshire CC reduced its
repairs and maintenance budget by £850,000 in 1984/85. It
first wanted to cut this budget by £1.1 million, but later
added an extra £250,000 to the budget. The extra monies can
be perceived as increased spending and a reduced spending
cut. The Education Committee of Knowsley MBC wanted over
£1.5 million extra to spend on service developments, but
received only £160,000 extra. This amount can be seen as a
slight increase in spending and a substantial reduction
from what the Committee wanted. These examples show that
148 Policy Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC.
149 Osborne and Gaebler argue that "spending money to 
save money" is a characteristic of enterprising 
governments, possessing "an "investment" perspective - a 
habit of gauging the return on their spending as if it were 
an investment" ((1992) p205).
150 Ridley (1992) p84.
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spending decisions can be presented in language of both 
cuts and growth. The expectations of the actors involved in 
making decisions are important in how these decisions are 
perceived. The Conservative Government claimed to have 
"held down unjustified rises in the cost of local 
government."151 The trend of increasing local authority 
spending is thus couched in the language of restraint. The 
base against which spending is measured often includes a 
psychological calculation of what spending is needed and 
expected in the future. There is little psychological 
difference in an expected decision to cut spending and an 
unexpected decision not to increase spending. The 
perception of spending cuts involves both financial and 
psychological calculations of the base.
A base widely used by local authorities for budgetary 
purposes is the base budget. As already mentioned, the base 
budget is the budget required to carry out the existing 
policies of local authorities. There are several advantages 
of examining the base budgets of local authorities in the 
analysis of spending cuts in local government. First, it 
allows decisions to cut spending to be distinguished from 
other decisions. Second, the base budget is updated to take 
into account price changes allowing comparisons to be made 
in real terms. Third, the base budget reflects changes in 
need as determined by local authorities. The base budget 
therefore serves as a very useful yardstick against which 
the spending of local authorities can be measured.
However, one disadvantage of using the base budget as a 
base is that any comparisons will be short-term. The base 
budget may ,be exceptional, and any comparisons with it 
would be distorted. It is important, then, also to compare 
local authority spending over a longer period of time. But 
if local authority spending is compared over a longer
151 Conservative Party (1992) p37.
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period of time, there is the problem of comparing like with
like. The functions provided by local authorities have
changed significantly over time. For example, since 1979
local authorities have lost responsibilities in development
(to urban development corporations), education (to city
technology schools, grant-maintained schools that have
opted-out of local authority control, the Polytechnics and
Colleges Funding Council and now the Higher Education
Funding Council) , and housing (to tenants buying their
council houses, and housing action trusts), but have gained
responsibilities mainly in community care (from health
authorities). The Conservative Government seeks to further
decimate the functions which local authorities provide by
encouraging masses of schools to opt-out of local authority
control and restructuring the police service.152 Indeed,
Rogaly predicted:153
"Those who look for local government around 
millennium-time may need a magnifying glass. The 
great town hall barons of the 1970s, with their 
direct labour forces, council-house fiefdoms, and 
monopolies over state education services will 
have been swept away.11
Longer-term comparisons of local authority spending need to 
be sensitive to these changes of local government 
functions. Thus, it is necessary to use several bases in 
order to make both short-term and long-term comparisons.
UNDERSTANDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING
In discussing public expenditure the problems of 
perception, aggregation and methodology were examined.
152 See Department For Education & Welsh Office (1992); 
and Home Office (1^93).
153 Rogaly (1992).
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These three problems plagued much of the literature on 
public expenditure, and consequently many of the debates 
became entangled with misunderstandings. It is important 
that these problems of local government spending are 
addressed to understand the nature of spending cuts in 
local government.
The perception of local government spending
Duke and Edgell have undertaken useful research on the 
perception of public expenditure cuts in Greater 
Manchester.154 In particular, they examined the public 
perception of public expenditure cuts and found there "are 
clear links between the subjective perceptions ... and the 
'objective' cuts...."155 Their research suggests that there 
is little misperception of public expenditure cuts. 
However, their finding is flawed on two counts. First, as 
they admitted, "it is perfectly possible for a service 
which has been increased nationally to have been cut in the 
local area."156 Thus, the perception of cuts is very 
dependent upon where the perceiver looks. Second, their 
research focused on public expenditure cuts and not local 
authority spending cuts. Their research on the perception 
of cuts in two local authorities must be treated with some 
caution.
The rhetoric of cuts emanating from the Conservative 
Government and many local authorities has created a
154 See Duke & Edgell (1984); Duke & Edgell (1986); 
Edgell & Duke (1981) ; Edgell & Duke (1982) ; Edgell & Duke 
(1983); Edgell & Duke (1986); and Edgell & Duke (1991) 
pp86-138.
155 Edgell & Duke (1991) pl25. See also Edgell & Duke 
(1981); and Edgell & Duke (1986).
156 Edgell & Duke (1991) pl24. See also Edgell & Duke
(1986) p235.
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perception that cuts have taken place in local government.
The Conservative Government wanted to cut local authority
spending, and many local authorities wanted to resist these
cuts. The Government believed cuts could be made without
damaging services, and local authorities (especially Labour
councils) believed cuts could be made only by cutting jobs
and services. In the battles between central and local
government in the 1980s both sides had a vested interest in
people believing their claims. It is hardly surprising that
spending cuts occupied a central place on the agenda of
local government. But given the literature on local
government spending and its many conflicting observations
and explanations, there is misperception of local authority
spending. For example, the Director of Works of Stockport
MBC believed that his department had made cuts, when in
fact no cuts were made in his budget.157 The reality and
the perception of local authority spending are often not
the same phenomenon. Following Newton and Karran:158
"Local finances are infused with political myths, 
nonsensical beliefs, and increasingly with far­
fetched ideological claims."
Another way in which local authority spending is 
misperceived lies in the way it is interpreted. Too often 
people make an axiomatic link between the quantity of 
spending and the quality of service that the spending 
provides. It is sometimes assumed that the inputs (as 
measured by money spent) determine the outputs (that is the 
service provided) . Thus, any spending cuts made by local 
authorities will automatically lead to reduced service 
provision. Richards in an established textbook on local 
government stated unequivocally:159
"Cuts in public expenditure require cuts in the
157 See Stockport MBC's Corporate Plan And Budget 1984- 
87, March 1984, pp43-47.
158 Newton & Karran (1985) pxiii.
159 Richards (1983) preface.
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standards of services. Without question local 
government is in decline."
Likewise, a New Society editorial declared that "there are
no cuts in spending without cuts in services.1,160 These
views see the relationship between spending and services in
a very simplistic light - more spending means more and
better services, and less spending means less and worse
services. This belief pervades much of the media coverage
of cuts, and makes for sensational headlines. For example,
The Daily Telegraph reported:161
"The tendency to blame almost every 
administrative shortcoming on "the Government 
Cuts" seems to know no bounds. According to the 
DUNDEE COURIER, a two-year-old girl from Stirling 
suffered a lacerated bottom when the seat of a 
local public lavatory collapsed underneath her.
When the child's angry mother, one Sylvia 
McDonald, telephoned Stirling District Council to 
express her displeasure she was apparently told:
"We can make no repairs because of Margaret 
Thatcher's cutbacks.""
The link between spending and service provision is 
complicated on two grounds. First, the link is a question 
of judgement, whether it is political, professional, 
managerial or so-called 'common-sense' judgement. To say 
that spending cuts damaged services is not an objective 
fact but a subjective judgement. A murder of a young girl 
sadly illustrates the subjective nature of assessing the 
impact of cuts upon services. In August 1989 Stephanie Fox, 
who was under the protection of the Social Services 
Department of Wandsworth LBC, was murdered by her father. 
At the time the Department was making substantial cuts. 
After an inquiry into her death the following headlines 
appeared in the press:162
160 New Society (1985) pl80.
161 The Daily Telegraph (1985). See also Ridley (1992) 
pp83-84.
162 Taken from Eaton (1990) p5; The Guardian (1990) p4; 
and Ivory (1990) p5.
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"Cuts reduced Stephanie's chances" (Social Work
Today)
"Cuts contributed to child's death" (Community
Care)
"Death followed council cuts" (The Guardian)
From these headlines the link between spending cuts and 
service provision is clearly made, but the precise link 
varies with each of the three headlines. On one hand the 
cuts merely contributed to her death, and on the other hand 
the cuts caused her death.
Second, the relationship between spending and services does
not take place in isolation from other factors. These other
factors, such as laws and expertise of staff, intervene in
the relationship between spending and services. Spending is
only one input, albeit very important, in the provision of
services. According to Rose:163
"Programmes are packages of three resources - 
laws, money and personnel - mobilized by 
government organizations and converted into 
outputs. Government is not to be reduced to a 
single concept or indicator: it is a set of
organizations, a set of resources, and a set of 
programmes. The three interact, influencing each 
other in a continuing feedback process. In turn, 
they influence and are subject to a host of 
social, economic and political influences that 
collectively affect the volume of resources at 
hand, the predispositions of organizations, and 
the content of programmes."
As a result of other factors the simple link between
spending and services is broken. Hogwood argued there is "a
weak link between changes in the quantity and quality of
the final output of a public policy...."164 Other things
being equal, when a local authority cuts its spending its
163 Rose (1985) p7. Similarly, Hood argued that spending 
is only one tool in a government's 'toolshed' ((1983)). See 
also Dunleavy (1986b) p379.
164 Hogwood (1992) pp33-34. Similarly, Danziger noted 
that the "amount of money does not necessarily correspond 
to either the quality or quantity of service" ((1978b) 
p59) .
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services will be reduced, but other things rarely remain 
equal.
There have been misperceptions of local government 
spending, both over its size and its impact upon service 
provision. These misperceptions have made for a very 
sterile debate on spending cuts in local government. Any 
perception of local government spending must be grounded in 
an understanding of how it is measured. This understanding 
can be gained only from looking at the aggregation and 
disaggregation of local government spending, and at the 
methodology of local government spending.
The aggregation of local government spending
Most observations on the size of local authority spending 
have been made at an aggregated level, either of a single 
local authority or local government generally. The spending 
within many account headings are added together to arrive 
at the total spending of a local authority, or the spending 
of local authorities are added together to arrive at the 
total spending of local government. However, as Rose 
warned, this aggregated approach fails to detect all 
changes in the parts, bundled and added together to 
calculate the whole.165 All four local authorities studied 
made decisions to cut spending, but these cuts were hidden 
by decisions to increase spending. An aggregated analysis 
of local authority spending would fail to examine these 
spending cuts, thus giving a misleading picture. Say, for 
example, a local authority decides in response to falling 
school rolls, as many have done, to close a school to save 
money. The aggrieved parents, pupils and teachers faced 
with this decision would not in any way be consoled that 
this decision does not represent a spending cut because the
165 Rose (1985) p5.
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local authority increased its overall level of spending. 
Spending cuts occur regardless of the overall trend of 
local authority spending. It is important to disaggregate 
local authority spending and focus on the decisions to cut 
spending.166
Rose pioneered 'the programme approach*, which is a form of 
disaggregated analysis.167 He justified this approach when 
he wrote:168
"The things that most visibly change in
government are its programmes; disaggregating 
government into programmes is therefore a 
meaningful and necessary way to understand its 
dynamics.1
Though this approach is refreshing it is also limited in 
the way it can be applied to the analysis of spending cuts 
in local government. Rose recognised this limitation when 
he remarked that the "variety of governmental activities 
poses a strategic question: what is the appropriate level 
of disaggregation in identifying programmes?"169 He
attempted to answer this question by defining programmes as 
"a set of government activities related in budgets and
organizational structure to a common purpose...."170 This 
programme approach assumes that local authorities budget 
and organise their activities in the same way, and pursue 
similar objectives. They do not. Though activities are
organised into programmes the contents of these programmes
166 As argued earlier, these decisions to cut spending 
can only be disaggregated in the budgets of local 
authorities. In the financial accounts of local authorities 
decisions are bundled together in an array of headings; 
whereas in their budgets decisions are presented as 
variations from the base budget. See Newton & Sharpe (1977) 
p70.
167 See Rose (1984) ; and Rose (1985) .
168 Rose (1985) pi.
169 Rose (1985) p9.
170 Rose (1985) p9.
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vary widely between local authorities. For example, in 
Bedfordshire CC the library service is overseen by its 
Leisure Committee, and can be regarded as a leisure 
function; but in Kent CC it is overseen by its Education 
Committee, and can be seen as an education function. Thus, 
a comparison of the leisure and education programmes of 
these two local authorities would not be comparing like 
with like. The programmes of local authorities display 
variety in their contents and purposes.171 Consequently, 
the programme approach becomes troublesome in analysing 
spending cuts in local government. It should be rejected in 
favour of the decision approach, which focuses on the 
decisions to cut spending. The decision approach is a more 
sophisticated form of disaggregated analysis of spending 
cuts in local government.
However, it is also equally important to place any 
decisions to cut spending in the perspective of the overall 
trend of local authority spending. This perspective allows 
meaningful comparisons to be drawn. Any analysis of local 
authority spending needs therefore to be undertaken at both 
an aggregated and disaggregated level. By combining both 
forms of analysis there is no danger of perceiving spending 
cuts from only one standpoint, because perceiving cuts 
depends on what is being looked at - government, local 
government, a local authority, a local authority service, 
or a specific decision to cut spending.172 At a
171 There is little advantage served by dividing the 
budgets of local authorities into comparable programme 
areas. Notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties in 
tidying up the programmes of local authorities, any 
reshuffling of spending between committees and departments 
would blur the decision-making boundaries within local 
authorities. Committees and departments are key decision­
making units in local authorities, and an examination of 
their interplay at budget time helps to explain the 
incidence of spending cuts in local authorities.
172 The failure to specify the level of analysis was 
seen earlier in Duke and Edgell*s research on spending cuts 
in local government.
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disaggregated level of analysis it is possible to examine 
spending cuts which would have otherwise been swamped at an 
aggregated level. At an aggregated level it is possible to 
detect general trends of spending which would not be found 
in the detailed (and possibly peculiar) analysis at a 
disaggregated level. The analysis of spending cuts in local 
government needs to focus on the specific decisions to cut 
spending but these decisions need to be placed in their 
wider context of the overall trends of local authority 
spending.
The methodology of local government spending
Given the many different ways to measure local authority 
expenditure it is perhaps not surprising that the vast mass 
of literature on local government spending reveals there is 
no consistent and therefore easily comparable way of 
measuring the spending of local authorities. As can be seen 
from table 2.2, the Treasury, the Department of the 
Environment, the Central Statistical Office and the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
produced very different measurements of local government 
spending because they used different methods to measure the 
spending of local authorities. The Treasury used current 
expenditure and net capital expenditure; the Department of 
the Environment used gross revenue expenditure and gross 
capital expenditure; the Central Statistical Office used 
current expenditure but did not explain what method was 
used to measure capital spending; and the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy used gross 
capital expenditure but did not explain what method was 
used to measure revenue spending.173 Furthermore, academics 
have used different methodologies in measuring local
173 See Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And 
Accountancy (1991c); Department Of The Environment (1986); 
and HM Treasury (1987b).
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authority spending. For example, Edgell and Duke tended to 
use net expenditure in assessing the perceived impact of 
cuts; Newton and Karran simply measured local authority 
spending as a share of both public expenditure and gross 
domestic product; and Travers often used current 
expenditure as a measure of local authority spending.174 
There is no consistent framework within which to compare 
the different measurements of local authority spending. It 
becomes therefore important to understand the methodology 
deployed in measuring local authority spending. Too often 
the methodology is not stated in the literature on local 
government spending; and, if stated, its significance is 
not explained.
This research focuses on spending cuts made in 1984/85 in 
four local authorities - Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, Knowsley 
MBC, and Stockport MBC. It is now necessary to summarise 
and justify the methodology used in the subsequent analysis 
of spending cuts in these local authorities. Essentially 
this analysis will focus on the following measures of local 
authority spending:
(a) gross expenditure - this measure captures the 
totality of local authority spending regardless 
of how it is financed;
(b) revenue and capital expenditure - these 
measures need to be examined separately because 
they are subject to different financing and 
control mechanisms, and therefore constitute 
different though linked decision-making arenas;
(c) actual and budgeted spending - actual 
spending (outturn) measures the reality of local 
authority spending, and budgeted spending allows 
an examination of specific decisions to cut 
revenue spending;
(d) cash and real spending - cash spending 
represents the money actually spent, and real 
spending is the amount spent discounted for 
inflation which allows for meaningful comparisons
174 See Edgell & Duke (1986); Newton & Karran (1985); 
and Travers (1986b).
over time;
(e) base budget - this measure represents the 
amount a local authority needs to spend to carry 
out its existing policies, and thus reflects 
changing prices, needs and demands as defined by 
the local authority;
(f) spending in 1984/85 compared to previous 
years - these measures allow the extent of change 
to be measured over both a short and longer 
period of time; and,
(g) aggregated and disaggregated spending - these 
measures provide context to decisions to cut 
spending, and focus on the actual decisions 
themselves.
Though defining and measuring local authority spending 
represents a methodological nightmare, the methodology 
above provides the best basis for analysing spending cuts 
in local government. This methodology has not been applied 
in any studies of spending cuts in local government, and 
therefore constitutes an original approach. Having 
discussed the anatomy of spending cuts in local government 
the remaining chapters will now examine why and how the 
four local authorities made spending cuts.
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CHAPTER THREE
SPENDING CUTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: CUTS? WHAT CUTS?
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For many years central government has attempted to control 
and curb public expenditure, and in particular local 
government spending. Local authority spending has become a 
prime target for central government in its drive to cut 
public expenditure. As a result of central government's 
attacks on local authorities there has been much talk about 
fiscal crisis, fiscal pressure and fiscal stress in local 
government.1 Central government, particularly the present 
Conservative Government, wanted to cut the spending of 
local authorities, and thus gave itself new statutory 
powers to curb their spending. Many local authorities, 
especially Labour-controlled local authorities, in turn 
complained about these attacks on their spending, and tried 
to resist making spending cuts and blamed central 
government on any damage to services caused by the cuts. 
There was, then, much conflict between central and local 
government. Many have blamed the Conservative Government 
for cuts in local government.2 The aim of this chapter is 
to examine what spending cuts were made and why cuts were 
made in local government. First, the chapter assesses the 
record of revenue and capital spending of the four local
1 See Bailey (1981); Baumol (1971); Bennett (1988); 
Blunkett & Jackson (1987) ; Boddy (1984) ; Boyne (1988); 
Cockburn (1977) pp41-66; Gibson, Watt & Smith (1987) ; 
Glassberg (1980); Glassberg (1981); Goldsmith & Villadsen
(1986); Gottdiener (1986); Greenwood (1981); Gurr & King
(1987); Ibrahim & Proctor (1992b); Jackson, Meadows &
Taylor (1982); Jones & Stewart (1985); Levine & Rubin 
(1980); Midwinter (1988) p21; Mouritzen (1992b); New
Statesman & Society (1991) ; Newton (1980); Newton & Karran
(1985); Nicholson (1988); Parkinson (1985b); Parkinson
(1988b); Piven & Friedland (1984); Rose & Page (1982b); 
Rubin & Rubin (1986); Sharpe (1981c); Szelenyi (1984); 
Terry (1986); and Walsh (1988).
2 See Baxter & Platt (1991); Blunkett & Jackson (1987);
Boddy (1984); Bundred (1986); Burgess & Travers (1980);
Clarke & Cochrane (1989) pp47-48; Elliott & McCrone (1984); 
Gyford (1985) pp30-32; Hall (1983); Labour Party Research 
Department (1979); Lansley, Goss & Wolmar (1989) pp23-46; 
Midwinter (1984); Midwinter & Page (1981); National Union 
Of Public Employees (Scotland) (1983) ; Platt (1987); Platt
S (1988) ; QueenSpark Rates Book Group (1983); Rodrigues 
(1980); and Stephen (1993).
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authorities studied - Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, Knowsley 
MBC, and Stockport MBC - to determine the extent and causes 
of any spending cuts. Second, the chapter places these 
specific empirical findings in a wider theoretical context, 
drawing on the literature on fiscal stress in local 
government.
CUTTING LOCAL AUTHORITY REVENUE SPENDING
The methodology to be used in understanding spending cuts 
in local government was set out in the last chapter. 
Analysis must focus on gross spending, and not net 
spending, and must distinguish between revenue and capital 
spending. With revenue spending it is important to examine 
both actual and budgeted spending. Only by looking at the 
budgets of local authorities can the specific decisions to 
cut spending be identified and therefore analysed. It is 
also important to measure revenue spending in a variety of 
ways - for example, in both cash and real terms - and to 
compare spending over several years. The revenue spending 
of the four local authorities is shown in the table below.
Table 3.1: Gross Revenue Spending of Four Local 
Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85*
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m
Bedford­
shire CC 140.6 162.1 193.0 215.0 219.3 239.4 248.3
Kent CC 353.3 407.4 481.5 542.8 575.7 601.4 647.6
Knowsley
MBC 76.2 88.0 104.9 113.0 119.7 122.0 124.9
Stockport
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MBC 88.3 103.6 136.6 150.6 158.3 165.6 172.6
England 20817.5 24454.7 29376.2 32369.4 34988.5 37352.6 39616.0
* These figures include spending in the General Rate 
Fund Account, Housing Revenue Account, and other 
accounts (less any inter-account transfers), but 
exclude contributions to and from special funds. The 
exclusion of fund transfers can be justified because 
there is no information on contributions to and from 
funds nationally, and therefore accurate comparisons 
cannot be made.
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC;
Stockport MBC; and Department Of The Environment 
(1986)
This table shows that their revenue spending increased 
substantially between 1978/79 and 1984/85. The trend of 
increased spending was mirrored at the national level, 
where spending almost doubled in this period. This picture 
of increased spending has been painted only in cash terms, 
and a very different picture emerges when painted in real 
terms - see tables 3.2 and 3.3 below.
Table 3.2: Gross Revenue Spending of Four Local 
Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85*
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m
Bedford-
sire CC 140.6 140.7 137.1 136.0 129.3 134.1 133.2
Kent CC 353.3 353.6 342.1 343.2 339.4 336.8 347.4
Knowsley
MBC 76.2 76.4 74.5 71.5 70.6 68.3 67.0
Stockport
MBC 88.3 89.9 97.1 95.2 93.3 92.8 92.6
England 20817.5 21228.0 20871.2 20468.8 20625.1 20921.1 21252.1
99
* Adjusted to 1978/79 prices by a deflator specific to 
local government
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC;
Stockport MBC; and Department Of The Environment 
(1986)
Table 3.3: Index of Gross Revenue Spending of Four 
Local Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85*
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85
Bedford­
shire CC 100 100 98 97 92 95 95
Kent CC 100
Knowsley
MBC 100
Stockport 
MBC 100
100
100
102
97
98
100
97
94
98
96
93
99
95
90
100
98
88
105
England 100 102 100 98 99 100 102
* 1978/79 is the base year.
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC;
Stockport MBC; and Department Of The Environment
(1986)
These two tables portray the revenue spending of the four 
local authorities after adjusting their spending to 
discount any pay and price changes in local government. 
These tables show that in real terms revenue spending of 
local authorities remained roughly constant. In other 
words, the increased cash spending only kept up with 
inflation in local government, and thus did not represent 
real growth. In general, local government spending stood 
still during this period. However, Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC 
and Knowsley MBC reduced their spending and Stockport MBC
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increased its spending in real terms. The spending of this 
sample of four local authorities corresponds very roughly 
to the national picture of spending restraint. In order to 
explore the causes of this financial restraint the revenue 
spending of the four local authorities will be examined in 
detail. The examination focuses on the financial year 
1984/85, which was not an exceptional year and fits into 
the general pattern of local authority spending. Its 
examination therefore will reveal much about the reasons 
why local authorities did or did not cut their spending.
In 1984/85 all of the four local authorities reduced their 
revenue spending in real terms. In particular, Knowsley MBC 
made a two per cent reduction from its previous year's 
spending. As argued in the last chapter, it is necessary to 
turn away from actual spending and look at budgeted 
spending if the decisions to cut spending are to be 
understood. The reasons why each of the four local 
authorities made decisions to cut spending will be 
explored.
Cutting revenue spending in Bedfordshire CC
The County Treasurer asserted that the Council's revenue 
budget "required reduction of spending on services of 
approximately 2% in real terms compared to 1983-84."3 
Notwithstanding the fact there was a slight overspend on 
the budget, this assertion is somewhat confusing on two 
grounds. First, this reduction was calculated using net 
spending and not gross spending of the local authority. The 
reduction included a significant proportion of increased 
revenue raised from fees and charges for services and
3 Taken from Bedfordshire CC's Annual Report And 
Statement Of Accounts 1984-85. p2.
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specific grants.4 Though these extra revenues have the 
effect of reducing the level of net spending, they have no 
such effect on the level of gross spending. Second, the 
proportion of spending cuts pointed out by the County 
Treasurer is greatly distorted by the treatment of funds 
for accounting and budgeting purposes. If money is set 
aside as a fund in one year it is treated as expenditure in 
that year even though the money has not actually been 
spent. If this money is taken out of the fund in another 
year it is treated as income even though the money has been 
actually spent. The table below details the gross spending 
of Bedfordshire CC as adjusted for any fund transfers.
Table 3.4: Gross Revenue Spending of Bedfordshire CC. 
1983/84 - 1984/85
Accounted spend 
Fund adjustment 
Actual spend
Real spend*
1983/84
£k
239362
(7123)
232239
232239
1984/85
£k
248284
187
248471
237976
Variation
%
+3.7
+7.0
+2.5
* Adjusted to 1983/84 prices 
Source: Bedfordshire CC
In 1984/85 Bedfordshire CC increased its actual gross 
spending by seven per cent compared to the previous year. 
This increase cannot be seen by looking at the Council's 
financial accounts because its spending in 1983/84 was 
artificially increased by making a substantial contribution 
to its Reserve Fund and in 1984/85 artificially decreased 
by taking a small amount of money out of the fund. In real 
terms, rather than the County Treasurer's two per cent
4 See table 2.3.
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reduction, there was in fact more than a two per cent 
increase of spending between 1983/84 and 1984/85. Though 
compared to 1978/79, as table 3.3 illustrates, there was a 
five per cent real spending reduction in 1984/85. In other 
words, the spending in 1984/85 represented a modest 
increase from the previous year, but still a substantial 
cut from the late 1970s.
Within this overall increase of gross spending in 1984/85 
from the previous year the Council made decisions both to 
increase and to decrease its spending. These decisions, as 
already mentioned, can be identified only at the budget 
stage, and the table below summarises these decisions.
Table 3.5: Budgeted Variations of Bedfordshire CC.
1984/85*
1983/84 Reductions Additions
Gross spending (£k) 232239 (3306) 1760
Variation (%) (1-4) 0.8
* Contingency sums, which were set aside mainly for
pay and price changes, have been excluded.
Source: Bedfordshire CC
A curious picture emerges from this table because the 
budgeted spending cuts nearly doubled the budgeted spending 
increases, and yet the actual spending in 1984/85 increased 
from that in 1983/84. This apparent contradiction becomes 
clear when it is remembered that there was a £6 million 
overspend on the 1984/85 revenue budget, and that certain 
changes were made to the base budget such as increased 
financing charges of the Council’s capital programme (which 
did not show up as a budgeted variation).
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The revenue budget of 1984/85 reflected to a large extent 
the 'hung' nature of Bedfordshire CC. The Council has been 
without majority party control for most of its time since 
1973.5 The budget was made in a very fragmented way, with 
each of the three main party groups exerting some influence 
upon its contents and size. As in previous years the budget 
was essentially a Conservative-Liberal concoction with a 
few minor amendments from the Labour Group. Consequently, 
the rationale of the budget strategy was varied and 
muddled. Each party group pursued different aims and 
formulated both different and similar strategies in 
devising their budget proposals. The table below outlines 
the budgets put forward by the three party groups, and also 
the budget that was eventually adopted by the Council.
Table 3.6: Budgets of Party Groups of Bedfordshire CC. 
1984/85
Net budget
Conservative Liberal 
£k £k
192745 193070
Labour
£k
197655
Council
£k
192746
Net reductions 3816 4096 1683 3602
Net additions 1212 1760 3786 1763
Funds used 525 3770 527
Balances used 7990 7480 6150 7480
Rate support 
grant 59000 59040 55500 59040
Precept
Precept
126227 126227 132534 126226
5 See Blowers (1977) ; Blowers (1982); and Blowers 
(1986).
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increase 0% 0% 5% 0%
Source: Bedfordshire CC
By looking at the budget proposals of the three main party 
groups the Conservative and Liberal budgets were most 
similar, and later formed the basis of the budget adopted 
by the Council. There were two major considerations which 
underpinned the making of the revenue budget which was 
agreed by the Conservative-Liberal majority on the Council.
First, ever since the election of the Conservative 
Government the Conservative Group on the Council shared the 
Government's commitment to reduce local authority spending. 
In response to initial government requests to cut local 
authority spending, the then Conservative-controlled 
Council drew up plans drastically to reduce spending over 
several years. These plans were never fully implemented 
because the Conservative Group lost control of the Council 
after the local elections of 1981 and the Council reverted 
back to a 'hung' council. The Conservative Group, however, 
was still committed to reducing the Council's spending. 
This commitment was held not so much out of ideological 
fixation to cut spending, but more out of a pragmatic 
realisation that given the Government's financial controls 
the Council's grant entitlement and precept level should be 
protected by keeping down its spending. In 1982 the 
Conservative Group commissioned the management team of 
chief officers to prepare proposals to reduce spending over 
two years to the level of grant-related expenditure 
calculated by the Government.6 This exercise was carried 
out because it was assumed the Government would continue to 
use the system of grant-related expenditure assessments 
(GREAs) as the basis for distributing block grant and
6 See Bedfordshire CC's Getting Down To GREA. 1982.
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controlling local government spending. In the event, the 
Government abandoned this system as a way of curbing 
spending, and instead introduced a severer regime of 
expenditure targets and grant penalties. Thus, the 'Getting 
Down To GREA' exercise was overtaken by events outside the 
control of the Council, and was "shelved in people's
minds" .7
The system of targets and penalties was based on past 
expenditure of local authorities, and not on notional
expenditure on which the grant-related expenditure
assessments were based. A local authority was penalised if 
it exceeded its expenditure target, and the more it went 
over target the more it proportionately lost in block 
grant. The table below outlines the system of targets and 
penalties which operated in the early 1980s.8
Table 3.7; System of Expenditure Targets and Grant 
Penalties. 1984/85
Excess over
expenditure 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 20% 50%
target
Grant
penalty* 2p 6p 14p 23p 32p 77p 167p 257p
* The grant penalty is the amount raised if these
penny rates were levied.
Source: Travers (1986b) pl31
This table shows that at some point it is no longer
financially worthwhile for a local authority to increase
7 Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC.
8 The system of expenditure targets and grant penalties 
has since been disbanded.
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its spending because of the punitive grant penalties 
incurred.9 Both the Conservative and Liberal Groups of 
Bedfordshire CC, like many other local authorities, saw the 
two per cent over target as the critical threshold beyond 
which it was not worth spending.10 Both believed that 
spending below this threshold prevented a massive precept 
rise to replace large grant losses, and thus protected 
services provided by the local authority. The revenue 
budget of 1984/85, then, was largely determined by the 
Council's expenditure target, and was "penalty-driven”.11
Second, and linked to the decision not to exceed greatly 
the Council's target, was the widespread concern among the 
Conservative and Liberal Groups to hold down the level of 
precept. Both recommended there should be no precept rise 
for 1984/85. The Conservative Group was committed to 
reducing the spending of the Council in order to toe the 
Government's line over curbing local authority spending, 
and also to maintain some financial pressure upon service 
provision and thus promote efficiency in the Council. 
Consequently, the Conservative Group favoured keeping the 
precept at the previous year's level, which many 
Conservative councillors already thought was "unacceptably 
high”.12
The Liberal Group was also committed to not increasing the 
Council's precept, and thus holding down the level of rates
9 Some local authorities, mainly Conservative- 
controlled, felt that incurring any grant penalty was not 
prudent, and restricted their spending to within their 
targets. Other local authorities, such as the now abolished 
Greater London Council and Inner London Education 
Authority, spent well in excess of their target and lost 
their block grant entitlement altogether - see Gibson & 
Travers (1985).
10 See Smith & Stewart (1985).
11 County Treasurer, Bedfordshire CC.
12 Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC.
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in Bedfordshire. This commitment can be best understood by
looking at the history of the Liberal Group of Bedfordshire
CC. In 1982 the Liberal Group sided with the Labour Group
in the making of the budget which led not only to a large
precept rise and but also to a supplementary precept.13
Some Liberal councillors blamed this precept increase for
their electoral defeats in the district council elections.
Blowers, a Labour councillor, noted:14
"The Liberals split when their Deputy leader 
blamed his party's poor performance in the 
District Council elections of May 1982 on their 
high expenditure plans. The Liberals began to 
lose their appetite for supporting Labour 
proposals for the restoration of cuts and 
improvements of services. For the remaining life 
of the 1981-5 council the Conservatives, with 
Liberal acquiescence, retained effective control 
over the budget."
In 1983 two of these councillors left the Liberal Group
over a dispute over school closures. This split led to the
Liberal Group losing the balance of power on the Council.
Following strong pressures from the wider Liberal Party the
two councillors rejoined the Group despite rumours that
they were to join the Conservative Group. They rejoined on
the implicit, but disputed, condition that the Liberal
Group recommended a nil precept rise for 1984/85. The two
dissenting councillors believed, along with other prominent
Liberal councillors, that any precept rise would have
adverse electoral consequences for the Liberal Party in the
forthcoming district council elections.15 Thus, the Liberal
and Conservative Groups, though holding different motives,
both agreed there should be no precept increase for
1984/85.
13 This supplementary precept was outlawed 
retrospectively by the Local Government Finance Act 1982 - 
see Blowers (1982) .
14 Blowers (1986) p6.
15 The Education Spokesman of the Liberal Group blamed 
his defeat in the district council elections on the high 
level of rates in Bedfordshire.
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Overall, then, the spending cuts contained in the revenue 
budget were the product of Conservative and Liberal 
thinking to limit both the level of spending and precept. 
They were able to vote together to pass a budget to fulfil 
both these aims despite the opposition of the Labour Group. 
The Labour Group was never in the budgetary frame because 
its strategy never coincided with that shared by the 
Conservative and Liberal Groups.
The level of spending reductions required to accomplish the 
budget strategy adopted by Conservative and Liberal Groups 
would have been much greater had it not been for the 
decision to use about £8 million from funds and balances to 
finance spending. Despite the caution and to some extent 
resistance of the County Treasurer, all three party groups 
agreed to raid these monies to keep down the level of 
precept, to finance additional spending on services, and to 
reverse several previous decisions to cut spending. Again, 
the motives of each Group varied.
Both the Conservative and Liberal Groups wanted to hold 
down the level of spending and precept for a mixture of 
reasons. Both recommended that monies from funds and 
balances should be used to keep down the amount of money 
required to be raised from issuing a precept. The 
Conservative Group's main concern was one of "strategy not 
tactics", and was more concerned about the size of the 
budget rather than its contents.16 The Liberal Group, 
however, was concerned about both the size and contents of 
the budget, and was particularly anxious to protect certain 
services that were seen as electorally popular in what was 
to be an election year for the district councils. For this 
purpose the Liberal Group established a substantial Reserve 
Fund to be set off against the spending of 1983/84 but was 
to be actually spent in subsequent years without attracting
16 Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC.
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grant penalty.17 The Labour Group wanted to deplete the 
monies held in the funds and balances because it argued 
that the spending of these monies on services was more 
important than holding them in reserve. This preference of 
the Labour Group, like most of its budget proposals, was 
not seriously aimed at the other two Groups. It represented 
an ideal position which was not made in the hope of 
attracting support from one of the other two Groups so that 
they may be implemented. Nevertheless, the Labour Group 
managed to secure the support of both the Conservative and 
Liberal Groups when it proposed the reversal of several 
previous decisions to cut spending. These decisions 
attracted fierce criticism from inside and outside the 
Council, particularly from trade unions. The criticisms 
played on the party groups' "sensitivity to the electoral 
impact" of implementing these cuts, and consequently the 
cuts amounting to £% million were reinstated and financed 
from the Reserve Fund.18
The revenue budget of 1984/85 reflected largely 
Conservative and Liberal thinking oiled by electoral 
considerations. The budget strategy was to hold down both 
the level of spending and precept. This strategy meant that 
net spending of the Council had to be reduced by about £3.6 
million. The Council was concerned with cutting net 
spending because the level of net expenditure determines 
the amount of block grant received from central government 
and the level of rates levied on ratepayers. The Council 
needed net spending to be cut because it wanted to protect 
its grant entitlement and not increase its precept. Net 
spending, as already seen in the last chapter, can be 
reduced by cutting gross spending or increasing specific 
service income. The Council increased its income by about
17 The Deputy Leader of the Liberal Group on the 
Council confirmed the electoral purposes of this fund by 
describing it as a "slush fund".
18 Member, Labour Group, Bedfordshire CC.
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£300,000, which meant that gross spending had to be reduced 
by £3.3 million.
This reduction in net spending was the outcome of the 
budget strategy determined by the Conservative and Liberal 
Groups on the Council. The decision not to exceed its 
expenditure target by more than two per cent and to peg the 
precept level to the previous year's level necessitated 
cuts in its budgeted spending. However, it would be too 
simplistic to ascribe all these spending cuts solely to the 
Council's budget strategy, because a significant portion of 
them would have been made regardless of this strategy. It 
is difficult to measure precisely the scale of these cuts 
because it is not possible to decide what would have 
happened without any of the budgetary constraints. 
Nonetheless, some of these cuts were the outcome of 
decisions made outside the budget strategy or were 
fortuitous savings. For example, the Council saved £110,000 
because its contribution to the advanced education pooling 
scheme was lower than expected. This saving would not have 
been presented as a spending cut if the exact contribution 
had been known earlier because it would have been written 
into the base budget. Also, the Council saved £20,000 
because there was some slippage on its capital programme 
and therefore delays in financing that programme from the 
revenue side. These 'cuts' certainly helped the Council 
achieve its aim of finding £3.3 million worth of gross 
spending cuts.
In Bedfordshire CC the making of the revenue budget was a 
muddled affair which reflected its 'hung' nature. Each of 
the three main party groups had some influence upon the 
making of the budget, though essentially it was a 
Conservative-Liberal budget. The Conservative and Liberal 
Groups managed to agree on a budget despite having 
different aims in their budget strategies. This example
Ill
shows that a budget serves different purposes.19 The budget 
of Bedfordshire CC served a variety of purposes, and the 
agreed budget fulfilling these purposes contained spending 
cuts of well over £3 million.
Cutting revenue spending in Kent CC
In 1984/85 Kent CC spent just under £650 million, which 
compared to the level of spending in 1978/79, was a two per 
cent reduction in real terms - see tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 
In order to examine the actual level of spending it is 
necessary to adjust the spending figures to take into 
account contributions to and from special funds. The table 
below sets out the adjusted spending of Kent CC in 1984/85.
Table 3.8; Gross Revenue Spending of Kent CC. 1983/84 
- 1984/85
Accounted spend 
Fund adjustment 
Actual spend
Real spend*
1983/84
£k
601433
 ££65)
600468
600468
1984/85
£k
647507
(2383)
645124
617876
Variation
%
+7.7
+7.4
+2.9
* Adjusted to 1983/84 prices 
Source: Kent CC
Table 3.8 shows that in 1984/85 there was over a seven per 
cent increase of spending compared to the previous year's 
level. This increase represented roughly a three per cent 
increase in real terms. Thus, the spending in 1984/85, 
though a fall from the spending of the late 1970s, was a
19 See Wildavsky (1964) ppl-5.
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significant rise from the spending of the early 1980s.
The revenue budget of 1984/85 contained both additions and 
reductions from the base budget. These budget changes are 
detailed in the table below.
Table 3.9; Budgeted Variations of Kent CC. 1984/85*
1983/84 Reductions Additions
Gross spending (£k) 600468 (13975) 15620
Variation (%) (2.3) 2.6
* Contingency sums, which were mainly set aside for 
pay and price changes, have been excluded.
Source: Kent CC
This table shows that Kent CC decided to make nearly £14 
million of spending cuts in 1984/85. These cuts were 
overshadowed by its decisions to spend more on services to 
the tune of over £15 million, adjustments to its base 
budget and a substantial overspend of its budget - see 
table 2.4.
Though there were no overall cuts in spending, there was a 
one per cent reduction in net spending from the base budget 
calculated for 1984/85. In 1983/84 Kent CC spent two per 
cent over its expenditure target, and in 1984/85 it was 
determined to get down to only one per cent over target. 
This aim required roughly a one per cent reduction of net 
spending. As already stressed, local authorities are more 
concerned to control their net spending because they want 
to maximise their grant entitlement and minimise their 
rates bills. Thus, Kent CC was more concerned to cut its 
net spending and not gross spending. This concern explains 
why net spending decreased and gross spending increased.
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The budget strategy was determined early in the budgetary 
cycle, and in the words of the County Treasurer, took the 
"flavour of the White Paper" on public expenditure. The 
Conservative-dominated Council always broadly supported the 
Government's policy of curbing local authority spending. 
There was a widespread belief within the Conservative Group 
that public expenditure, including local government 
expenditure, should be reduced in order to promote economic 
growth. The former Leader of the Conservative Group 
explained on behalf of the Council that "we endorse the 
Government's broad economic strategy, and will therefore 
continue to play our part to assist its achievement."20 
Though several Conservative councillors felt that Kent CC 
had been harshly treated by the Government, there was 
general agreement that spending should be reduced in line 
with government plans. This agreement was strengthened by 
the concern to minimise grant losses by exceeding the 
Council's expenditure target. The County Treasurer 
calculated that a one per cent reduction of net spending 
was necessary to bring down spending to only one per cent 
over target.
Further to the concern to get down to target, the Council 
has always restricted its precept increases to the general 
rate of inflation, and that there was to be no exception 
for 1984/85 especially in view of the county council 
elections to be held the following year. The precept issued 
represented an increase of under five per cent from the 
previous year's level, and was the smallest increase in the 
previous 15 years. Though electoral considerations played 
their part in shaping the budget strategy of the 
Conservative Group, the principal concern was the effect of 
the rates upon local businesses. The former Leader of the
20 Taken from 'Rate rise approved', Kent & Sussex 
Courier. February 1984.
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Conservative Group aired this concern when he argued:21
"Our rates in Kent are certainly among the lowest 
in the country, and our aim has again been to 
keep them that way. Businessmen are looking to 
come to Kent because the rates are kept at a 
reasonable level, and this is important to them."
The prominence of business considerations in setting the 
precept level reflects the dominance of both company 
executives and self-made businessmen within the 
Conservative Group. The Council has moved over the years 
away from the traditional 'squirearchy' to an authority led 
by business-minded councillors.22 The Conservative 
leadership is particularly "closely in touch with 
business", and given the commanding position of the 
leadership within the Conservative Group and the Group in 
the Council it is certainly not surprising that business 
interests have a substantial influence upon the decisions 
of the local authority.23 The level of precept was not an 
issue of concern for either the Confederation of British 
Industry or the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
These two bodies representing a wide range of business 
interests in Kent had favourable relations with Kent CC. 
The Confederation of British Industry believed that the
21 Taken from Kent & Sussex Courier. January 1984.
22 This move in Kent CC reflected the rise of the New 
Suburban Right within the Conservative Party locally, which 
espouses business and managerialist values (see Holliday 
(1991a); Holliday (1991b); Ridley (1988); Saunders (1983) 
pp209-324; Stoker (1988) pp40-41; and Stoker (1991) pp40- 
43) .
23 Reporter, Kent Messenger Ltd. Further evidence of 
the influence of business considerations upon the outlook 
of the Council lay in the expansion of its economic 
development activities. Galvanised by the closure of the 
naval dockyards at Chatham, the Council embarked on a 
programme to regenerate the local economy. This expansion 
was heralded by the former Conservative leader as "good 
news for local business" (taken from Kent & Sussex 
Courier. January 1984). The Local Government and Housing 
Act 1989 has since restricted the economic development 
functions of local authorities.
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Council was "not spendthrift".24 And the London Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry pointed to the Council's "good 
history of housekeeping".25
Before the firm decision to reduce net spending of the 
Council all committees were required to identify their 
proportionate share of net spending reductions. Following 
this exercise the Conservative Group believed this 
reduction would not disrupt the provision of services. This 
view was shared by the two leading officers involved in the 
making of the budget - the Chief Executive and the County 
Treasurer. The Chief Executive stressed that the Council 
adopted a "good housekeeping approach" because savings from 
efficiency measures rather than from service cuts were 
sought to achieve the required level of net spending 
reductions.26 This view, however, was rejected by the two 
opposition party groups, who both predicted that the budget 
would damage the provision of services. The Leader of the 
Labour Group maintained that "people want the services, 
they don't want the cuts, they want to pay".27 Similarly, 
the Leader of the Liberal Group rejected "the policy of 
expenditure cuts which reduce service [sic] in the current
24 Director (South Eastern Region) , Confederation of 
British Industry.
25 Secretary (Kent Section), London Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry.
26 The Chief Executive admitted there was a limit to 
how much can be saved through efficiency measures before 
reducing service provision, but maintained that this limit 
had not yet been breached. However, there is some 
ambivalence in this viewpoint because only the previous 
year he noted that in future years the "possibility of 
finding reductions by increased efficiency and savings - 
although not exhausted - will not be sufficient" - see the 
Kent CC's Report And Accounts 1982-83. p4.
27 This view was later reinforced by a finding of a 
MORI survey commissioned by the Council. It found that 
maintaining services "is a higher priority to Kent 
residents than keeping rates down" - see Market & Opinion 
Research International (1987) pvii.
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climate of targets and Government grants11.28 Nonetheless, 
the Conservative Group believed that the budget of 1984/85 
would have no adverse effect upon service provision.
In the making of the revenue budget, then, there were three
overriding concerns for the Conservative Group - the
Councilfs expenditure target set by the Government, the
precept level and its impact upon local business, and the
provision of services. These concerns were summed up in the
words of the former Leader of the Conservative Group:29
"... we have achieved a lot in this budget. We 
have got nearer to the Government's target, we 
have kept the precept increase below the rate of 
inflation, and we will still be providing first- 
class services in the county in 1984-85."
These budgetary considerations, particularly getting down 
to the Council's expenditure target and limiting the 
precept increase to the rate of inflation, meant there had 
to be a one per cent reduction of net spending. This 
requirement, in turn, led largely to the making of cuts in 
gross spending, which amounted to nearly £14 million. These 
cuts, though, were hidden by the decisions to increase 
spending by well over £15 million. Kent CC, thus, managed 
to cut its net spending but increase its gross spending. A 
significant proportion of these reductions would have 
certainly been made for other reasons regardless of the 
budget strategy. For example, there was a budgeted 
reduction of £500,000 which was based on a substantial 
underspend in the school meals service. Nevertheless, most 
of these spending cuts were the outcome of the Council's 
decision to cut net spending. Table 3.9 reveals that the 
amount to be reduced was less than the amount to be added 
to the base budget, but the Council still managed to cut 
net spending by increasing substantially its specific
28 Taken from Kent & Sussex Courier. January 1984.
29 Taken from Kent & Sussex Courier. January 1984.
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service income. In total an extra £2.4 million was raised 
by increasing charges for services and receiving new or 
increased grant provision for specific services, eg an 
education grant from the European Social Fund.30 Compared 
to the previous year, Kent CC increased its spending, but 
hidden within this overall increase lay a large sum of 
spending cuts.
Cutting revenue spending in Knowsley MBC
In 1984/85 Knowsley MBC spent about £125 million which 
represented an increase from the previous year's level of 
spending. Though if funding adjustments are taken into 
account this increase becomes much larger. The table below 
sets out the actual spending of Knowsley MBC in 1984/85 
compared to the previous year.
Table 3.10: Gross Revenue Spending of Knowslev MBC 
1983/84 - 1984/85
Accounted spend 
Fund adjustment 
Actual spend
Real spend*
1983/84
£k
122028
(2300)
119728
119728
1984/85
£k
124885
1575
126460
121119
Variation
%
+2.3
+5.6
+1.2
* Adjusted to 1983/84 prices 
Source: Knowsley MBC
The above table shows that Knowsley MBC increased its 
spending in both cash and real terms from the previous 
year's level. However, this increase must be seen against
30 See table 2.3.
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a long term trend of falling spending measured in real 
terms - see tables 3.2 and 3.3. Between 1978/79 and 1984/85 
there was a 12 per cent real cut in spending by Knowsley 
MBC.
Though gross spending increased compared to the previous 
year, there were some spending cuts made within this 
increased total. These cuts were more than offset by 
larger spending increases made in the revenue budget. Most 
of these increases appeared in the base budget and are 
therefore difficult to measure, but some appeared as 
additional items to the base budget. The table below 
illustrates the budgeted reductions and additions made by 
Knowsley MBC in 1984/85.
Table 3.11 Budgeted Variations of Knowsley MBC.
1984/85*
1983/84 Reductions Additions
Gross spending (£kj 119728 (1726) 773
Variation (%) (1*4) 0.6
* Contingency sums, which were mainly set aside for
pay and price changes, have been excluded.
Source: Knowsley MBC
This table shows that spending cuts of over £1.7 million 
were made by the Council, representing 1.4 per cent of its 
spending of the previous year. These spending cuts arose 
largely from the budget strategy adopted by the Council, 
though some of which would have occurred in any event. For 
example, money was saved because of some slippage on the 
housing capital programme. Nonetheless, the bulk of the 
spending cuts was the outcome of the deliberate decision 
taken by the ruling Labour Group of the Council to cut
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spending.
From the outset of the budgetary cycle the Council was
determined to avoid a large rates rise. In the words of the
Borough Treasurer:31
"It was clear ... from a very early stage that, 
if a substantial rate rise was to be avoided, not 
only would a re-allocation of current resources 
be necessary but a reduction in net revenue 
expenditure would also need to be examined."
The clear commitment to only a single-figure rates rise, at 
first glance, may appear surprising given that Labour- 
dominated councils such as Knowsley MBC are alleged to be 
those local authorities which preside over the largest rate 
increases.32 This concern to limit the rates increase has 
to be understood within the context of Knowsley*s economy. 
The area of Knowsley, which includes Huyton and Kirkby, is 
economically depressed with a very fragile industrial 
base.33 Much of Knowsley's industry is in decline - for 
example, Birds Eye recently closed its factory in Kirkby 
resulting in more than a 1,000 job losses.34 Furthermore, 
industry in Knowsley is dominated by several large 
international companies such as the Ford Motor Company at 
Halewood.35 The Council has embarked on an ambitious
31 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Budget 1984/85. pi.
32 This allegation is commonly made by the Conservative 
Government as a justification for its measures to curb 
local authority spending, such as rate-capping.
33 Knowsley*s economic and social deprivation is well 
chronicled. See Audit Commission for Local Authorities in 
England and Wales (1984d); Brindle (1993); Brindley, Rydin 
& Stoker (1989) ppl39-157.; Carvel (1984); CES Limited
(1984); CES Limited, Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council 
& Merseyside Metropolitan County Council (1982); Financial 
Times (1989a); Meegan (1989); and Penn (1984).
34 See Laurance & Dunn (1989) .
35 See Firth (1992) p89. In 1987 Ford Motor Company 
paid about £6 million in rates to Knowsley MBC - see Dunn 
& Wintour (1987).
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programme to retain and attract jobs to the local area. A 
major plank in this programme was to limit the Council's 
rate levy to a "defensible" level.36 This view is founded 
on the belief that the level of rates is a critical factor 
in both the performance and the location of businesses.37 
Consequently, the Council limited its rates increase to 
about nine per cent from the previous year's level. This 
decision placed a firm pressure upon the Council to reduce 
its spending.
The Labour Group was also concerned that a higher rates 
rise may have left it open to be rate-capped by the 
Government. The political complexion of the Labour Group of 
Knowsley MBC can only be understood with reference to the 
politics of nearby Liverpool City Council. At the time of 
making the budget for 1984/85, Liverpool CC was embarking 
on a campaign against Government measures to cut its 
spending.38 There was some pressure upon the Labour Group 
of Knowsley MBC to give political support to its party 
colleagues in Liverpool. There were substantial links, not 
just party links, between the two local authorities.39 
There was some support within the Labour Group to a adopt 
a more confrontational line against the Government, as
36 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
37 This widespread belief is strongly held by the 
Government and the Confederation of British Industry, and 
underpinned the idea of rates consultation with 
representatives of local business, and more recently, the 
introduction of a national non-domestic rate set by central 
government.
38 See Carmichael (1993); Hatton (1985); Midwinter
(1985); Militant (not dated); Parkinson (1985a); 
Parkinson(1985b); Parkinson (1987a); and Parkinson (1988b).
39 See Kilroy-Silk (1986); and Williams (1985). Until 
recently the former deputy leader of Liverpool CC, Derek 
Hatton, was employed by Knowsley MBC and developed 
extensive links with the Labour Group on the Council. There 
are also more dubious links between the two councils that 
have been regularly reported in Private Eve's 'Rotten 
boroughs' column.
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Liverpool CC was doing, but this tactic did not receive the 
support of the majority in the Group which was assured by 
officers that the Council could achieve its plans within 
government spending guidelines. The budget set by the 
Council remained at four per cent over its expenditure 
target, which incurred drastic grant penalties. However, 
according to the Chief Executive, the Labour Group had to 
do "the right thing politically", and therefore decided 
deliberately to go into penalty in support of Liverpool CC 
without facing the severe financial and other consequences 
of rate-capping, surcharges and disqualification facing the 
councillors of Liverpool CC.
The second major consideration in making the budget was the 
widespread concern to protect and develop services. This 
concern went beyond the normal concern of most local 
authorities to maintain and improve service provision, and 
was rooted in alarm over the widespread deprivation of the 
area. Knowsley "exhibits the social and economic problems 
of 'outer 1 estates", which "are comparable with those 
experienced in the inner city areas of major 
conurbations. .. . "40
The scale of deprivation and the consequent pressures 
placed upon the Council were described by the Chief 
Executive in the following words:41
"... the Borough faces a combination of economic
and social problems which are unique in their
40 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Annual Report And Accounts 
1984-85. p6.
41 Penn (1984) p2. The Chief Executive claimed that*: 
"the Borough-wide indicators of deprivation would horrify 
most other authorities in the country" (Penn (1984) p2) . In 
recognition of this deprivation Knowsley MBC was awarded 
programme status by the Government in 1983, which afforded 
the Council greater access to grants available under the 
urban programme. The urban programme was traditionally seen 
as a way of combatting deprivation in inner city areas, and 
Knowsley was the first 'outer estate* to be granted 
programme status.
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severity. The low income in the Borough (with 
exceptionally high dependence on state benefits) 
means that not only is financial pressure on the 
authority intense but the range of goods and 
services from the private sector available in 
most parts of the country is not available in 
Knowsley. In consequence, the authority has to 
make provision where the private sector is not 
able or willing to play its traditional role.”
This widespread economic and social deprivation has placed
many demands and pressures upon the services provided by
the Council, and in response the Council has adopted an
explicit policy of "maintaining jobs and services".42 In
particular, the Council had formulated plans to improve
services provided to the unemployed and the elderly, who
were seen as the most disadvantaged groups in the area.
Consequently, the leeway available to the Council to limit
its rates increase was narrowed considerably because of its
commitment to protect and develop services.
In making its revenue budget Knowsley MBC was faced with
competing pressures both to reduce and to expand spending
on services. The Council wanted to limit its rates rise and
therefore reduce its spending in order to retain and
attract industry to the depressed area, but because the
area is depressed there were substantial pressures upon the
Council to increase its spending on services. This dilemma
was exacerbated by the Council's contracting revenue base
because its rateable resources, its grant entitlement and
its specific service income were all falling. As the
Borough Treasurer pointed out:43
"Looking ahead, it is clear that the Council's 
financial situation will certainly not improve in 
the shorter-term. Service requirements have not 
reduced significantly, whilst the three main 
sources of revenue available to the Council are 
all in decline.... The future, therefore, holds
42 Leader, Labour Group, Knowsley MBC (taken from 
Knowsley MBC's Annual Report And Accounts 1984-85. p2) .
43 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Annual Report And Accounts 
1984-85. p8.
123
the prospect of trying to match stable or
increasing needs with declining resources."
In the past this dilemma has been resolved by various 
financing and funding adjustments. Though these creative 
accounting options were dwindling the Council still managed 
to find a substantial amount from these measures. But the 
Council still needed to make an overall reduction of £1.3 
million of net spending in order to achieve its budget 
strategy. The Council had committed itself to additional 
spending, amounting to over £750,000, and therefore had to 
make a corresponding reduction to facilitate this extra 
expenditure. Thus, there needed to be a cut of over £2 
million of net spending made by the Council to comply with 
its budget strategy. In fact, only £1.9 million was found, 
and the rest was made up from a further raid of funds. The 
net spending cuts included an amount of about £170,000 
raised from additional specific service income, and 
therefore gross spending cuts amounted to just over £1.7 
million.
These spending cuts were the outcome of the budget strategy
pursued by the Council. The Leader of the Labour Group
outlined the budgetary constraints upon the Council:44
"No longer is this Council in a position to rely 
upon funds and balances it has maintained over 
the years to support these functions. In order to 
ease the situation other sources of finance are 
being pursued, including funds from the European 
Economic Community, and the Council is still 
committed to developing those areas of service 
which could be achieved without radically 
increasing the burden on the Borough's ratepayer.
Our planned policies of switching resources from 
one service to another as the need arises, have 
allowed us to continue to develop more policies 
of real relevance to the Borough's inhabitants, 
to improve the environment in which we live, and 
to help sustain local industry."
Thus, the budget strategy of limiting the rates increase,
of avoiding excessive grant penalties and of reallocating
44 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Annual Report And Accounts 
1984—85. p2.
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resources to priority services led to the requirement that 
there had to be some spending cuts in the revenue budget of 
1984/85.
Cutting revenue spending in Stockport MBC
In stark contrast to the other three local authorities, the 
spending of Stockport MBC increased in real terms between 
1978/79 and 1984/85 - see tables 3.2 and 3.3. In 1984/85 
the Council spent over £170 million, which represented a 
five per cent real increase from the level of spending in 
1978/79. The actual level of expenditure adjusted for 
contributions to and from special funds is shown in the 
table below.
Table 3.12: Gross Revenue Spending of Stockport MBC. 
1983/84 - 1984/85
Accounted spend 
Fund adjustment 
Actual spend
Real spend*
1983/84
£k
165592
(2057)
163535
163535
1984/85
£k
172571
682
173253
165935
Variation
%
+4.2
+5.9
+1.5
* Adjusted to 1983/84 prices 
Source: Stockport MBC
This table shows that in 1984/85 Stockport MBC increased 
its revenue spending in both cash and real terms compared 
to the previous year. This increase fits into the general 
trend of increased local government spending generally - 
see tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Within this increased spending 
there were a few items of expenditure that were cut, but 
they tended to be masked by the overall growth of spending.
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The following table outlines the budgeted reductions and 
additions of the Council's base budget.
Table 3.13: Budgeted Variations of Stockport MBC.
1984/85*
1983/84 Reductions Additions
Gross spending (£k) 163535 (127) 1706
Variation (%) (0«1) 1*0
* Contingency sums, which were mainly set aside for
pay and price changes, have been excluded.
Source: Stockport MBC
This table reveals that the reductions made to the base 
budget were very small, which hardly registered as a change 
from the previous year's spending. The budgeted additions 
were well over ten times the reductions. Rather than 
examining in detail why only £127,270 of spending was cut 
it would be more worthwhile to explore the reasons why 
significant spending cuts were not made. The reason why no 
sizable cuts were made was that the Council was able to 
implement its budget strategy without making such cuts. 
There were three strands to the strategy of the revenue 
budget for 1984/85.
First, the ruling Conservative Group had never budgeted in 
excess of its expenditure target set by the Government, and 
there was to be no such breach for 1984/85. It was broadly 
sympathetic to the Government's aim of curbing local 
authority spending. The Chairman of the Development 
Services Committee revealed this sympathy in a statement on 
the Government's capital expenditure controls when he
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wrote:45
"The Government was elected to keep down public 
spending. If we do not comply we are undermining 
the democratic process of the country."
Furthermore, the Conservative Group did not want to incur
any grant penalties by exceeding the Council's expenditure
target. It believed that incurring financial penalty
because of its spending plans was no more than "mortgaging
this year next year".46
Second, the Conservative Group was determined to set a rate 
less than inflation. The rate levy for 1984/85 amounted to 
a five per cent increase from the previous year, which was 
heralded as "an inflation beater".47 The Conservative Group 
had always attempted to minimise rates increases, and had 
decided to use funds and balances to hold down the level of 
rates. This commitment "has been the cornerstone of 
Stockport's Tory administration."48 The principal objective 
of holding down the rates was to protect ratepayers, 
especially business ratepayers. This concern is evident in 
the following words of the Leader of the Conservative 
Group:49
"The need to aim for a thriving commercial and 
industrial community cannot be overstressed and 
we must grasp every opportunity that comes our 
way by wise use of our resources."
The influence of local business over the Council was not 
expressed in any formal way, and local business 
associations admitted they carried little weight in the
45 Taken from Civic Review. December 1984, p4.
46 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC.
47 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC (taken 
from Stockport MBC's Civic Review. March 1984, pi).
48 Public Relations Officer, Stockport MBC (taken from 
Municipal Review (1984) p205).
49 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC (taken 
from Stockport MBC's Civic Review. March 1984, p4) .
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running of the Council.50 There existed, however, informal
channels through which the voice of business was heard
loudly in the local authority.51 For example, many
councillors of the Conservative Group are businessmen
themselves, and are very conscious of the Council"s impact
upon local business and are able to represent the interests
of business inside the Council. As a result, the
Conservative Group has always attempted to hold down rate
levels, and also has given the Council's economic
development function a very high priority. This favourable
attitude towards business is captured in the following
account of the achievements of Stockport MBC:52
"... Stockport's rates have remained relatively 
low. This factor has been its selling point in 
attracting industry and commerce. Unemployment is 
well below national and regional averages and the 
town now has a diversified industrial portfolio 
to sustain it for the foreseeable future. 
Stockport has set its store as the heir apparent 
to any business that Manchester loses, especially 
in the retail sector.... Stockport reckons to be 
winning."
These two strands of the budget strategy - keeping within 
the Government's expenditure target and limiting the rates 
rise - were by far its most important components. However, 
there was a third strand of the Council's budget strategy, 
which was the concern to protect services. The Conservative 
Group wanted to maintain the quality of services provided 
by the Council, but its Leader stressed that spending on 
services and the standards of service provision "are not 
synonymous". The Conservative Group was more concerned to
50 Later, under the Rates Act 1984, a local authority 
was obliged to consult representatives of business 
ratepayers about its budget proposals.
51 The Assistant Regional Director (North Western 
Region) of the Confederation of British Industry described 
the relationship between the Council and the Stockport 
Chamber of Commerce as a "heavy petting relationship".
52 Public Relations Officer, Stockport MBC (taken from 
Municipal Review (1984) p205).
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improve services by various efficiency measures than to 
increase spending on services. Both the opposition party 
groups complained that the budget of 1984/85, though 
increasing spending, did not keep up with the increasing 
need for services. The Leader of the Labour Group believed 
that the budget offered "no real improvement to services", 
and the Leader of the Liberal Group argued the Council was 
"still not meeting the need".53 After the local elections 
in May 1984 the Council became 'hung', and the Labour and 
Liberal Groups injected more money into the budget to 
improve services. A £20,000 spending cut in school 
caretaking and cleaning was reversed, and an extra £177,000 
was spent to employ more teachers. The Conservative Group 
was more concerned to protect existing services rather than 
expand services. In the words of the Chairman of the 
Finance Sub-Committee, the "fundamental need is to keep 
rates down to the minimum possible without any reduction in 
the standard of services provided".54
There were, then, three strands to the Council's budget
strategy which can be traced in the following statement
made by the Leader of the Conservative Group:55
"Our aim has been to protect the ratepayers from 
having to pay extra rates because of grant 
penalties which are incurred by local authorities 
for spending above Government targets and to keep 
rate increases down to a reasonable level. This 
must be balanced against the provision of 
adequate services which must be run efficiently 
for the benefit of our local inhabitants. It is 
pleasing to be able to report that once again we 
have achieved these aims in setting our budget 
and rate for 1984/85 not only within target but 
below the current rate of inflation."
53 Taken from Stockport MBC's Civic Review. March 1984,
p4 •
54 Taken from Stockport MBC's Corporate Plan And Budget 
1984-87. piv.
55 Taken from Stockport MBC's Civic Review. March 1984,
P4 •
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The Conservative Group was able to achieve its budgetary 
objectives without having to make any significant cuts in 
its spending plans for 1984/85. However, this budgeted 
picture of few spending cuts is slightly misleading. It is 
probable, though impossible to be certain, that more
spending cuts were made but were disguised by the way the 
revenue budget was presented. The amount of spending cut 
was probably significantly higher than the budgeted amount 
to be cut on two grounds.
First, there is a long record of underspending in Stockport 
MBC, and spending of 1984/85 was no exception - see table
2.4. For example, in 1983/84 there was a large underspend
of over £1 million, which was set aside in a special fund 
to be spent in subsequent years. Though the underspend of 
1984/85 was not so large it still amounted to about
£2 00,000. Much of this underspend lay outside the control 
of the Council, and did not constitute an actual reduction 
but an overestimated forecast of spending. In 1983/84, for 
example, the rate of inflation and interest rates fell 
sharply during the year, thus leaving some monies set aside 
as a contingency not spent. However, some of the underspend 
was the outcome of a deliberate decision by the 
Conservative Group to freeze vacant staff posts for several 
months before filling them. In 1974 the Conservative Group 
set up the Establishment Control Panel which vetted claims 
to fill vacant posts. This deliberate way of underspending 
was a form of cutting spending, which was revealed in 
neither the revenue budget nor the financial accounts of 
the Council.
Second, the spending cuts discussed so far were those 
reductions of the Council's base budget. The base budget, 
as explained in the last chapter, is the budget required to 
carry out the existing policies of the local authority. The 
base budget of one year is adjusted to take into account 
the different conditions under which existing policies are
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carried out.56 The calculation of the base budget is
"primarily an officer preparation".57 Existing policies are
costed by service and finance departments and presented to
councillors as the base budget. In Stockport MBC any
changes to existing policies and new policies are presented
to councillors as policy options. If these options are
endorsed by councillors, they will be written into the base
budget of subsequent years. The distinction between the
base budget and policy options is critical, The Director of
Education explained:58
"A clear distinction is drawn in Stockport 
between policy options and variations to the base 
budget. Policy options require a firm decision of 
the Committee and change the base budget up or 
down as the case may be. Variations in the base 
budget happen as a result of policy decisions 
taken in previous years. Thus, the major savings 
in the current year's budget do arise directly 
from decisions taken previously about the 
treatment of falling school rolls, e.g. reduction 
in the number of teachers abated by a policy 
option to retain a number as part of staffing 
contingency; taking out of use pupil places by 
the removal of temporary classrooms, closures and 
amalgamation of schools; reductions in the number 
of school kitchens in use and economies with 
regard to the changeover to convenience foods."
This distinction rests on the commonly held assumption that 
councillors make policy, and therefore consider policy 
options; and officers administer policy, and thus compile 
the base budget costing policies already made by 
councillors. It is not a technical but a political 
distinction, because it is all about who makes decisions 
and in this case who makes spending cuts. There is much 
evidence in Stockport MBC, and in the other three local 
authorities, that spending cuts sometimes appear in the
56 For example, £630,000 was built into education's 
base budget to reflect extra costs incurred by falling 
school rolls (Director of Education, Stockport MBC).
57 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC.
58 Taken from a letter dated 24 August 1984.
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base budget and not as policy options. Several officers 
preferred to make cuts at the base budget stage rather than 
allowing councillors to make cuts at the policy options 
stage.59 Officers could then make cuts without interference 
from councillors. It was not that officers wanted 
necessarily to make cuts but that if cuts had to be made 
officers would sooner make them than let councillors make 
them. For example, a reduction of £65,000 was made in parks 
base budget, which was to be "achieved mainly by altering 
the hours, duties and conditions of service in respect of 
the Games and Watching Attendant duties during evenings and 
weekends throughout the year".60 This spending cut could 
have been presented arguably as a policy option since there 
was no existing policy within which this change could have 
been made to the base budget. This example shows that there 
is considerable discretion in the making of the base budget 
and that spending cuts can be made within the base budget. 
The policies of a local authority can be varied in their 
interpretation, and spending cuts thus may appear both 
outside and inside the base budget. It is certain that in 
Stockport MBC there were many spending cuts within the 
fringes of the base budget made without councillors being 
fully aware of them despite a few "murmurings" about these 
cuts.61
Therefore, the budgeted reduction of only £127,000 is 
almost certain to be a substantial under-estimation because 
of the spending cuts disguised as underspending and as 
changes to the base budget. Unfortunately it is impossible
59 These officers included the Assistant Director of 
Finance, Stockport MBC; Assistant Director of Housing and 
Environmental Health, Stockport MBC; and Assistant Director 
of Recreation and Culture, Stockport MBC.
60 Assistant Director of Recreation and Culture (Parks 
and Amenities), Stockport MBC (taken from a letter dated 30 
August 1984).
61 Chairman, Education Committee, Stockport MBC.
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to be precise about the scale of these cuts since they are 
not recorded.
CUTTING LOCAL AUTHORITY CAPITAL SPENDING
This section examines the capital spending record of the 
four local authorities, assesses the extent to which their 
capital spending has been reduced over time, and explores 
the reasons why their capital programmes have been trimmed. 
Like revenue spending, the focus of analysis is on gross 
spending. But unlike revenue spending, the focus of 
analysis is on actual spending. Revenue and capital 
spending are different in nature, requiring the analysis of 
budgeted revenue spending and actual capital spending.62 
The record of capital spending of the four local 
authorities is shown in the next three tables.
Table 3.14: Gross Capital Spending of Four Local 
Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m
Bedford­
shire CC 11.3 10.4 14.8 12.4 12.5 10.7 11.1
Kent CC 23.8 28.2 27.9 32.0 29.3 33.0 33.1
Knowsley 
MBC 5.7 7.4 5.5 8.9 12.6 20.0 22.9
Stockport
MBC 6.7 11.2 11.2 7.4 12.1 16.6 13.0
England 4011.2 4580.0 4889.1 4623.2 5723.8 6451.4 6866.4
62 See chapter two, pp67-68.
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Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC;
Stockport MBC; and Department Of The Environment 
(1986)
This table shows that there has been a general increase in 
the amount spent on capital projects by local authorities. 
Between 1978/79 and 1984/85 there was over 70 per cent 
increase capital spending nationally. The capital spending 
of three of the four local authorities mirrored this 
national trend of increased spending, the exception was 
Bedfordshire CC. The next two tables below reveal much more 
because they show the record of capital spending measured 
in real terms.
Table 3.15: Gross Capital Spending of Four Local 
Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85*
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
£m £m £ m  £m £ m  £ m  £m
Bedford­
shire CC 21.3 16.8 20.1 15.4 14.4 11.8 11.8
Kent CC 44.9 45.5 38.0 39.6 33.8 36.5 35.1
Knowsley
MBC 10.8 11.9 7.5 11.0 14.5 22.1 24.3
Stockport
MBC 12.6 18.1 15.2 9.2 14.0 18.4 13.8
England 7565.6 7388.5 6654.1 5728.1 6608.7 7132.7 7278.4
* Adjusted to 1985/86 prices by the GDP deflator. The 
GDP deflator is used because there is no single 
deflator for local authority capital spending.
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC;
Stockport MBC; and Department Of The Environment 
(1986)
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Table 3.16: Index of Gross Capital Spending of Four 
Local Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85*
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85
Bedford­
shire CC 100 79 94 72 68 55 55
Kent CC
Knowsley
MBC
100
100
Stockport
MBC 100
101
110
144
85
69
121
88
102
73
75
134
111
81
205
146
78
225
110
England 100 98 88 76 87 94 96
* 1978/79 is the base year.
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC;
Stockport MBC; and Department Of The Environment
(1986)
The two tables above show that though local authority 
capital spending has increased in cash terms it has been 
substantially cut in real terms. Between 1978/79 and 
1984/85 there was a four per cent real reduction of local 
authority capital spending across the country. Indeed, in 
1985 the Audit Commission calculated that local authority 
capital spending had "declined by over 40% in real terms 
since the first oil crisis and the backlog of capital 
maintenance on local authority assets has been estimated at 
as much as £15 billion...."63
In contrast to this national trend of decreased capital 
expenditure both Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC increased
63 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1985a) pi.
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their spending in real terms between 1978/79 and 1984/85. 
Knowsley MBC more than doubled its real spending on capital 
projects. This large increase was mainly "the result of the 
application of capital receipts particularly from Council 
house sales and the maximisation of available grant-aid.',64 
The Council, as a programme authority, received substantial 
capital grants from central government, and like Stockport 
MBC has benefitted from selling off its council homes which 
generated large capital receipts. The other two local 
authorities, Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC, received much 
less in government grants and capital receipts. For 
example, in 1984/85 Knowsley MBC financed almost £10 
million of its capital spending from capital receipts and 
nearly £1 million from the Government's urban programme, 
but Bedfordshire CC financed under £1 million from capital 
receipts and received next to nothing in government capital 
grants.
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 show that there has been a real 
reduction in the capital spending of local authorities 
generally. Though there was a real decline in capital 
spending, it increased slightly in real terms in 1984/85 
compared to the previous year. From table 3.16 it can be 
calculated that there was a two per cent real increase in 
money spent by local authorities on capital projects. Of 
the four local authorities only Knowsley MBC increased its 
real level of capital spending. Kent CC reduced its capital 
spending in compliance with the Government's request to cut 
local authority capital spending. Stockport MBC reduced its 
spending by ten per cent in real terms from the previous 
year. This decrease would not have appeared so dramatic if 
capital spending in 1983/84 was not unusually high. In this 
year the Conservative Government wanted to increase 
spending on home improvements and offered a financial 
inducement to housing authorities to award more home
64 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Annual Report And Accounts 
1984-85. p35.
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improvement grants.65 Stockport MBC "more than doubled" its 
spending on these grants, and spent nearly £7 million.66 It 
spent only £3 million in 1984/85.
Looking at the capital spending record of local authorities 
there have been peaks and troughs within this declining 
trend of spending.67 In the 1960s local authority capital 
spending expanded with the blessing of central government. 
By the mid-1970s central government curbed this growth of 
local authority capital spending. But in 1982 the 
Conservative Government was very concerned about the low 
level of capital investment, and its impact upon the 
country*s infrastructure and the construction industry. 
From this concern it urged local authorities to spend more 
on capital projects. Consequently, the overall level of 
local authority capital spending increased in the mid- 
1980s.68 However, the Government soon changed its tune, and 
in 1984 called for voluntary restraint of capital spending. 
Some local authorities, such as Kent CC and Knowsley MBC, 
observed this call, but other local authorities, such as 
Stockport MBC, ignored this plea in spite of a threat of a 
moratorium on capital spending.69 This request and the 
consequent uncertainty over future government actions led 
to a slight downturn in the level of capital spending. 
Overall, then, there has been a real decline in the amount
65 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1985a) pl3.
66 Taken from Stockport MBC*s Annual Report And 
Accounts 1983-84. pl6.
67 See Foster (1981) ; and Travers (1986b) ppl42-145.
68 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1985a) ppl3-14.
69 For example, the Borough Treasurer of Knowsley MBC 
claimed that the Government's call for voluntary restraint 
in 1984 "contributed to a £0.4m underspend on the capital 
budget" (taken from Knowsley MBC's Annual Report And 
Accounts 1984-85. p8) . See Audit Commission For Local 
Authorities In England And Wales (1985a) ppl4-15.
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spent by local authorities on capital projects, but within 
this decline there have been "rapid cycles of expansion and 
contraction".70 These cycles are very evident from studying 
tables 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16 which detail the record of
capital spending of local authorities.
The rapid changes in the level of capital spending were the
outcome of an unpredictable government policy on capital
expenditure. Following the Audit Commission:71
"A longer-term central government perspective is 
notable for its absence. The history of capital 
expenditure controls over the past several years 
has been of short-term changes generally made to 
meet the requirements caused by an annual public 
expenditure system."
The pressures to both increase and decrease capital
spending were brought about by government economic policy.
The level of capital expenditure has been used, and still
is used, by central government as a short-term macro-
economic tool to dampen and stimulate the economy. Central
government has always exerted more control over the level
of capital than revenue spending of local authorities.
Central government has claimed that local authority capital
spending affects the running of the economy, which it
firmly believes is the responsibility of the Treasury and
not local authorities.72 In the words of Tom King, the
former Secretary of State for the Environment, there "must
be an overall financial umbrella within which central
government must control the economy."73 This justification
was outlined by the Layfield Committee when it reported:74
70 Travers (1986b) ppl44-145.
71 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1985a) p47.
72 See Brittan (1982); and Ridley (1988) ppll, 22.
73 Taken from Travers (1986b) pl40.
74 Committee Of Inquiry Into Local Government Finance 
(1976) ppl20-121. See also Sbragia (1983).
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"The amount of local authorities' capital 
expenditure and how much they borrow to finance 
it affect the government's responsibility for the 
overall management of the economy, First, local 
authorities' borrowing is important for monetary 
policy. It forms a significant proportion of 
borrowing in the domestic capital markets.... The 
scale of local authority borrowing therefore has 
implications for the control of money supply, the 
management of financial markets and international 
confidence. Second, there is the need to secure 
the government's intended national relationship 
between investment and consumption. The choice 
made by local authorities between capital and 
current spending affects this relationship. The 
factors that affect the choice local authorities 
make will not be the same as those which 
influence the government."
In 1980 the Conservative Government increased its control 
over local authority capital spending. Before the passing 
of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 central 
government controlled the level of capital borrowing by a 
loan sanction system. The Act allowed central government to 
control the level of capital spending regardless of how it 
was financed.75 The Department of the Environment 
calculated the amount a local authority was allowed to 
spend each year on capital projects. This authorisation, 
which was divided into several main service areas known as 
block allocations, applied only to prescribed capital 
expenditure.76 This spending was tightly defined in the 
1980 Act, and included the major forms of capital projects 
such as the acquisition of land and construction of 
buildings. The Act also empowered the Government to define
75 See Watt (1982) . The Act, however, placed 
restrictions on local authorities on how local authorities 
may spend their capital receipts, which are still in 
operation.
76 The Government continued to exercise detailed 
control over capital projects within the domain of the Home 
Office, eg police - see Audit Commission For Local 
Authorities In England And Wales (1985a) p52. The Local 
Government and Housing Act 1989 replaced the system of 
block allocations on prescribed capital expenditure with a 
system of credit limits on local authority borrowing.
139
unprescribed capital expenditure, which included the minor 
forms of capital projects such as repairs of buildings and 
the purchase of vehicles. This type of capital expenditure 
escaped the control imposed on local authorities* 
prescribed capital expenditure. There is evidence 
suggesting that local authorities increased their non­
prescribed expenditure at the expense of prescribed 
expenditure. For example, Knowsley MBC embarked on a 
massive £5 million repairs programme in 1984/85 which was 
excluded as part of its block allocation. In Stockport MBC 
the Assistant Director of Recreation and Culture maintained 
that small capital projects were preferred because they no 
longer had to "go through the full rigours of the capital 
programme".
However, the bulk of local authority capital spending falls 
under the controls over prescribed expenditure. There is 
tolerance over how these limits were applied, and local 
authorities were allowed to exceed their block allocation 
by up to ten per cent in any given year but any excess was 
deducted from either the previous year*s 'unspent* 
allocation or the next year's allocation. Furthermore, 
local authorities were able to supplement their block 
allocations by spending, among other things, a proportion 
of their capital receipts, any profits from trading 
undertakings, and any allocations given to them from other 
local authorities. By far the most significant of these 
enhancements was the use of capital receipts generated from 
selling off assets such as council homes. The Conservative 
Government, however, strictly controls the proportion of 
capital receipts that can be used in any given year. For 
the financial year 1984/85 local authorities could use only 
40 per cent of housing capital receipts and 50 per cent of 
non-housing capital receipts to finance capital 
expenditure.77 Local authorities, and especially housing
77 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1985a) pp9-10, 39.
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authorities, have utilised extensively their capital 
receipts to finance capital expenditure. Most local 
authorities have attempted to increase the capital receipts 
available to spend on capital schemes.78 For example, the 
Head of the Property Services Department of Kent CC claimed 
that priority was given to searching for assets to be sold 
off in order to generate capital receipts. Housing 
authorities are in an advantageous position compared to 
other local authorities because under the Housing Act 1980 
many council house tenants have purchased their council 
homes, which has yielded a massive amount of capital 
receipts.79 Stockport MBC was dependent on these capital 
receipts to finance its capital programme.80 Other local 
authorities have fewer capital assets to sell off, but have 
generated some capital receipts by selling off surplus land 
such as playing fields.
Despite these legitimate and widespread methods of 
enhancing the block allocations of local authorities, the 
Government influenced greatly the amount spent by local 
authorities on the capital side. These controls certainly 
depressed the level of local authority capital spending. 
This squeeze on capital spending can be seen if a 
comparison is made between what local authorities planned 
to spend, what central government allowed them to spend, 
and what local authorities actually spent. This comparison 
can be made from the table below.
Table 3.17; Index of Planned. Allocated and Actual 
Capital Spending in a Sample of Local
78 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1985a) ppll-13.
79 By 1984 local authorities had sold about 650,000, 
and by 1988 well over one million council homes (taken from 
Atkinson & Durden (1990) pl21).
80 Assistant Director of Finance, Stockport MBC.
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Authorities. 1981/82 - 1983/84
Bid 
100 
100 
100
Source: Audit Commission For Local Authorities In
England And Wales (1985a) pp59-61
This table shows that in the early 1980s the block 
allocations of local authorities were about 3 0 per cent 
less than their bids, but their actual spending was over 30 
per cent more than their allocations. Thus, local 
authorities tended to spend as much as their plans 
submitted to the Government, because they enhanced their 
allocations particularly by tapping into their capital 
receipts. For example, for 1984/85 Kent CC submitted a 
capital spending bid of £36.8 million, received an 
allocation combined of £27.3 million, and actually spent 
£33.1 million. It is clear that the Government exercised 
only a loose but significant control over the level of 
capital spending, and its control played a major part in 
curbing capital spending. These controls were recognised by 
the County Treasurer of Kent CC when he noted that the 
"level of capital expenditure which can be approved for 
1984-85 will depend upon capital allocations...."81
Though the Government's capital expenditure controls were 
a significant constraint, its controls over local authority 
revenue spending were the more important constraint on the 
level of local authority capital spending. There is a 
mountain of evidence leading to the conclusion that
81 Taken from his Report to Kent CC's Policy and Budget 
Group, 15 April 1983, p3.
Allocation Year Allocation Outturn
69 1981/82 100 116
74 1982/83 100 138
61 1983/84 100 148
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financial pressures on the revenue side, and not those on
the capital side, have most dampened down the level of
capital spending. For example, the County Treasurer of
Bedfordshire CC stated:82
"During the year capital investment by the 
Council amounted to £11.1 million.... Because of 
the constraints brought about on the revenue 
budget by the Government's expenditure targets 
and grant penalties it has again not proved 
possible to finance any part of the capital 
programme from revenue resources. The level of 
the Council's capital programme is substantially 
governed by the capital allocation control 
arrangements operated by Central Government and 
their prescription on local authorities over the 
use of capital receipts. However, as in 1983-84, 
in view of the pressures placed upon the 
council's revenue budgets by the Government's 
current policy of public expenditure restraint, 
the revenue consequences of that capital 
investment programme have become an equally 
important determinant in setting the annual size 
of the Council's programme."
In Bedfordshire CC, the Chief Executive and the County
Treasurer remarked that the capital programme of 1984/85
was made with explicit emphasis on "the consequential
revenue costs (both financing charges and current
expenditure) arising upon completion of the programme".83
There was a clear strategy that new capital projects would
be programmed only if their revenue consequences were
limited.84 Thus, the financial pressures on the revenue
side meant that not only no revenue contributions could be
made but that the revenue consequences of the capital
programme had to be minimised. The Council preferred to
82 Taken from Bedfordshire CC's Annual Report And 
Statement Of Accounts 1984-85. p3.
83 Taken from Bedfordshire CC's Countv Council Budget 
1984-85: Part 1. pv.
84 Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC; 
Deputy Leader, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC; County 
Surveyor, Bedfordshire CC; and Principal Assistant, County 
Surveyor's Department, Bedfordshire CC.
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"build roads rather than homes".85 These revenue 
constraints were also felt in Kent CC. Its County Treasurer 
warned:86
"The Policy and Budget Group and the Policy and 
Resources Committee in considering the capital 
programme expressed their concern at the County 
Council's ability to continue to sustain the 
programme at its present level and at the impact 
that resultant revenue commitments could have on 
future revenue budgets. The Policy and Resources 
Committee has therefore given approval in 
principle only to the 1984-85 programme and has 
agreed that a detailed review of the entire three 
year programme 1984-85 to 1986-87 be carried out 
by members of the Policy and Budget Group before 
any proposals included for 1984-85 can proceed."
In Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC there was less concern 
about the revenue consequences of their capital programmes 
than that displayed in Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC. In 
Stockport MBC there was some concern but because the 
Council could fall back on a large pool of capital receipts 
the concern was largely expressed as concern for the 
future. The Chairman of the Finance Sub-Committee remarked 
that capital spending "invariably generates further revenue 
expenditure which can cause problems of financing growth 
when budgets are already tight."87 In Knowsley MBC the 
level of concern over the revenue consequences of its 
capital programme was even lower than that expressed in 
Stockport MBC. It faced fewer pressures on the capital side 
because like Stockport MBC it had a large sum of money from 
selling its council houses, and unlike Stockport MBC it 
received a large amount of grant as part of the 
Government's urban programme. The Council, however, ensured 
that the bulk of this urban programme money was spent on
85 Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC.
86 Taken from Kent CC's Revenue Budget And Capital 
Programme 1984-85. p3.
87 Taken from Stockport MBC's Corporate Plan And Budget 
1984-87 pv.
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capital projects with minimal revenue commitments for 
future years.
For the financial year 1984/85 the four local authorities 
faced very different constraints upon their capital 
programmes. Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC with little in 
capital receipts were constrained by the revenue 
consequences of their capital programmes which would 
produce financial difficulties on the revenue side in 
subsequent years. Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC, flush 
with capital receipts, were more constrained by financial 
controls on the capital side, particularly the restrictions 
on the use of capital receipts.
The two major constraints upon the level of local authority
capital spending were the controls imposed by the
Government on both the capital and revenue sides. However,
another less important constraint, and often forgotten, is
the possibility and almost probability of slippage of a
local authority's capital programme. There are often delays
in starting and completing a capital scheme, such as
shortage of staff and contract overruns. The slippage of
capital projects is widespread in local government. In
Bedfordshire CC the Chief Executive and the County
Treasurer noted:88
"Experience in previous years has shown that due 
to a number of factors actual capital payments 
have tended to fall short of the original planned 
programme and due to late commencement of new 
projects, payment commitments have slipped into 
a later year. It seems likely that this situation 
will occur again during 1984-85 and the position 
is being monitored in order to be taken into 
account as and when the Council makes its future 
capital expenditure decisions."
Also, there was some slippage in Kent CC's capital
programme of 1984/85 which allowed the Council to observe
the Government's request for restraint without having any
88 Taken from Bedfordshire CC's Countv Council Budget 
1984-85; Part 1. pv.
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effect on the programme.
Overall, there has been a real decline of local authority
capital spending. The pressures on capital spending were
summarised in the following words:89
"The most significant change is that capital 
spending by local authorities is now about half 
of what it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
At the same time the need for capital investment, 
particularly in urban areas, has continued to 
grow, reaching crisis proportions in some areas. 
Several factors have contrived to reduce spending 
ability:
- the use of local authority capital spending as 
an economic regulator by successive governments.
A far more rapid downturn in public expenditure 
figures can be achieved by limiting new starts 
than by pressuring other areas of spending, where 
reductions take longer to work through.
- pressures on the rate which limit individual 
authorities* ability to undertake projects with 
significant revenue effects.
- artificial limitations on the use of capital 
receipts to finance new capital expenditure.
- the availability of capital receipts."
These pressures on the level of local authority capital 
spending were very evident in the four local authorities 
examined. On one hand, the capital spending of Bedfordshire 
CC and Kent CC fell in real terms because of the mixture of 
government controls over capital and especially revenue 
spending. These two local authorities were unable to expand 
their capital programmes because the consequent revenue 
consequences (such as debt charges) would have increased 
the likelihood of incurring severe grant penalties and also 
there was only a little pool of capital receipts to finance 
capital spending. On the other hand, Knowsley MBC and 
Stockport MBC increased their capital spending in real 
terms. They were able to use monies to finance their 
expanding capital programmes that were not available to the 
other two local authorities. Both local authorities, as 
housing authorities, were able to generate a substantial 
yield of capital receipts from selling off council houses.
89 Baker (1987) p25.
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And Knowsley MBC, as a programme authority, was able to tap 
government grants to finance its capital programme. Though 
capital spending of local government generally contracted 
in real terms, some local authorities (notably housing 
authorities) increased their capital spending. The 
pressures curbing capital spending were faced by all local 
authorities - some local authorities reduced their spending 
because of these pressures, but other local authorities 
increased their spending because they were cushioned from 
these pressures.
FISCAL STRESS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The examination of the spending of the four local 
authorities lends only qualified support to the widespread 
notion that there were spending cuts in local government 
between 1978/79 and 1984/85. Both revenue and capital 
spending of these local authorities and local government 
generally increased in cash terms, with the exception of 
Bedfordshire CC's capital spending - see tables 3.1 and 
3.14. If the spending figures are adjusted for inflation 
and measured in real terms, a different picture emerges. On
the revenue side, there was a real increase in local
government spending, but this national trend of increased 
spending was mirrored only in the spending record of one of 
the four local authorities, Stockport MBC - see tables 3.2 
and 3.3. The other three local authorities, Bedfordshire 
CC, Kent CC and Knowsley MBC, reduced their spending. On
the capital side, there was a real decrease of local
government spending - see tables 3.15 and 3.16. However, 
two of the four local authorities, Knowsley MBC and 
Stockport MBC, increased their capital spending in real 
terms. In general, the national spending picture during 
this period was one of real expansion on the revenue side,
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and one of real contraction on the capital side. 90
Most observations of local authority spending are 
aggregated observations. They usually measure the spending 
of all local authorities or a single local authority. Both 
measures are aggregated calculations. If aggregated 
spending is broken down it invariably reveals a more 
complicated picture. The breakdown of spending of the four 
local authorities revealed that substantial spending cuts 
were made but were hidden in the aggregated spending totals 
by much larger spending increases. The table below outlines 
the disaggregated changes of revenue spending of the four 
local authorities.
Table 3.18: Breakdown of Gross Revenue Spending of
Four Local Authorities. 1983/84 - 1984/85
Bedford- Knowsley Stockport
shire CC Kent CC MBC MBC Total Change
£m £m £m £m £m %
1983/84* 232.2 600.5 119.7 163.5 1115.9
Base budget
changes 2.7 4.7 3.0 3.8 14.2 1.3
Budgeted
reductions (3.3) (14.0) (1*7) (0.1) (19.1) (1-7)
Budgeted
additions 1.8 15.6 0.8 1.7 19.9 1.8
Contingency 8.6 20.9 2.5 3.9 35.9 3.2
Overspend 6.5 17.4 2.2 0.5 26.6 2.4
1984/85* 248.5 645.1 126.5 173.3 1193.4 106.9
* Adjusted for contributions to and from special funds
90 See Travers (1987b).
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Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and 
Stockport MBC
This table above details the changes made to the outturn of 
1983/84. From this table it is possible to isolate the 
decisions which were made to increase spending and to 
decrease spending of the four local authorities. The 
spending increases are the base budget changes, budgeted 
additions and overspend.91 Furthermore, if the contingency 
monies are excluded, then, these spending increases and 
decreases are changes in spending as measured in real 
terms. Contingency monies were set aside by the local 
authorities to cover pay and price increases throughout the 
financial year 1984/85. The table below shows the breakdown 
of spending increases and decreases of the four local 
authorities.
Table 3.19: Breakdown of Real Spending Increases and 
Decreases of Four Local Authorities. 
1983/84 - 1984/85
1983/84 Increases Decreases 1984/85
Bedfordshire CC (£m) 232.2 11.0 (3.3) 239.9
(%) 4.7 (1.4) 103.3
Kent CC (£m) 600.5 37.7 (14.0) 624.2
(%) 6.3 (2.3) 103.9
91 The base budget changes included decisions which 
reduced spending, as stated earlier, but it is impossible 
to isolate these reductions from the much greater additions 
to the base budget. Furthermore, some of the overspend may 
have been caused by the local authorities under-estimating 
the amount of contingency needed to cover inflation. Again 
it is impossible to calculate precisely the share of 
overspend caused by higher inflation than that forecasted 
by the local authorities. Given the overwhelming tendency 
that base budget changes increased spending, and that 
inflation during this period was stable and therefore 
easier to forecast it is reasonable to include both base 
budget changes and overspend as real spending increases.
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Knowsley MBC (£m) 119.7 6.0 (1.7) 124.0
(%) 5.0 (1.4) 103.6
Stockport MBC (£m) 163.5 6.0 (0.1) 169.4
(%) 3.7 — 103.6
Total (£m) 1115.9 60.7 (19.1) 1157.5
(%) 5.4 (1.7) 103.7
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and 
Stockport MBC
This table shows that the four local authorities reduced 
budgeted spending by over £19 million in 1984/85, 
representing nearly two per cent of the level of spending 
in 1983/84. The amount of budgeted reductions varied 
between local authorities from Kent CC making a 2.3 per 
cent cut to Stockport MBC making no significant cuts at 
all. Table 3.19 reveals that for 1984/85 the four local 
authorities increased their real spending by over £60 
million and cut their spending by over £19 million from the 
previous year's level. The spending increases more than 
trebled the spending decreases. As a result, there was 
overall an increase in the revenue spending of the four 
local authorities as measured in real terms between 1983/84 
and 1984/85.
These findings will now be examined in light of the vast 
mass of literature on local government spending documented 
in the last chapter. There are three general viewpoints on 
the trends of local authority spending - namely that local 
authorities have cut their spending, that local authorities 
have increased their spending and that local authorities 
have faced increasing financial pressures which have led to 
both growth and cuts in their spending. These views will 
now be discussed.
The first view catalogues the spending cuts made by local
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authorities.92 This view can be substantiated only by a 
disaggregated analysis of local authority spending - that 
is, if spending is broken down. For example, there have 
been real cuts made in the level of local authority capital 
spending - see tables 3.15 and 3.16; and also local 
authorities made specific decisions to cut spending in 
making their revenue budgets, which were overshadowed by 
decisions to increase their spending by more than they 
decided to cut it - see tables 3.18 and 3.19.
The second view focuses on the growth of local authority 
spending.93 This view can be substantiated by an aggregated 
analysis of local authority spending - that is, if spending 
is seen in total. Local authority spending increased 
substantially in cash terms, and increased slightly in real 
terms during the early 1980s - see tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 
Furthermore, local authority capital spending increased in 
cash terms during this period - see table 3.14; and also 
local authorities made decisions to increase their spending 
in making their revenue budgets - see tables 3.18 and 3.19.
There is, then, some evidence to support these two 
contrasting views on local authority spending. However, it 
is important to understand the methodology of how local 
authority spending is being measured in order to make sense 
of the sometimes heated arguments about local authority 
spending. Though there is some weight behind these two 
views they are too unwieldy as sophisticated explanations 
of spending trends in local government. They are rooted in 
a monolithic assumption of local authority spending - 
downward or upward - and thus possess no subtlety in 
explaining why some local authorities increased and others 
cut their spending, and why local authorities make 
decisions to increase and cut items of spending at the same
92 See chapter two, footnote 65.
93 See chapter two, footnote 66.
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time.
These limitations are avoided in the more complex and
robust third view of local authority spending. This view
focuses on the increasing pressures facing local
authorities in making spending decisions.94 Whether
spending falls or rises depends on the outcome of these
pressures, and the outcome varies between local
authorities, within a local authority and over time. This
view, often couched in the language of fiscal pressure,
fiscal stress and fiscal crisis, best explains the patterns
of local authority spending. The competing pressures to
spend and not to spend have "created a local government
resource squeeze of considerable strength."95 This resource
squeeze was described in the following words:96
"... while there is a local resource squeeze in 
Britain, it does not amount to anything 
resembling crisis proportions, nor is it rooted, 
ultimately, in financial conditions. Rather, it 
is caused by local authorities being caught in 
political cross-fire coming from several 
directions: from ratepayers fighting to keep
rates down; from council tenants, and others, who 
pay local fees and charges, opposing increases in 
local authority prices for services and 
amenities; from the general public as a whole 
requiring and demanding more and better local 
services; from central government (consciously or 
unconsciously, willingly or by default) keeping 
local government on a shoestring by limiting it 
to the rates as the only tax; and, most recently 
of all, from central government using its 
political power to cut grants and total local 
government spending. The conditions that cause 
local financial problems lie less in local or 
financial circumstances than in national and 
political ones."
According to Mouritzen, there are three meanings of fiscal
94 See chapter two, footnote 67.
95 Newton (1981a) pl96.
96 Newton (1981a) p225.
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stress.97 First, fiscal stress can be seen as "a socio­
economic imbalance", reflecting "a mismatch between what 
citizens want in relation to what the private sector 
economy can support."98 This view says little about the 
fiscal position of local authorities. Though socio-economic 
factors shape their financing and spending, local 
authorities can provide only a part of what citizens want 
and are only part of government that is sustained allegedly 
by the private sector. Second, fiscal stress can be defined 
as "an imbalance between fiscal policies and available 
resources."99 This narrower view focuses on the gap between 
the resources that local authorities possess and their 
policies they wish to pursue. Third, fiscal stress can be 
regarded as "an imbalance between demands, needs or wants 
on the one side and fiscal policies on the other."100 This 
view contains a subjective component because fiscal stress 
is measured when the demands, needs and wants of those 
perceiving stress are not being satisfied.101 It is
97 Mouritzen (1992a) pp28-30.
98 Mouritzen (1992a) p29. This political economy 
approach to defining fiscal stress encompasses the Marxist 
view of fiscal crisis in capitalist states (for example, 
see Alcaly & Mermelstein (1977); Cockburn (1977) pp41-66; 
Friedland (1981); Friedland, Piven & Alford (1977); Gough
(1979); Gough (1980); Marcuse (1981); O'Connor (1973); Offe
(1984); Rubin & Rubin (1986); and Saunders (1980)). It 
includes also the New Right view of the pernicious effects 
of increasing government spending (including local 
government spending) upon the economy (for example, see 
Bacon & Eltis (1976); Butler & Pirie (1981); Friedman 
(1976); Friedman & Friedman (1980); Henney (1984); Ilersic 
(1975); Institute Of Economic Affairs (1980); Minford
(1984); Piven & Friedland (1984); Ridley (1988) ; Rubin & 
Rubin (1986); Taylor (1980); Tory Reform Group (1979); and 
Walker (1983)).
99 Mouritzen (1992a) p29.
100 Mouritzen (1992a) p30.
101 Rose noted the subjective nature of fiscal stress 
when he argued that frustration over public expenditure "is 
the subjective consequence of a 'squeeze' between what is 
expected and what is received..." ((1980) plO).
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difficult to operationalise given the methodological 
difficulties in defining and measuring demands, needs and 
wants.102 Of the three general definitions of fiscal 
stress, the second one is most applicable in examining the 
making of spending cuts in local authorities. It focuses on 
organisations (eg local authorities), rather than the 
political economy within which organisations operate. It 
looks at the policies and resources of organisations, 
rather than the perceived impact of organisations upon 
their environment.
Fiscal stress in local government occurs when local
authorities must significantly cut their expenditures,
increase their revenues, or both cut expenditure and
increase revenue.103 As Wolman and Davis noted:104
"We define fiscal pressure as a situation in 
which a local government, faced with the 
necessity of achieving a balance between revenues 
and expenditures, must in time choose either to 
(1) increase taxes through changes in the tax 
rate or structure in order to maintain existing 
real expenditure and service levels, (2) reduce 
real expenditures from the level of the previous 
year or (3) engage in some combination of these 
activities."
Fiscal stress is the symptom of the widening gap between 
revenues and expenditures of local authorities, reducing 
their capacity to supply the demand to provide services. 
The competing pressures facing local authorities in their 
financing and spending decisions were evident in the four 
local authorities studied. In making their revenue budgets 
and capital programmes they were faced with many critical
102 See chapter two, pp71-77.
103 See Barnett (1986) ; Elcock (1987b) pp7-9; Elcock, 
Jordan & Midwinter (1989) ppl05-116; Newton (1980);
Sondheimer (1986); Wolman (1983); Wolman & Davis (1980); 
Wolman & Peterson (1980); Wolman & Peterson (1981); and 
Wooldridge (1984). Also, on the measurement of fiscal 
stress in local government see Boyne (1988) ppl6-20; and 
Clark & Ferguson (1983) pp43-74.
104 Wolman & Davis (1980) pi.
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decisions. On the revenue side, they had to decide by how 
much, if at all, to exceed their expenditure target, the 
level of rates or precept to set, and finally the required 
level of service provision. On the capital side, they had 
to decide how much to spend on capital projects given their 
block authorisation, the amount of funds available to 
finance their projects, and the revenue consequences 
incurred by their capital programmes. These critical 
factors weighed very heavily in making their budget 
decisions. There are two distinctive though related arenas 
of budgeting in local government, within which the 
interplay of these factors takes place. They revolve around 
the level of financial resources available to a local 
authority, and the level of expenditure required by that 
local authority. There are competing pressures to spend and 
not to spend operating in these two arenas, which will now 
be examined in light of what happened in the four local 
authorities studied.105
The financial resources of local authorities
The level of resources available to be spent is determined 
by the amount of revenue and capital resources available to 
local authorities. At the time of the research revenue 
resources included income from rates, rate support grant 
and other grants from central government, council house 
rents, and fees and charges for services. Capital resources 
included monies raised from loans, capital receipts, 
various grants and revenue contributions.
On the revenue side, the two largest sources of income were 
from rates and the rate support grant (which comprised 
block grant, and a much smaller domestic rate relief grant)
105 For a general discussion of these pressures facing 
local authorities see Newton (1980); and Newton & Karran
(1985) pp52-98.
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- see tables 3.20, 3.21 and 3.22. Table 3.20 below details 
the monies raised from rates and received as block grant by 
the four local authorities.
Table 3.20: Gross Revenue Income of Four Local 
Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85
1978/79 1981/82 1984/85
£m £m £m
Bedfordshire CC
- rates 77.2 101.6 125.6
- block grant* 48.6 56.7 61.7
Kent CC
- rates 174.5 207.0 261.7
- block grant* 99.8 211.0 219.4
Knowsley MBC
- rates 18.8 23.0 31.6
- block grant* 32.9 39.8 37.9
Stockport MBC
- rates 29.4 39.6 49.1
- block grant* 35.9 40.3 38.8
* As the block grant system was introduced by the 
Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 the 
equivalent figures for 1978/79 are calculated by 
adding together the needs and resources elements of 
the rate support grant.
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and 
Stockport MBC
Table 3.21 outlines what proportion of spending of the four 
local authorities was respectively financed from rates and 
block grant.
Table 3.21: Share of Gross Revenue Income of Four 
Local Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85*
1978/79 1981/82 1984/85
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Bedfordshire CC
- rates 55
- block grant 35
Kent CC
- rates 49
- block grant 28
Knowsley MBC
- rates 25
- block grant 43
Stockport MBC
- rates 33
- block grant 41
47
26
38
39
20
35
26
27
51
25
40
34
25
30
28
22
* Calculated as a share of gross revenue expenditure
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and 
Stockport MBC
The two tables above show that though the amount of block 
grant given to the local authorities increased during this 
period, it significantly declined as a share of financing 
their spending. The table below portrays the national 
picture of how local government spending was financed.
Table 3.22: Share of Gross Revenue Income of Local
Authorities in England. 1980/81 - 1984/85*
1980/81 1982/83 1984/85
% % %
Rates 29 33 32
Rate support grant 34 29 26
Specific grants 16 14 21
Council house rents 6 9 5
Charges and other income 15 15 16
* Calculated as a share of gross revenue expenditure
Source: Department Of The Environment (1986) p7
157
Table 3.22 shows that the share of revenue spending 
financed from rate support grant fell, and that from rates 
rose. This significant shift of financing local authority 
expenditure took place because the Conservative Government 
reduced gradually the level of rate support grant given to 
local authorities as part of its drive to curb their 
spending.106 In 1981 Greenwood observed that there "is no 
evidence ... that cumulative grant loss affects changes in 
expenditure.11107 He argued that local authorities preferred 
generally to raise their rates than cut their spending.108 
This observation was also made later by Newton and Karran, 
who maintained that in response to grant cuts local 
authorities tended "to fill the hole from other sources of 
income."109 Table 3.23 below reveals that this preference 
was exercised by local authorities in the early 1980s.
Table 3.23; Rate Income and Rate Support Grant of
Local Authorities in England. 1980/81 - 
1984/85
106 The level of rate support grant was not cut evenly 
between local authorities. In the early 1980s the 
Government changed the method of calculating and 
distributing block grant, which was by far the most 
significant component of rate support grant. This change 
favoured generally the shire authorities (eg Kent CC) and 
local authorities with low rateable resources (eg Knowsley 
MBC) at the expense of urban authorities and local 
authorities with high rateable resources - see Travers 
(1986b) pp93-103.
107 Greenwood (1981) p90. See also Gibson (1982) .
108 Greenwood argued that "loss of grant was important 
only in 1975/76 and 1976/77", during which "spending 
decisions were tailored to the exigencies of grant 
receipts, but not thereafter" ((1981) p89).
109 Newton & Karran (1985) pill. See also Audit 
Commission For Local Authorities In England And Wales 
(1984g) pp7, 9-28; Barnett (1986); Boyne (1990); Elcock, 
Jordan & Midwinter (1989) ppl06-108; Greenwood (1982b);
Midwinter (1988) pp25-27; Sondheimer (1986); and Wolman & 
Goldsmith (1987) pl78.
1980/81 1982/83 1984/85
Rate income (£m)* 7444 8529 8513
+1085 -16
Rate support grant (£m)* 8708 7478 6768
-1230 -710
* Adjusted to 1980/81 prices
Source: Department Of The Environment (1986) p7
Between 1980/81 and 1982/83 the level of rate support grant 
given to local authorities fell by over £1,000 million in 
real terms, but the level of rate income increased by just 
under the same amount. However, there is little evidence to 
suggest that local authorities increased their rates to 
compensate for grant loss in the mid-1980s. In fact, table 
3.23 shows that local authorities not only received less 
grant in real terms but also received less rate income 
between 1982/83 and 1984/85. This national picture is not 
mirrored when the record of the four local authorities is 
examined - see table 3.24.
Table 3.24: Rate Income and Block Grant of Four Local 
Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85
1978/79 1981/82 1984/85
Bedfordshire CC
- rate income (£m)* 77 64 67
-13 +3
- block grant (£m)* 49 36 33
-13 -3
Kent CC
- rate income (£m)* 175 131 140
-44 +9
- block grant (£m)* 100 133 118
+33 -15
Knowsley MBC
- rate income (£m)* 19 15 17
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-4 +2
- block grant (£m)* 33 25 20
-8 -5
Stockport MBC
- rate income (£m)* 29 25 26
-4 +1
- block grant (£m)* 3 6 25 21
-11 -4
* Adjusted to 1978/79 prices
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and
Stockport MBC
The table above shows that the four local authorities faced 
both reductions of their block grant and rate income in 
real terms during the early 1980s. But in the mid-1980s 
there is some evidence to suggest that they raised their 
rates to offset grant losses. Thus, the pattern seen in 
these local authorities was the reverse of that seen 
nationally. Nevertheless, the drastic real reductions of 
rate support grant imposed downward pressures on local 
authority spending. The scale of spending cuts required of 
this grant loss was lessened to a limited extent because 
local authorities raised additional income from other 
sources, notably the rates. Following Newton and Karran, 
"the fact remains that grants have been pared down, and 
that this had the effect of restraining local 
expenditure.1,1,0 Similarly, the Department of the 
Environment, though tacitly recognising its failure to cut 
local authority spending, still believed that spending was 
lower than it would otherwise have been without expenditure 
targets and grant penalties.111
The amount of rate income was a major constraint upon the
110 Newton & Karran (1985) pill.
111 Taken from National Audit Office (1985) pl5. See 
also Conservative Party (1992) p37.
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level of resources available to be spent by local 
authorities. Until rate-capping was introduced, local 
authorities determined their own rate levels.112 The 
examination of the four local authorities suggested there 
were two main concerns in setting their rates. They were 
the concerns over the impact of rates upon business and 
upon voters. In three of the four local authorities - Kent 
CC, Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC - there was explicit 
concern over the alleged adverse effects of high rates upon 
business in the local areas. Their assumption was that high 
rates made local businesses less competitive and deterred 
new businesses from setting up in their local areas.113 
They attempted consequently to limit their rate increases 
to protect business interests.
All four local authorities, especially Bedfordshire CC, 
were concerned to limit their rate increases in order to 
protect domestic ratepayers, and therefore local voters. 
This concern was usually expressed in terms of electoral 
advantage in forthcoming local elections. Newton 
observed:114
"In the past many local authorities have held 
annual elections, and since it is widely believed 
among council members that rate and rent 
increases can have a marked effect on local 
election results, the tendency has been to hold 
increases down to a minimum, especially when 
control of the council is in the balance and 
could be upset by a small electoral swing."
The widespread belief that the level of rates had a
112 Rate-capping first came into effect in 1985/86.
113 This assumption was challenged by the findings of 
research commissioned by the Department of the Environment. 
It found that "local authorities which levy above average 
rates, or which increase their rates more than others, are 
probably not damaging their local economies" (Fothergill & 
Monk (1985) p55). Though Bennett and Fearnehough claimed 
later that high rates "remain for business an important 
problem" ((1987) p35).
114 Newton (1981a) p221. See also Elcock (1987a) p248; 
Ferry (1979); and Midwinter (1988) p26.
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decisive effect on local election results is not supported 
by research on local voting behaviour. The Widdicombe 
Committee, after commissioning research on local voting, 
noted:115
"... local factors - such as rate increases and 
school closures - can and do influence 
elections.... There is, however, little evidence 
that local issues will be decisive except in 
authorities which are otherwise very marginal.... 
National party allegiances and attitudes to 
national politics play a major part in local 
election results."
Though the local authorities were concerned about the
electoral consequences of their rates, their concern was
inversely related to the size of majority of the
controlling party group. The rates increases of the four
local authorities ranged from the nil increase of
Bedfordshire CC to the nine per cent increase of Knowsley
MBC. The Conservative and Liberal Groups of 'hung'
Bedfordshire CC decided not to increase the Council's
precept in order to court popular support in the
forthcoming local elections. The large Labour Group of
Knowsley MBC increased their rates substantially in the
comfort that local election results would not threaten its
majority on the Council. The findings of recent research on
the effects of rate increases on local voting were
confirmed in this study of four local authorities. The
general concern over the effects of rates upon voters and
business was an important constraint upon the level of
resources available to local authorities.
On the capital side, the main sources of finance were loans 
and capital receipts - see tables 3.25 and 3.26. The table 
below shows the amount that each major source of capital 
finance raised by the four local authorities between
1978/79 and 1984/85.
115 Committee Of Inquiry Into The Conduct Of Local 
Authority Business (1986) p39. See also Miller (1988).
Table 3.25; Gross Capital Income of Four Local 
Authorities. 1978/79 - 1984/85
1978/79 1981/82 1984/85
£ m  £ m  £m
Bedfordshire CC
- loans 7.2 7.5 10.1
- capital receipts 1.1 0.8 0.9
- grants 1.6 1.3 -
- revenue contributions 0.5 0.9 -
Kent CC
- loans 20.8 15.4 21.6
- capital receipts 0.7 2.5 4.5
- grants 1.6 6.1 0.7
- revenue contributions 3.0 4.1 3.5
Knowsley MBC
- loans n/a* 6.8 12.1
- capital receipts n/a* 0.6 9.8
- grants n/a* 0.1 0.9
- revenue contributions n/a* 0.8
Stockport MBC
- loans n/a* 6.0 7.8
- capital receipts n/a* 0.6 3.6
- grants n/a* 0.4 0.4
- revenue contributions n/a* - -
* Figures not available from their annual accounts
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and 
Stockport MBC
The table above shows that loans and capital receipts were 
by far the most significant source of capital finance for 
the four local authorities, as they were nationally. Table 
3.26 below details the proportion that each source of 
capital finance contributed towards capital spending. This 
table reveals that loans were, and still are, the largest 
source of capital finance, that capital receipts became 
increasingly significant as a source of capital finance and 
that revenue contributions to capital outlay declined over 
the years because of severe financial pressures on the 
revenue side.
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Table 3.26: Share of Gross Capital Income of Four 
Local Authorities, 1978/79 - 1984/85*
1978/79
%
Bedfordshire CC
- loans 64
- capital receipts 10
- grants 14
- revenue contributions 4
1981/82
%
60
6
10
7
1984/85
91
8
Kent CC
- loans 87
- capital receipts 3
- grants 7
- revenue contributions 13
48
8
19
13
65
14
2
11
Knowsley MBC
- loans n/a
- capital receipts n/a
- grants n/a
- revenue contributions n/a
Stockport MBC
- loans n/a
- capital receipts n/a
- grants n/a
- revenue contributions n/a
76
7
1
9
81
8
5
53
43
4
60
28
3
* Calculated as a share of gross capital expenditure
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and 
Stockport MBC
Local authorities have access to substantial resources to 
finance their capital programmes though their spending was, 
and still is, controlled by central government. Within 
these controls local authorities can tap into a large pool 
of capital resources from several sources. Local 
authorities can raise loans either from the Public Works 
Loan Board or the open money markets. They have few 
problems, notwithstanding the Hammersmith and Fulham case 
involving interest rate swaps, in raising loans not least 
because the Public Works Loan Board acts as a lender of
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last resort.116 At the time of the research the major 
constraint upon local authority borrowing was the amount of 
debt charges (that is, payments of both the principal and 
interest of loans) incurred on the revenue side. This 
constraint deterred both Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC from 
borrowing more money to finance their capital programmes. 
The other major source of capital finance was capital 
receipts generated from the sale of local authorities' 
capital assets. As a result of the right-to-buy scheme 
introduced under the Housing Act 1980, housing authorities 
such as Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC received substantial 
sums of capital receipts from selling off council houses, 
which were then used to finance their capital 
programmes.1,7 There were other sources of capital finance, 
such as grants from central government and other bodies, 
revenue contributions, and leasing arrangements. For 
example, in 1984/85 Kent CC raised well over £1 million 
from leasing deals.
Overall, the level of revenue and capital resources created 
pressures to both increase and decrease local authority 
spending. Put crudely, the more financial resources a local 
authority possesses, the more it spends; the less it 
possesses, the less it spends. The resources of local 
authorities are subject to an array of financial, economic 
and political constraints. Financially, Parliament 
determines the sources of finance upon which local 
authorities rely - for example, local authorities cannot 
levy a local income tax. Central government attempted to 
control the amount of revenue and capital resources 
available to local authorities - for example, it 
distributed grants to local authorities, and imposed
116 see Hepworth (1984) ppl41-144; and Sbragia (1983) 
pp9-10. On the Hammersmith and Fulham case see Arnold- 
Forster (1993); Cross (1990); King (1993) p201; Loughlin 
(1990); Loughlin (1991); Miller (1989); and Travis (1989).
117 See The Economist (1984) .
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expenditure targets and grant penalties on the revenue side 
and block allocations on the capital side. Economically, 
local authorities were constrained by their perception of 
the effects of rates upon business. Taxes, which partly 
finance government grants to local authorities, are very 
dependent upon the state of the economy. Politically, the 
Conservative Government generally penalised Labour- 
controlled local authorities and rewarded Conservative- 
controlled local authorities in its grant calculations and 
rate-capping decisions. Local authorities are concerned 
about the electoral consequences of their financing 
decisions. The resources available to local authorities are 
critical determinants of local authority spending.
The expenditure requirements of local authorities
The level of required expenditure of local authorities is 
determined by a variety of influences and controls. The 
economic, social and political conditions of local 
government produce pressures on local authority 
spending.118 These three types of pressures will be 
examined in turn.
First, there are very significant economic pressures on 
local authority spending. Local authorities often spend 
more or less depending on the state of their local 
economies. Kent CC, Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC all 
expanded their economic development activities in order to 
regenerate their local economies.
118 See Alt (1971); Danziger (1978b); Foster, Jackman & 
Perlman (1980) pp77-101; Harrison & Smith (1978); Newton 
(1980); Newton & Karran (1985); Oliver & Stanyer (1969); 
Radley (not dated); Sharpe & Newton (1984); and Travers 
(1992). There are also other spending pressures. For 
example, after the violent storms of 1987 Kent CC spent £22 
million clearing up its damage, of which 75 per cent was 
later reimbursed by central government - see Hedley (1987).
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Local authority spending is also dependent on the state of 
the national and world economy. Inflation is a significant 
economic pressure facing local authorities which largely 
lies outside their control, and is rooted in the national 
and world economies. In times of inflation local 
authorities have to spend more to provide a constant level 
of service provision. The costs of providing local 
authority services have increased over years, which 
generate pressures upon local authorities to spend more 
just to stand still. According to Greenwood, one of the 
main causes of fiscal pressure in local government "was the 
rapid upward movement of pay and prices."119 In the 1970s 
and early 1980s the high rate of inflation forced many 
local authorities to increase their rates to keep up with 
the inflationary pressures upon spending and some local 
authorities to cut their spending. There were two reasons 
why inflation was felt by some local authorities more than 
other local authorities. The first reason was that rates 
did not keep up automatically with inflation like income 
tax. Local authorities must always increase rates just to 
keep up with inflation.120 In times of high inflation local 
authorities are faced with contradictory pressures of 
restricting their rates rises and increasing their spending 
in line with inflation. The second reason is that pay and 
prices in local government tend to increase more than those 
in the wider economy.121 Inflation in local government is 
generally higher than the general rate of inflation (as
119 Greenwood (1981) p79.
120 See Newton (1981a) pp218-219.
121 See Committee Of Inquiry Into Local Government 
Finance (1976) pp26-27; Hepworth (1976) p6; Hepworth (1984) 
ppl4-16, 24-25; Newton (1980) pp99-124; Newton (1981a)
pp208-210; and Newton & Karran (1985) pp84-98. According to 
Baumol, the "progressive and cumulative increases in the 
real costs incurred" in providing services such as those 
provided by local authorities are the root causes of the 
inevitable "urban crisis" ((1971) pl08). On the effects of 
inflation and the relative price effect upon local 
government see chapter two, pp69-70.
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measured by the Retail Price Index (RPI)) because local
authorities are large employers and large borrowers. Wage
rises and interest rates have exceeded inflation, which
have thus exacerbated the spending pressures on local
authorities. Bedfordshire CC trimmed its capital programme
at a time of high interest rates because it could not
afford the debt charges in subsequent years. Inflation,
then, "imposes pressures upon a local authority that are
more intense than on many other organisations.1,122
Following Newton and Karran:123
"... local government spending has risen partly 
because its costs have kept pace with general 
prices, or even outpaced them. In other words, 
part of the rise in local government spending is 
attributable to factors which are beyond the 
immediate control of local authorities 
themselves. They do not determine rates of 
interest, they do not pass laws which oblige them 
to borrow for a large part of their capital 
investment, and they do not choose to deal mainly 
with labour-intensive services."
Second, there are social pressures on local authority 
spending. Local authorities spend more or less depending on 
the demographic characteristics of the people living in 
their areas. For example, many local education authorities 
made savings as a result of falling school rolls. Generally 
Travers predicted that "demographic change will result in 
pressures for higher expenditure over the next eight or 10 
years."124 Knowsley MBC increased its spending in part 
because it convinced central government that it should 
receive more grant in compensation for widespread social 
deprivation in the area. Even the power of the mass media 
influences local authority spending. In 1984 local 
authorities faced "a massive leap in compensation claims
122 Hepworth (1984) pl5.
123 Newton & Karran (1985) p96.
124 Travers (1992) pl5. See also Newton (1981a) pp202- 
206. For a general discussion on the effects of demographic 
change upon public policy, see Hogwood (1992) pp209-219.
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involving uneven pavements, potholes and roadworks” after 
the television character from 'Coronation Street', Stan 
Ogden, successfully received compensation for stubbing his 
toe on a raised paving slab.125
Third, there are important political pressures on local
authority spending. Local authorities spend more or less
depending on their political complexion and their political
environment. The party political complexion of a local
authority is widely regarded as a critical determinant of
its spending. It is assumed that Labour-controlled councils
spend more and make fewer spending cuts than Conservative-
controlled councils - a claim that is widely proclaimed by
the Conservative Party at local election time. In the words
of Sharpe and Newton:126
"... authorities which stay under Labour control 
increase their spending more than authorities 
under continuous Conservative control. 
Authorities which switch to the Conservatives cut 
their spending in relative terms, but do so 
slowly. Conservative authorities which switch to 
Labour control increase their spending, and do so 
quite rapidly. There is, in other words, a clear 
party control effect on spending, and the Labour 
high spending effect is stronger after a change 
of control than the Conservative low spending 
effect."
Similarly, Duke and Edgell looked at the spending of a 
Conservative-controlled and a Labour-controlled council.127 
They found that in response to measures introduced by the
125 See Daily Mail (1984) pll.
126 Sharpe & Newton (1984) pl99. See also Alt (1977) 
p89; Bennett (1982b) ppl009-1015, 1021; Boyne (1990);
Elcock (1987a) pp246-248; Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) 
pp49-67; Kennett (1980) p63; Newton & Sharpe (1977) p73; 
Oliver & Stanyer (1969); Page (1990); and Sharpe (1981a). 
Sharpe and Newton maintained, however, that "the more 
competitive the party systems the more similar the 
expenditure patterns of authorities, irrespective of party 
control" ((1984) p200). See also Alt (1977) pp89-90; Newton 
Sc Sharpe (1977) pp73-74; and Sharpe (1981a) pp9-ll.
127 Duke Sc Edgell (1986); and Edgell Sc Duke (1991) pp86-
116.
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Conservative Government to cut local government spending,
the spending of the Conservative-controlled council fell
and that of the Labour-controlled council rose in real
terms. They wrote:128
"Torytown has experienced real cuts in gross 
expenditure..., whilst Labourville1s gross 
expenditure has continued to increase."
This party political effect did not manifest itself among
the four local authorities studied - see table 3.27. This
table reveals that a Labour-dominated authority, Knowsley
MBC, cut its revenue spending the most; and that a
Conservative-controlled authority, Stockport MBC, increased
its spending the most during this period. Even looking just
at 1984/85 there was a larger increase of spending in
Conservative-controlled Kent CC and Stockport MBC than
Labour-controlled Knowsley MBC. Turning to capital
spending, Knowsley MBC increased its spending much more
than the other three local authorities.
Table 3.27: Changes of Revenue and Capital
Spending of Four Local Authorities
Party control 1978/79-1984/85* 1983/84-1984/85**
% %
Bedfordshire CC 'hung'
- revenue
- capital
Kent CC
- revenue
- capital
Conservative
-5
-45
-2
-22
+2
0
+3
-4
Knowsley MBC
- revenue
- capital
Labour
-12
+125
+1
+10
Stockport MBC Conservative
- revenue
- capital
+5
+10
+1
-25
128 Duke & Edgell (1986) p261.
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* Adjusted to 1978/79 prices 
** Adjusted to 1983/84 prices
Source: Bedfordshire CC; Kent CC; Knowsley MBC; and 
Stockport MBC
From these findings it is perhaps tempting to stand 
conventional wisdom on its head, and make a case that 
Conservative-controlled local authorities spend more than 
Labour-controlled local authorities. This temptation must 
be resisted.129 Party control is an important determinant 
but not the most important determinant of local authority 
spending. It is less important than, for example, the type 
of local authority. On the revenue side, the type of local 
authority - county or district council, and shire or 
metropolitan council - was an important ingredient in the 
calculation of rate support grant. On the capital side, the 
type of local authority - housing or non-housing authority 
- is a major factor in the yield of capital receipts. Thus, 
the type of local authority upsets the expected party 
political pattern of spending that would have otherwise 
have emerged in the four local authorities.130
Furthermore, party labels are somewhat cumbersome 
analytical tools to explain the political pressures upon 
local authority spending. Party political analysis of local 
authority spending can explain only the effects of party 
politics and not the effects of other forms of politics. 
There is intra-party politics. There are political 
differences within a party group which often affect local
129 A sample of four local authorities is too small to 
discredit a general observation.
130 However, there is a link between type and party 
control of a local authority - an urban local authority (eg 
metropolitan district council) is more likely to be Labour- 
controlled, and a shire authority (eg county council) is 
more likely to be Conservative-controlled (see Dunleavy
(1980) pp87-89).
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authority spending. The split in the Liberal Group of 
Bedfordshire CC reflected to a large extent differences 
within the Group over how much should be spent on 
education. There is also pressure politics and community 
politics which sometimes influence the spending decisions 
of local authorities.131 Bedfordshire dropped its proposal 
to close a library after an "acrimonious” campaign led by 
a local newspaper.132
The political environment of local authorities is very much 
shaped by central government. Central government is perhaps 
the most important political constraint upon local 
authority spending. With one hand it encourages local 
authority spending, and with the other hand it discourages 
spending.133 Central government is schizophrenic in its 
attitude towards local government. Parts of central 
government (eg the Treasury) want to constrain local 
authority spending, and other parts (eg Department for
131 See Chandler (1991) ppl76-188; Dunleavy (1980) 
ppl50-159; Gyford (1984) pp82-98, 133-136; Kingdom (1991) 
ppl94-210; Pirie (1981) ppll-12; and Stoker (1991) ppll4- 
139.
132 County Librarian, Bedfordshire CC.
133 Central government often sent out contradictory 
messages to local authorities about their spending. Many 
local authorities wanted to close schools partly in 
response to pressures from the Department of the
Environment to cut spending. If there were objections 
locally to a proposed school closure, then, the Department 
of Education and Science was required to approve its
closure. However, many local authorities complained over 
the delay that the Department of Education and Science in 
making decisions on school closures, thus reducing the 
planned 'savings* (see Sharratt (1984)). At the same time 
the Audit Commission accused local authorities of failing 
to close schools in response to falling school rolls, 
causing "wasteful spending worth £100 million to £200 
million a year" (Carvel (1985)). A few years later the 
Department for Education also criticised local authorities 
for not closing enough schools (see MacLeod (1992)). The 
Conservative Government, via the Funding Agency for
Schools, now plans to close many schools (see Bevins
(1994); and MacLeod (1994)).
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Education) want to champion local authority spending in 
particular policy areas.134 The Department of the 
Environment is a 'two-faced friend* of local government. It 
defends local government when negotiating the annual grant 
settlement with the Treasury, but attacks local government 
when distributing grant between local authorities. Central 
government is not monolithic but fragmented, and creates 
competing and contradictory pressures upon the spending of 
local authorities.
Central government wearing its parliamentary veil requires 
local authorities to provide many services. Local 
government provides a range of statutory services such as 
schooling and policing. Under the Social Security and 
Housing Benefits Act 1982 housing authorities were required 
to administer a complex housing benefit scheme to replace 
the existing system of rate rebates and rent benefits. This 
scheme, though grant-aided, increased substantially the 
amount spent by local authorities. In 1984/85 Knowsley MBC 
spent over £16 million on administering the scheme, but in 
1982/83, the year before it came into effect, the Council 
spent only £7.5 million on administering the equivalent 
system of rate rebates and rent benefits. Local authorities 
are outlawed from providing services beyond their statutory 
powers. Thus, central government through its dominance of 
Parliament controls the functions that local authorities 
carry out, and these statutory limitations shape the level 
of their spending on providing services. In 1984 the now 
defunct Local Authorities Conditions of Service Advisory 
Board estimated central government initiatives on local 
government "added almost 1% to employment between June 1979 
and December 1983 compared with the overall reduction of
134 See Rhodes (1988) ppl03-106. He argued "the service 
departments are probably the best friends of local 
government at the centre because their interests coincide 
either in seeking an increase in funds or in resisting 
'cuts**1 ((1988) ppl04-105).
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As well as encouraging spending central government also 
discourages local authority spending. It possesses an array 
of financial controls designed to influence the level of 
spending by local authorities. The advent of the 
Conservative Government in 1979 witnessed a significant 
increase in the range and severity of these financial 
controls.136 The rationale behind these controls has been 
seen as part of the Governments drive to reduce public 
expenditure, and as part of its strategy to reduce the role 
of government. Boddy argued that this strategy is one in 
which "macro-economic arguments have been run together with 
the broader objectives of rolling back the state and the 
public sector, freeing market forces and individual private 
enterprise, cutting taxation and privatisation.1,137 In a 
similar light the government policy of cutting local 
government spending has been viewed as a way of stimulating 
the private sector and encouraging economic growth. 
Saunders maintained that local authority spending cuts "are 
simply one facet of an overall policy designed to increase 
profitability in the private sector."138 Leon Brittan, the 
former Chief Secretary to the Treasury, stated that "it is 
in the interests of the national economy and of the health 
and viability of local government to seek to overcome the 
real problems which repeated overspending brings with it", 
and that "its damaging effect on the national economy and 
on industry will soon force any Government to take further 
steps in the direction of central control."139 Kenneth
135 Local Authorities Conditions Of Service Advisory 
Board (1984) p4. See also Caulcott (1983) pp75, 78-79.
136 See chapter two, pp27-28.
137 Boddy (1984) p215.
138 Saunders (1980) p550.
139 Brittan (1982) p61.
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Baker, the former Secretary of State for the Environment, 
accused local authorities of being "high-spending engines 
of inflation".140 Rhodes believed central government 
controls over local government spending were "a substitute 
for the failure to control central expenditure.1,141 The 
Government wanted to cut local government spending because 
it believed that cutting local authority budgets would be 
easier politically than cutting its own budget.142 Whatever 
the explicit and implicit rationale behind the Governments 
financial controls, and whatever the validity of the 
rationale, the financial controls undoubtedly had a very 
marked effect on the level of local authority spending.143
On the revenue side, the Government set expenditure targets 
and extracted grant penalties if local authorities exceeded 
their targets. Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC and Knowsley MBC 
were not prepared to spend much over their target because 
of the grant penalties incurred. Bedfordshire CC went two 
per cent over, Kent CC one per cent over, and Knowsley four 
per cent over target. Their spending was influenced by the 
expenditure targets set by central government. The other 
local authority, Stockport MBC, spent at its target, but 
instead of curbing its spending actually increased its
140 Baker (1993) pll2.
141 Rhodes (1992c) p61.
142 See Gilmour (1992) p217; Glennerster (1980a) p375; 
Glennerster (1980b) pl86; Jones & Stewart (1985) pp62-71; 
Jones, Stewart & Greenwood (1981); 0*Higgins (1983) pl63; 
Pliatzky (1982) pl55; Rhodes (1985a) pp50-51; Thain &
Wright (1988) p5; Thain & Wright (1992b) pp219-221; and
Wright (1982).
143 The validity of the rationale of financial controls 
has been hotly disputed. See Barlow (1981); Boddy (1984) 
pp227-233; Gilmour (1992) p213; Greenwood, Jones & Stewart 
(1982) p304; Harrison (1980); Jackman (1979); Jackman 
(1982); Jackson (1981); Jackson (1982a); Jones & Stewart 
(1983d); Jones & Stewart (1985) pp51-73; Lawson (1992)
ppl03-104; Livesey (1987); Newton & Karran (1985) ppl23- 
124; and Powell (1981).
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spending to reach target. The Leader of the Conservative 
Group wanted originally to spend less to set a lower rate, 
but was persuaded by the Director of Finance to increase 
spending in order to maximise its grant entitlement.144 
Thus, following Greenwood, local authority spending "was 
strongly influenced by the governments expenditure 
targets."145 In most cases expenditure targets and grant 
penalties had a depressing effect on local authority 
spending. This depressing effect on revenue spending was 
extended to capital spending because local authorities cut 
their capital spending in order to minimise the revenue 
consequences of their capital programmes.
Furthermore, though in 1984/85 rate-capping was not in 
force there is some evidence that some local authorities, 
particularly Knowsley MBC and to a less extent Bedfordshire 
CC, were discouraged from spending more than they did in 
case they were selected for rate-capping in 1985/86 by the 
Government. The threat of rate-capping, as well as rate- 
capping itself, restrained local authority spending.
On the capital side, the Conservative Government possessed 
a set of controls over local authority spending. It 
regulated the bulk of capital spending by issuing block 
allocations to local authorities which they could not 
significantly exceed, and by restricting the use of capital 
receipts. It "used local authority capital expenditure as 
an accelerator or as a brake on total public spending.1,146 
The capital expenditure controls, with the financial 
controls on the revenue side, forced local authorities to 
cut their capital spending.
144 Chairman, Recreation and Culture Committee, 
Stockport MBC. On grant maximisation see Elcock, Jordan & 
Midwinter (1989) ppl06-107; and Midwinter (1988) p25.
145 Greenwood (1981) p84.
146 Travers (1986b) pl42.
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Thus, there are economic, social and political pressures 
which shape the level of local authority spending. These 
pressures are interlocking. For example, the former 
National Coal Board (now British Coal), faced with cheap 
coal imports and a Government committed to privatising the 
coal, electricity and gas industries, proposed to close 
many of its collieries thus prompting the miners* strike of 
1984/85. The policing of the miners* dispute was 
coordinated by the National Reporting Centre of the 
Metropolitan Police, and involved many police forces 
including those of Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC. The 
deployment of these police forces led to extra spending, 
though much of the additional costs were reimbursed later 
by the Home Office. Kent CC had to find an extra £15 
million to police the miners* strike.147 It was claimed by 
Bedfordshire CC's Chairman of the Police Committee that 
there was no detrimental effect on policing in Bedfordshire 
as a result of these deployments of police officers outside 
the county.148 This example shows the inter-connected 
nature of economic, social and political pressures on local 
authority spending. The economic pressures took the form of 
cheaper coal imports forcing the National Coal Board to try 
and produce more competitive coal to sell to the soon-to-be 
privatised electricity industry, and the consequent pit 
closures and miners' strike. The social pressures included
147 Principal Administration Officer, Kent County 
Constabulary, Kent CC. An extra £7 million was paid as 
increased overtime - see Kent Messenger. 30 November 1984, 
p5.
148 See Bedfordshire CC's Questions To Councillor F 
Lester. Chairman Of The Police Committee From Councillor J 
Tizard. 19 April 1984. This claim was supported by research 
commissioned by the Police Foundation - see Waddington
(1985). What was interesting in the debate about policing 
the miners' strike in Bedfordshire CC was that on one hand 
the police claimed that policing did not suffer as a result 
of the strike, but on the other hand the police claimed 
that there was insufficient establishment and wanted more 
police officers in the following year (Leader, Labour 
Group, Bedfordshire CC).
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the general move away from burning fossil fuels because of 
its environmental consequences, and the breakdown of mining 
communities. The political pressures involved the 
Government's commitment to privatise the electricity and 
coal industries, and its determination to curb trade union 
power. Economic, social and political pressures combined to 
mould the spending of local authorities.
Explaining fiscal stress in local government
From reading the literature on central-local government
relations and from surveying the set of stringent controls
in the hands of central government it is tempting to
conclude, as many have done, that not only have there been
spending cuts in local government but that these cuts were
the outcome of the Government's measures to curb local
authority spending.149 For example, Clarke and Cochrane
argued that "real cuts in council spending" were the
"cumulative effect" of policies pursued by the Conservative
Government.150 Writing about the financial problems of
local governments in Western Europe Newton argued:151
"... higher levels of government, especially 
national government, play such an enormously 
important role in the political economy of local 
government that it is not too much of an 
exaggeration to suggest that a large part of the 
financial problems which beset the localities are 
attributable not to their own policies and 
actions, but, on the contrary, to the laws 
enacted and policies pursued by central 
government."
These conclusions are wrong. First, there have been no cuts 
in the total of local government spending. Local 
authorities have cut spending only if their spending is 
adjusted for inflation. Also, spending cuts have fallen
149 See chapter three, footnote 2.
150 Clarke & Cochrane (1989) p48.
151 Newton (1980) p207.
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more heavily on capital than revenue spending. Within the
total of local government spending local authorities made
decisions to cut spending but the amounts cut were
overshadowed by the amounts of extra spending. It is
important to make these qualifications in any discussion of
spending cuts in local government. Second, to blame central
government for any spending cuts in local government,
however measured, is too simplistic. This mistaken view
ignores the complex set of pressures facing local
authorities in making financing and spending decisions. In
the words of Stewart:152
"Local government expenditure has not fallen to 
the extent sought by central government, which 
always seemed to demand greater reductions in 
local government than it was ready to impose on 
itself.... Nevertheless, there has been a change.
The period since 1974/5 has been a period of 
constraint, whether that constraint was a result 
of the changed economic climate, government 
persuasion, grant reduction or the gradual 
accumulation of central governments powers.
Local authorities varied in their response; in 
some, severe cuts were made in expenditure; in 
others, expenditure grew for at least part of the 
period. But in all, the climate has changed, and 
growth in expenditure year by year could no 
longer be regarded as the normal condition of 
local government."
It is important in understanding fiscal stress in local 
government that local authorities enjoyed a degree of 
latitude, albeit dwindling, in their dealings with central 
government, which allowed them to override the Government's 
wishes to cut local authority spending. Central government 
was not, and is not omnipotent. The latitude was seen in 
many different places - the electoral mandate from the 
local people to protect jobs and services, the choice in 
setting rates, the use of funds and balances, the spending
of capital receipts, and even the reluctance of central
government to apply its controls to their full. This
understanding is critical in explaining why the
152 Stewart (1986) ppl9-20.
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Conservative Government's intentions to cut local authority 
spending were never fulfilled.153 In conclusion, there was 
a complex array of pressures on the financing and spending 
of local government, of which central government was only 
one, albeit very powerful. The interplay of these pressures 
determined whether local authorities made spending cuts or 
not.
153 See chapter two, footnote 142.
PART B: EXAMINING THE SCENE
CHAPTER FOUR
CUTBACK MANAGEMENT IN FOUR LOCAL AUTHORITIES
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Local authorities have faced considerable pressures both to 
cut their spending and to spend more on services. Their 
expenditure requirements have surged ahead of their 
financial resources. There is, then, a significant gap 
between what spending local authorities were able to 
finance and what spending they wanted to undertake. This 
gap widened significantly during the 1970s and 1980s mainly 
because central government attempted to curb local 
authority spending. This gap reflected the intensifying 
fiscal pressure facing local authorities, and represented 
fiscal stress, and some would say fiscal crisis, in local 
government. Though central government largely failed to cut 
local government spending, its measures heralded the era of 
cutback management in local government. This chapter charts 
the rise of cutback management generally, and then examines 
cutback management in the four local authorities and looks 
at how they made cuts in their revenue and capital 
spending. This analysis will lay the empirical foundations 
for the theoretical discussion of cutback management in 
local government in the final part of the thesis.
THE RISE OF CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
About 15 years ago an American academic, Levine, observed
that "very little" was known about how government agencies
made cuts.1 This ignorance was very much a reflection of
the prevailing assumption of government growth. He wrote:2
"In this period of expansion and optimism among 
proponents of an active government, isolated 
incidents of zero growth and decline have been
1 Levine (1978) p316. In 1989 Dunsire and Hood still 
maintained that little academic attention has been given to 
"how the difficulties of cutting back government might best 
be approached" ((1989) pi).
2 Levine (1978) p316.
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considered anomalous; and the difficulties faced 
by the management of declining agencies coping 
with retrenchment have been regarded as outside 
the mainstream of public management concerns."
However, since the 1970s this assumption of growth has been
challenged and even shattered.3 Successive governments, the
Labour Government in the 197 0s and Conservative Government
from the 1980s onwards, have sought increasingly to reduce
local authority spending thus overturning any assumptions
of growth. Though the Thatcher Government, unlike the
preceding Callaghan Government, failed to extract wholesale
spending cuts from local authorities, the era of cutback
management was born in local government. There may have
been no cuts in the total level of local authority
spending, but as already seen, local authorities decided to
cut certain areas of spending. Furthermore, the
Government's attempts to reduce their spending may have
failed, but they applied a brake to the rate of increase of
local authority spending.4 The Government's rhetoric of
cuts and local authorities' expectation of them unleashed
a 'cutback management mentality'. Cutback management became
a necessary and vogue concern in government generally and
local government particularly, whose spending has attracted
more exhortation and control than most other areas of
government spending.5
According to Levine, cutback management "means managing 
organizational change toward lower levels of resource
3 See Stewart (1980).
4 See chapter three, pl59.
5 On government generally see Aucoin (1981); Aucoin 
(1991); Behn (1980); Behn (1983); Dunsire (1991); Dunsire
& Hood (1989); Gill & Frame (1990); Greenhalgh & McKersie
(1980); Hogwood & Peters (1985) ppl46-159; Hood & Wright 
(1981b); Jorgensen (1987a); Jorgensen (1987b); Levine
(1978); Levine (1979); Levine (1980); Levine & Rubin
(1980); McTigue (1979); Schick (1986); Schick (1988); 
Tarschys (1983); and Wright (1980c).
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consumption and organizational activity."6 Cutback
management is all about managing with less. It is how
organisations manage with less resources, how they reduce
and even terminate their activities, and how they pursue
more restricted goals. Schick stated:7
"Cutback budgeting is the term applied to efforts 
to reduce spending below the level that would 
ensure if current policies were continued."
A flood of literature on cutback management in local
government has now been published as a testament of changed
economic and political times.8 Much of this literature is
rooted in budgetary theory.9 It recognises that cutback
management lies at the heart of the budgetary process. In
6 Levine (1979) pl80.
7 Schick (1988) p524. As a local authority's base 
budget is essentially a continuation budget it becomes a 
very important focus in analysing cutback management in 
local government.
8 See Bebbington & Ferlie (1980); Butler & Pirie
(1981) ; Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And 
Accountancy (1979); Clapham (1983); Cockburn (1977); Cope
(1990); Cope (1992); Elcock (1986a); Elcock (1987b); Elcock
(1991) ppl05-108; Elcock & Jordan (1987); Elcock, Jordan & 
Midwinter (1989); Ferlie & Judge (1981) ; Foster & Algie 
(1985); Glassberg (1980); Glassberg (1981); Glennerster 
(1980a); Hallows (1975); Hewton (1986); Hinings, Greenwood, 
Ranson & Walsh (1980); Hood & Wright (1981b); Jacobs
(1979); Local Authorities Management Services And Computer 
Committee (1981); Mouritzen (1992b); Newton (1981a); 
Pinkham & Platt (1980); Stephenson (1985); Stewart (1977b); 
Taylor (1980); Terry (1986); Wolman (1983); and Wright 
(1980c). On cutback management in local government abroad 
see Banner (1985); Bens (1982); Clark & Ferguson (1983) 
pp223-261; Glassberg (1978); Glassberg (1980); Glassberg
(1981); Gutierrez (1984); Hoggart (1991); Kemp (1983a); 
Kemp (1983b); Kemp (1984); Levine (1980); Levine & Rubin
(1980); Levine, Rubin & Wolohojian (1981a); Levine, Rubin 
& Wolohojian (1981b); Levine, Rubin & Wolohojian (1982); 
Lewis S t  Logalbo (1980); Mouritzen (1992b); Public 
Management (1982); Rajadhyaksha (1984); Randall & Wilson 
(1989); Reynolds (1984); Rubin (1982); Smith (1988); Wolman 
(1982a); Wolman (1983); Wolman (1986); Wolman f i t  Davis 
(1980); Wolman & Peterson (1980); Wolman & Peterson (1981); 
and Wynne (1983).
9 For example, see Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989).
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1991 Aucoin noted:10
"Restraint budgeting has been the order of the 
day for all governments in industrialized
democracies for over a decade."
The processes of budgeting and cutback management are very
much intertwined. An understanding of how budgets are made
leads to an understanding of how spending cuts are made.
Following Wildavsky, a budget serves many different 
purposes, one of which is to act as "a mechanism for making 
choices among alternative expenditures."11 Given that the 
spending demands upon a local authority exceed its
financial resources, the making of a budget involves 
deciding what demands are or are not to be met. Levine
argued that cutback management "involves making hard
decisions about who will be let go, what programs will be 
scaled down or terminated, and what clients will be asked 
to make sacrifices.1,12 Cutback management is difficult.13 
Dunsire and Hood saw that "the 'cutback management problem1 
for government is how to achieve cuts in public expenditure 
and personnel at minimum cost to political objectives."14 
The scale of this problem was recognised by Behn when he 
advised:15
"The manager of an organization faced with 
declining resources can do one of two things:
10 Aucoin (1991) pll9.
11 Wildavsky (1988) p2.
12 Levine (1979) pl80.
13 Tarschys observed that "most politicians and civil 
servants find it rather painful to abolish jobs and 
services" ((1983) p219). See also Greenhalgh & McKersie
(1980); and Taylor (1981).
14 Dunsire & Hood (1989) pi.
15 Behn (1980) p614. On policy termination see Bardach 
(1976); Behn (1978a); Behn (1978b); Biller (1976); Brewer 
(1978) ; deLeon (1978); deLeon (1983) ; Frantz (1992) ; 
Greenwood (1993); Hogwood & Peters (1985) ppl46-159; and
Kaufman (1976).
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eliminate the organization completely; or cut it 
back. Termination ... is the easier task; it 
requires only that the organization be destroyed.
In contrast, retrenchment involves turning the 
organization into one that is smaller, doing 
less, consuming fewer resources, but still doing 
something well."
The problems of cutback management will now be examined by 
looking at how local authorities made spending cuts in 
their revenue budgets and capital programmes. It is 
necessary to examine the ways in which local authorities 
budgeted their spending cuts. This examination will 
illustrate the immense difficulties experienced by local 
authorities in making spending cuts.
MAKING CUTS IN REVENUE SPENDING
Given that those who cut spending also make budgets, it is 
therefore important that the budgeting processes of the 
four local authorities - Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, Knowsley 
MBC, and Stockport MBC - is examined to explore how they 
made cuts in their revenue spending.
Making cuts in Bedfordshire CC
Since the reorganisation of local government in the early 
1970s Bedfordshire CC has been 'hung' for most of its 
existence. In Bedfordshire CC budgets tended to be made by 
the Conservative and Liberal Groups together, leaving the 
Labour Group on its own.16 The revenue budget of 1984/85 
was essentially a Liberal budget which was supported by the 
Conservative Group, though towards the end of the budget
16 See Blowers (1987) p35.
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process a few Labour amendments were written into the 
budget. It is important to explore the thinking of the 
three party groups, particularly Conservative and Liberal 
thinking, to understand how the spending cuts were made in 
Bedfordshire CC.
The Conservative Group, as the largest group, chaired all 
the committees, and consequently led the budget discussions 
in committee and thus revealed its budget plans throughout 
the formal committee cycle. In contrast, the Liberal and 
Labour Groups did not formally reveal their budget plans 
until the Conservative Group had presented its budget. The 
Liberal Group wanted to put forward a budget likely to 
secure the support of the Conservative Group. It 
anticipated Conservative support because its budget was 
made with the explicit aim of appealing to the Conservative 
Group.17 Though the Liberal Group never committed itself to 
siding with the Conservative and not the Labour Group, it 
was always more disposed to such an arrangement. This 
preference emerged following a split in the Liberal Group, 
which temporarily resulted in the Group losing the balance 
of power on the Council. Before this split the Liberal 
Group tended to side with the Labour Group.18 However, the 
two councillors leaving the Liberal fold were only 
persuaded to return if the Group exercised greater 
financial restraint - an attitude more in line with 
Conservative than Labour thinking.19 As a result of this 
split budget-making in Bedfordshire was dominated by the 
Conservative and Liberal Groups with the exclusion of the 
Labour Group.
17 Deputy Leader, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC; and 
Education Spokesman, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC.
18 See Blowers (1987) p34.
19 See Blowers (1986) p6. According to the Deputy 
Leader of the Conservative Group both councillors 
considered joining the Conservative Group.
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The Conservative Group wanted to reduce the Council's 
spending. Before the making of the budget of 1984/85 it had 
undertaken several cost-cutting exercises, the most 
important of which was the one reluctantly carried out by 
the Management Group of chief officers.20 This exercise, 
like previous ones, was never implemented, but shaped the 
climate within which subsequent budgets were made. In 
particular, it sent signals to officers that the 
Conservative Group wanted to cut spending.
The Conservative Group wanted to keep spending within two 
per cent over the Council's expenditure target. Towards the 
end of 198 3 the County Treasurer prepared the base budget, 
which was substantially more than two per cent over target. 
As a result, the Chief Executive suggested several ways to 
reduce spending, which were presented to the Conservative 
Group through the Policy and Resources Committee. He 
suggested that £1 million could be cut from the base budget 
if equivalent repayments to the Capital Fund were 
cancelled. This mild form of creative accounting was 
readily accepted by the Conservative Group, as indeed it 
was by the other two groups. He, then, presented three 
options to reduce net spending. The first option was to 
reduce the spending of each committee across-the-board in 
proportion to their net spending of the previous year. The 
second option was to reduce the spending of committees in 
proportion to how much particular heads of expenditure 
exceeded the corresponding components of the Council's 
grant-related expenditure assessment (GREA). The third 
option was to reduce committee spending in accordance with 
the 'Getting Down To GREA' exercise.
These options provided some "realistic conditioning" upon 
the thinking of the Conservative Group.21 The Group did not
20 See Bedfordshire CC's Getting Down To GREA. 1982.
21 Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC.
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consider any other ways of cutting spending. The three 
options, though, were framed by the Chief Executive to fit 
the prevailing mood of the Conservative Group.22 The 
Conservative Group, dominated by its leadership, preferred 
the second option of using the grant-related expenditure 
assessment as the basis for reducing spending.23 It 
believed that this central government computation was a 
convenient tool for making spending cuts. The Group had no 
confidence in this calculation of spending need but saw it 
as an "external measuring stick".24 According to the Leader 
of the Conservative Group, it was "a fairer way of making 
savings" because it came from outside and not from any 
vested interests inside the local authority. There was, 
however, one exception to the application of this option. 
The Conservative Group decided that the police budget would 
be exempted from this exercise, because it felt that the 
police force was already stretched for resources.25
The Conservative Group was far more concerned with the 
budget strategy than the budget details.26 It was concerned 
about the size and not the contents of the budget. The 
specific items put forward as spending cuts in the 
Conservative budget largely came from chief officers.27 To
22 Chief Executive, Bedfordshire CC.
23 The Leader and the Deputy Leader managed 
successfully to override a few dissenting voices in the 
Group. Several councillors opposed this option mainly on 
the grounds that the committees on which they served 
(notably the Education Committee) would lose out more under 
this option than the other two options.
24 Chief Executive, Bedfordshire CC.
25 This view was also shared by the Liberal and Labour 
Groups. At the time many police officers of the 
Bedfordshire police force were policing the miners' strike.
26 Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC.
27 County Treasurer, Bedfordshire CC; and Chairman, 
Education Committee, Bedfordshire CC. The exception was the 
making of the education budget where there was more
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a certain extent, however, chief officers were likely to 
put forward cuts they knew were acceptable to the 
Conservative Group.28
Furthermore, given the previous cost-cutting exercises, and 
especially the 'Getting Down To GREA1 exercise, officers 
and councillors had before them a 'shopping list' of 
spending cuts.29 The spending of departments had been 
already extensively reviewed, and many of the spending cuts 
contained in the budget of 1984/85 emanated from these 
exercises. Though these exercises portrayed a high degree 
of planning in making spending cuts, it is important to 
stress their limitations by looking at three examples. 
First, there was no assessment of how much money was 
required to maintain buildings and roads. The planning of 
building maintenance was conducted on an ad hoc "annual 
crisis basis".30 The planning of roads maintenance was made 
virtually redundant in this era of spending restraint 
because it identified only areas where more not less money 
was needed to be spent.31 Second, there was no assessment 
of where spending cuts could be made in the central 
services save for a "notional exercise" carried out by the 
County Treasurer recommending across-the-board reductions 
of departmental budgets controlled by the Policy and
councillor involvement because of the widespread mistrust 
of the motives of the Chief Education Officer (Chairman, 
Education Committee, Bedfordshire CC; Deputy Leader, 
Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC; and Assistant Education 
Officer, Bedfordshire CC). In the past the Chief Education 
Officer was suspected of deliberately offering 
recommendations which were politically damaging (Assistant 
Education Officer, Bedfordshire CC).
28 County Secretary, Bedfordshire CC.
29 Director of Social Services, Bedfordshire CC; and 
Assistant Director of Social Services/ Bedfordshire CC.
30 County Architect, Bedfordshire CC.
31 County Surveyor, Bedfordshire CC; and Principal 
Assistant, County Surveyor's Department, Bedfordshire CC.
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Resources Committee.32 Third, the budgets of the four 
colleges of further and higher education were to be reduced 
by a prescribed amount, but their governing bodies were to 
determine where the cuts were to fall.33 These three 
examples show that the analysis which underpinned the 
exercises to cut spending was limited.
Though the Liberal Group deliberately refrained from 
formally revealing its budget plans, the Conservative Group 
was still broadly aware of its strategy. Not least was the 
split in the Liberal Group which sent signals that it 
wanted to exercise financial prudence in making its budget. 
There were also informal contacts between the Deputy Leader 
of the Conservative Group and the Education Spokesman of 
the Liberal Group, through which each Group learnt of the 
other Group's thinking. As a result, these two councillors, 
both influential in making their respective group's budget, 
were able to formulate a budget likely to appeal to the 
other group.34
The Liberal budget was largely based on the Conservative 
budget, which in turn was shaped by the 'Getting Down To 
GREA' exercise. In fact, over 80 per cent of the spending 
reductions contained in the Liberal budget were found in 
the Conservative budget. The Liberal Group in making its 
budget started with the Conservative budget, and then made 
several changes to suit its own political preferences.35
32 County Secretary, Bedfordshire CC.
33 Assistant Education Officer, Bedfordshire CC.
34 The informal budgetary coalition between the 
Conservative Group and Liberal Group effectively ended any 
hopes that the Labour Group may have had in influencing the 
budget of 1984/85. The Labour Group had no discussions with 
the other two groups, reducing even further the likelihood 
that the Labour budget would court their support (Leader, 
Labour Group, Bedfordshire CC).
35 Deputy Leader, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC; and 
Education Spokesman, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC.
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These relatively minor changes occurred in the education, 
leisure and social services budgets, and reflected Liberal 
concern not to propose any spending reduction which would 
damage its electoral fortunes.36 It rejected several 
Conservative proposals to cut spending on primary and 
secondary schools. The local Liberal Party was committed 
above all else to increase its representation on councils, 
and hoped to gain control of some councils in Bedfordshire. 
Consequently, the overriding criterion in making cuts was 
their perceived electoral impact. This electoral 
sensitivity was reflected in its concern to hold down the 
level of precept, and to a less extent to protect certain 
services which were seen to be electorally popular.37 The 
pressure within the Group to test its budget for its 
electoral impact was further compounded by the way its 
meetings were structured. They were open to all local party 
members such as parliamentary candidates, who were 
primarily interested in the electoral fortunes of the 
Liberal Party.38 These strong populist pressures within the 
local party played a significant part in shaping the budget 
adopted by the Liberal Group. Its electoral sensitivity 
explains why the Liberal budget differed from the 
Conservative budget.39
Though the Liberal Group modified the Conservative budget
36 Education Spokesman, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC; 
and Social Services Spokeswoman, Liberal Group, 
Bedfordshire CC.
37 Education Spokesman, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC.
38 Leader, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC.
39 This sensitivity explained why the Chief Executive 
believed that the Liberal Group used more subjective 
criteria than the Conservative Group in making its budget. 
The Liberal Group relied less on officer advice than the 
Conservative Group (Deputy Leader, Liberal Group, 
Bedfordshire CC; Education Spokesman, Liberal Group, 
Bedfordshire CC; Social Services Spokeswoman, Liberal 
Group, Bedfordshire CC).
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it still wanted to court Conservative support for its 
budget, otherwise its budget would not be adopted by the 
Council. There were, therefore, limits to how far the 
Liberal Group was able to modify the Conservative budget. 
By waiting until the Conservative Group had revealed its 
budget the Liberal Group was able to frame its budget in 
such a way so as to secure Conservative support.40 In March 
1984 the Council met to issue a precept, and consequently 
to make the budget of 1984/85. The Liberal Group rejected 
the Conservative budget, but the Conservative Group 
accepted the Liberal budget. As stated earlier, the 
Conservative Group was more concerned about the level of 
precept and spending than the precise contents of the 
budget. It was therefore able to support the Liberal budget 
which more or less fitted in with its own budget 
strategy.41 The Liberal Group, more concerned about the 
details of the budget, was unable to support the 
Conservative budget. Thus, in the Council meeting the 
Liberal budget was adopted with Conservative support.
The Labour Group so far played no part in the budget 
process, save for making a tokenistic budget of its own. 
But later in July 1984 it proposed a budget amendment that 
over £200,000 of spending cuts contained in the education 
budget be reversed and financed instead from the Reserve 
Fund. This amendment was accepted by both the Conservative 
and Liberal Groups, and the proposed cuts were reinstated 
in the education budget.
40 Though the Conservative Group revealed its budget 
well in advance of the Council meeting in March 1984, it 
did not reveal its preferred precept until the meeting. Up 
to this meeting it had budgeted for a five per cent precept 
increase, but on the day it suggested using more money from 
the balances and instead recommended a nil precept 
increase, believing that it would secure Liberal support 
(Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC). The 
Liberal Group, however, was not tempted to support this 
move.
41 Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC.
194
The Leader of the Labour Group justified this amendment on 
the grounds that funds should be spent on services and not 
left lying around in bank accounts. However, his 
justification explains only the general stance of the 
Labour Group towards spending cuts, and does not explain 
why these cuts and not others were to be reversed. These 
cuts included a £56,000 reduction in the cost of employing 
school caretakers and cleaners, and a £150,000 reduction in 
the school meals budget. The cuts, if implemented, would 
have led to the deterioration of the conditions of service 
of school caretakers, school cleaners and school meals 
staff. The National Union of Public Employees, representing 
these staff, pressed the Labour Group to reinstate the cuts 
and organised industrial action to protest against the 
cuts.42 The Labour Group, not wanting to spoil relations 
with the trade union, proposed that these cuts should be 
reversed on the grounds that it mitigated the worst effects 
of the spending reductions contained in the March budget. 
The close relationship between the trade union and the 
Labour Party locally, above all else, explains why these 
cuts were reinstated. However, for these cuts to be 
reversed the amendment needed the support of one of the two 
other groups.
When the Liberal Group proposed these spending cuts in the 
education budget, it wanted the National Union of Public 
Employees to be consulted over their implementation.43 
Although this consultation exercise was a tokenistic 
gesture, because the effects of the cuts could not have 
been cushioned, the Liberal Group's concern over 
consultation signalled it was not firmly committed to 
making these cuts. Its wavering commitment was evident in 
its response to the Labour amendment. It capitulated to the
42 Area Officer (1), National Union Of Public 
Employees. See Local Government Chronicle (1984b).
43 Education Spokesman, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC.
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demand because it was concerned not to break nationally 
negotiated conditions of service, and most important it 
wanted to silence the most vociferous opposition to its 
package of cuts.44 The Liberal Group was primarily 
concerned about its electoral image, and was thus readily 
prepared to use monies from the Council's Reserve Fund to 
reinstate these cuts.45
The Conservative Group also supported the Labour amendment
because it too was concerned about its electoral image if
it was seen to oppose the amendment. Its Leader argued:46
"... if one finds oneself in the position where 
one can establish that you are going to be 
outvoted, then, unless it is a clear matter of 
principle, you might as well row in and get 
whatever political kudos there is a-going."
The Labour Group succeeded in getting its budget amendment
accepted because of Conservative and Liberal "sensitivity
to electoral impact".47
In addition, two further spending reductions were 
reinstated by the Council at the July meeting. The March 
budget contained a £38,000 reduction of the adult education 
budget. This reduction was dependent on a fall in demand 
for adult education classes, which never materialised. Any 
rationalisation of course provision became severely 
limited. In July the Council decided to increase its 
repairs and maintenance budget by £250,000. To put it 
differently, the repairs and maintenance budget was cut by 
only £850,000 and not £1.1 million as initially proposed in 
the March budget. This increase, or reduced decrease in
44 Area Officer (1), National Union of Public 
Employees.
45 The Deputy Leader of the Liberal Group revealingly 
described this fund as a "slush fund".
46 Taken from a letter dated 13 November 1984.
47 Member, Labour Group, Bedfordshire CC.
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spending, corresponded to the money spent on removing 
asbestos, which was not included in the March budget. All 
three party groups supported this injection of money into 
the repairs and maintenance budget because it was a non­
recurring increase of spending. It would not commit the 
Council to spending more in the future.
Following the Council meeting in July, about £% million of 
spending cuts proposed in the March budget were reversed. 
The budget of 1984/85 was devised by the Liberal Group, 
supported by the Conservative Group, and later amended by 
the Labour Group. It was the outcome of the 'hung' politics 
of the Council.
Making cuts in Kent CC
In February 1983 the Conservative Government published its 
public expenditure plans.48 For the Policy and Resources 
Committee these plans "provided an initial framework for 
the 1984-85 budget...."49 The Policy and Budget Group, a 
sub-committee of the Policy and Resources Committee, met to 
devise a budget strategy. However, the ruling Conservative 
Group decided to delay the formulation of a formal strategy 
because of the forthcoming elections in May 1983. It wanted 
to prevent any debate of spending cuts from taking place in 
the election campaigns of both the general election and the 
district council elections.50
Nonetheless, an informal budget strategy was developed,
48 See HM Treasury (1983) .
49 Taken from Kent CC's, Summons To And Agenda For A 
Meeting On The 17th November 1983. 1983, pi. Kent CC was 
the only one of the four local authorities studied formally 
to incorporate an analysis of the Government's public 
expenditure plans into the budget process.
50 Deputy County Treasurer, Kent CC.
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which was not formalised as a committee report. The County 
Treasurer and the Leader of the Conservative Group 
considered three options as ways of responding to the 
Government's public expenditure guidelines - namely, a 
budget representing no growth, a one per cent reduction and 
a two per cent reduction from the previous year's net 
spending. By November 1983 the 'one per cent reduction' 
option was seen as "justifiable" in light of the 
Government's announcement of the Council's expenditure 
target.51 The County Treasurer believed that this option 
would have a "minimum effect on services", would keep 
spending "near target" and would require the "right precept 
increase".
This option was later endorsed by the Conservative Group. 
Following informal discussions between the Chief Executive, 
the County Treasurer, the Leader of the Conservative Group 
and committee chairmen, it was agreed that each committee 
would draw up plans in line with this option and consider 
the effects of the other two options. The across-the-board 
approach reflected the traditional preference of the 
Conservative leadership in apportioning spending cuts 
between committees. It represented an "equity of agony", 
and consequently reduced conflict within the Group on how 
spending cuts should be made.52 Each committee chairman 
tended to defend his committee's budget in Group meetings, 
and was thus more likely to accept cuts if other chairmen 
did likewise. However, the Conservative Group realised that 
"some fine-tuning" may be necessary towards the end of the 
budget process if some committees experienced problems in 
finding their share of cuts.53 Indeed, the Chief Executive 
justified this approach because it provided the opportunity
51 County Treasurer, Kent CC.
52 Chairman, Development and Transportation Committee, 
Kent CC.
53 Chairman, Education Committee, Kent CC.
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to Mjudge the agony" of committees in making cuts, and the 
flexibility of later adjusting the budgeted cuts to 
ameliorate any 'agony'.54
There was, however, some opposition within the Conservative 
Group to the traditional across-the-board approach. A 
prominent business-led faction argued that this approach 
was a very blunt instrument for making cuts, because it 
involved only an attempt to assess spending priorities 
within a committee's budget and not between committees. The 
Chairman of the Development and Transportation Committee 
claimed that "the danger during a period of restraint is a 
sense of siege and defence in employees, particularly in 
local government, leading to unnecessary 'across the board' 
reductions in services to the public."55 The across-the- 
board approach of apportioning spending cuts assumed that 
the existing share of the budget that each committee 
enjoyed should be rolled forward into the future, which to 
this Conservative faction meant "carrying on mistakes made 
in history".56 This faction wanted to reassess the 
budgetary shares of committees to reflect changing 
priorities between services. Despite this opposition the 
preference for the across-the-board approach prevailed in 
the Conservative Group as the way of implementing the 'one 
per cent reduction' option.
The next stage of the budget process was the search for
54 The Chief Executive claimed that there was a 0.2 per 
cent safety margin built into the 'one per cent reduction1 
exercise.
55 Odling (1984) p52.
56 Chairman, Social Services Committee, Kent CC. This 
faction of Conservative councillors later succeeded in 
appointing a new Leader of the Conservative Group. This 
coup was an explicit recognition of the abandonment of the 
traditional across-the-board approach. The new Leader 
believed that this approach was for those who are "too weak 
to face up to the realities of life".
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spending cuts within committee budgets. The scope for 
making cuts was generally very limited. Much of the budget 
is outside the control of committees and is largely 
determined by outside forces. Much of a committee's budget 
could not therefore be cut. For example, the Education 
Committee is obliged by statute to provide schooling; the 
Fire and Public Protection Committee must provide a fire 
service capable of responding to demand; and the Police 
Committee is required to employ an established number of 
police officers on nationally-determined rates of pay.57 
Consequently, committees could cut only their controllable 
expenditure, which in the short term represented a small 
proportion of their budgets.
The spending cuts contained in the budget of 1984/85 were 
largely made by departments not committees. The
Conservative Group displayed little interest in the list of 
spending cuts proposed by departments.58 The major 
exception was the spending reductions which resulted from 
the implementation of recommendations made by management 
consultants.
The Council commissioned a plethora of management 
consultants to review its management and organisation. For 
example, both Arthur Andersen and Arthur Young reviewed the
structure of the Social Services Department; Price
Waterhouse reviewed the management of the Education 
Department; Peat, Marwick & Mitchell reviewed the financial 
management of bus companies in Kent; Coopers & Lybrand
reviewed the organisation and management of the Council's 
central services; Arthur Young McClelland Moores reviewed
57 The Principal Administration Officer of Kent County 
Constabulary estimated that employee costs accounted for 
over 80 per cent of the police budget, of which only a 
small fraction (eg overtime costs) is controllable 
expenditure.
58 Chairman, Finance and Review Group, Kent CC.
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the management of further education colleges; and Harold 
Whitehead reviewed the management of the Highways and 
Transportation Department.59
This high level of management consultant activity reflected
the increasing domination of businessmen in the
Conservative Group, which led one Conservative councillor
to describe the Council as being "run like a business".60
The Conservative Group increasingly believed that spending
cuts could be generated only by the restructuring of
departments, and that restructuring was more likely to come
about with the intervention of management consultants. A
leading Conservative councillor argued:61
"To reduce unproductive expenditure and not the 
quality of the service, 'cuts' must be 
accompanied by a reshaping of organisations and 
procedures."
The Conservative Group regarded management consultants as 
convenient vehicles in which its preferred changes could be 
implemented in departments.62 The Chairman of the Finance 
and Review Group believed that they "act as a catalyst for 
change that we are trying to seek".63 The Conservative 
Group employed management consultants as 'mercenaries' to 
impose its wishes upon departments and to overcome officer 
resistance to its wishes.64 In the words of one
59 See Hatchett (1990); Holliday (1991b); and Odling 
(1984).
60 Chairman, Fire and Public Protection Committee, Kent
CC.
61 Odling (1984) p52.
62 See Holliday (1991b).
63 Similarly, the County Treasurer saw the use of 
management consultants as a "catalyst for change".
64 Leader, Conservative Group, Kent CC. The 
Conservative Group clearly preferred to use outside 
management consultants than the Council's Computing and 
Management Services Unit. This preference was based on the 
view that the Unit was too small and; did not possess the
2.0.1
Conservative councillor:65
"Implementing change is difficult. In some 
instances it involves moving to new locations, 
selling redundant sites, operating new 
procedures. Against a background of posts 
becoming redundant, it is not surprising that the 
usual stratagems - such as protecting individuals 
and existing procedures - have been evident in 
attempts to preserve the status quo."
He argued that management consultants were often necessary
to counter these stratagems. On the Whitehead review of the
Highways and Transportation Department he noted:66
"Internal studies had been commissioned to seek 
improvements in financial control for all work in 
the county organisation and procedures for work 
done by the districts, but they had only 
preserved the status quo. ... It was . . . clear 
that an external catalyst was essential with a 
hard cutting edge."
The reports produced by the management consultants usually 
stimulated much political commitment to change. First, the 
money spent on commissioning management consultants 
required justification in the mind of the Conservative 
Group, and this justification was provided by implementing 
their recommendations.67 Second, many Conservative 
councillors believed in the appropriateness and correctness 
of reports written by management consultants because they 
were able to bring private sector expertise into the public 
sector, and because they operated independently from the 
department under review and were therefore able to put
required expertise to undertake these reviews.; However, the 
Conservative Group made no attempt to strengthen this Unit.
65 Odling (1984) p53.
66 Odling (1984) p52.
67 Head, Computing and Management Services Unit, Kent 
CC; and Principal Performance and Investigation Officer, 
Computing and Management Services Unit, Kent CC.
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forward impartial and objective recommendations.68 Finally, 
and most important, management consultants in making 
recommendations were made aware of what was and what was 
not acceptable to the ruling Conservative Group. For 
example, recommendations which, if implemented, produced 
cost savings were more acceptable than those which incurred 
additional expenditure.69 Management consultants were given 
a remit, both formally and informally,which necessarily 
shaped their recommendations. They tend to deliver whatever 
the client wants - or as the saying goes, 'those who pay 
the piper call the tune'.
Apart from the spending cuts which emanated from the 
implementation of management consultant reports, decisions 
about what to cut and what not to cut were made mainly by 
officers. The role of committees was very much restricted 
to vetting the proposed lists of spending cuts put forward 
by departments, and apportioning spending cuts across 
departments under the formal control of each committee.70
There was some variation between departments on how they 
made spending cuts. Three general patterns emerged. First, 
in the smaller departments, such as the Planning Department 
and the Trading Standards Department, the list of spending
68 Leader, Conservative Group, Kent CC; Chairman, 
Finance and Review Group, Kent CC; Head, Computing and 
Management Services Unit, Kent CC; and Principal 
Performance and Investigation Officer, Computing and 
Management Services Unit, Kent CC.
69 The pressure to produce cost savings was very 
evident in the implementation of the Arthur Andersen report 
on restructuring the Social Services, Department. The team 
of management consultants were required to demonstrate cost 
savings in order maintain "credibility” with the 
Conservative Group (Assistant Director of Social Services, 
Kent CC). The recommended savings of £80,000 never 
materialised when the Arthur Andersen proposals were 
implemented.
70 Chairman, Property, Supplies and Services Group, 
Kent CC; and Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC.
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cuts was drawn up principally by the chief officers on the 
advice of other officers in the department and the County 
Treasurer's Department. Second, in several larger 
departments, such as the Social Services Department, the 
list of spending cuts was largely determined by the
departmental management team, which was headed by the chief 
officer. Third, in other large departments, such as the
Highways and Transportation Department and Kent County
Constabulary, the chief officer in effect delegated the 
task of making spending cuts to other officers in the 
department. Spending cuts in the highways and 
transportation budget were made by the Manager of the 
Highways and Transportation Department, who trimmed 
spending bids from within the department "using engineering 
common sense". In Kent County Constabulary the spending 
cuts were drawn up by the Assistant Chief Constable 
together with the Principal Administration Officer. The
role of the Police Committee in making the police budget 
was marginal, and the role of the Chief Constable limited 
to setting down general guidelines.71
Towards the end of 1983 most committees had identified 
their share of spending cuts to comply with the 'one per 
cent reduction' option. Only two committees - the Education 
Committee and the Police Committee - failed to identify 
their required share of spending reductions. The Education 
Committee was required to find more than other committees 
because of substantial overspending in the previous year. 
This overspend of £1.9 million was the result of an under­
estimated forecast of teachers' pay awards, and was 
required to be clawed back in 1984/85. It exacerbated the 
difficulties facing the Education Committee to reduce its 
spending. Indeed, the Education Department (and the Social 
Services Department) have often overspent their budgets. As 
a result, they have sought more money to cover their
71 Principal Administration Officer, Kent County 
Constabulary.
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overspending much to the chagrin of other departments, 
which felt these two departments had a deliberate tactic of 
'special pleading’ with the County Treasurer's 
Department.72 However, most departments believed this 
tactic had since ended and that budgets were realistically 
negotiated between departments and the County Treasurer's 
Department.73 In the past the County Treasurer's Department 
tended to trim budgets because of suspected padding, and 
departments tended to pad budgets because the County 
Treasurer's Department trimmed their bids. The major 
exception to this realistic conditioning of budget-making 
was the making of the police budget.
The Police Committee was not required to make its 
proportionate share of spending cuts because of a carefully 
prepared strategy by the police force to be excluded from 
making cuts. The Police Committee played no part in making 
the police budget save for its statutory but ritual 
authorisation. According to one police officer, the Police 
Committee would have "no possible idea how to approach 
it".74 Moreover, the Committee was committed to protect and 
even expand the level of policing in Kent.75 Its commitment 
undoubtedly explains why the Assistant Chief Constable 
described the Police Committee as a "very supportive police
72 County Planning Officer, Kent CC; and Assistant 
Director of Social Services, Kent CC.
73 Chief Executive, Kent CC; County Education Officer, 
Kent CC; County Surveyor, Kent CC; County Secretary and 
Solicitor, Kent CC; Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC; 
Principal Administration Officer, Kent Fire Brigade; 
Manager, Highways and Transportation Department, Kent CC; 
and Finance Officer, Highways and Transportation 
Department, Kent CC.
74 Principal Administration Officer, Kent County 
Constabulary.
75 The Chairman of the Police Committee wanted to 
demonstrate the Committee's support towards law and order 
mainly for electoral reasons (Principal Administration 
Officer, Kent CC).
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authority" which maintained an "excellent relationship" 
with the police force. This political commitment given to 
the police force was turned into a budgetary advantage by 
those making the police budget. A small reduction in the 
overtime budget was included in the "self-evident" list of 
spending cuts.76 This reduction would have been very easy 
to find in the budget of over £46 million allocated for 
pay. This small reduction, however, was included to signal 
to the Police Committee that the budget could not be cut 
further without reducing police manpower. The Police 
Committee, already supportive of the police force, 
therefore never pressed for further spending reductions.77
The inability of both the Education Committee and the 
Police Committee to find their share of spending cuts 
threatened the across-the-board 'one per cent reduction1 
option. The Leader of the Conservative Group was reluctant 
to enforce compliance upon the two committees because of 
the perceived adverse electoral consequences of cutting 
these highly visible services. At this point the County 
Treasurer offered a package of capital financing 
adjustments which would release more money on the revenue 
side.78 This package of creative accountancy was readily 
accepted by the Conservative Group as a way of sustaining 
its budget strategy. The monies released by these
76 Principal Administration Officer, Kent County 
Constabulary.
77 This tactic was also exercised successfully in the 
making of the budget of 1985/86. The police budget was 
required to be cut by £2 million. The Assistant Chief 
Constable argued that only £1 million could be cut without 
reducing manpower. Again, the Police Committee was excused 
from complying with the budget strategy because of the 
Council's commitment to protect the police force, 
particularly when many of its police officers were deployed 
to police the miners' strike of 1984/85.
78 This package included the early repayment of 
Consolidated Loans Fund debt, the liquidation of the 
Capital Fund, and the transfer of maintenance expenditure 
to the Repairs and Renewal Fund.
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adjustments were apportioned pro rata between committees. 
As a result, the 'one per cent reduction1 requirement 
became a '0.6 per cent reduction' requirement, with which 
all committees were able to comply.
In general, the process of making spending cuts was
determined by the outcome of decisions made by three
prominent budgetary actors. First, the Conservative Group 
preferred an across-the-board approach to making spending 
cuts. This approach did not mean that all budgets were cut
equally.79 The reductions were to be made in the
committees' net spending not their gross spending. Net 
spending can be cut either by reducing gross spending or by 
raising more specific service income. Table 2.3 in chapter 
two details the proportions of gross spending cuts that 
were made and specific service income that was increased by 
committees of the four local authorities, including Kent 
CC, in order to cut net spending. The table shows that in 
Kent CC some committees, eg the Police Committee, were able 
to raise much more specific service income and therefore 
make fewer spending cuts than other committees, eg the 
Education Committee. As a result of their different 
capacities to raise specific service income, spending cuts 
were distributed unevenly between committees. Furthermore, 
committees had discretion over how they apportioned 
spending cuts between departments under their jurisdiction. 
For example, the Fire and Public Protection Committee 
required the Trading Standards Department to reduce its 
spending more than Kent Fire Brigade. Second, departments 
largely determined spending cuts contained in the budget of 
1984/85. They exercised discretion over how spending cuts 
were apportioned between headings of departmental budgets. 
Third, the County Treasurer facilitated the capital 
financing adjustments which allowed committees to comply
79 Also, actual spending cuts of committees varied 
slightly from the budgeted spending cuts because of 
underspending and overspending of budgets.
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with the 'one per cent reduction1 budget strategy. The 
making of spending cuts in Kent CC was thus dominated by 
the Conservative Group, departments and the County 
Treasurer, and the budget of 1984/85 reflected the mutual 
accommodation between these three dominant actors on the 
budget stage.
Making cuts in Knowslev MBC
The making of spending cuts in Knowsley MBC was formally 
part of the Policy Planning and Budgeting Process 1984/85- 
1986/87.80 This process was an explicit attempt to link 
policy-making and budget-making in the local authority.81
In April 1983 the Borough Treasurer reported to the Policy 
and Resources Committee that the Council's net spending 
needed to be substantially cut if the Labour Group wanted
to achieve its objective of a "single figure rate
increase".82 As a result, the Policy and Resources
Committee instructed committees to reduce their net 
spending. As part of the Policy Planning and Budgeting 
Process committees were required to develop "priorities for 
service development bearing in mind the need for financial 
constraint", and more important to prepare "options to
reduce net expenditure by a minimum of 3%".83 There were 
thus two elements to the Policy Planning and Budgeting 
Process - a 'lower expenditure options' exercise to find
80 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
81 The Audit Commission, Local Government Training 
Board and Institute of Local Government Studies commended 
this budget process as an example of good management in 
local government ((1985) p30).
82 Borough Treasurer, taken from Knowsley MBC's Budget 
1984/85. 1984, p2.
83 Knowsley MBC's PPBP For 84/5: Approach To Lower
Options And Service Developments. 1983, p2.
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the required spending reductions in 1984/85, and a 'service 
developments' exercise to plan and prioritise policies over 
three years.
The Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer prepared
guidelines to assist committees in these two exercises.
These guidelines were endorsed by the Policy and Resources
Committee. For the 'lower expenditure options1 exercise
committees were advised to categorise their options
according to the following criteria:84
"(a) Nil or least impact on service - eg. 
increased income not affecting demand
(b) Acceptable implications on service/declared 
priorities - eg. re-phasing of schemes
(c) Unacceptable effect on services - eg. 
advanced closure of schools"
For the 'service developments' exercise committees were
advised to adopt the following criteria:85
"(a) Statutory/declared Priority/Commitments -
eg. tertiary college
(b) High priorities which are cost effective in 
both service and financial terms - eg. URP [Urban 
Renewal Programme] schemes which are high 
priorities in service terms
(c) Other priority schemes - eg. providing 
recreation for the unemployed
(d) Low priority - Not cost effective"
Despite these general guidelines the Policy Planning and 
Budgeting Process had broken down towards the end of 1983. 
The breakdown occurred at both the departmental and 
corporate levels of the local authority.
At the departmental level committees were required to 
identify specified reductions of net spending and to plan 
policies over three years. By November 1983 committees had 
carried out the 'lower expenditure options' and 'service
84 Taken from Knowsley MBC's PPBP For 84/5: Approach To 
Lower Options And Service Developments. 1983, pi.
85 Taken from Knowsley MBC's PPBP For 84/5: Approach To 
Lower Options And Service Developments. 1983, pi.
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developments' exercises, but at this stage "things started 
to go wrong11.86 The progress of the budget process is 
charted in the table below.
Table 4.1; Policy Planning and Budgeting Process of 
Knowsley MBC. 1984/85
Service
Lower expenditure 
options
£ %
Service
developments
£
Net
change
ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Department* 
Committee** 
Budget***
(42100)
(42100)
(62150)
(4.6)
(4.6)
(6.7)
187860
187860
36700 (2 .8)
EDUCATION 
Department* * * * 
Committee 
Budget
(350000)
(378000)
(878500)
(0.7)
(0 .8)
(1.8)
1535540
1535540
162820 (1.5)
FINANCIAL
CONTROL
Department
Committee
Budget
(88490)
(88490)
(88490)
(26.4)
(26.4)
(26.4)
530
530
530 (26.3)
GENERAL
PURPOSES
Department
Committee
Budget
(79500)
(79500)
(79500)
(21.9)
(21.9)
(21.9)
56560
36190
1630 (21.4)
HOUSING AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH 
Department 
Committee 
Budget
(46100)
(46100)
(46100)
(4.2)
(4.2)
(4.2)
10620
10620
3970 (3.8)
LEISURE 
SERVICES . 
Department 
Committee 
Budget
(146040)
(146040)
(48340)
(2.6)
(2.6)
(0.8)
138820
138820
46300 (0.0)
MANPOWER
86 Borough Treasurer, Knowsley MBC.
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SERVICES 
Department 
Committee 
Budget
POLICY AND
RESOURCES 
Department 
Committee 
Budget
SOCIAL
SERVICES 
Department 
Committee 
Budget
TECHNICAL AND
PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES 
Department 
Committee 
Budget
TOTAL 
Department 
Committee 
Budget
* Departmental recommendation, November 1983 
** Committee recommendation, November 1983 
*** Budget, February 1984
**** The recommended spending reductions identified by 
the 'lower expenditure options1 exercise was made by 
the Borough Education Officer alone. The Chief 
Executive and the Borough Treasurer recommended 
reductions amounting to £1,254,000, which represented 
a 2.6 per cent reduction of net spending.
Source: Knowsley MBC
In November committees met to determine their responses to 
the 'lower expenditure options' and 'service developments! 
exercises. Departments made recommendations to committees 
on the two exercises. These recommendations were prepared 
by the Chief Executive, the Borough Treasurer and the 
respective chief officers of departments, though the views 
of the committee chairmen were informally fed into their 
preparation. As shown in the table above, departmental
(16320) (38.2)
(14880) (34.8)
(14880) (34.8)
(8620) (3.8)
(8620) (3.8)
(8620) (3.8)
(306200) (3.3)
(300000) (3.3)
(365790) (4.0)
(295760) (12.1)
(295760) (12.1)
(303200) (12.4)
(1379130) (2.0)
(1399490) (2.1)
(1895570) (2.8)
35000 
35000 
4000 (25.5)
11680 
11680 
2500 (2.7)
134177
134177
122530 (2.7)
3355790 
3355790 
391590 3.6
5466577 
5446207 
772570 (1-7)
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recommendations were invariably endorsed by committees, not 
least because the informal input of committee chairmen 
influenced these recommendations.87 There were only small 
variations between departmental and committee 
recommendations in the education, general purposes, 
manpower services and social services budgets.
Table 4.1 shows that the 'lower expenditure options' 
exercise failed to generate the required three per cent 
reduction of total net spending. The exercise yielded 
spending reductions amounting to only £1.4 million, which 
represented about a two per cent reduction. Indeed, the 
additional spending earmarked for 'service developments' 
far exceeded the spending cuts identified as 'lower 
expenditure options'. The 'service developments' exercise 
generated demands for increased spending of over £5.4 
million, of which £3.9 million was regarded as priority 
spending by committees. This exercise also failed arguably 
in its attempt to keep policies in line with financial 
restraint.
The reasons of the breakdown of the Policy Planning and 
Budgeting Process varied between committees and 
departments. Table 4.1 reveals that the majority of 
committees had identified the required amount of spending 
reductions. It is necessary to examine why these committees 
were successful in complying with the budget strategy, 
whereas the Education Committee and the Leisure Services 
Committee were unsuccessful. The reasons were twofold.
The first reason was the ease with which some committees 
identified their quota of 'lower expenditure options'. Both 
the Housing and Environmental Health Committee and the
87 The Director of Leisure Services, for example, 
claimed to put forward only "realistically possible" 
recommendations, which precluded any recommendations, say, 
on the contracting-out of services.
212
Social Services Committee were able to make relatively 
painless spending cuts. The Housing and Environmental 
Health Committee was able to reduce its spending by £34,000 
because of slippage in its capital programme. The Social 
Services Committee identified only one 'lower expenditure 
option1 amounting to £300,000, which arose from reduced 
demand for children's residential accommodation. The 'easy' 
spending cuts were not spread evenly between committees, 
and therefore some committees were more able to find their 
required share of spending reductions than other 
committees.
Furthermore, some committees were more able to cut net
spending by increasing specific service income than other
committees. The 'lower expenditure options1 exercise
required committees to reduce their net spending, which
they could by either cutting their gross spending or
increasing specific service income (eg increasing charges
for services, receiving extra monies in specific grants).
Departments and committees preferred to cut net spending by
increasing their income rather than cutting their spending.
For example, in the Council's corporate plan the Chief
Executive included the following objective:88
"Without prejudicing the Council's main policy 
priorities, takes advantage of the opportunities 
offered by Knowsley's Programme Status, and other 
sources of grant - such as derelict land grant, 
urban development grant, Operation Groundwork and 
EEC grants."
This strategy of raising additional income, particularly 
from extra grant funding, played a part in the way 
committees determined their list of 'lower expenditure 
options'. This preference is illustrated in the table 
below.
88 Taken from Knowsley MBC's The Strategy For The 
1984/5 - 1986/7 Knowsley Plan. 1983, p3.
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Table 4.2: Analysis of Net Spending Reductions
Proposed bv Committees of Knowsley MBC. 
1984/85
Committee
Net spending 
reductions
Increased service 
income
Economic and 
Development 42100 42100 100
Education 378000
Financial Control 88490
General Purposes
Housing and 
Environmental Health
79500
46100
30000 38
Leisure Services 146040 40830 28
Manpower Services 14880
Policy and Resources 8620
Social Services 300000
Technical and 
Professional Services 295760 102380 35
TOTAL 1399490 215310 15
Source: Knowsley MBC
This table shows that the Technical and Professional 
Services Committee found 35 per cent, the General Purposes 
Committee 38 per cent, and the Economic and Development 
Sub-Committee all of its 'lower expenditure options' from 
additional income. Even the Leisure Services Committee, 
which was unable to identify the required reductions, found
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28 per cent of its net spending reductions from additional
income. The Director of Leisure Services commented:89
"Leisure Services have been fortunate in being 
able to expand in spite of cuts through the 
judicial use of grant from Special Initiatives,
Urban Programme, Sports Council, Development Land 
Grants, Operation Groundwork, etc., thereby 
mitigating the effect of spending costs on the 
services offered by the Department."
Committees that enjoyed the discretion to raise additional 
income preferred to exercise this discretion rather than 
cut their actual spending. This capacity to raise 
additional income partially explains why some committees 
and not others were able to comply with the 'lower 
expenditure options1 exercise. However, there are limits on 
the amount of additional income that can be raised by 
committees. For example, the level of grant funding is 
determined by other bodies, most notably central 
government. The amount raised by increasing charges for 
using services is limited by the demand for those services 
- increased charges may lead to reduced demand for 
services, and therefore reduced income.90 Nonetheless, the 
scope to raise additional income was not evenly spread 
between committees, and therefore some committees were more 
able to resist cutting their spending than other 
committees.
The second reason was the relationships between the service 
departments and the Chief Executive and the Borough 
Treasurer, the main architects of the budget strategy. The 
Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer were heavily 
involved with the Policy Planning and Budgeting Process, 
especially the 'lower expenditure options1 exercise. They 
prepared recommendations jointly with the respective chief
89 Taken from Director of Leisure Services' Brief Notes 
On Expenditure Costs In Local Government.
90 The income raised by increasing charges depends on 
the elasticity of demand for local authority services.
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officers of the service departments, and thus the 
implementation of the budget strategy depended on the 
relationships with their counterparts in the service 
departments. The Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer 
had very close relationships with the departments providing 
central services, and thus were more able to ensure their 
compliance with the budget strategy. Indeed, as they ran 
two of these departments they offered more than their 
required spending reductions as an example to other 
departments. As table 4.1 shows, only two departments were 
unable to identify the three per cent reduction of net 
spending - the Education Department and the Leisure 
Services Department. In each case the relationships between 
the chief officers of the two service departments and the 
Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer were less close - 
relationships were distant for leisure services, and 
strained with education.
In making the leisure services budget the influence of the 
Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer was downgraded 
because the Director of Leisure Services enjoyed a close 
relationship with the chairman of the Leisure Services 
Committee and the Labour Group. Furthermore, Derek Hatton, 
who at the time was the Deputy Leader of Liverpool CC, was 
employed in the Leisure Services Department. There was thus 
a network of influence spreading between the Department, 
the Committee, the Labour Group and the local Labour Party 
which insulated the leisure services budget from the 
demands to cut its spending. The Chief Executive and the 
Borough Treasurer were thus less able to impose their will 
upon the Director of Leisure Services who could count upon 
significant political support.
In making the education budget there was a very tense 
relationship between the Borough Education Officer, and the 
Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer. They were unable 
to agree on a list of 'lower expenditure options1 to
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recommend to the Education Committee. Table 4.1 reveals 
that the Borough Education Officer identified only 
£3 50,000, and the Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer 
identified £1,2 54,000 of spending reductions. The Borough 
Education Officer indicated that "on educational grounds he 
is not in a position to make any recommendations regarding 
reductions in expenditure to the Committee, other than 
those which result from the ongoing effects of existing 
policy...."91 The Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer 
offered some "sweeteners" in the 'service developments' 
exercise in the hope of persuading the Borough Education 
Officer to comply with the 'lower expenditure options1 
exercise.92 Despite these 'sweeteners1 the Borough 
Education Officer felt that "enough is enough", and easily 
persuaded the Education Committee to resist making more 
spending cuts than he recommended.93 The inability of the 
Education Committee to generate the required spending cuts 
was, in effect, the ruin of the Policy Planning and 
Budgeting Process, because the education budget accounted 
for about 7 0 per cent of the Council's net expenditure. 
Thus, both the Education Department and the Leisure 
Services Department were able to resist trimming their 
budgets because of their substantial support in committee 
and in the ruling Labour Group.
The budget process collapsed not only at the departmental 
level but also at the corporate level of the local 
authority. In the early stages of the budget process the 
controlling Labour Group, through the Policy and Resources 
Committee, unleashed two conflicting demands upon
91 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Joint Report Of The Chief 
Executive. Borough Treasurer And Borough Education Officer. 
22 November 1983.
92 Borough Education Officer, Knowsley MBC.
93 As ward representatives, school governors and 
teachers, members of the Education Committee were concerned 
to protect the education budget.
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committees - the 'service developments1 exercise and the 
'lower expenditure options' exercise. The Policy Planning 
and Budgeting Process was intended to be both policy-led 
and finance-led. The 'service developments1 exercise was 
designed to plan new policies over three years, which in 
practice often.meant planning for increased spending. The 
'lower expenditure options1 exercise was designed to 
identify cuts in net spending, which meant planning for 
reduced spending. These exercises, when carried out by 
committees and departments, produced two contradictory sets 
of spending expectations - one to spend and another not to 
spend.
The Labour Group was committed to keep the rates down, but 
did not issue unequivocal guidelines to reduce net spending 
necessary to realise its commitment. Though committees were 
required to identify 'lower expenditure options1, they were 
still allowed to plan 'service developments'. The 'service 
developments' exercise was little more than an invitation 
to committees to draw up a 'shopping list' of spending, 
which led to demands for increased spending and thus 
greater resistance to cut spending.94 Committees and 
departments were required both to draw up spending plans 
and to make immediate spending cuts. These exercises 
frustrated many chief officers who realised that many of 
their plans would never materialise because of the 
overriding requirement to reduce spending. Though the 
Policy Planning and Budgeting Process was a formal 
mechanism of service and finance planning, in practice it 
was no more than a "finance-led exercise" dominated by the 
need to make spending cuts.95
94 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC; Borough Treasurer, 
Knowsley MBC; Borough Education Officer, Knowsley MBC; and 
Director of Technical and Professional Services, Knowsley 
MBC.
95 Director of Leisure Services, Knowsley MBC. In 
making the budget of 1985/86 the Policy Planning and 
Budgeting Process was effectively put "on ice", and
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Thus, in the early stages of the budget process the ruling 
Labour Group failed to develop a clear corporate strategy 
within which committees and departments could make their 
budgets. The Labour Group provided no direction to 
committees and departments on how they should cut spending 
and by how much. In the words of the Borough Treasurer, the 
"politicians let us down" because they failed to make a 
corporate strategy to guide the budget process.
By the end of 1983 the Policy Planning and Budgeting 
Process had more or less collapsed - the 'lower expenditure 
options' exercise failed to yield the required spending 
cuts, and the 'service developments1 exercise only created 
'spending lobbies1. The budget process so far had been 
ridden with departmentalism mirrored by the 'committee- 
mindedness1 of councillors. The Chief Officers1 Group - the 
management team of chief officers - was unable to resolve 
the competing claims of departments.96 The Leaders' 
Consultative Committee, a cabal in the Labour Group, was 
likewise unable to resolve the competing claims of 
committees. The budget process ran into a logjam, which 
neither the Chief Officers' Group nor the Leaders' 
Consultative Committee was able to unlock. Both these 
groups were dominated by defenders of services, and were 
thus unwilling to make spending cuts.97
The Policy Planning and Budgeting Process had run aground 
towards the end of 1983. It had collapsed at both the 
departmental and corporate levels of the local authority, 
and thus had to be abandoned. Instead, the Leaders' 
Consultative Committee asked the Chief Executive and
committees were not required to plan 'service developments' 
but only to identify 'lower expenditure options' (Borough 
Treasurer, Knowsley MBC). The process was later scrapped - 
see Fellows (1990); and Long (1990).
96 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
97 Borough Treasurer, Knowsley MBC.
219
Borough Treasurer to find the spending cuts required to 
keep the rates down. The Labour Group, in effect, delegated 
the task of making the budget to these two chief officers. 
In the words of the Chief Executive, "we're doing the dirty 
work for them".
This delegated task of making the budget was made easier 
because of the availability of fund contributions and 
identification of spending cuts in the earlier 'lower 
expenditure options' exercise. The Borough Treasurer 
estimated that "a single figure rate increase required 
reductions of £2.8m", of which "some £1.5m could be 
achieved by financing and funding adjustments."98 These 
"sizeable contributions" from various funds, such as the 
Repair, Maintenance and Replacement of Buildings Fund and 
the Equipment Fund, allowed net spending to be cut without 
cutting actual gross spending.99 The decision to utilise 
these funds was solely in the hands of the Borough 
Treasurer.100 His predecessor was more cautious in using 
funds. As a result, the amount of fund monies built up 
allowing their utilisation in 1984/85, though as the 
Borough Treasurer warned, the "scope to utilise funds to 
reduce expenditure in future years will become increasingly 
limited. ",()l
These funding contributions eased the task of making 
spending cuts. Furthermore, the spending reductions 
identified in the 'lower expenditure options' exercise
98 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Budget 1984/85. 1984, p2.
99 Borough Treasurer, Knowsley MBC, taken from Knowsley 
MBC's Annual Report And Accounts 1984-85. p8.
100 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
101 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Annual Report And Accounts 
1984-85. p8. However, because of a small overspend in 
1984/85 the Borough Treasurer suggested a further £3.35 
million could be utilised from these funds in 1985/86 
(taken from Knowsley MBC's Budget 1985/86. 1985, p6) .
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provided the basis of the reductions considered by the 
Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer. According to the 
Chief Executive, these options were examined and placed 
into four categories - "accept in full", "accept in part", 
"defer", and "not acceptable". The criteria of categorising 
the spending reductions were a mixture of political 
feasibility and impact upon service provision. The 
judgements made by the Chief Executive and the Borough 
Treasurer were made after informal discussions with the 
Leader of the Labour Group, committee chairmen and chief 
officers, who advised on the political and professional 
acceptability of the proposed spending cuts.102 The 
exception was the making of the education budget where 
decisions to cut spending were made unilaterally without 
the agreement of the Borough Education Officer.
Thus, the Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer relied 
on the outcomes of the formal 'lower expenditure options1 
exercise and informal negotiations in putting together a 
package of spending cuts. The spending cuts were neither 
evenly distributed nor explicitly apportioned according to 
some grand plan. The Council's corporate plan remained very 
much in the background of the budget process. The making of 
spending cuts in Knowsley MBC started out as a formal, 
corporate and planned process, but ended up as an informal, 
fragmented and ad hoc process. When the Policy Planning and 
Budgeting Process failed to produce the required spending 
cuts to keep the rates down, the Labour leadership turned 
to the Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer to deliver 
"the coup de grace" in making the spending cuts in the 
budget of 1984/85.103
Making cuts in Stockport MBC
102 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
m  Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
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Stockport MBC has established a three-year corporate 
planning and budgeting process which is revised each year. 
The annual Corporate Plan and Budget represents a statement 
of the Council's policies and budgets, together with the 
planned changes from the previous year. For each committee 
there are two main elements in this process - a policy 
statement and policy options. A policy statement is "the 
committee's current policies and levels of service 
including committed changes over the next three years", and 
policy options are "proposals to change policies or levels 
of service and set out the resource implications, over the 
next three years, of adopting thern."im
In 1984/85 the budget of Stockport MBC was more or less a 
standstill budget. The budget contained only £127,270 of 
spending cuts, which constituted about 0.1 per cent 
reduction from the previous year's spending. However, as 
discussed in the last chapter, this amount was a 
significant under-estimation of the amount of spending 
actually cut. In addition to the spending cuts revealed in 
the budget, there were spending cuts made in the 
calculation of the Council's base budget, and in the drive 
not to overspend its budget and even to underspend on its 
outturn. Thus, spending cuts appeared not only as policy 
options but were also found within the policy statements 
and within the outturn of committees. It is not possible to 
calculate with any accuracy the extent of the spending cuts 
made in the policy statements and outturn because they 
cannot be disentangled from the rest of the spending under 
various headings in both the budgets and accounts. However, 
they, along with the spending cuts that appeared as policy 
options, will be examined to explain how they were made in 
Stockport MBC.
In Autumn 1983 the task of preparing the Council's base
104 Taken from Stockport MBC's Development Services: 
Policy Statement And Options 1984-87. 1984, preface.
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budget was undertaken by the Finance Department and other 
departments. The base budget is the budget required to 
sustain existing policies of the Council. It is updated 
each year to reflect changes in the way agreed policies 
take effect upon service provision and changes in the cost 
of administering existing policies. Spending cuts, which 
were included in the base budget of 1984/85, resulted from 
policy options of previous years being written into the 
policy statements of committees. For example, spending cuts 
were made in the education base budget, because of the 
existing policy of cutting spending as a result of falling 
school rolls.10'
The calculation of the base budget is left to officer 
negotiations between the service departments and the 
Finance Department.1116 The negotiations varied from 
department to department. In some departments there were 
realistic discussions with the Finance Department, eg 
Development and Town Planning Department, Housing and 
Environmental Health Department, and Education 
Department.107 In other departments there was a "ritual 
game" in which the Finance Department would deliberately 
underestimate budget provision (especially inflation 
allowances) and service departments would deliberately 
overestimate their budget requirements.108 The base budget
105 Director of Education, Stockport MBC (taken from a 
letter dated 24 August 1984) . Rosenberg observed the 
tendency for many spending cuts to be contained in the base 
budget and thus disguised from councillors ((1985b) pl60).
106 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC.
107 Director of Education and Acting Director of 
Housing, Stockport MBC; Director of Development and Town 
Planning, Stockport MBC; and Assistant Director of Housing 
and Environmental Health, Stockport MBC.
108 Assistant Director of Recreation and Culture, 
Stockport MBC. The Leader of the Conservative Group 
condoned an "acceptance level" of padding because it 
provided flexibility to respond to unforeseen events once 
the budget has been made.
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represented a negotiated settlement between service 
departments and the Finance Department, and included many 
adjustments that reduced spending.
The budget process of Stockport MBC is traditionally a 
finance-led exercise. The Council under the control of the 
Conservative Group has never started from plans of what 
spending was needed to provide services, but from a 
calculation of what money was available to spend on 
services.109 This approach has prevented a 'shopping list1 
of spending demands being drawn up because it was always 
widely known in the early stages of the budget process what 
spending could be afforded. The making of the budget of 
1984/85 was no exception to this budgetary rule.
The ruling Conservative Group was committed to restricting 
the rates rise to less than the general rate of inflation, 
and to keeping the Council's spending within the 
expenditure target set by central government. Given these 
commitments the Director of Finance calculated that the 
budget of 1984/85 would have to remain very close to the 
base budget.110 The ramifications of this standstill budget 
option were discussed by the Leader of the Conservative 
Group, the Chief Executive and the Director of Finance.111 
This triumvirate, or "three-man band", provided the 
leadership of the Council.112
109 Assistant Director of Finance, Stockport MBC.
1.0 Taken from Stockport MBC's Revenue Expenditure And 
Budget Forecast 1983/84 and 1984/85. 1983.
1.1 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC; Chairman, 
Development Services Committee, Stockport MBC; Chairman, 
Recreation and Culture Committee, Stockport MBC; Leader, 
Labour Group, Stockport MBC; and Finance Spokesman, Labour 
Group, Stockport MBC.
1.2 Chairman, Recreation and Culture Committee, 
Stockport MBC.
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On the officer side, the Chief Executive and the Director 
of Finance dominated the Management Board of chief 
officers, mainly because other chief officers realised they 
had considerable backing from the Conservative 
leadership.113 On the councillor side, the Conservative 
Group was dominated by its Leader, largely because no other 
Conservative councillor was prepared to challenge for the 
leadership.114 Thus, the influence of the Chief Executive, 
the Director of Finance and the Leader of the Conservative 
Group was highly significant in making the Council's budget 
strategy.
The Leader of the Conservative Group, together with the 
Deputy Leader and the Chairman of the Finance Sub­
committee, ensured that the budget achieved the aims of 
keeping the rates increase within inflation and spending 
within the Government's target. These three councillors, 
which constituted the Conservative leadership, met with 
each committee chairman (and sometimes vice-chairman) in 
turn to sort out the policy options to be adopted in 
committee.11-' In this "smoke-filled room" the committee 
chairman had to persuade the leadership of the necessity of 
the policy options to be recommended in committee.116 The 
policy options were generally initiated by chief officers
113 Assistant Director of Finance, Stockport MBC.
114 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC; Chairman, 
Development Services Committee, Stockport MBC; Chairman, 
Recreation and Culture Committee, Stockport MBC; Leader, 
Labour Group, Stockport MBC; and Finance Spokesman, Labour 
Group, Stockport MBC.
1,5 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC; Chairman, 
Development Services Committee, Stockport MBC; Chairman, 
Education Committee, Stockport MBC; Chairman, Finance Sub­
committee, Stockport MBC; Leader, Labour Group, Stockport 
MBC; Director of Development and Town Planning, Stockport 
MBC; and Assistant Director of Recreation and Culture, 
Stockport MBC.
116 Assistant Director of Recreation and Culture, 
Stockport MBC.
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in consultation with the respective committee chairman.117 
However, it was left to the committee chairman of each 
committee to defend the policy options in front of the 
Conservative leadership. At this stage many policy options 
were pruned to comply with the overall budget strategy.
The Conservative leadership performed this 'sweat shop' 
function because committee chairmen tended to "fall in love 
with what they are doing", and thus accepted almost blindly 
the policy options suggested by chief officers.118 The 
Leader of the Conservative Group claimed no chief officer, 
with the exception of the Director of Finance, had ever 
volunteered a spending cut as a policy option.119 As a 
result the Conservative leadership wanted to scrutinise the 
spending bids of committees. In the words of the Deputy 
Leader, "we are there to protect the ratepayer".120 This 
'sweat shop1 function allowed the Conservative leadership 
to make spending cuts in a selective manner.121 To a large 
extent the leadership adopted 'divide and rule1 tactics 
which prevented the rest of the Conservative Group from 
effectively challenging its decisions. Indeed, its
117 Only £127,270 of spending cuts were presented as 
policy options, of which £100,000 was a reduction in the 
budget of Stockport College of Technology. It was left to 
the college to implement because neither the Education 
Committee nor the Education Department were concerned how 
the college made the reduction or even whether the college
could make the reduction. The Chairman of the Education
Committee, echoing the advice of the Director of Education, 
"had a feeling that they could find it".
118 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC.
119 The Chief Executive stated the policy and resources
budget had been cut in the past as an example to other
departments.
120 Chairman, Development Services Committee, Stockport 
MBC. He was also the Deputy Leader of the Conservative 
Group.
121 Chairman, Development Services Committee, Stockport
MBC.
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decisions were reported to the Party Executive Group 
comprising committee chairmen, which in turn reported to 
the whole Group. The Conservative leadership was thus 
insulated from the wider Group.
The close relationships between the Conservative leadership 
(notably the Leader of the Group) on the councillor side 
and the Chief Executive and the Director of Finance on the 
officer side strengthened each side in making spending 
cuts. The Conservative leadership was fed with information 
from the Chief Executive and the Director of Finance, and 
in return the Conservative leadership backed the two chief 
officers in their dealings with other officers. The 
Conservative leadership in its dominance of the Group 
provided the political support for the budget strategy, 
which in turn allowed the Chief Executive and the Director 
of Finance to secure departmental compliance with the 
strategy. Both sides were interdependent, and reinforced 
each other's position in the budget process. Spending cuts 
were made in a highly centralised and secretive way in 
Stockport MBC.
So far the making of spending cuts in the policy statements 
(that is, the base budget) and as policy options (that is, 
changes to the policy statements) have been examined. The 
third and final form of making spending cuts was the 
constant pressure to underspend the Council's budget. 
Throughout the financial year the Finance Department 
monitored regularly the spending of departments. In 
December 1983 the Director of Finance estimated that pay 
awards would increase by four per cent, and the cost of 
supplies and materials by five per cent.122 These inflatibn 
allowances were then incorporated into the base budget. 
However, in June 1984 the Director of Finance reported that
122 Taken from Stockport MBC's Revenue Expenditure And 
Budget Forecast 1983/84 and 1984/85. 1983, p3.
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"this provision may not be adequate."123 By August 1984 he 
believed that this provision "must be viewed now as ever 
more likely to be exceeded.11124 At this stage the Director 
of Finance successfully recommended that funds be used to 
keep the Council's spending within the Government's 
expenditure target and therefore avoid grant penalty. By 
October 1984 the Director of Finance now believed that "the 
budget in so far as the current year is concerned will 
prove about right, although there may be a small 
overspending. . . . "125
In fact there was a small budgeted underspend in the 
Council's outturn, which continued a long record of 
underspending in Stockport MBC. Though this underspend was 
partly because of the decision to utilise £682,000 from the 
Repairs and Renewal Fund, it was also the result of 
considerable political and administrative pressure upon 
departments to underspend their budgets.126
The main source of pressure to underspend came from the 
Establishment Control Panel. The Panel comprised a "cabal 
of three" including the Leader of the Conservative 
Group.127 It was set up in 1974, but from 1976 onwards 
until its eventual abolition, it vetted staffing claims of 
departments.m  It had no formal status, reported to no
123 Taken from Stockport MBC's Longer Term Financial 
Outlook. 1984, pi.
124 Taken from Stockport MBC's Budgetary Control Report. 
August 1984, p5.
125 Taken from Stockport MBC's Budgetary Control Report. 
October 1984, p2.
126 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC; and 
Chairman, Development Services Committee, Stockport MBC.
127 Director of Administration, Stockport MBC.
12!< The Establishment Control Panel was abolished by the 
Labour Group and the Liberal Group when the Council became 
'hung' after the May 1984 local elections.
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other committee and acted in secret.129 Its main function 
was to save money by either delaying the filling of vacant 
posts or rejecting claims to fill vacant posts. The delay 
in filling vacant posts allowed the Panel to decide whether 
the vacancy needed to be filled or not.130 If there were 
any adverse effects of the post remaining vacant then it 
would be filled; and if there were no adverse effects then 
it would probably not be filled. For example, there was 
significant under-staffing of the engineering section in 
the Works Department which jeopardised the maintenance 
programme of roads and sewers. As a result, and following 
some adverse publicity in a local newspaper, more staff 
were employed in the engineering section.131 The 
Conservative leadership was very aware that staffing costs 
represented a substantial share of the budget, and 
therefore needed to be controlled and even reduced if its 
budget strategy were to succeed. The Establishment Control 
Panel was an effective budgetary control mechanism, and 
exercised substantial pressure to underspend the budget. 
The budget was always made on the basis that all posts 
would be filled and therefore included the wages and
129 Leader, Labour Group, Stockport MBC; Finance 
Spokesman, Labour Group, Stockport MBC; and Director of 
Administration, Stockport MBC.
130 Chairman, Development Services Committee, Stockport
MBC.
131 See Stockport MBC's Report of the Chief Executive 
and Director of Works. 20 August 1984; and P Robinson, 
'Crisis hits the road', Stockport Express Advertiser. 23 
August 1984, pi. The Leader of the Conservative Group 
believed the report was leaked to the local press by the 
Director of Works as part of a.deliberate strategy to press 
for more staff. He justified the under-staffing of the 
engineering section on the grounds that work on the sewers 
may have been reclaimed by the North West Water Authority. 
As a result, the Chairman of the Transportation and Works 
Committee argued that the newspaper report was "rubbish", 
and that the newspaper was run by "a bunch of raving 
loonies". The Council maintained its agency agreement with 
the water authority, and later employed more staff in the 
engineering section of the Works Department.
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salaries of those staff. In reality, however, not all the 
posts would be filled all year round, and consequently a 
significant underspend was likely. The Establishment 
Control Panel was a crude but effective way of making 
spending cuts.
After the local elections in May 1984 the Conservative 
Group lost control of the Council. The Council became 
'hung'. There were two significant changes made to the 
inherited Conservative budget by the Labour Group and 
Liberal Group combined. First, the proposed spending 
reduction of £20,000 in the school caretaking and cleaning 
budget was reversed. This proposal was opposed by the 
National Union of Public Employees, which argued that this 
spending cut threatened the pay and conditions of its 
members.132 The trade union was involved in protracted 
negotiations with the Education Department on the 
implementation of this reduction. However, after lobbying 
the Labour Group and the Liberal Group its implementation 
was suspended. Second, an extra 28 primary school teachers 
were recruited, which added £177,000 to the education 
budget. This measure was supported again by both the Labour 
Group and Liberal Group. Though the measure was justified 
on educational grounds, it was put forward by the Labour 
Group before the local elections took place in order to 
gain electoral advantage.133
Despite these two relatively minor changes, the budget of 
1984/85 was still essentially the product of the 
triumvirate which dominated the Council, that is, the 
Leader of the Conservative Group, the Chief Executive and 
the Director of Finance. Spending cuts were largely made by 
this interdependent and powerful group.
132 Area Officer (5) , National Union of Public 
Employees.
133 Leader, Labour Group, Stockport MBC; and Finance 
Spokesman, Labour Group, Stockport MBC.
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MAKING CUTS IN CAPITAL SPENDING
The four local authorities - Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, 
Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC - had contrasting records of 
capital spending.134 Three of the four local authorities 
had increased their capital spending in real terms between 
1978/79 and 1984/85 - the exception was Bedfordshire CC. 
However, only Knowsley MBC had increased its capital 
spending in 1984/85 compared with the previous year.
Though a local authority may spend less on its capital 
programme than in previous years, this reduction does not 
mean that existing or ongoing projects have been axed 
before completion, but rather that planned projects have 
been postponed or even cancelled. Both Kent CC and 
Stockport MBC spent less in real terms on their capital 
programmes in 1984/85 than in 1983/84, but no capital 
project was abandoned. Instead capital projects were re­
phased in their programmes. In Kent CC the rephasing of its 
capital programme was caused more by unforeseen slippage in 
its existing programme than by financial pressure exerted 
by central government.135 Implementation delays in 
completing capital projects are significant reasons why 
actual capital spending is less than planned capital 
spending.136 Another reason for reduced local authority 
capital spending is the financial pressure applied by 
central government. For example, Knowsley MBC's Urban 
Renewal Programme of 1984/85 was approved and grant-funded 
by central government, but the "substantial shortfall of 
available funds relative to the total cost of approved
134 See chapter three, ppl32-146.
135 Reporter, Kent Messenger Ltd.
136 Deputy Leader, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC.
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schemes required substantial rephasings and deferments.1,137 
In understanding how a local authority cuts its capital 
spending it is necessary to examine the way in which its 
capital programme is formulated as well as how specific 
capital projects within the programme are determined.
There are several common features in the making of the 
capital programme evident in the four local authorities, 
and indeed in local government generally. These features 
include the availability of resources in financing the 
capital programme, the degree of planning involved in 
setting the capital programme, and the centralised manner 
of making the capital programme. They are important 
elements in the cutback management of capital projects, and 
will be now considered.
The first feature to be looked at in the making of capital 
programmes is the availability of funds to finance capital 
schemes. As argued in the last chapter, the Government's 
spending controls plus the capacity to circumvent these 
controls mainly determined the amount local authorities 
spent on capital projects. The Government's capital and 
revenue spending controls depressed the level of local 
authority spending. Of the four local authorities only 
Knowsley MBC increased its capital spending. In 1983 
Knowsley MBC was granted urban programme status by central 
government, and consequently received substantial grant 
funding for its capital projects. The other three local 
authorities reduced their capital spending compared to the 
previous year.
Each local authority was subject to a general spending
137 Taken from Knowsley MBC's Knowsley Urban Renewal 
Programme 1985-86. pi.
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limit on its capital programme.138 The limit was determined 
by a series of notional computations of what each local 
authority needs to spend under a set of service blocks. The 
main service blocks were education, housing, social 
services, transport and other services. These block 
allocations were calculated by central government after 
receiving bids under each of the blocks by local 
authorities. The table below outlines the bids made by a 
sample of local authorities, the allocations approved by 
central government and the actual spending of local 
authorities under the each block.
Table 4.3: Index of Planned. Allocated and Actual 
Capital Spending of Local Authorities. 
1983/84
Block Bid Allocation Outturn
Education 126 100 117
Housing 166 100 149
Social services 103 100 85
Transport 117 100 84
Other services 356 100 408
TOTAL* 163 100 148
* Total excludes other blocks such as the urban 
programme.
Source: Audit Commission Of Local Authorities In
England And Wales (1985a) pp59-61
Table 4.3 shows that local authority bids under each of the 
main service blocks greatly exceeded the allocations given
138 The exception was capital expenditure on the police, 
probation and magistrate court services, which was 
controlled by the Home Office.
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to local authorities.139 This general trend can also be 
seen in how Kent CC's rolled-forward capital programme 
compared to its set of block allocations - see table 4.4 
below.
Table 4.4: Capital Programme and Block Allocations of 
Kent CC
1983/84 
Block Allocation*
£k
1984/85
Capital
Programme**
£k
Excess of 
Programme 
1984/8 5 over
Allocation*** Allocation 
£k £k
Highways 13884 17935 16359 1576
Social
services 4075 3361 3061 300
Education 4821 7176 4347 2829
Local
services 3480 8289 3523 4766
TOTAL 26260 36761 27290 9471
* 1983/84 outturn prices 
** November 1983 prices 
*** 1984/85 outturn prices
Source: Kent CC
Table 4.4 reveals that both Kent CC's education and social 
services block allocations were reduced compared with the 
allocations of the previous year. The Social Services 
Committee "has suffered a reduction of over Elm when
139 The Audit Commission of Local Authorities in England 
and Wales argued that in the case of housing "exaggerated 
bids" were often made by local authorities "anticipating 
reductions" in the calculation of their block allocation 
((1985a) p35).
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compared with the allocation of 1983-84"; and the Education 
Committee "has in the past 12 months made strong 
representations to the Department of Education and Science 
for an increase in capital allocation for Kent but at 
£4.347m the allocation notified for 1984-85 is nearly 10% 
lower in cash terms than for 1983-84. "140
The block allocations of 1984/85 were notified to local 
authorities in December 1983. Under the Local Government, 
Planning and Land Act 1980 a local authority was allowed to 
spend its block allocations how it wanted and was not 
obliged by law to spend, say, its education block
allocation on education. It was allowed to exercise 
virement between block allocations. However, local
authorities tended to spend roughly in line with their 
block allocations. The Audit Commission found that local 
authorities "have been reluctant to use this power, fearing 
it might contradict Department policies and result in lower 
allocations in future years."141 The transport block
allocation given to Bedfordshire CC was solely allocated to 
transport projects, because the Council felt if it was not 
spent on these projects it would be reduced in subsequent 
years.142 Kent CC exercised only a limited degree of 
virement - about £700,000 of its other services block 
allocation of over £8 million was transferred to other 
blocks. Knowsley MBC explicitly organised its capital 
programme around the main service blocks.143
The block allocations of a local authority could be
140 Taken from Kent CC's Summons To And Agenda For A 
Meeting On The 16th February 1984. 1984, p2.
141 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1985a) plO.
142 County Surveyor, Bedfordshire CC; and Principal 
Assistant, County Surveyor's Department, Bedfordshire CC.
143 See Knowsley MBC's Budget 1984/85. 1984, appendix D.
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exceeded in several ways. Under the Local Government,
Planning and Land Act 1980 a local authority was able to
exceed its total allocation of prescribed expenditure by
using a proportion of its capital receipts, block
allocations from other local authorities, profits of
trading undertakings, and its ten per cent tolerance above
its allocations. There were various devices which local
authorities used to enhance their "capital expenditure
capacity".144 Local authorities utilised extensively their
capital receipts as a way of financing their capital
programmes, though their utilisation is restricted by the
Government. In Kent CC its Property Services Department
undertook much work to identify surplus property which
could be sold off to raise capital receipts.145 In Labour-
controlled Knowsley MBC the sale of council houses was
encouraged primarily as a way of generating capital
receipts to fund its capital programme.146 The use of these
receipts financed over 40 per cent of the Council’s capital
spending in 1984/85. Likewise, the capital programme of
Stockport MBC was heavily dependent on the use of capital
receipts.147 Its Director of Finance stated:14*
"Taken together the available borrowing powers 
fall some way short of the approved programme, 
and approval has been given to the utilisation of 
capital receipts amounting to £5.516m...."
Another legitimate way of circumventing the Government's
capital spending controls was the widespread practice of
144 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1985a) plO.
145 Head, Property Services Department, Kent CC.
146 Director of Leisure Services, Knowsley MBC.
147 Assistant Director of Finance, Stockport MBC.
,4i< Taken from Stockport MBC's, Capital Programme 1983- 
1987. 1984, p2.
236
leasing.149 The spending covered by leasing arrangements 
counted as non-prescribed expenditure, and therefore fell 
outside capital expenditure controls.150 Bedfordshire CC 
and Kent CC embarked upon substantial leasing programmes in 
order to supplement their block allocations.
Thus, all the four local authorities attempted to maximise 
their 'capital expenditure capacity1 by extensively using 
sources of capital finance that lay outside the 
Government's capital spending controls. Table 4.4 shows 
that Kent CC's capital programme exceeded its block 
allocations by over £9 million in 1984/85. The Council 
enhanced its allocations by using its tolerance (notably 
the carrying forward of 'unspent' allocation from the 
previous year), capital receipts and leasing finance. These 
enhancement methods explain why the capital spending of 
local authorities often exceeded their block allocations - 
see table 4.3. However, as argued in the last chapter, the 
'capital expenditure capacity' of local authorities varies 
considerably in both the block allocations calculated by 
central government and funds to enhance these allocations. 
Housing authorities, such as Knowsley MBC and Stockport 
MBC, possessed generally more 'capital expenditure 
capacity' than non-housing authorities, such as 
Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC, because of the substantial 
capital receipts generated under the 'right-to-buy'
149 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1985a) pp56-57; Blackburn (1986);
Blunkett & Jackson (1987) pp230-231; Chandler (1991) p71; 
Chartered Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy 
(1984c) pp53-54; Cochrane (1993) pp36-37; Cook (1993)
ppl59-160; Dillon (1985); Elcock (1991) pl49; Gray &
Jenkins (1991) p458; Letwin (1992) pl84; Midwinter (1988) 
p2 6; Stoker (1988) ppl66-168; Stoker (1991) ppl74-176; and 
Taylor (1987).
150 The opportunities for leasing have since been 
curtailed because the exemption from prescribed expenditure 
of the leasing of vehicles, plant and equipment, and the 
substantial tax allowances that lessors could claim and 
pass onto the lessees have both been removed.
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legislation.151 In general, the 'capital expenditure 
capacity' of local authorities was a key determinant in 
setting the level of their capital spending.
The pressures facing local authorities in making their
revenue budgets significantly influenced the making of
their capital programmes. The Government imposed an
expenditure target upon every local authority, which if
exceeded attracted punitive grant penalties. Furthermore,
it threatened rate-capping of those local authorities
which, in the Government's eyes, were seriously
'overspending'. These controls and threatened controls
restricted not only the level of revenue spending but also
the level of capital spending of local authorities. Local
authorities were concerned not to embark upon capital
projects which substantially incurred revenue commitments,
both in the form of debt charges as repayment of the loans
arranged to finance the capital schemes and running costs
of the completed schemes. In Bedfordshire CC the Chief
Executive and County Treasurer noted:152
"In determining the size of the Capital Programme 
for 1984-85 the Council have placed particular 
emphasis on the consequential revenue costs (both 
financing charges and current expenditure) 
arising upon completion of the programme. With 
this in mind the recommendation from the Policy 
and Resources Committee that the programme of new 
starts for each Programme Committee should be 
contained within a level of ultimate estimated 
revenue consequences was adopted by the County 
Council and this criterion has formed the basis 
of the Council's approved programme of new 
schemes for 1984-85."
As a result of this recommendation, each committee was
given a target for its capital programme, which was mainly
determined by the amount of revenue consequences that could
151 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1985a) pl2.
152 Taken from Bedfordshire CC's County Council Budget 
1984-85: Part 1. pv.
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be absorbed in the revenue budget.153 In Kent CC the County 
Treasurer observed that "whatever level of capital 
programme possible within supplemented allocations, the 
impact on revenue budgets is inhibiting.11154 The Leader of 
the ruling Conservative Group argued that committees must 
bear the revenue consequences of their capital schemes 
otherwise they would have a "licence to print money". The 
Policy and Budget Group responded to this concern over the 
revenue implications of the Council's capital programme by 
undertaking a detailed review. Also Kent CC 'capitalised' 
some of its highway maintenance expenditure.155 In Knowsley 
MBC there was a partially successful attempt to include 
only capital projects with no or minimal revenue 
consequences in its Urban Renewal Programme.156 
Furthermore, the Council also 'capitalised' some of its 
maintenance programme in order to keep down revenue 
spending.157 In Stockport MBC the Chairman of the Finance 
Sub-Committee warned:158
153 County Surveyor, Bedfordshire CC; and Principal 
Assistant, County Surveyor's Department, Bedfordshire CC. 
Many major capital schemes, such as a road bypass, were not 
started because of the overriding concern to minimise the 
revenue consequences of the capital programme.
154 Taken from Taylor (1984a) p768.
155 Manager, Highways and Transportation Department, 
Kent CC; and Finance Officer, Highways and Transportation 
Department, Kent CC.
156 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC; and Borough 
Treasurer, Knowsley MBC.
157 Director of Leisure Services, Knowsley MBC. The 
Audit Commission for Local Authorities in England and Wales 
found that in maintaining school buildings "some 
authorities have been capitalising repairs ... to avoid 
revenue penalties" ((1985a) p29).
158 Taken from Stockport MBC's Corporate Plan And Budget 
1984-87. 1984, pv. However, the Assistant Director of 
Finance pointed out that at this time no capital project 
had been halted because of this concern to minimise the 
revenue consequences of the Council's capital programme. 
The Council was cushioned to a certain extent because of
.2.39
"Expenditure on capital schemes invariably 
generates further revenue expenditure which can 
cause problems of financing growth when budgets 
are already tight."
All four local authorities in making their capital
programmes were therefore constrained by the Government's
controls on both capital and revenue spending. The size of
their capital programmes was determined by their 'capital
expenditure capacity' and limited by the revenue
consequences incurred by their capital spending. The making
of the capital programme was very largely a finance-led
exercise dominated by resource considerations. The Audit
Commission observed that resource considerations are mainly
determined by central government and not local authorities,
and argued:159
"... local members cannot be reasonably be held 
accountable for the size of the total programme, 
for local priorities between services and 
projects, and for methods of financing and 
quality standards...."
The second feature to be examined is the degree of planning 
involved in setting the capital programmes of local 
authorities. The making of a capital programme requires 
much planning by a local authority because of the large- 
scale nature of most capital schemes. The Audit Commission 
noted:160
"Capital projects take several years to 
complete.... [E]ven relatively small schemes can 
take 15-24 months in preparation before contracts 
are let. Feasibility studies, sketch designs, 
working drawings and specification of bills of 
quantities and evaluating tenders all take time - 
and involve up to 10% of the eventual project 
cost. So local authorities need at least a three 
year planning horizon to feel confident."
capital receipts it was able to utilise to finance its 
capital programme.
159 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1985a) p37.
160 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1985a) p37.
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Of the four local authorities, Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC and 
Stockport MBC had a three-year capital programme, and 
Knowsley MBC had only a two-year capital programme. 
Stockport MBC planned and prioritised its capital programme 
according to the following sections:161 
"Base Programme (Green Pages)
This includes all ongoing schemes and thus 
expected to be committed by 31st March 1984. It 
represents a reappraisal of the current year's 
programme and shows its impact on future years.
Starts List (Yellow Pages)
This consists of all schemes planned to start in 
1984/85, which will be the subject of individual 
implementation reports to the Council during the 
year.
Design List (Pink Pages 
This includes schemes planned to start in 
1985/86. The Council has demonstrated a degree of 
commitment to these schemes by authorising design 
effort and in some cases advance expenditure on 
them during 1984/85.
Preliminary List (Blue Pages)
This includes schemes which are not expected to 
start before 1986/87. Inclusion on this list will 
enable the client Division to undertake 
feasibility studies without committing major 
design effort or any advance expenditure."
However, all four local authorities experienced 
considerable difficulties in planning their capital 
programmes. In Kent CC the Highways and Transportation
Department developed a four-year rolling programme of 
highways maintenance. This exercise was part of the
Department's corporate strategy, and attempted to orientate 
its maintenance programme to the corporate objectives of 
the Department.162 The Department wanted to find a "more 
consistent and objective way" of managing its
activities.163 Despite this rationalist intention the
161 Taken from Stockport MBC's Capital Programme 1983- 
1987. 1984, ppl-2.
162 County Surveyor, Kent CC.
163 Manager, Highways and Transportation Department, 
Kent CC.
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Department's maintenance programme was often disrupted
because of uncertainty about its financing, and more
important, the severe limits on what could be financed in
each immediate year.164 This financial pressure stemmed
directly from central government. The Government calculated
capital allocations and revenue expenditure targets of
local authorities for only one year in advance, and
consequently much uncertainty was created for local
authorities planning their capital programmes. Local
authorities were very anxious not to over-commit themselves
in future years on both the capital and revenue sides,
because they did not know whether they could finance these
future spending commitments. In the words of the Audit
Commission:163
"The present capital control systems do not 
provide ... longer term perspective. Government's 
intentions as set out in the Public Expenditure 
White Paper now only provide details of planned 
total local government capital expenditure for 
one year ahead; and one year capital allocations 
only reach local authorities around the turn of 
the year - less than three months before the 
beginning of the period to which they apply."
Thus, the need for local authorities to plan their capital 
programmes is undermined by financial uncertainties and the 
immediate financial constraints imposed upon them by 
central government. This uncertainty surrounding the making 
of capital programmes is prevalent in the short term as 
well as the longer term. In July 1984 the Government 
requested that local authorities should voluntarily curb 
their capital spending otherwise a moratorium would have to
164 Manager, Highways and Transportation Department, 
Kent CC; and Finance Officer, Highways and Transportation 
Department, Kent CC.
165 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1985a) pl4.
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be imposed.166 This request set against a background of a 
threatened moratorium created much short-term uncertainty 
in financing capital programmes of local authorities. 
Though many local authorities ignored it, both Kent CC and 
Knowsley MBC complied with the request.167 In Kent CC some 
of its planned building maintenance programme had to be 
shelved.16* In Knowsley MBC the decision to comply with the 
call for voluntary restraint "contributed to a £0.4m 
underspend on the capital budget."169 The four local 
authorities attempted to plan their capital programmes both 
in the short and long term, but the degree of planning was 
severely diminished because of uncertainties about the 
financing of such plans.
The third feature to be discussed is the centralised manner 
of making the capital programmes of local authorities. In 
the four local authorities the formulation of the capital 
programme was conducted largely at the centre. In 
Bedfordshire CC the Capital Programme Working Group was 
established to coordinate and review the Council's capital 
programme. This Group was largely dominated by the Leader 
of the Conservative Group and the County Treasurer.170 It 
set targets within which committees made their capital 
budgets.171 In Kent CC the Policy and Budget Group, a sub­
committee of the Policy and Resources Committee, performed
166 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In
England And Wales (1985a) ppl4-16; and Travers (1986b)
pl44.
167 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In
England And Wales (1985a) pl4.
I6H Head, Property Services Department, Kent CC.
169 Borough Treasurer, Knowsley MBC, taken from Knowsley 
MBC's Annual Report And Accounts 1984-85. p8.
170 Assistant to the Chief Executive, Bedfordshire CC.
171 County Surveyor, Bedfordshire CC; and Principal 
Assistant, County Surveyor's Department, Bedfordshire CC.
24 3
a similar function.
Officers played the leading role in making the capital
programmes of the four local authorities. Their influence
was prevalent in two critical stages of formulating the
capital programme. First, the specific capital projects
were primarily determined by officers within the service
departments under the general but loose guidance of
committees.172 Second, the method of financing capital
projects and the rules governing local authority spending
are very complex.173 This financial complexity increased
the influence of the finance departments at the centre over
both the service departments and councillors. The technical
and financial expertise needed in making a capital
programme reinforced the leading role of officers who
possessed such expertise, notably the specialised staff of
service departments and the finance department. The
influence of officers over councillors is further
compounded by the lack of time that a local authority has
in which to formulate a capital programme. The Audit
Commission argued:174
"The need for rapid decisions on what to cut from 
capital programmes means that members are forced 
to rely on their officers' judgement to an 
unhealthy extent."
The centralised manner of making the capital programme was
to a significant extent a reflection of the increasing role
of finance departments in local authorities during times of
cutback management. Given the financial pressures facing
172 County Treasurer, Bedfordshire CC. However, in 
Knowsley MBC the Director of Technical and Professional 
Services noted with some surprise that councillors were 
more involved in the making of the capital budget than the 
revenue budget, but as seen earlier, councillors abdicated 
any role in the making of the revenue budget of 1984/85.
173 See Audit Commission For Local Authorities In 
England And Wales (1985a) pp63-64.
174 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1985a) pp39-40.
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local authorities, the finance department was increasingly 
charged to plan their capital and revenue spending, to 
control strictly the level of capital spending and to 
review regularly the progress of capital projects.175 Local 
authorities thus required a centralised group, largely 
dominated by professionals (particularly finance 
professionals), to plan, control and review their capital 
programmes.
The making of capital spending cuts in the four local 
authorities was characterised by considerable financial 
stringency, a diminished degree of planning and a 
centralised manner of decision-making. The financial 
stringency largely led to financial uncertainty, thus 
compounding the lack of effective planning and degree of 
centralised control involved in making capital programmes. 
The making of a capital programme was essentially resource- 
led, which severely limited the effectiveness of longer- 
term planning. The only way to contain this uncertainty was 
to centralise the manner in which capital budgets were made 
in order to impose a degree of certainty, and therefore 
control, in the budget process.
175 In Stockport MBC, for example, its capital programme 
was "under constant review" (taken from Stockport MBC's 
Capital Programme 1983-1987. 1984, p2).
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DISSECTION OF A SPENDING CUT
246
It is important, as argued in chapter two, to examine the 
making of spending cuts in local government at both an 
aggregated and disaggregated level of analysis. The 
previous two chapters looked at the making of spending cuts 
in four local authorities. The reasons for making, and the 
ways of making, spending cuts were explored in these local 
authorities. It is now necessary to complement these forms 
of aggregated analysis with a case study on a specific 
decision to cut spending. Only at this disaggregated level 
can the making of spending cuts in local government be 
fully understood. This chapter focuses on the decision by 
Kent CC to privatise its school cleaning. Contracting-out 
is now firmly established on the local government agenda. 
The New Right has consistently argued that contracting-out 
of local authority services leads to both improved service 
provision and reduced costs of providing services. Its 
argument is underpinned by the belief that the private 
sector is inherently more efficient than the public sector 
in providing services.1 This argument influenced the 
Conservative Government, which has encouraged local 
authorities to contract-out work to private sector.2 The 
Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, the Local 
Government Act 1988 and the Local Government Act 1992 
imposed compulsory competitive tendering onto local 
government. Under this legislation local authorities are 
required to tender out certain prescribed areas of work, 
such as road building and refuse collection. The workforces 
of local authorities, organised as direct labour 
organisations or direct service organisations, must compete 
with private contractors to undertake work traditionally 
carried out by themselves. Given the financial pressures 
facing local authorities, many have accepted bids from
1 See Adam Smith Institute (1982); Adam Smith Institute 
(1989) pp6-8; Beresford (1987); Forsyth (1981); Forsyth 
(1982a); Forsyth (1982b); Forsyth (1983); Minford, Savas & 
Mays (1985); and Pirie (1988).
2 See Ridley (1988).
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private contractors because they have been lower than those 
from their own workforces. These local authorities have 
regarded contracting-out as a significant way of cutting 
their spending. Contracting-out is thus a tool of cutback 
management in local government. The decision by Kent CC to 
contract-out school cleaning will be examined as a case 
study to assess the effectiveness of contracting-out as a 
way of cutting local authority spending. The chapter 
assesses the usefulness of the case study approach, 
discusses the decision to contract-out school cleaning in 
Kent CC, and considers contracting-out as a cutback 
management strategy. This case study examines the interplay 
of actors in making the decision to privatise school 
cleaning, and thus provides further empirical analysis 
which will underpin the theoretical analysis of cutback 
management in the final part of the thesis.
RESCUING THE CASE STUDY
According to Stoecker, case studies include "studies of any 
individual persons, organizations, communities, or 
societies11.3 The analysis of the decision of Kent CC to 
privatise its school cleaning fits into this broad 
definition of the case study. The analysis focuses on a 
specific decision made by a single organisation. The 
validity of case studies has been questioned by many social 
scientists.4 Stoecker argued there are two general 
critiques of the case study method. The first critique 
challenges the internal validity of the case study*
3 Stoecker (1991) p88.
4 For example, see Eckstein (1975).
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Stoecker observed:5
"Case study research, since it does not provide 
experimental controls and therefore is assumed to 
not allow for 'scientific distance1, has no 
built-in corrective against the researcher's 
possible biases."
This critique is not peculiar to case study research, and
applies to other research in social science generally, and
political science particularly. It is highly questionable
whether social science research can ever achieve the
scientific rigour of other sciences, because of the
complexity of variables studied and difficulties in
constructing experiments in the economic, political and
social worlds. The 'internal validity' critique alone does
not provide a sufficient excuse to abandon case study
research, but warns only of the methodological dangers in
undertaking such research.
The second critique challenges the external validity of the
case study. Stoecker noted that "the case study does not
allow us to generalize our findings to other settings."6
This critique is far more damning of the case study method
than the first critique, because it applies only to case
study research. It is founded on the inductive-deductive
debate which pervades many discussions on research
methodology in the social sciences.7 The debate rests on
the merits of whether a social scientist should deduce the
particular from a general theory or induce the general from
a particular observation. Kennedy wrote:H
"We have two situations: the special case and the 
general case. And we have methodologies for
5 Stoecker (1991) p91. See also Dror (1968) pp73-77; 
Eckstein (1975) ppl24-131; and Yin (1989) p21.
6 Stoecker (1991) p91. See also Dror (1968) p74;
Eckstein (1975) ppl24-131; and Subramaniam (1980) p92.
7 See Popper (1972) pp42-46; and Sayer (1992) ppl53-
159, 169-173, 226-231.
K Kennedy (1979) p661.
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studying each. But the relationship between these 
two has continued to plague social scientists.
There are situations in which knowledge of the 
general case is used to explain or predict a 
specific case. And there are situations in which 
knowledge of a specific case may be generalized 
to great segments of the population."
She argued that the "serious drawback in the single-case
study methodology that has prevented it from being widely
applied is the lack of generally accepted rules for drawing
causation and generalization inferences from the data."9 It
is important to recognise the vagaries of the case study
method before analysing the case study on school cleaning
in Kent. Whilst acknowledging the dangers of generalising
from a single case study there are two advantages from
deploying the case study method.
First, the analysis of a case study assists in explaining 
the specific case itself. Thus, the following case study 
seeks only to explain why and how Kent CC contracted-out
its school cleaning. It increases the pool of empirical
findings requiring explanation. The case study seeks no 
more than an explanation of the privatisation of school 
cleaning in Kent. It does not seek to make generalised 
observations and explanations about making spending cuts in 
local government.
Second, the analysis of a case study assists in explaining
the general case. Yin argued:10
"... case studies, like experiments, are
generalizable to theoretical propositions and not 
to populations or universes. In this sense, the 
case study ... does not represent a "sample," and 
the investigator's goal is to expand and 
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and 
not to enumerate frequencies (statistical
generalization)."
If the case study is not unique, then, it can be used to
9 Kennedy (1979) p663.
10 Yin (1989) p21.
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make generalised observations and explanations about 
cutback management in local government. The decision to 
privatise school cleaning, though controversial, was not 
atypical of other decisions to cut spending in Kent CC, and 
to a less extent, other local authorities. Kent CC made a 
series of decisions to cut spending in 1984/85 that 
reflected the commitment of the Conservative-controlled 
local authority to privatisation as a strategy of cutback 
management. For example, it commissioned management 
consultants to review its management processes and 
structures, thus providing a conduit for private sector 
management ideas to be conveyed to the local authority. It 
coopted a voluntary body into a partnership agreement to 
run day centres for the elderly. The decision to contract- 
out school cleaning was typical of Kent CC's increasing 
preference to use privatisation strategies as ways of 
making spending cuts. The analysis of this case study can 
be used to make useful generalisations about cutback 
management in local government. Furthermore, with school 
cleaning now subject to compulsory competitive tendering it 
can be used to offer valuable insights into the processes 
of compulsory competitive tendering and contracting-out 
generally.11 Because the decision to privatise school 
cleaning is not unique, then, it is possible and desirable 
to make certain qualified generalisations from its analysis 
as a case study. Stoecker believed that the case study "is 
the best way by which we can refine general theory" .12
The disadvantages of the case study method can be avoided 
if either its explanatory power is narrowed to the specific 
case itself or the case study is chosen carefully to
11 The Local Government Act 1988 required a range of 
services, including school cleaning, to be subject to the 
requirements of compulsory competitive tendering.
12 Stoecker (1991) p!09.
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reflect a general trend. Platt wrote:13
"... case studies can do a whole variety of 
things. But some case studies do not do any of 
them well, and this is often because no 
particular rationale has dictated the choice of 
case. It is only too easy to study a case merely 
because it is convenient, and hope that something 
of more general interest will come of it...."
The choice of analysing Kent CC's decision to contract-out
school cleaning was made carefully to allow more
generalised observations to be made from the specific case
study.
The case study is also necessary because, as argued
earlier, to understand fully the making of spending cuts in
local government it is necessary to undertake both
aggregated and disaggregated analysis of spending cuts.14
Aggregated analysis allows the identification of general
trends, and disaggregated analysis allows the
identification of specific decisions to cut spending. The
case study is a useful form of disaggregated analysis,
allowing the examination of the making and impact of
spending cuts. Newton and Sharpe argued:15
"... total budgets for most major services are, 
after all, little more than accounting devices in 
the sense that the main operational unit of 
government tends to be the subfunctional bureau 
or agency rather than the whole department.... 
Expenditure decisions do have a department-wide 
ambit on occasion; but, in general, conventional 
expenditure totals probably have little meaning 
in policy-making terms for either politicians or 
bureaucrats, except at budget-making time. They 
have little meaning at all for the general 
public, apart from the transitory publicity given 
to them when the local tax is set, or when major 
cuts are announced. Just as we need to 
disaggregate in order to get closer to the 
reality of public services in relation to their 
quality, so, too, we need to disaggregate in
13 Platt J (1988) p20.
14 See chapter two, pp89-92.
15 Newton & Sharpe (1977) p70.
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order to get to grips with the operational 
reality of the services; that is to say, the 
subfunctions around which the sources of 
variation - party ideology, public demand, the 
personal values of political and bureaucratic 
leaders, local traditions - are likely to focus."
Aggregated analysis is often a cumbersome tool to examine
specific decisions to cut spending because they are often
hidden from view by other decisions, including those to
increase spending. Disaggregated analysis allows an
examination of specific spending cuts, and provides answers
to the questions of why spending was cut, how spending was
cut and what effects the cuts had. The case study on school
cleaning in Kent is disaggregated analysis, which
complements the more aggregated analysis of the preceding
chapters.
SCHOOL CLEANING IN KENT
In early 1984 Kent CC decided to contract-out the cleaning 
of more than 500 schools and colleges in the county, which 
at the time heralded one of the largest acts of 
contracting-out in local government. Before making this 
decision the Council wanted to reduce the non-teaching 
aspects of its education budget. The teaching side of the 
budget was more electorally sensitive, and was therefore 
shielded from drastic spending cuts. The concern not to cut 
spending on the teaching side thus exposed the non-teaching 
side to cuts. On the decision to contract-out school 
cleaning the Chairman of the Education Committee 
remarked:16
"Savings in this area will enable us to protect
the 'sharp end’ of education - teaching staff,
16 Taken from Kent CC's Public Relations Office, News 
Release: Private Contractors To Handle School Cleaning. 23 
February 1984.
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books, stationery and apparatus - in fact, the 
important creative area of the classroom and 
lecture room."
As a result of this desire not to damage Conservative 
electoral fortunes the focus for spending cuts was always 
firmly on the non-teaching side of the education budget.17 
Indeed in 1979 the Council decided to reduce cleaning 
standards in its schools and colleges to make savings of 
over £2 million each year.18
As part of the across-the-board exercise to reduce spending 
the Conservative Group again focused on the school cleaning 
budget. This focus partly resulted from a series of 
complaints from councillors and teachers about poor 
standards of cleaning in schools.19 Towards the end of 1983 
several Conservative councillors considered the option of 
privatising the cleaning of schools, and in October 1983 
the Education Committee invited tenders for contracts to 
clean schools.20
It would be mistaken to see the decision to privatise 
school cleaning as purely an ideological move asserting the 
supremacy of the private over the public sector, though the 
decision undoubtedly "was in tune with the council's
17 County Education Officer, Kent CC.
18 Taken from County Education Officer's Report to Kent 
CC's Education Committee, 10 October 1983. See National 
Union Of Public Employees (Kent) (1983) p4.
19 Head, Computing and Management Services Unit, Kent 
CC; Principal Performance and Investigation Officer, 
Computing and Management Services Unit, Kent CC; and 
Honorary Secretary (Kent Federation), National Association 
of Schoolmasters and Union of Women Teachers.
20 Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC. School 
cleaning now falls under the compulsory competitive 
tendering provisions of the Local Government Act 1988. On 
compulsory competitive tendering and contracting-out in 
Kent CC see Frater (1988); and Griffiths (1988).
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general policies."21 According to one officer, ideology was
"not an overriding motivation" in making this decision.22
The overriding criterion was the concern to cut spending.23
Before the decision was made to privatise school cleaning
the County Education Officer reported that a "major
consideration in Members’ minds will no doubt be the scope
for making savings."24 On contracting-out school cleaning
the Audit Commission observed:25
"Significant cost savings are claimed by . . . LEAs 
[local education authorities] as achievable once 
the service has settled down."
The decision to contract-out school cleaning was driven
more by the potential financial savings to be made than an
ideological preference to privatise services.26 Indeed, the
21 Reporter, Kent Messenger Ltd. This view was echoed 
by the Chairman of the Education Committee; the Honorary 
Secretary (Kent Division) of the National Union of 
Teachers; the Area Officer (2) of the National Union of 
Public Employees; the Regional Organiser of the General, 
Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union; and the 
Regional Manager of ICC Cleaning Services Ltd.
22 County Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, 
Kent CC.
23 Chairman, Education Committee, Kent CC; Chairman, 
Fire and Public Protection Committee, Kent CC; and County 
Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, Kent CC.
24 Taken from the County Education Officer's Report to 
Kent CC's Education Committee, 10 October 1983.
25 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1984a) p47. See also Coombs (1983) p3.
26 It is difficult to separate the arguments based on 
cost savings from the arguments founded on ideology in the 
ongoing debate on contracting-out, because proponents of 
contracting-out claim that the private sector can provide 
better services more cheaply than the public sector. See 
Adam Smith Institute (1982); Adam Smith Institute (1989) 
pp6-8; Banham (1985); Bennett & Johnson (1981); Beresford
(1987) ; Butler (1985); Contract Cleaning And Maintenance 
Association (not dated (a)); Contract Cleaning And 
Maintenance Association (not dated (b)); Coombs (1983); 
Forsyth (1981); Forsyth (1982a); Forsyth (1982b); Forsyth 
(1983); Hartley & Huby (1985); Minford, Savas & Mays 
(1985); Pirie (1981) ppl4-15; Pirie (1985) pp43-50; Pirie
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Conservative Group wanted to use the Council's own 
workforce if sufficient savings could be made.27 In January 
1984 the Council secured a draft agreement with the trade 
unions involved (most notably the National Union of Public 
Employees) which guaranteed the continued use of direct 
labour to clean schools on the condition that £1 million 
was 'saved' from the budget.28
There was, however, much disagreement between the Council 
and the trade unions about the ways in which this saving 
could be made, and as a result there was disagreement 
between the trade unions over their response to the 
Council's proposals. The Council proposed to make the 
savings by reducing the pay and conditions of service of 
its school cleaners.29 The trade unions were concerned not 
only to protect the pay and conditions of employment of its 
members but also to protect their jobs. Furthermore, the 
National Union of Public Employees was committed to 
opposing any form of privatisation in its campaign to 
defend public services.30 The trade unions felt they were
(1988) ppl40-156; Public And Local Service Efficiency
Campaign (1989); Public And Local Service Efficiency 
Campaign (not dated); Ridley (1988); and Savas (1987).
27 This preference corresponds generally to moves by 
many local authorities offering the recommended savings to 
their workers (see Ascher (1987) p244).
28 See Draft Agreement Between Manual Workers And Kent 
County Council. February 1984. See also Contract Services 
(1984c).
29 According to the Assistant Education Officer, the 
Council proposed to make savings by reducing the hours of 
work and bonus payments, and not the wage rates and holiday 
entitlements of its workforce.
30 See Bickerstaffe (1985); and National Union Of 
Public Employees(not dated). This platform is perhaps as 
much to do with retaining its membership as about 
protecting public services because the trade union finds it 
more difficult to retain or recruit employees of private 
contractors to its membership. See Public Service Action 
(1985). The Government's privatisation policy is an attack
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placed in an invidious position of having to reduce their 
members' conditions of employment in order to protect their 
jobs. As one trade union official put it, they were in a 
"no-win situation" because they were "invited to tender for 
our own jobs."31 The trade unions reluctantly submitted a 
proposal which produced the required savings and was 
therefore acceptable to the Council.
However, on the day the Finance and General Purposes Sub­
committee, a sub-committee of the Education Committee, was 
to meet to award the contracts for cleaning schools the 
trade unions withdrew their tender. As a result the Council 
awarded the contracts to several private contractors. The 
Conservative Group was inclined to use direct labour if 
significant savings could be made, but were 'forced' to 
privatise school cleaning because there was no direct 
labour bid on the table. The Deputy Leader of the 
opposition Labour Group believed that the Conservative 
Group "didn't want to do it". The Chairman of the Education 
Committee claimed to have given informal assurances to the 
trade unions that the Council would continue to use direct 
labour even if the savings produced were slightly less than 
those produced by using private contractors.32 This claim 
was disputed by some trade union officials who believed 
that no such assurance was ever given to the trade
on public sector trade unions. See Ascher (1987) pp32-42, 
97-134; Evans (1985) ppl08-110; Forsyth (1982a); Halford 
(1983) p56; Painter (1991); Stoker (1991) pp218-219; and
Walsh (1989a) pp33-34.
31 Area Officer (2) , National Union of Public 
Employees.
32 The Deputy Leader of the Labour Group and both Area 
Officer (3) and Area Officer (4) of the National Union of 
Public Employees acknowledged this assurance was given to 
the trade unions.
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unions.33
The trade unions withdrew their bid because of much in­
fighting within their ranks. On one side, there was a view 
most forcefully expressed by one official of the National 
Union of Public Employees that there was no way trade 
unions representing direct labour could compete with 
private contractors, and that the Council would only 
repeatedly threaten to privatise school cleaning to trim 
the nationally negotiated pay and conditions of its 
workforce.34 This faction believed, correctly as it turned 
out, that if school cleaning were privatised the private 
contractors would employ fewer cleaners on lower pay and 
conditions of employment.35 It wanted therefore to make a
33 Area Officer (2) , National Union of Public 
Employees; and Regional Organiser, General, Municipal, 
Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union.
34 Area Officer (2) , National Union of Public 
Employees. Following Stoker, many local authorities "have 
used threats of privatisation to re-establish firm control 
over their in-house staff and trade unions" ((1988) pl87). 
See also Ascher (1987) pp244-245; Coombs (1983) p2; Kline 
(1983-4); Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) p49; Minogue & O'Grady 
(1985b) p89; Walsh (1991) pplll-113; and White & Palmer
(1987).
35 This view needs to be placed within the ideological 
battle raging between the vested interests of labour and 
business. On one side there is a (mainly left-wing) view 
that any financial savings accruing from contracting-out 
are largely the result of lower labour costs of providing 
services - see Ascher (1987) ppl02-lll, 209-246; Bartlett 
(not dated); Benlow, Ramage, French, Simmonds & Whitfield 
(1983); Benlow & Scott (1983); Bickerstaffe (1985); Centre 
For Public Services (1992); Community Action (1983) ppl6- 
26; Douglas & Lord (1986) p47; Dunleavy (1986a); East 
Sussex Trade's Union (1984); Evans (1985); Greater London 
Council (1983); Halford (1982); Halford (1983); Hastings & 
Levie (1983); Kline & Mallaber (1986); Labour Research 
Department (1985); Labour Research Department (1986); LGIU 
Special Briefing (1993) pi; Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) pp40- 
41; Minogue & O'Grady (1985b) pp84-85; National Union Of 
Public Employees (not dated); National Union Of Public 
Employees (Kent) (1983); Painter (1991) pp218-219; Public 
Services Privatisation Research Unit (not dated) ppl9-22; 
Services To Community Action And Trade Unions (1985);
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stand against the Council's strategy, and urged members to
withdraw their bid and organise industrial action.36 On the
other side, there was a view supported by the other trade
union officials that the trade unions had to submit a
tender in order to protect the jobs of their members, even
if the pay and conditions of service of their members
deteriorated as a result of winning the contract (because
they would deteriorate even further if private contractors
won the contract) ,37 These two sides represented a
fundamental dilemma facing trade unions in the competitive
tendering process. Stoker argued:38
"In highly unionised and militant areas 
unions have refused to cooperate with management 
and attempted to use industrial action and public
Services To Community Action And Trade Unions (1988) ; 
Services To Community Action And Trade Unions & Hillingdon 
Trade Union Support Unit (1985); Society Of Metropolitan 
Treasurers (1984); Sonnet (1985); Stoker (1988) ppl73-191; 
Stoker (1991) pp205-229; Szymanski & Wilkins (1993); Trades 
Union Congress (1984); Walker & Moore (1983) ; Walsh (1989a) 
pp51-52; Whitfield (1992) pp268-278; Williams (1984); 
Wolman (1982a) p75; and Wolman & Peterson (1981) p795. On 
the other side there is a (mainly right-wing) view that 
financial savings are also the result of increased 
efficiency of private contractors - see Adam Smith 
Institute (1982); Adam Smith Institute (1989) pp6-8; Banham 
(1985) ; Bennett & Johnson (1981) ; Beresford (1987) ; Butler 
(1985); Contract Cleaning And Maintenance Association (not 
dated (a)); Contract Cleaning And Maintenance Association 
(not dated (b)); Coombs (1983); Forsyth (1981); Forsyth 
(1982a); Forsyth (1982b); Forsyth (1983); Knapp (1988); 
Minford, Savas & Mays (1985); Pirie (1981) ppl4-15; Pirie 
(1985) pp43-50; Pirie (1988) ppl40-156; Public And Local
Service Efficiency Campaign (1989) ; Public And Local
Service Efficiency Campaign (not dated); Ridley (1988); 
Royal Institute Of Public Administration (1984); Savas
(1987); and Spann (1977).
36 Area Officer (2) , National Union of Public
Employees.
37 Area Officer (3) , National Union of Public
Employees; Area Officer (4), National Union of Public 
Employees; and Regional Organiser, General, Municipal, 
Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union.
38 Stoker (1988) pl87. See also Halford (1983) p56; and 
Painter (1991).
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campaigning to oppose privatisation. In other 
areas unions have found themselves working to win 
the contract for in-house employees. Both 
strategies have major disadvantages. Unions run 
the danger of losing localised oppositional 
campaigns, while 'playing the contractual game1 
can lead to cooperation in a process of job 
cutting."
The trade unions in trying to formulate a response to the 
Council's invitation to tender for the contract were faced 
with the quandary - do they refuse the invitation and 
oppose any move to privatise school cleaning, but risk the 
work being contracted-out; or do they accept the invitation 
and compete against the private sector, and therefore trim 
the conditions of service of their members but if 
successful ameliorate the conditions of service compared to 
those in the private sector?
The more militant faction within the trade union ranks 
organised a series of meetings for members to reject the 
direct labour option, and to organise industrial action 
against the Council's wish to privatise school cleaning. 
This stance was opposed by the more moderate faction, but 
was "outmanoeuvred" by the militant faction.39 One trade 
union official of the moderate faction accused the other 
faction of holding 'rigged' meetings "set up to say 
'no'."40 The turning point in this dispute came when the 
Council proposed that the bonus scheme of its cleaners 
should be further trimmed.41 This proposal exposed the 
position of the moderate faction, and pushed the school 
cleaners into the militant camp. The trade unions were "not
39 Area Officer (3) , National Union of Public 
Employees.
40 Regional Organiser, General, Municipal, Boilermakers 
and Allied Trades Union.
41 See Local Government Chronicle (1984a). This 
proposal may be construed as evidence that the Council 
always wanted to privatise school cleaning, but, according 
to the Council, this proposal was only a suggestion for 
discussion and not a firm offer.
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prepared to talk about bastardising national agreements", 
and thus withdrew their tender and organised industrial 
action.42
On 23 February 1984 the Council decided to privatise school 
cleaning, and awarded the contracts to several companies - 
Cleaners Ltd, Provincial Cleaning Services Ltd, Automagic 
Cleaning Services Ltd, ICC Cleaning Services Ltd, and 
Andmarc Cleaning Services Ltd.43 This decision was made 
amidst allegations of collusion between the private 
contractors in 'carving up' the contracts.44 These 
allegations were denied by both the Council and the private 
contractors.45 The Council almost by default was 'forced1 
to privatise school cleaning despite an abortive rescue bid
42 Regional Organiser, General, Municipal, Boilermakers 
and Allied Trades Union. The threatened industrial action 
never materialised save for a 'mass' lobby before the 
Council meeting at which the decision was made to privatise 
school cleaning (Area Officer (3), National Union of Public 
Employees; and Area Officer (4) , National Union of Public 
Employees).
43 See Contract Services (1984c). The contracts came 
into effect on a staggered basis - half the contracts began 
in June 1984, and the other half in September 1984 with the 
exception of the Tunbridge Wells contract which was later 
awarded to Pall Mall Cleaning Group Ltd. On the main 
private contractors operating in the public sector see 
Ascher (1987) pp54-96; Greater London Council (1983); 
Labour Research Department (1986); Public Services 
Privatisation Research Unit (not dated) pp48-49; Services 
To Community Action And Trade Unions & Hillingdon Trade 
Union Support Unit (1985); and Stephenson (1988).
44 Regional Organiser, General, Municipal, Boilermakers 
and Allied Trades Union. See Hartley (1990) pl95. Savas 
argued that these allegations are a predictable response of 
trade unions because "contracting is such a threat to the 
affected union that allegations of corruption are likely to 
be hurled in the heat of battle to sway the media and 
public" ((1987) p257).
45 Senior Assistant, Education Department, Kent CC; 
Operations Director (2) , Pritchard Services Group pic; 
Regional Manager, ICC Cleaning Services Ltd; and Secretary 
General, Contract Cleaning and Maintenance Association.
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from the trade unions.46 According to one trade union 
official, "politically it was a very easy to make a 
decision" to contract-out school cleaning because there was 
no direct labour tender.47
This outcome is widespread whenever trade unions have
confronted this dilemma over competitive tendering. Ascher
explained this dilemma:48
"The experiences of Gloucester and Wandsworth 
nicely illustrate two of the most difficult facts 
for the unions to accept. The first is that where 
they have cooperated in the tendering process . . . 
they have frequently been successful in retaining 
the contract. Often the in-house bid has been 
selected over cheaper bids from private 
contractors, as was the case in Gloucester, 
suggesting that many authorities are still 
willing to pay a premium to retain direct control 
over their services. The converse has been 
equally hard for the unions to swallow. Where 
local branches have refused to cooperate with 
either efficiency reviews or with competitive 
tendering, they have rarely retained the service.
In Bath, the unions' refusal to implement the
efficiency review recommendations and to 
cooperate with tendering led directly to 
privatisation. As Bath's city engineer noted:
'The great tragedy of this thing is that if the 
men had followed the agreed route they would 
still be working for me."
In Kent CC, the Deputy Leader of the Labour Group
acknowledged this dilemma and believed that "staff didn't
need to be sacked". The choice facing the trade unions over
the Council's decision to tender out school cleaning, it
seems, was either to lose or to lose badly. They could
either submit a competitive bid and accept a deterioration
in their members' conditions of employment, or they could
oppose the Council and probably see their members lose
46 Area Officer (3) , National Union of Public 
Employees; and Area Officer (4), National Union of Public 
Employees.
47 Regional Organiser, General, Municipal, Boilermakers 
and Allied Trades Union.
48 Ascher (1987) pp244-245.
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their jobs though some would be re-employed by the private 
contractors on worse terms of employment than if they had 
won the contract. In withdrawing their tender the trade 
unions paved the way for the Council to privatise school 
cleaning.
The Council made well over 2,000 school cleaners 
redundant.49 The costs of redundancy payments and other 
costs of terminating its direct labour operations were 
borne by the Council's Efficiency Fund. This fund was set 
up by the Council in recognition that some cost-saving 
decisions incur short-term costs before yielding longer- 
term savings. Departments were able to borrow from this 
fund to finance the short-term costs of decisions, and then 
repay the 'loan' over a five-year period.50 The Education 
Department borrowed over £1 million from the Efficiency 
Fund to finance the redundancy costs arising from the 
decision to contract-out school cleaning.51 Many, but by no 
means all, of the redundant school cleaners were re­
employed by private contractors.52 The private contractors
49 See Kent CC's Public Relations Office, News Release: 
Private Contractors To Handle School Cleaning. 2 3 February 
1984. See also Fretwell (1988) p23; and Trades Union 
Congress (1984) pl6.
50 Former Leader, Conservative Group, Kent CC; 
Chairman, Finance and Review Group, Kent CC; County 
Treasurer, Kent CC; Deputy County Treasurer, Kent CC; 
Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC; and Senior 
Assistant, Education Department, Kent CC.
51 Former Leader, Conservative Group, Kent CC; 
Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC; and Senior Assistant, 
Education Department, Kent CC.
52 The Chairman of the Education Committee believed 
that the private contractors were obliged to recruit the 
redundant school cleaners before recruiting other cleaners. 
However, this obligation was not written into the contract. 
The Regional Manager of ICC Cleaning Services Ltd said that 
his company employed over a half of their school cleaners 
from the former Council workforce. Cleaners Ltd wanted to 
recruit the former cleaners of the Council in order to 
minimise the disruptive effects of change, but later
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were obliged to implement the 'Fair Wages Clause' which the
Council incorporated into the contract to protect its
former workforce. The contract stated:53
"The contractor shall pay rates of wages and 
observe hours and conditions of work not less 
favourable than those established for the trade 
or industry in the district where the work is 
carried out by machinery of negotiation or 
arbitration to which the parties are 
organisations of employers and trade unions...."
This nebulous clause had no statutory force.54 As a result,
private contractors were allowed to employ the redundant
cleaners on lower pay and conditions of employment than
those of the Council. At the time the County Caretaking and
Cleaning Services Officer remarked that the cleaners' rates
of pay had generally fallen from the nationally negotiated
rate of £1.96 per hour to between £1.60 and £2.00 per hour
admitted that this recruitment strategy was a mistake 
because of the poor relations between the cleaners formerly 
employed by the Council and the 'new' cleaners (Operations 
Director (1), Pritchard Services Group pic; and Operations 
Director (2), Pritchard Services Group pic). Andmarc 
Cleaning Services Ltd gave the redundant school cleaners 
"first consideration for continued employment by the 
company" (Contract Services (1984b) p26). Forsyth argued
more generally that "there is usually an arrangement to 
give ex-council employees the first crack at the new jobs" 
((1983) pl7; see also Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) p42;
Minogue & O'Grady (1985b) p86; Pirie (1985) p43; Pirie
(1988) pl42; and Savas (1987) p258) .
53 Taken from Kent CC's Cleaning Services In 
Educational Establishments: Conditions Of Contract. p8.
54 County Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, 
Kent CC. The Fair Wages Resolution which governed wages of 
many public sector workers was rescinded in 1983. Though 
this resolution .did not apply to local authorities "the 
vast majority of authorities have for many years included 
their own version of a fair wages clause in outside 
contracts" (Ascher (1987) pl07; see also Minogue & O'Grady 
(1985a) p40). Furthermore, under the provisions of the 
Local Government Act 1988 this clause and certain other 
form of contract compliance are now outlawed because 'non­
commercial matters' cannot be considered by local 
authorities in the process of compulsory competitive 
tendering, which encompasses school cleaning.
paid by the private contractors.55
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The savings resulting from the decision to privatise school 
cleaning stem from the private contractors employing fewer 
cleaners on lower pay and conditions of employment than the 
Council. In February 1984 the County Education Officer 
estimated the savings that would be made from contacting- 
out school cleaning, which are reproduced in the table 
below.
Table 5.1: “Savings from Contracting-Out1
1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
Total savings based 925,650 1,389,760 1,389,760 464,110
on recommended
tenders
less
supervision costs (109,500) (127,000) (107,100) (29,870)
lump sum (1,069,450)
termination costs
CASH FLOW (253,300) 1,262,760 1,282,660 434,240
Source: County Education Officer's Report to Kent CC, 
23 February 1984
55 Area Organiser (2) , National Union of Public 
Employees; Regional Organiser, General, Municipal, 
Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union; Operations Director 
(1), Pritchard Service Group pic; Operations Director (2), 
Pritchard Services Group pic; Marketing Director, ICC 
Cleaning Services Ltd; and Regional Manager, ICC Cleaning
Services Ltd. See also Kline & Mallaber (1986) p2; National
Union Of Public Employees (Kent) (1983) ; and Trades Union 
Congress (1984) pl6. In general, contracting-out and the 
deterioration of the pay and conditions of employment hurt 
workers already lowly paid, and in cleaning, lowly paid 
women in part-time work. See Community Action (1984b) ppl4- 
27; Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) p49; Minogue & O'Grady
(1985b) p89; Services To Community Action And Trade Unions 
(1985) pp41-42; Stoker (1988) pl88; Webster (1985a) pp30-
32; and White & Palmer (1987) p45.
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In the Council's revenue budget of 1984/85 £1 million was
earmarked as the savings produced from the privatisation of
school cleaning.56 The Education Committee secured a
sizable loan from the Council's Efficiency Fund to offset
the costs of winding down the direct labour operations (eg
redundancy payments) , and thus was able to present the
decision to contract-out the cleaning of schools as a
significant spending reduction. The trade unions believed
that this £1 million saving was a 'paper saving' because
the real costs of privatisation were hidden by the
contribution from the special fund.57 The National Union of
Public Employees argued:58
"We are told that the decision has been taken for 
"financial and not political" reasons. We are 
told that this is due to the financial prospects 
for 1984/85. But just how can this be true? Let 
us examine the arithmetic presented in the 
documents in front of the Committee:
"Savings" from privatisation: £1,300,000 to
£1,600,000
Total cost of redundancy: £1,265,000 to
£1,725,000
In fact, the total cost of redundancy could 
actually exceed the "savings" from privatisation 
by £425,000. So privatising school cleaning would 
cost Kent's ratepayers more money in 1984/85."
Below is a table summarising the many costings of 'savings' 
made by the Council's decision to privatise school 
cleaning.
56 More than twice this amount could have been saved if 
the Council had awarded the contracts to the companies 
submitting the lowest tenders (Assistant Education Officer, 
Kent CC).
57 Area Officer (2) , National Union of Public 
Employees; Area Officer (3), National Union of Public 
Employees; and Area Officer (4), National Union of Public 
Employees.
58 National Union Of Public Employees (Kent) (1983) p7.
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Table 5.2: Costings of * Savings' of Contracting-Out 
School Cleaning. 1984/85
Source
(i) Kent CC
(ii) Kent CC (fund contribution excluded)
(iii) NUPE (fund contribution excluded)
(iv) Public Service Research Centre
(v) Public Service Research Centre
(vi) Public Service Research Centre
(vii) Contract Services
(viii) Contract Services
(ix) Local Government Chronicle
(x) Local Government Chronicle
* 'Savings', unless otherwise noted, 
contribution from Kent CC's Efficiency Fund.
Source: (i) Kent CC's Revenue Budget And Capital
Programme 1984-85. 16 February 1984, plO; (ii) County 
Education Officer's Report to Kent CC, 2 3 February 
1984; (iii) National Union Of Public Employees (Kent) 
(1983) p7: (iv) Public Service Review (not dated (a))
p4; (v) Public Service Review (not dated (b)) p7; and 
Public Service Review (not dated (c)) p5; (vi) Public 
Service Review (not dated (d) ) p6; (vii) Contract
Services (1984a) p4; (viii) Contract Services (1984d) 
p34; (ix) Hardingham (1984) p706; and (x) Fretwell
(1988) p2 3
This table above shows there is considerable dispute 
between the various bodies about the precise amount of 
money saved from using private contractors to clean schools 
in Kent. On one side, the trade unions (notably the 
National Union of Public Employees) argue that the decision 
to privatise school cleaning cost the Council more than if 
it had used direct labour. On the other side, the private 
contractors in the guise of the Public Service Research 
Centre claim that considerable savings resulted from the
'Savings'* 
£
1,000,000 
(253,300) 
(425,000) 
1,100,000
1.389.760 
843,647 
800,000 
925,650
1.389.760 
1 ,000,000
include the
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privatisation.59 In between these two sides, the Council 
realised that in the short term contracting-out incurred 
additional costs (eg redundancy payments), but beyond the 
short term it cut spending on school cleaning.
On the decision to privatise school cleaning the Chairman
of the Education Committee stated:60
"We have stressed all along that we would only be 
interested in a scheme which would ensure that 
existing standards in our schools would be 
maintained or improved."
The Council had four weapons at its disposal to protect the
standards of cleaning in its schools.61 The first weapon
was the specifications ('Specification Documents') laid
down in the contract stipulating the standards with which
the private contractors must comply.62 According to the
Chairman of the Education Committee these specifications
were "very hard-nosed" designed to maintain existing
cleaning standards in schools. One officer believed that
the standards of cleaning laid down in the contract were of
59 The Public Service Research Centre maintained close 
links with the Public and Local Service Efficiency Campaign 
(PULSE), a body set up and financed by private contractors 
and potential private contractors to campaign for 
contracting-out in health and local authorities.
60 Taken from Kent CC's Public Relations Office, News 
Release: Private Contractors To Handle School Cleaning. 23 
February 1984.
61 See Newman (1986).
62 These specifications were drawn up by the Council 
after undertaking a work study exercise carried out by its 
own officers (Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC; County 
Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, Kent CC; Head, 
Computing and Management Services Unit, Kent CC; and 
Principal Performance and Investigation Officer, Computing 
and Management Services Unit, Kent CC). Also, Kent CC sent 
a team of officers to Cambridgeshire CC and Dudley MBC to 
learn from their experience of privatising school cleaning 
(Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC; and County 
Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, Kent CC). At the 
time Cambridgeshire CC was selling its contract at £200 
(Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC).
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a "more even standard than we had before" because standards 
had never been systematically set nor rigorously applied in 
schools.63 The second weapon used was the appointment of 
several officers to monitor and supervise the cleaning of 
schools by private contractors, and to enforce the 
conditions of the contract upon the private contractors. 
The third weapon was the requirement upon head teachers of 
schools to complete fortnightly satisfaction notes 
('Certificates of Satisfaction1). If head teachers were not 
satisfied, penalties would be extracted from private 
contractors, and in extreme cases the contract would be 
terminated.64 The fourth weapon was the review of the 
contracts by the Council after three years. In fact, after 
this period the Council terminated all of the contracts, 
and as a result of the "lessons learned" from contract 
cleaning made "important changes in the conditions of 
contract and cleaning specifications."65
The Council regularly monitored the cleaning of its schools
by private contractors. In June 1984 the Council found:66
"Reports indicate that the contract cleaning 
service in educational establishments in Dover 
and Gravesham Divisions is running much as would 
be expected at this stage, with some minor 
problems. There are some areas in the Shepway, 
Dartford, Swale and Maidstone Divisions where the
63 County Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, 
Kent CC.
64 These satisfaction notes were based on the 
subjective and sometimes impressionistic judgements of head 
teachers. Head teachers were more likely to complain if 
cleaning standards were lower than those before 
privatisation than if the cleaning standards fell below 
those specified in the contract. Private contractors could 
appeal against decisions to fine them, and in "mitigating 
circumstances" the penalty may be waived (County Caretaking 
and Cleaning Services Officer, Kent CC).
65 County Education Officer, Kent CC. Taken from a 
letter dated 25 August 1987.
66 Taken from Kent CC's Public Relations Office, News 
Release: Contract Cleaning. 15 June 1984.
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contractors had difficulty in recruiting 
staff.... The company with the contract for the 
Canterbury Division has had rather more serious 
recruitment difficulties for a minority of the 
establishments in that Division, and has, as a 
temporary measure, had to bus staff in from 
outside the area."
The Chairman of the Education Committee believed that the
problems of privatising the cleaning of schools amounted to
no more than "some teething troubles" with the exception of
the Canterbury contract.67
In September 1984 the Council noted:68
"It would be fair to say that in ten of the 
Divisions, contract cleaning is working 
satisfactorily and in two of those 10 very well 
indeed. The contractors are having recruitment 
problems in parts of the Tonbridge and Mailing 
and Sevenoaks Divisions in the West Kent area 
where the contracts started only last week.... 
The problem in Canterbury when they occurred last 
term received urgent and serious attention from 
the Authority and are currently being closely 
monitored."
In October 1984, a month later, the councillor, who largely 
pioneered the Council's move to privatise school cleaning, 
confirmed:69
"Of the 13 Divisions where contract cleaning is 
now in operation, we have significant problems in 
only three. The most difficult problem is still 
in the Canterbury Division."
In fact, because of the continuing problems with the
Canterbury contract the Education Committee decided to
terminate the contract with Provincial Cleaning Services
Ltd, and award the contract instead to Automagic Cleaning
67 Taken from Kent CC's Public Relations Office, News
Release: Contract Cleaning. 15 June 1984.
68 Taken from Kent CC's Public Relations Office, News
Release: Private Contract Cleaning. 14 September 1984.
69 Taken from Kent CC's Public Relations Office, News
Release: Contract Cleaning Of Schools And Colleges. 8
October 1984.
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Services Ltd.70
In December 1984 the County Education Officer reported that 
"the general standard of cleaning is much the same as it 
was before contract cleaning started, with a better 
standard of cleaning in some and a worse standard in 
others."71 By March 1984 the County Education Officer had 
overseen a more systematic survey of cleaning standards in 
the Council's schools. Below is a table summarising the 
findings of the survey.
Table 5.3: Survey of Standards of Contract Cleaning in 
Kent CC * s Schools and Colleges
Division Schools satisfactorily cleaned
Pre-privatisation* Post-privatisation**
% %o o
Dartford 100. 0 77. 1
Gravesham 97.6 95. 2
Medway 97 . 3 98 . 7
Gillingham 100. 0 97.4
Swale 95. 3 100. 0
Canterbury 88 . 9 77.8
Dover 96.8 100. 0
Thanet 97 . 0 97 . 0
Sevenoaks 87 . 0 87. 0
Tonbridge and Mailing 94 . 9 n/a
Maidstone 96.4 89. 3
Ashford 100. 0 92.8
Shepway 92 . 6 100. 0
TOTAL*** 95. 9 93 . 6
* As found in early 1984
** As found in mid-January 1985
*** This total excludes the Tunbridge Wells Division, 
whose cleaning of schools was later privatised.
70 Taken from Kent CC's Public Relations Office, News 
Release: Private Contract Cleaning. 31 October 1984.
71 Taken from County Education Officer's Report to the 
Finance and General Purposes Sub-Committee of Kent CC's 
Education Committee, 5 December 1984.
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Source: Kent CC
Table 5.3 reveals there was "a very slight general 
deterioration in standards" of cleaning in the Council's 
schools and colleges.72 This picture did not change 
significantly up to August 1987 when the contracts were 
terminated in favour of new-style contracts. The County 
Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer wrote that 
"cleaning standards remained as they were...."73 Though 
there was a slight improvement in the performance of 
private contractors cleaning standards were still lower 
than those before privatisation.74 Overall, there was a 
general consensus within the Council that the privatisation 
of school cleaning led to a slight diminution of cleaning 
standards in its schools, though they varied widely between 
schools and between divisions.75
This view was largely shared by the local newspaper 
reporter covering the Council's affairs. In the beginning 
of contract cleaning there was a "fair bit of adverse press
72 County Education Officer, Kent CC. Taken from County 
Education Officer's Report to the Education Committee, 18 
March 1985.
73 Taken from a letter dated 25 August 1987.
74 This improvement was measured by the gradual 
reduction of the amount of penalty deducted from the 
private contractors for unsatisfactory cleaning. At the, 
start of contract cleaning the penalty rate was about four 
per cent of the total contract value (Assistant Education 
Officer, Kent CC). At the end of the contracts the penalty 
rate had fallen to less than three per cent (County 
Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, Kent CC - taken 
from a letter dated 25 August 1987) .
75 Chairman, Education Committee, Kent CC; and County 
Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, Kent CC.
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coverage."76 But over time the journalist believed "the 
change only led to a swings and roundabouts situation."77
Turning to the trade unions and private contractors, they 
not surprisingly painted very different pictures of the 
standards of cleaning in Kent's schools. On one hand, the 
trade unions were far more critical of the poor standards 
of school cleaning. The teachers' trade unions complained 
of "dirty" schools78; of "absolutely dreadful" standards of 
cleanliness in schools79; of "patchy" results80; and of 
privatisation leading to "a further fall in standards"81. 
The National Union of Public Employees was even more 
disparaging of the standards of contract cleaning in 
schools, and produced a booklet as part of the "Dirty. 
Disgraceful. And Disgusting" series on the privatisation of 
school cleaning in Kent.82 It pointed out that the savings 
were made "by undercutting the rates of pay and conditions 
of school cleaners, and by reducing the service."83 The 
trade unions also argued:84
76 County Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, 
Kent CC. For example, see P Balow, 'Dust flies in rumpus 
over school cleaning', Kent Messenger. 12 October 1984.
77 Reporter, Kent Messenger Ltd.
78 Honorary Secretary (Kent Federation), National 
Association of Schoolmasters and Union of Women Teachers.
79 Honorary Secretary (Kent Branch), Assistant Masters 
and Mistresses Association.
80 Honorary Secretary (Kent Division), National Union 
of Teachers.
81 Convenor, Secondary Heads Association.
82 See National Union Of Public Employees (Kent)
(1983).
83 National Union Of Public Employees (Kent) (1983) p8. 
See also Kline & Mallaber (1986) p2; and Trades Union 
Congress (1984) ppl6-17.
84 East Sussex Trade's Union (1984) p2.
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"There is massive evidence of the failures of 
privatisation in Kent but the Council there is 
trying to cover up the real situation for 
political reasons to keep from the ratepayer the 
magnitude of their mistaken policy."
The trade unions were not impressed with the claims from
the Council that money had been saved and that cleaning
standards had fallen only marginally as a result of
privatising school cleaning.
On the other hand, the private contractors believed that 
there were some 'teething problems1 but as a result of the 
learning experience these problems had more or less 
disappeared, and that the standards of school cleaning had 
gradually improved.85 Indeed private contractors blamed the 
poor specifications drawn up by the Council as the main 
cause of the initial problems of contract cleaning.86 One 
private contractor complained that the contract
specification "was not comprehensive enough to tackle the 
job."87 The private contractors claimed that its cleaners 
were cleaning up to and even above the required standards 
laid down in the contract, but because these standards were 
not wholly accepted by the head teachers, complaints were 
made about the standards of cleaning rather than the 
standards of cleaning specified in the contract. Thus, the
reduction of cleaning standards in schools was less about
private contractors not fulfilling the contract
specification but more about the lower standards of
85 Regional Manager, Provincial Cleaning Services Ltd; 
Operations Director (1), Pritchard Services Group pic; 
Operations Director (2), Pritchard Services Group pic; and 
Regional Manager, ICC Cleaning Services Ltd.
86 Operations Director (1), Pritchard Services Group 
pic; Operations Director (2) , Pritchard Services Group pic; 
and Regional Manager, ICC Cleaning Services Ltd.
87 Operations Director (1) , Pritchard Services Group
pic.
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cleaning specified in the contract.8* Furthermore, a 
private contractor remarked that head teachers were far 
more aware of the cleaning of their schools because of its 
privatisation.89 As a result of this heightened awareness 
they were more likely to inspect their schools more 
thoroughly, and find fault in their fortnightly 
satisfaction notes. The County Education Officer observed 
that because of "the advent of contract cleaning, attention 
has undoubtedly focussed [sic] more sharply on the 
cleanliness of educational establishments."90 The same dust 
unnoticed before privatisation was noticed because of 
privatisation. The private contractors were not convinced 
they should be blamed for the decline of cleaning standards 
in schools. They cited the widely anticipated 'teething 
problems', the standards specified in the contract, and the 
increased attention upon school cleaning because of 
privatisation, as the key reasons for the slight reduction 
of cleaning standards.
Whether savings were made from privatising school cleaning 
and whether standards of school cleaning fell or not as a 
result of privatisation depends very much on whose side is 
taken - the Council, trade unions or private contractors.
88 Operations Director (1), Pritchard Services Group 
pic; Operations Director (2), Pritchard Services Group pic; 
and Regional Manager, ICC Cleaning Services Ltd. The two 
officers involved in drawing up the contract specification 
confirmed that the cleaning standards had been lowered as 
well as evened out in schools (Head, Computing and 
Management Services Unit, Kent CC; and Principal 
Performance and Investigation Officer, Computing and 
Management Services Unit, Kent CC).
89 Regional Manager, ICC Cleaning Services Ltd.
90 Taken from County Education Officer's Report to the 
Finance and General Purposes Sub-Committee of Kent CC's 
Education Committee, 5 December 1984. The Honorary 
Secretary (Kent Branch) of the Assistant Masters and 
Mistresses Association acknowledged that teachers were 
generally more aware because of the decision to contract- 
out the cleaning of schools.
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The Council admitted there was a slight fall in cleaning 
standards in its schools, but justified this fall with the 
significant savings made from the privatisation of school 
cleaning. The trade unions wanted to defend the pay and 
conditions of employment of their members, and also to 
retain their membership. They, therefore, dismissed the 
claims that contract cleaning was cheaper than direct 
labour, and stressed the diminished standards of school 
cleaning arising from its privatisation. The private 
contractors wanted to win the contracts to make profit.91 
As a result, they had to deliver financial savings to the 
Council and clean schools to the standards specified in the 
contract. The private contractors claimed they cleaned 
schools not only cheaper but also better than direct 
labour.
This case study on the decision made by Kent CC to 
contract-out school cleaning provides a very useful form of 
disaggregated analysis of spending cuts in local 
government. The decision to privatise school cleaning was 
essentially made in order to cut spending. However, there 
was no agreement on how much money was saved by 
contracting-out school cleaning. The many calculations of 
how much was saved were tainted by the vested interests of 
the dominant actors - the ruling Conservative Group of Kent 
CC, the Education Department of the Council, the trade 
unions, and the private contractors. These dominant actors 
defended and promoted their interests. Their analyses of 
the case for and against contract cleaning, of the savings
91 Cleaners Ltd forecasted a 2%-4 per cent profit 
margin in its tenders for the contracts (Operations 
Director (1), Pritchard Services Group pic; and Operations 
Director (2), Pritchard Services Group pic). Other private 
contractors were reluctant to reveal their profit margins. 
However, the Secretary General of the Contract Cleaning and 
Maintenance Association, the trade body of contract 
cleaners, estimated that contracts generally contain a 
profit margin of between three to four per cent of the 
contract value.
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yielded from contract cleaning, and the standards of 
contract cleaning were coloured by their material 
interests. Each actor interpreted and manipulated the 
evidence to suit its interests and masked its self-interest 
by pointing to wider benefits gained from its position.
CUTTING BY PRIVATISING
Privatisation is a strategy reducing the role of government 
in society. According to Heald, privatisation is "an 
umbrella term for very many different policies, loosely 
linked by the way in which they are taken to mean a 
strengthening of the market at the expense of the state."92 
Privatisation encompasses a variety of methods including 
the sale of government assets, deregulation of public and 
private sector activities, buying of goods and services 
from the private sector and injection of private sector 
management techniques into the public sector.93 More 
narrowly, Dunleavy defined privatisation as "the permanent 
transferring of service or goods production activities 
previously carried out by public service bureaucracies to 
private firms or to other forms of non-public organization, 
such as voluntary groups."94
The New Right have rallied under the banner of 
privatisation, and encouraged governments to experiment 
with privatisation. The Conservative Government has 
attempted to privatise local government as part of its
92 Heald (1983) p298. See also Savas (1987) p3; and
Veljanovski (1987) pi.
93 See Whitfield (1992) pl29; and Young (1986).
94 Dunleavy (1986a) pl3.
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wider privatisation programme.95 One of the main forms of
privatisation in local government is contracting-out.96
Contracting-out involves the private sector providing goods
and services to a public sector organisation. The public
sector determines (usually in a contract) the goods and
services to be provided, pays the private contractor to
provide the goods and services, and retains responsibility
for their provision to the wider public. Ascher wrote:97
"The term 'contracting out1 describes the 
situation where one organisation contracts with 
another for the provision of a particular good or 
service. It is essentially a form of procurement, 
in the sense that contractors may be considered 
'suppliers', but in common usage it has come to 
refer more specifically to the purchase of an end 
product which could otherwise be provided 'in- 
house' by the purchaser himself."
Many local authorities have contracted-out services to
private contractors, especially since the advent of 
compulsory competitive tendering.98 Contracting-out is
widely regarded as a way of cutting costs in providing
local authority services. Fiscal stress in local government 
precipitated the rise of contracting-out in local 
government. Ascher argued that "in both North America and 
Western Europe increasingly stringent financial constraints 
upon local authorities have focused attention upon the
95 See Ascher (1987) pp209-246; Cochrane (1993); 
Kingdom (1991) pp40-47; and Stoker (1991) pp205-229.
96 Contracting-out needs to be distinguished from 
compulsory competitive tendering, which requires local 
authorities to compete with private contractors to carry 
out work in prescribed areas. Compulsory competitive 
tendering involves contracting-out only if private 
contractors win the contract.
97 Ascher (1987) pp7-8. See also Minogue & O'Grady
(1985a) p35; Minogue & O'Grady (1985b) p83; Pirie (1985)
p43; Pirie (1988) pl40; and Savas (1987) p68.
98 For example, see Fretwell (1988); Hardingham (1984); 
Railings & Thrasher (1989); Whitehead (1985); Whitehead 
(1986); and Whitehead (1987).
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protected position of local authority workers and have 
stimulated interest in alternative methods of service 
provision.1,99 Most local authorities, like Kent CC with 
school cleaning, contracted-out to reduce costs of service 
provision.100
However, it is very problematical to calculate accurately 
the extent of cost savings resulting from contracting-out 
of service provision. Marsh surveyed the many studies of 
contracting out and competitive tendering and concluded 
that their introduction "has led to significant cost 
savings", but noted that the studies "have major problems: 
different methods are used to calculate savings; often the 
studies assess expected savings rather than measuring 
actual ones; and sometimes the data are collected from 
interested parties, councils with an ideological commitment 
to privatize or even contractors who have won 
contracts".101 These three problems were very evident in 
the case study on Kent CC's decision to contract-out school 
cleaning. Table 5.2 reveals eight different calculations of 
the 'savings' resulting from contracting-out of school 
cleaning in Kent, ranging from El,389,760 'saved' to 
£425,000 'wasted'.
First, the calculations were based on different ways of 
measuring the cost savings. The Education Department 
borrowed money from Kent CC's Efficiency Fund, which was 
repaid over a period of five years. Most calculations 
excluded this fund contribution. Furthermore, the amount of 
'savings' depended on the timescale of the measurement. If
99 Ascher (1987) p209. See also Chandler & Feuille 
(1991) pl6; Hamer (1993); Kolderie & Humphrey (1982); 
Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) p49; Minogue & O'Grady (1985b) 
p89; and Savas (1987) p256.
100 Halford (1983) pp55-56.
101 Marsh (1991) p466. See also Kolderie (1987) pp9-10; 
and Savas (1987) pp258-262.
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the fund contribution is excluded from the calculation, 
then, more money would appear to be 'saved' each year over 
a five-year period than a one-year period because in the 
first year of the contracts Kent CC incurred the costs of 
redundancy. Furthermore, a comparison of the cost of 
cleaning schools before and after privatisation must 
compare like with like. On contracting-out Kent CC changed 
the standards of school cleaning, thus making comparison 
difficult. The calculation of cost savings resulting from 
contracting-out is confounded by these methodological 
problems.102
Second, the measurement of cost savings accruing from 
contracting-out was further confounded by measuring 
estimated and not actual 'savings'. In chapter two it was 
argued that it is necessary to examine budgeted spending 
cuts because decisions to cut spending can be more easily 
identified and therefore analysed.103 However, using 
budgeted savings runs the risk that they will not 
materialise, making their measurement invalid. With 
contracting-out this danger is minimised because the local 
authority, notwithstanding any extraordinary circumstances 
(eg contract termination) , will pay no more than the bid of 
the successful private contractor. The budgeted savings 
are, therefore, the actual savings. Nonetheless, the local 
authority still incurs costs in monitoring the contract. 
Kent CC estimated that in the first three years costs of
102 See Hartley (1990) pl90; Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) 
pp44-45; Minogue & O'Grady (1985b) pp86-87; Savas (1987)
pp258-262; and Society Of Metropolitan Treasurers (1984) 
pp6-7. For a debate on the methodological difficulties in 
measuring the cost savings arising from contracting-out 
refuse collection in local government, see Audit Commission 
For Local Authorities In England And Wales (1984f) pp20-22; 
Bennett & Johnson (1981) pp43-47; Cubbin, Domberger &
Meadowcroft (1987); Domberger, Meadowcroft & Thompson 
(1986); Domberger, Meadowcroft & Thompson (1988); Ganley & 
Grahl (1988); Szymanski & Wilkins (1993); and Walsh (1991).
103 See chapter two, pp62-68.
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supervising the school cleaning contracts would exceed over 
£100,000 each year.104 For an accurate comparison before 
and after privatisation these costs must be included in the 
calculation.105
Third, most of the figures cited in table 5.2 were 
calculated by actors closely involved with the decision to 
privatise school cleaning. Kent CC, the National Union of 
Public Employees, and the contract cleaning industry 
(represented by its trade journal, Contract Services, and 
the Public Service Research Centre) had different 
interests, which explain why their costings varied. Kent CC 
wanted to ensure that the decision to contract-out school 
cleaning did yield savings, thus justifying its decision. 
The National Union of Public Employees, whose members lost 
out with the decision to privatise, wanted to expose the 
private contractors as being more expensive than direct 
labour. Private contractors wanted to demonstrate that the 
private sector is cheaper to drum up further business from 
local authorities. Minogue and O'Grady observed:106
104 See table 5.1.
105 The bid submitted by the private contractor may 
reflect the costs incurred by the local authority, but not 
reflect the actual costs incurred by the private 
contractor. Marsh noted there was "little doubt that 
initial bids by private contractors were loss-leaders" 
((1991) p466; see also Domberger, Meadowcroft & Thompson 
(1986) pp82-83; Forsyth (1983) ppl5-16; Savas (1987) p262; 
Society Of Metropolitan Treasurers (1984) p23; Szymanski & 
Wilkins (1993) ppl26-127; and Turner (1982) pl287). There 
was no evidence that Kent CC accepted 'loss-leader' bids 
from private contractors. The submission of 'loss-leader' 
bids is a strategy of winning contracts in the short term 
and getting the local authorities' workforces disbanded, 
thus reducing competition and paving the way for profitable 
bids to be submitted in the longer term. Their existence 
invalidates a true comparison of costs between a local 
authority and private contractor.
106 Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) p45. They added that when 
"commitment to contracting out arises from strong 
ideological or political views it is doubtful whether a 
competent and unbiased verdict can emerge" ((1985a) p46).
281
"The decision to contract out is charged with 
highly emotional (and therefore political) 
overtones. It can be an all or nothing matter for 
members of the existing workforce under threat of 
redundancy. It can threaten the integrity of 
bureaucratic empires and the career advancement 
of those whose promotion is linked to the number 
of people they have working under them. Moreover 
the consequent publicity that surrounds any 
decision to go ahead and purchase service from 
another agent of supply, rebounds to the certain 
discredit of the purchaser should anything go 
wrong with the way the new service is managed.
And things are likely to go wrong, especially at 
the time of change-over, since it takes time for 
any new contractor to get acclimatized to the 
precise requirements of the contract and of the 
locality."
Given so much at stake, local authorities, trade unions and 
private contractors distort the calculation of 'savings' 
resulting from contracting-out in order to defend their 
interests.107 Furthermore, analysis by others more detached 
from contracting-out decisions (eg academics) are highly 
dependent on data supplied by vested interests.108
Kent CC contracted-out school cleaning to save money. Its 
decision yielded cost savings over the three-year term of 
the contract.109 However, it is far more difficult to 
ascertain whether standards of school cleaning deteriorated 
during this period. Marsh claimed there "is considerable 
debate as to whether or not the standard of services has
107 See Halford & Wheen (1982) p9.
108 Savas observed "many researchers rely on data that 
are easy to find instead of working hard to obtain the data 
they really should use" ((1987) pl24).
109 Table 5.2 reveals only two calculations suggesting 
that Kent CC incurred extra costs from contracting-out 
school cleaning. Both excluded the fund contribution, and 
therefore included the significant redundancy costs. If 
these costs were spread over the three years of the 
contract the decision to contract-out would yield cost 
savings of well over £2 million - see table 5.1.
282
declined as contractors cut costs".110 The National Union 
of Public Employees and private contractors came to 
opposite conclusions. Kent CC monitored the performance of 
private contractors cleaning its schools and found a slight 
deterioration of school cleaning standards.111 Their 
assessments were tainted again by their respective 
interests. They were not comparing like with like, since 
cleaning standards changed in the specifications laid down 
in the contract. Furthermore, the assessment of cleanliness 
is subjective. Kent CC relied largely on a few officers and 
its head teachers to assess the cleanliness of schools. 
Councillors, caretakers, pupils, parents, governors, 
ratepayers, local voters and cleaning 'experts' were not 
involved in assessing the cleanliness of schools, and if 
they were, would undoubtedly have different opinions.
Though contracting-out affected adversely, albeit unevenly 
and indeterminately, the cleaning standards in schools, the 
greatest impact of the decision to privatise school 
cleaning fell on the cleaners previously employed by Kent 
CC. They were sacked, and most of those re-employed by 
private contractors were recruited on lower pay and 
conditions. As a result of privatisation there were net job 
losses and lower wage bills for cleaning schools in Kent. 
The cost savings arising from the contracting-out of school 
cleaning derived largely from the reduced costs of 
employing labour.112 As Minogue and O'Grady observed, "the
110 Marsh (1991) p466. Savas noted that "costs are 
generally easier to measure than service quality" ((1987) 
pl23).
111 See table 5.3.
112 This finding corresponds to other studies of 
contacting-out - see Ascher (1987) ppl02-lll, 209-246; 
Dunleavy (1986a); Halford (1982); Halford (1983); Hartley 
& Huby (1985); Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) pp40-41; Painter 
(1991) pp218-219; Society Of Metropolitan Treasurers
(1984); Stoker (1988) ppl73-191; Stoker (1991) pp205-229;
Szymanski & Wilkins (1993); Walsh (1989a) pp51-52; Wolman 
(1982a) p75; and Wolman & Peterson (1981) p795. Even the
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feasibility of securing gains from contracting out is in 
many ways closely associated with a situation of high 
unemployment and low economic growth".113 Unemployment and 
low economic growth created greater downward pressures on 
labour costs in the contract cleaning industry where pay 
and conditions are negotiated locally than in local 
authorities where pay and conditions were nationally 
negotiated. The pay of cleaners employed by private 
contractors tended to be lower than those employed by local 
authorities. In times of unemployment the supply of 
cleaners greatly exceeds the demand for cleaners. Private 
contractors were able to employ cleaners on lower pay, and 
offer significant cost savings to local authorities. The 
school cleaners and trade unions realised that outright 
opposition to Kent CC's decision to tender out school 
cleaning by striking or not submitting a bid would push 
Kent CC to privatise school cleaning and lead to redundancy 
and lower pay and conditions.
Jorgensen argued "organizations vary with regard to their 
chances of shoving costs and problems on to others.11,14 
Kent CC exported spending cuts to its school cleaners, who 
felt the full brunt of their effects with redundancy, lower 
pay and conditions if recruited by the private contractors,
New Right recognise that lower labour costs contribute 
towards the cost savings of contracting-out (see Forsyth
(1983)). These cost savings may disappear if the Government 
is forced to concede that the European Community's Acquired 
Rights Directive, protecting the conditions of employment 
of workers involved in a transfer of an undertaking, 
applies to undertakings transferred from the public to the 
private sector (eg contracting-out of local authority 
services) - see LGIU Special Briefing (1993) .
1.3 Minogue & O'Grady (1985a) p38. See also Minogue & 
O'Grady (1985b) p84.
1.4 J0rgensen (1987a) pl99. See also Jorgensen (1987b)
p22.
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and possible unemployment if not recruited.115 Much 
attention has been paid to the widely observed cutback 
management strategy of transferring spending cuts to 
another actor's budget.116 Less attention has been paid to 
precisely where the spending cuts are transferred. There is 
no gain for an organisation making spending cuts by cutting 
another organisation's budget if the recipient organisation 
can retaliate. Kent CC cut its school cleaning budget by 
sacking its school cleaners and privatising school 
cleaning. The cleaners were in a weak position to retaliate 
because they provided a support service largely invisible 
to the wider public (eg parents of school children). They 
had few defenders. Furthermore, the trade unions 
representing the cleaners were divided and withdrew their 
bid to win the school cleaning contract. Kent CC exported 
the spending cut to its cleaners, most of whom received 
lower wages when employed by the private contractors. 
Wolman and Peterson predicted when spending cuts are made 
"services will be maintained, to the extent possible, at 
the expense of ancillary and support functions."117 They 
added :118
"Departments . . . cut back on activities 
considered "frills" which have low visibility and 
weak political support."
Kent CC regarded school cleaning as a 'frill', where
1.5 The redundant school cleaners, if unemployed, 
increased the demands placed on budgets of other government 
agencies, such as the then Department of Health and Social 
Security and even the Social Services Department within the 
same local authority (see Rhodes (1985a) p35).
1.6 See Glennerster (1980a) p375; Glennerster (1981) 
pl86; Jordan (1987) pl6; Levine, Rubin & Wolohojian (1981b) 
pl90; Pinkham & Platt (1980) p21-22; Rosenberg (1985a) p67; 
Wolman & Davis (1980) ppl7, 52-53; and Wolman & Peterson 
(1980) p77.
1.7 Wolman & Peterson (1980) p78. See also Wolman (1983)
p259.
118 Wolman & Peterson (1981) p813. See also Wolman
(1983) p2 59.
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slightly lower standards of school cleaning were acceptable 
provided contracting-out produced substantial cost savings.
The costs of contracting-out school cleaning were borne
largely by the school cleaners. Dunleavy argued:119
"It is perfectly consistent with the general 
bureau-shaping motivation that policy-level 
staffs in almost all types of agency should co­
operate in shedding low-level or routine 
functions to contractors. After all, what does it 
matter to senior bureaucrats who changes the 
towels in the office washrooms, so long as they 
do get changed and they do not have to engage in 
delicate industrial relations negotiations with 
the washroom attendants?"
He argued that senior bureaucrats, contrary to the budget-
maximisation thesis, are not concerned to protect all of
their organisation's budget because their welfare is not
dependent on large parts of the budget.120 Dunleavy
maintained:121
"... the pursuit of privatization affords great 
unprecedented opportunities for policymakers in 
delivery agencies to effect radical 
transformations in their agency's character and 
status. An increasing shift to a control agency 
format effectively insulates policy-level staff 
from reliance on continued high levels of budget 
appropriations in order to maintain their welfare 
levels. The costs of privatization are borne 
overwhelmingly by rank and file state workers, 
whose job security, hours of work, working 
conditions, access to union protection, and wage 
rates may all come under drastic downward 
pressure. Equally, policy-level bureaucrats have 
little to lose if there are qualitative changes 
in service provision, service standard reductions 
or decreased public or consumer control over the 
format of service provision as a result of 
privatization. These costs are born [sic] chiefly
1,9 Dunleavy (1986a) p21.
120 On the budget-maximising model see Blais & Dion 
(1991); Dunleavy (1991) ppl47-173, 210-248; Niskanen
(1971); Niskanen (1973);. and Niskanen (1975). On the 
bureau-shaping model see Dunleavy (1985) ; and Dunleavy 
(1991) ppl74-248.
121 Dunleavy (1986a) p21.
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by consumers and service recipients."
By contracting-out school cleaning Kent CC moved, albeit 
slightly, from a delivery agency to a control agency. It no 
longer cleaned schools, but controlled private contractors 
that cleaned schools. The school cleaners were thus 
vulnerable to cuts imposed on them by senior officers and 
councillors. The cleaners made redundant by Kent CC's 
decision to contract-out school cleaning were largely 
women, poorly educated and trained, and unskilled. They 
were mainly working class women. Dunleavy suggested that 
privatisation "advances the (class) interests of central 
and policy-level officials at the expense of job losses and 
worsened conditions of rank and file state workers."122 
Webster observed that women "are likely to be the most 
affected by cuts in jobs and services which result from 
reductions in local authority spending."123 She argued that 
spending cuts fall in areas where women occupy lowly paid, 
routine and unskilled jobs in local authorities.
This case study on school cleaning supports neither the 
observation that spending cuts are "made within departments 
in a manner that minimizes the loss of employment for 
existing employees"124, nor the claim that "bureaucrats 
prefer to identify new projects and policies in which 
staffing is maximized.11,25 The case study lends support to 
the argument that contracting-out "must be seen as a
122 Dunleavy (1986a) p31. More generally Dunsire and 
Hood maintained that "blue-collar workers suffered more 
than white-collar workers during the recent retrenchment" 
in central government ((1989) pl07).
123 Webster (1985) pl9. See also Edgell & Duke (1983); : 
Hunt (1987); and Turner (1979).
124 Wolman & Peterson (1980) p80.
125 Blore (1987) p82. Furthermore, Boyne found the 
staff-maximisation model to be "without empirical 
foundation" in local government ((1987) plOO). See also 
Boyne (1986); Boyne (1989); Boyne (1991); Gibson (1988); 
Gibson (1990); and Gibson (1991).
continuation of the strategies already well developed by 
senior policy-level bureaucrats for advancing their class 
(and frequently gender) interests against those of rank and 
file state workers and service consumers."126 The 
examination of Kent CC's decision to privatise school 
cleaning reveals that class and gender politics were 
significant in its making.
126 Dunleavy (1986a) p30.
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CHAPTER SIX
CUTBACK MANAGEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A RATIONALIST VIEW
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Many theories of cutback management have been put forward 
to explain how organisations manage in hard times.1 There 
are essentially two dominant decision-making paradigms 
within which these theories of cutback management have been 
developed. They are the rationalist and incremental models 
of decision-making. These models have dominated the 
literature on decision-making.2 As making cuts involves 
hard decisions it is not surprising the two models have 
also dominated the literature on cutback management. It is 
therefore necessary to test these two models of cutback 
management to examine how plausible they are in explaining 
the making of spending cuts in local government. This 
chapter will examine the rationalist model, and the next 
chapter the incremental model of cutback management. These 
two models will be tested by applying them to the empirical 
findings outlined in the chapters three, four and five. The 
aim of the chapter is to develop and test the rationalist 
model of cutback management. In the chapter the rationalist 
model of decision-making will be explored to identify a 
series of rationalist traits of cutback management. These 
traits will be examined to see whether they were displayed 
in the way the four local authorities - Bedfordshire CC, 
Kent CC, Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC - made spending 
cuts. This examination will be used as the basis for 
constructing and surveying a rationalist theory of cutback 
management in local government.
RATIONALIST MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING
1 See chapter four, footnotes 5, 8, and 15.
2 See Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970); Burch & Wood (1989) 
pp24-33; Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) plO; Frohock 
(1979) pp23-63; Ham & Hill (1993) p80; Hogwood & Gunn
(1984) pp42-64; Hudson (1992) ppl95-196; Ibrahim & Proctor 
(1992b) p50; Leach (1982) p6; Lindblom (1959); Lindblom
(1965); Manzer (1984); and Smith & May (1980) pl47.
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The rationalist model of decision-making involves the 
making of a decision in an analytical and comprehensive 
manner. The model, according to Haynes, "is founded on the 
need for regular comprehensive analysis".3 It is widely 
portrayed as a series of cyclical stages through which a 
decision is made.4 The diagram below outlines the stages of 
the rationalist model of decision-making.
Diagram 6.1: Rationalist Model of Decision-Making
IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUE 
FOR DECISION
REVIEW OF DECISION 
AND OBJECTIVES
FORMULATION OF 
OBJECTIVES
IMPLEMENTATION OF 
DECISION THAT MOST 
ACHIEVES OBJECTIVES
IDENTIFICATION OF 
POSSIBLE WAYS OF 
ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES
EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE 
WAYS OF ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES
The rationalist model of decision-making is built upon the 
foundations of analysis, and in particular, means-ends
3 Haynes (1980) pl03. See also Braybrooke & Lindblom 
(1970) p38; and Lane (1993) p74.
4 See Allison (1971) pp29-30; Banfield (1962) pp71-73; 
Booth (1988) p4; Brown & Steel (1979) ppl77-178; Burch & 
Wood (1989) pp24-27; Dahl (1991) ppl40-141; Dror (1968)
ppl32-141; Haynes (1980) p78; Hogwood & Gunn (1984) p45; 
Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) ppl4, 25; Jackson (1982b) pp88- 
91; Jordan & Richardson (1987) pp9-10; Lindblom (1965)
ppl37-138; Richardson & Jordan (1985) pl9; Smith (1976) 
pp33-38; Spiers (1975) ppl44-150; Stewart (1971) p30; and 
Thompson & McEwen (1958) p25.
analysis.5 In the rationalist camp Self argued this model
yielded three different though related meanings of
rationality. He wrote:6
"First, it stands for the notion of reflection as 
a prelude to action. Instead of acting upon 
hunch, the decision-maker should analyse the 
situation carefully, consider alternative 
options, list their pros and cons, and so on.... 
Secondly, rationality is an instrumental value 
concerned with the maximisation of some goal or 
the application of some value judgement.... 
Finally, rationality stands sometimes for a 
principle of harmony between conflicting aims or 
values.... At a more mundane level this sense of 
rationality is expressed as the popular idea of 
'reasonableness'."
The rationalist model of decision-making assumes the ends
to be achieved are determined, and then the means to
achieve these desired ends are decided upon. The model
involves the setting of goals, objectives and priorities,
and the making of the decision that most achieves the given
ends. The Bains Committee, reporting on management in local
authorities, believed "policy decisions should be based on
planning and analysis of objectives and the means of
attaining them. 1,7
The rationalist model of decision-making is also built upon 
the foundations of comprehensiveness. It assumes there is 
a comprehensive pool of knowledge, resources and time from 
which the decision-maker can make a decision. According to 
Lindblom, "rational-comprehensive analysis leaves out 
nothing important."8
The rationalist model thus assumes a decision is made on
5 See Greenaway, Smith & Street (1992) pl5; and Lane 
(1993) p210.
6 Self (1975) ppl96-197.
7 Department Of The Environment (1972) pl2.
8 Lindblom (1959) p84. See also Braybrooke & Lindblom 
(1970) p39.
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the basis of comprehensive analysis. The decision is 
analytically and comprehensively designed to achieve 
desired purposes. Analysis and comprehensiveness are 
therefore the critical traits of the rationalist model of 
decision-making. However, this model has been refined in 
response to the limitations to its application, of which 
there are two significant limitations.
The first limitation refers to the assumption built into 
the rationalist model that there are objective criteria by 
which the ends can be formulated and the means designed to 
achieve the ends examined. In his attack on the policy 
sciences Fay pointed to "the difficulty of drawing a sharp 
and enduring distinction between what is an end and what is 
a means", and argued "every means is an end relative to the 
means required to achieve it, so that any given course of 
action may be either a means or an end depending upon the 
point of view which one adopts."9 Likewise, Dunleavy argued 
that "the essential relativism of any means/end distinction 
makes this ideal incapable of realisation; any given 
'means' for one set of actors or interests may always 
involve their consideration as 'ends' by some other 
actor."10 The distinction between means and ends is an 
artificial abstraction of reality existing in the minds of 
only those making the distinction.11 Oakeshott believed:12
9 Fay (1975) p51. See also Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) 
pp51-57; Dahl & Lindblom (1976) pp26-27; Hogwood & Gunn
(1984) pp48-49; Jackson (1982b) pl06; Lane (1993) pp210- 
211; Lindblom (1959) pp81-84; Lindblom (1965) ppl39-143;
Self (1975) ppl50-151; Simon (1957a) pp62-66; and Smith
(1976) pl42.
10 Dunleavy (1980) pl65.
11 Furthermore, Oakeshott argued that an end cannot be 
formulated in advance of the means necessary to achieve it 
((1962) ppl-36, 80-136). The rationalist model of decision­
making presupposes that an end can be formulated in advance 
of the means necessary to achieve it. But he believed that 
if indeed an end can be constructed it can only flow from 
the available means, and that the means cannot therefore, 
as rationalists believe, spring from the given end.
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"In political activity, then, men sail a 
boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither 
harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, 
neither starting-place nor appointed 
destination."
Notwithstanding this important philosophical argument that
there may be no objective criteria upon which to construct
these ends and means, the assumption has to be also
challenged on practical grounds. A single decision-maker
may be able to calculate criteria to make a decision, but
several decision-makers together will find it more
difficult if not impossible to agree upon the criteria by
which a decision can be made. Spiers argued:13
"... one could say that politics tends to limit 
rationality in group decision-making, because 
(even assuming rationality on the part of 
persons) each person tends to have different 
preferences and preference ratings, so that the 
combined decision tends to consist in the
reconciliation of these differences."
For the rationalist model to be practicable there must be *
Oakeshott argued vehemently that it "is an error to call an 
activity 'rational' on account of its end having been 
specifically determined in advance and in respect of its 
achieving that end to the exclusion of all others, because 
there is in fact no way of determining an end for activity 
itself; and if there were, the spring of activity would 
still remain in knowing how to act in pursuit of that end 
and not in the mere fact of having formulated an end to 
pursue" ( (1962) p91) . He noted that a "cook is not a man who 
first has a vision of a pie and then tries to make it; he 
is a man skilled in cookery, and both his projects and his 
achievements spring from that skill"((1962) p91) .
12 Oakeshott (1962) pl27.
13 Spiers (1975) pl46. See also Booth (1988) p5;
Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) pp23-36; Brown & Steel (1979) 
pl75; Dahl & Lindblom (1976) p83; Jackson (1982b) ppl05-, 
108; Self (1975) pl50; Simon (1957a) pp70-73; and Smith .
(1976) pl42. Furthermore, collective action problems may 
result when more than one decision-maker makes a decision. 
McLean noted that a collective action problem is "any 
situation in which players' individually rational actions 
lead to an outcome which could have been bettered if 
players had chosen differently" ((1991) p500; see also
Dowding (1991) pp84-114; and Dunleavy' & O'Leary (1987)
pp79-82).
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agreement between decision-makers on the criteria by which
the ends and means are formulated. However, given there can
be only subjective criteria by which decisions are made it
is very unlikely that decision-makers, possessing different
preferences and representing different interests, can
easily agree on the criteria to be used to make a decision.
Simon illustrated this clash of rationalities between
decision-makers when he wrote:14
"... in terms of what objectives, whose values, 
shall rationality be judged? Is behavior of an 
individual in an organization rational when it 
serves his personal objectives, or when it serves 
the organizational objectives? Two soldiers sit 
in a trench opposite a machine-gun nest. One of 
them stays under cover. The other, at the cost of 
his life, destroys the machine-gun nest with a 
grenade. Which is rational?"
Decision-makers must agree upon the ends to be achieved and
the means to achieve the given ends, without which the
rationalist model of decision-making is severely limited.
The second limitation concerns the high degree of 
comprehensiveness assumed by the rationalist model of 
decision-making. Decision-making resources are scarce, 
which drastically limits the degree of comprehensiveness 
that can be achieved in making a decision. A decision-maker 
may not have sufficient knowledge, money or time to analyse 
a complex set of objectives, all ways of achieving the 
objectives and every consequence of a decision.15 In the 
words of Simon:16
14 Simon (1957a) p76. See also Ham & Hill (1993) p81.
15 See Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) pp48-50; Hogwood & 
Gunn (1984) pp50-52; Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) pl5; 
Lindblom (1959); Lindblom (1965) ppl38-139; Lindblom (1979) 
p518; March & Simon (1993) ppl57-192; Simon (1957a) pp68- 
70, 80-84; Wildavsky (1964) pl46; Wildavsky (1967) ppl21- 
123; and Wildavsky (1986) plO.
16 Simon (1957a) p81. See also Booth (1988) p6;
Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) pp32, 50-51; Dahl & Lindblom
(1976) pp59-64; Frohock (1979) pp50-51; Greenaway, Smith & 
Street (1992) p21; Ham & Hill (1993) p82; Hogwood & Gunn
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"Rationality implies a complete, and attainable, 
knowledge of the exact consequences of each 
choice. In actuality, the human being never has 
more than a fragmentary knowledge of the 
conditions surrounding his action, nor more than 
a slight insight into the regularities and laws 
that would permit him to induce future 
consequences from a knowledge of present 
circumstances."
Decision-makers must sacrifice a degree of
comprehensiveness because of scarce decision-making
resources. This sacrifice represents another significant
limitation in the application of the rationalist model of
decision-making.
These two limitations upon the rationalist model over the 
degree of analysis and comprehensiveness that can be 
achieved have been widely acknowledged by both its . 
proponents and opponents. Rationalists have refined the 
model in response to these limitations.17 Leach argued the 
"appropriate response to these criticisms is not to reject 
the model per se, but to accept the boundedness of 
rationality and to be prepared to use the rational model 
flexibly."18 The refined model, according to rationalists, 
captures a limited form of rationality. They concede 
readily the rationalist model of decision-making cannot be 
applied perfectly, but maintain the model can be applied in 
a limited way. The decision-maker should, and indeed often
(1984) p48; Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) pl2; Lindblom (1965) 
pl39; Smith (1976) ppl60-173; Spiers (1975) ppl45, 151; and 
Weiss & Woodhouse (1992) p256. Limited information
available to decision-makers is compounded by risk and 
uncertainty where "the outcomes of some or all available 
actions depend on unpredictable chance events" (Harsanyi
(1977) p8; see also Dahl (1991) pl41; Heath (1976) pp7-18, 
75-90; Jackson (1982b) ppl01-102, 112-118; and Simon (1976) 
ppl33-135, 142-144). Following Harsanyi, the rationalist
model "is largely restricted to the case of certainty" 
((1977) p8).
17 For example, see Dror (1964); Dror (1968); Etzioni 
(1967) ; Leach (1982); March (1986); and Simon (1957a) .
18 Leach (1982) p7.
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does, follow the steps of the rationalist model as far as 
possible given the limitations. This limited application of 
the rationalist model constitutes "bounded rationality".19 
Simon argued the theory of bounded rationality is concerned 
with "the behavior of human beings who satisfice because 
they have not the wits to maximize."20 Leach recommended 
"the idea of selective rationality" which makes the 
rationalist model "more feasible".21 This view of bounded 
rationality is the closest and practical approximation to 
the application of the rationalist model of decision­
making. It . still recognises that analysis and 
comprehensiveness are integral components of decision­
making, but 'satisfices' rather than optimises the level of 
analysis and comprehensiveness involved in decision-making.
Given this outline of the rationalist model of decision­
making it is possible to construct a rationalist model of 
cutback management in local government. Cutback management 
in local government would be portrayed by a high degree of 
analysis and comprehensiveness. In particular, it would be 
characterised by the following series of rationalist 
traits:
(a) a local authority would calculate its reduced 
provision of resources, and assess the effects 
upon its policies and plans
(b) a local authority would review and re­
formulate its objectives in light of its 
declining resources
(c) a local authority would explore a wide range 
of options to achieve its refined objectives
(d) a local authority would examine the 
consequences of its cutback options
(e) a local authority would implement the package 
of cuts which minimises the harmful effects and
19 Simon (1957a) pxxiv.
20 Simon (1957a) pxxiv.
21 Leach (1982) pl3.
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maximises the beneficial effects upon its 
obj ectives
(f) a local authority would plan its future 
resource levels, service demands and policy 
objectives
(g) a local authority would set up centralised 
reviews to formulate, coordinate and oversee its 
cutback management strategy
(h) a local authority would rely on expert advice 
in making and implementing its package of cuts
These traits stem directly from the rationalist model of 
decision-making, and thus constitute the rationalist model 
of cutback management in local government. If these traits 
are found in local authorities, the rationalist view of 
cutback management is an applicable and plausible way in 
which to understand the making of spending cuts in local 
government.
RATIONALIST MODEL OF CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
The rationalist model of cutback management, as delineated 
by the above set of cutback management traits, will be 
examined to measure the extent to which the four local 
authorities cut spending in a rationalist manner.
(a) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD CALCULATE ITS REDUCED PROVISION 
OF RESOURCES, AND ASSESS THE EFFECTS UPON ITS POLICIES AND 
PLANS
Budgeting in the four local authorities was essentially a 
resource-led exercise. Each of the four local authorities 
constructed a base budget, which is the proposed amount of 
money required to carry out the existing policies of the 
local authority. The base budget of the local authority is
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its previous budget plus the changes in the cost of 
maintaining existing services. It is largely a standstill 
budget.
Each local authority then considered the financial 
implications of its base budget. In particular, the local 
authorities examined the amount of money they would receive 
in central government grant, and the amount they needed to 
raise in rates if they were to continue providing their 
present level of services. At this stage the local 
authorities tentatively decided upon how much they wanted 
to spend on services. These decisions were based more on 
resource than service considerations. The local authorities 
wanted to see what money was available to spend before 
deciding what spending was needed to provide services.
All four local authorities set a ceiling below which their 
rates (or precepts) were to be kept; and three of the four 
local authorities wanted to keep their spending at or close 
to central government's expenditure target in order to 
protect their grant entitlements.22 The four local 
authorities wanted to maximise central government grant and 
minimise their rate bills. These two concerns over 
financial resources outweighed the concern to protect and 
develop services.
Budget-making was resource-driven in the four local 
authorities. In Bedfordshire CC both the Conservative and 
Liberal Groups wanted to limit the precept increase, and to 
keep spending within two per cent of central government's 
expenditure target. In Kent CC the ruling Conservative 
Group wanted to keep the precept increase below the 
inflation rate, and spending within one per cent of target. 
In Knowsley MBC the ruling Labour Group wanted a single­
figure rates increase, and its spending no more than four
22 Knowsley MBC exceeded the expenditure target set by 
central government.
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per cent over target in the hope of avoiding rate-capping. 
In Stockport MBC the ruling Conservative Group wanted to 
keep the rates increase below the inflation rate, and 
spending at target. All four local authorities determined 
their capital programmes according to their block 
allocations from central government, their capital receipts 
from the disposal of assets, and the revenue consequences 
of proposed capital schemes. Budgets, therefore, were set 
according to the level of resources available to the local 
authorities and not to the level of service provision 
preferred by the local authorities. Hender observed that 
local authority services were "tailored to meet financial 
constraints" .23
Local authorities had access to a variety of financial 
resources (eg rates, charges, government grants, loans and 
capital receipts), which could be utilised to provide 
services. However, local authorities were subject to 
considerable government controls and other outside 
pressures which significantly limited their access to these 
resources. The resources available to local authorities 
were limited by central government in the form of grant 
penalties and rate-capping on the revenue side, and block 
allocations and restrictions on the use of capital receipts 
on the capital side. The availability of resources was also 
limited by other outside pressures, most notably local 
ratepayers and business. These pressures, however, were 
often anticipated rather than actually felt by the four 
local authorities. For example, the Liberal Group of 
Bedfordshire CC did not want to increase the precept 
because of the anticipated adverse consequences of such an 
increase upon its electoral fortunes. The Conservative
23 New Society (1984) p264. This resource-led form of 
budgeting corresponds closely to findings of other studies 
of local authority budgeting. See Elcock (1991) ppll4-117; 
Elcock Sc Jordan (1987) ; Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) ; 
Greenwood (1979); Greenwood (1983); and Greenwood, Hinings, 
Ranson & Walsh (1976).
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Group of Stockport MBC wanted to hold down the level of 
rates because of the anticipated benefits in attracting 
business to Stockport (as opposed to Manchester).24
As a result of these outside controls and pressures the 
four local authorities decided to limit their spending. 
This widespread concern largely outweighed any attempt to 
calculate how much spending was needed to provide a desired 
range of services. The decisions on how much to spend on 
each service followed the decision on how much to spend in 
total on services. In the four local authorities the 
concern to limit spending unleashed a round of spending 
cuts. Three local authorities, though not Stockport MBC, 
wanted to cut spending lower than their base budget. At 
this stage they knew that there would be service 
implications of their chosen budget strategies.
The Bains Committee argued that fiscal stress "has ... led 
to more attention being paid to monitoring and review by 
restricting the resources available for growth."25 Contrary 
to this observation, the concern of the four local
authorities to limit spending preceded any analysis of 
service provision. Furthermore, there was no wholesale
analysis of the effects upon service provision at the time 
of their decisions to limit spending. For example, in
Bedfordshire CC the management team of chief officers 
undertook the cost-cutting 'Getting Down To GREA' exercise 
which formed the basis of many of the spending cuts 
identified in the budget of 1984/85, but this exercise took 
place two years before the adoption of this budget. In 
Knowsley MBC the 'lower expenditure options' exercise 
generated some of the spending cuts in its revenue budget 
of 1984/85, but the Chief Executive and the Borough
Treasurer were required to rescue this exercise when it
24 Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC.
25 Department Of The Environment (1972) pl4.
failed to deliver sufficient spending cuts.
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There are two general features that need to be stressed 
about the way the four local authorities analysed the 
effects upon service provision of the proposed rounds of 
spending cuts.
First, whatever analysis was undertaken took place at the
departmental not the corporate level. This level of
analysis reflects the dominant position of professionalism
in local government.26 Despite the rise of corporate
management in the late 1960s and 1970s and the emergence of
consumerism in the 1980s and early 1990s, local authorities
are still generally organised and managed along
professional lines. Greenwood argued:27
"The traditional, or orthodox, ideology was based 
upon 'professionalism' . This conceived the role 
of the local authority as the administration of 
a series of services each treated and organised 
as essentially independent, and as a product of 
statutory requirement. Policy development and 
review occurred within professionally staffed 
departments in which professional judgement was 
the instinctive and preferred method of analysis 
and choice. . . . The orthodox and widely prevailing 
ideology, in short, was a conjunction of 
essentially limited domain responsibilities 
(provision of statutorily determined services) 
and a mode of organising which stressed the
separateness of services and the relevance of
professional principles for guiding 
administration and choice."
In the four local authorities there was very little
synoptic analysis of the effects upon service provision of
cutting spending. In Bedfordshire CC's 'Getting Down To
GREA' exercise the analysis was fed into the process by the
26 There is a rich vein of literature on the influence 
of professions in local government. See Dunleavy (1980) 
ppllO-119; Elcock (1983); Elcock (1986b) pp298-303; Elcock, 
Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pp79-86; Kingdom (1991) ppl37- 
154; Laffin (1986a); Laffin (1986b); Laffin & Young (1990) ; 
and Rhodes (1988).ppl87-191.
27 Greenwood (1984) p291.
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service departments, and the management team compiled the 
report.28 Even in the two local authorities which adopted 
formal corporate processes of policy-making - Knowsley MBC 
and Stockport MBC - analysis was largely undertaken by 
professionals in service departments, and not by those in 
central departments. Thus, the analysis undertaken before 
making spending cuts was not centralised and therefore not 
strategic, but decentralised and therefore fragmented.
Second, departmental analysis of the proposed service cuts 
was undertaken more to identify where the spending cuts 
should fall rather than to assess the feasibility of the 
budget strategy of the four local authorities. The 
decisions about the level of spending which could be 
financed from rates and central government grants were 
parameters of analysis. The analysis was not designed to 
question and review these parameters but only to decide 
where the spending cuts should fall. Schick argued that 
"the most budget-relevant test for a cutback is the amount 
of money it saves."29 In the few instances where the 
identified spending cut proved to be not feasible other 
means of financing (such as the use of special funds) were 
found to reverse the proposed cut. Bedfordshire CC 
reinstated a package of spending cuts in its budget by 
using monies from its Reserve Fund. Knowsley MBC used 
various fund monies to ease the pain of finding the 
required amount of spending cuts. The use of funds was 
preferred as a way of reversing spending cuts because their 
use did not decrease the local authorities' grant 
entitlement nor increase their rates (or precepts).
Thus, the fragmented analysis of spending cuts undertaken 
by the four local authorities had minimal influence upon 
the setting of the budget strategy of the local
28 Assistant to the Chief Executive, Bedfordshire CC.
29 Schick (1988) pp528-529.
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authorities. The decision to cut spending was made without 
any systematic analysis of the consequences of such 
spending cuts. Though there was much analysis of the amount 
of resources available to provide services, there was 
little analysis of the consequences upon service provision 
before the decision to cut spending.
(b) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD REVIEW AND RE-FORMULATE ITS 
OBJECTIVES IN LIGHT OF ITS DECLINING RESOURCES
Under the rationalist model of cutback management local
authorities would examine their objectives as a result of
their reduced level of resources available to achieve their
objectives. Existing objectives of service provision may no
longer be realistic because of the decision to reduce
spending. Objectives thus need to be reviewed and perhaps
refined to reflect the reduced provision of resources. In
the words of McTighe:30
"An examination of the mission (s) of the 
organization is central to the development of a 
workable cutback strategy."
According to several observers of cutback management in 
local government the requirement to cut spending leads to 
the increased review of the activities and therefore the 
objectives of local authorities.31 In the words of 
Elcock:32
"... in recent years the growth of output 
budgeting techniques combined with the 
increasingly severe financial restraints imposed 
by the central government have encouraged local 
authorities to examine their budgets more
30 McTighe (1979) p88.
31 See Elcock (1986b) ppl80-192; Elcock (1991) pl21; 
Foster & Algie (1985); Greenwood (1983); Greenwood, 
Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1976); Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson 
Sc Walsh (1980) pp25-48; Pendlebury (1985) ; and Stewart
(1983) ppl98-211.
32 Elcock (1986b) p!83.
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fundamentally."
According to this view, local authorities faced with the
need to cut spending and armed with new budgetary
techniques have increasingly examined their spending.
Greenwood observed the "greater willingness at the centre
to review existing expenditures and activities."33
Pendlebury found that nearly one-half of the local
authorities surveyed regularly reviewed their base
budgets.34 These studies have demonstrated consistently
that when local authorities make cuts they increasingly
scrutinise their existing spending commitments. In other
words, they increasingly analyse their base budgets.
Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson and Walsh noted:35
"... the experiences of local government are that 
conditions of a sustained decline in resources 
prompt the examination of increasing percentages 
of the base. The parameters of budgetary review 
are widened."
The experience of cutback management in the four local 
authorities does not correspond to this observation of 
increased base budget analysis in local government. All 
four local authorities constructed a base budget which 
amounted to little more than last year's spending updated 
for inflation. None of the local authorities examined its 
base budget in any significant sense.36 The evidence from 
the four local authorities challenges the prevailing 
orthodoxy of increased analysis of the base in times of 
financial restraint.
33 Greenwood (1983) pl61.
34 Pendlebury (1985) p30.
35 Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1980) p38.
36 A few service departments attempted to scrutinise 
their base budgets, but this scrutiny was not undertaken 
each year. In Bedfordshire CC the Director of Social 
Services and the Assistant Director of Social Services 
claimed over a period of several years they had scanned all 
of their department's budget.
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Though Kent CC, Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC subscribed 
to various corporate planning processes, which ostensibly 
reviewed the objectives enshrined in the budget, none of 
these processes proved effective in practice of undertaking 
such analysis.37 The corporate plans of Kent CC and 
Stockport MBC were little more than descriptions of how the 
money budgeted was to be spent rather than why it was being 
spent. In Knowsley MBC the Policy Planning and Budgeting 
Process collapsed in the face of administrative resistance 
and political inertia. The only form of base budget 
analysis undertaken in the four local authorities was the 
ritual negotiation between the finance and service 
departments in compiling the base budget. However, this 
analysis rarely extended to a review of objectives because 
it focused only upon the amount of money needed to carry 
out existing policies and not upon why these policies 
needed to be carried out. Objectives were not seriously 
questioned nor even stated during these inter-departmental 
negotiations.
Stockport MBC probably reviewed the objectives enshrined in 
its base budget more than the other three local 
authorities.38 Stockport MBC pursued a strategy of making 
significant spending cuts in constructing its base budget. 
This strategy involved the limited review of its 
objectives. The 'sweat shop' function, performed by the
37 Indeed, two leading councillors of Kent CC - the 
Chairman of the Development and Transportation Committee 
and the Chairman of the Finance and Review Group - lamented 
the absence of analysis of the base budget, and cited the 
lack of time to undertake such analysis. As Elcock, Jordan 
and Midwinter noted, "the demands that scrutiny of the, 
budget 'base' imposes on both officers and politicians is 
[sic] excessive" ((1989) ppl83-184).
38 This finding corresponds to the observation made by 
Greenwood, Hinings and Ranson that the parameters of * 
budgetary review are widened if the chief executive is 
powerful and the ruling party group is highly organised, 
both of which were more evident in Stockport MBC than in 
the other three local authorities ( (1977) pp38-45) .
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political and administrative leadership, reviewed 
objectives by scrutinising the spending of committees. Also 
the Establishment Control Panel in deciding whether vacant 
posts were to be filled or not reviewed to some extent the 
objectives of the post.39 However, the ad hoc review of 
objectives in Stockport MBC was undertaken primarily to 
find spending cuts and not to review explicitly the 
objectives of its policies. Any review of objectives 
resulting from the pressure to cut spending came about more 
by default than design.
The findings of cutback management in the four local 
authorities supports Schick's claim that cutback budgeting 
"has not generally been based on assessment of existing 
programs."40 The Principal Administration Officer of Kent 
County Constabulary admitted to "working to a figure rather 
than working to a need". The need to make spending cuts by 
the local authorities became the overriding objective, and 
the review of other competing objectives, such as those of 
service provision, was secondary and even redundant because 
of the pressing need to reduce spending.41 The four local 
authorities reviewed their capital programmes in an attempt 
to minimise the revenue consequences of capital projects. 
These reviews were resource-driven - capital projects were 
being programmed in order to achieve the objective of 
limiting revenue spending. The four local authorities did 
not systematically review and reformulate their objectives 
in times of fiscal stress.
(c) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD EXPLORE A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS 
TO ACHIEVE ITS REFINED OBJECTIVES
39 On the role of these special panels in reviewing 
base budgets see Greenwood (1983) pl58; and Tomkins (1982) 
p25.
40 Schick (1988) p528.
41 See Cope (1987) pp88-101.
308
The degree of option analysis varied widely between the 
four local authorities. In Bedfordshire CC the Chief 
Executive prepared three options to reduce the Council's 
spending. Before making the revenue budget of 1984/85 the 
Council had conducted several cost-cutting exercises - a 
four per cent reduction exercise in 19 7 942; a six per cent 
reduction exercise in 198143; and the 'Getting Down To 
GREA' exercise in 198244. These exercises produced a 
shopping list of spending cuts which was used as a set of 
options by the party groups in making their respective 
budgets.
Knowsley MBC carried out its 'lower expenditure options' 
exercise with the formal aim of making committees and 
departments put forward spending cuts as options, which 
would be later sifted in a corporate way to reflect the 
priorities of the Council. Though the process broke down, 
it yielded at least some options for the Chief Executive 
and the Borough Treasurer in drawing up their cuts package.
In Kent CC the ruling Conservative Group adopted an across- 
the-board approach to making spending cuts, whereby 
committees had to cut their spending by the same 
proportion. It considered three budgetary scenarios 
budgets representing no growth, a one per cent reduction 
and a two per cent reduction from the previous year's 
spending.45 The Conservative Group examined no options on 
how to cut spending between services, though it examined 
and implemented a considerable number of options on how to
42 Bedfordshire CC's Policy And Resources Committee, 
Expenditure Levels For 1979/80 And 1980/81. 17 October 
1979.
43 Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC.
44 Bedfordshire CC's Getting Down To GREA. 1982.
45 This method is a an example of the "'extended' form 
of percentage pool" (Greenwood (1979) pp81-82); or of 
"option percentage planning" (Greenwood (1983) pl53) .
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cut spending within services. Management consultants were 
widely deployed to review its management and organisation. 
School cleaning was contracted-out to private contractors. 
The Social Services Department experimented with and 
pioneered many community care initiatives.46 These moves 
were feasible only if they produced cost savings. The 
rationale for the contracting-out of school cleaning was 
the demonstrated cost savings over direct labour.47 
Likewise, the decision to finance Age Concern-run day 
centres for the elderly had to be justified as a cost 
saving.48 The Social Services Department estimated that Age 
Concern could run day centres at substantially less cost 
than the Council, and calculated that £25,000 could be 
saved.49 The decisions to contract-out school cleaning and 
day centres were facilitated by the existence of the 
Efficiency Fund, from which departments were able to borrow 
money to finance the initial costs of implementing 
decisions that produced longer-term cost savings, and then
46 See Butler, Oldman & Greve (1983) ppl53-154; Cervi
(1990); Challis & Davies (1980); Challis & Davies (1981); 
Challis & Davies (1985); Challis & Davies (1986) ; 
Chesterman (1988); Davies (1980); Davies, Bebbington & 
Charnley (1990) pp328-330; Davies & Challis (1980); Davies 
Sc Challis (1986) ; Forsyth (1981) plO; Grugeon (1981) ; and 
Kemp (1987).
47 Chairman, Education Committee, Kent CC; Chairman, 
Fire and Public Protection Committee, Kent CC; County 
Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, Kent CC; Deputy 
Leader, Labour Group, Kent CC; and Regional Organiser, 
General, Municipal. Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union.
48 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC; 
Development Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC; 
and County Organiser, Age Concern Kent.
49 The Assistant Director of Social Services predicted 
this saving was unlikely to materialise because the 
calculation was based on Age Concern taking over all 
existing day centres, whereas in fact Age Concern embarked 
upon a pilot project involving only several day centres.
310
repay the 'loan' over a period of five years.50 The 
Efficiency Fund enhanced the number of options available to 
the Council in making spending cuts because the 'payback' 
time period was significantly extended - options which 
yielded longer-term savings could be examined as well as 
those which produced immediate savings.51 This fund widened 
substantially the scope of choice of the local authority.
In Stockport MBC the ruling Conservative Group adopted a 
variant of the across-the-board approach seen in Kent CC. 
Each committee had to prepare a standstill budget which was 
then scrutinised at its margins by the triumvirate of the 
Leader of the Conservative Group, the Chief Executive and 
the Director of Finance.
The number and type of options canvassed by the four local 
authorities were dependent on two factors. First, the 
options tended to be put forward by officers - budget 
options on how spending should be cut were prepared by the 
chief executive and treasurer; and policy options on where 
spending should be cut were prepared by professionals in 
service departments. Second, all four local authorities 
wanted to limit and even reduce their spending. As a result 
the options suggested by officers had to fit into this 
prevailing political objective. The budgetary and policy 
options considered were restricted to those that 
complemented this objective. Policy objectives were 
generally subsumed under the imperative to limit 
spending.52 In general, officers needed to frame their
50 For example, the redundancy payments made to the 
school cleaners employed by the Council were financed from 
this Efficiency Fund.
51 See Behn (1978a) pp406-407.
52 The major exception is when local authorities are 
forced by law to provide a new service - the statutorily- 
defined objective of a new policy then overrides the 
objective to limit spending, eg. the legal requirement 
under the provisions of the Local Government, Planning and
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advice within the political preferences of the ruling party 
group.53
There were limits to the range and type of options explored 
by the four local authorities in cutting spending. The 
limitations were imposed internally and externally upon the 
local authorities.54 Rose and Page calculated "53 per cent 
of revenue and 83 per cent of local authority expenditure 
is principally determined by external forces - central 
government, national market trends and international 
economic forces."55 Danziger stated the "impact on the 
budget of inflation and of nationally determined wages and 
salary scales were relatively uncontrollable for local 
budgeters."56 Central government imposes spending controls 
upon local authorities, allocates grants to local 
authorities, makes laws affecting local authorities, sets 
many standards of service provision and controls interest 
rates. As a result of these external constraints Honey 
believed a local authority "has little room for 
manoeuvre."57 Though Stewart questioned this view he 
recognised this "myth of statutory constraint is a powerful
Land Act 1980 to publish annual reports must be satisfied 
(at least in a minimalist sense) regardless of the cost of 
complying with this requirement.
53 In Bedfordshire CC, however, the Chief Executive 
observed that officers were not always aware of the 
preferences of the party groups, and therefore preferred to 
suggest options for deliberation rather than as 
recommendations for decision. This sensitive advice was 
less likely to offend any of the party groups represented 
on the 'hung' Council.
54 See Cope (1987) p92; Danziger (1978b) ppl48-149,
210-211; Greenwood (1983) pl60; Hogwood (1987) pl58; Newton 
(1980) pi85; and Stewart (1983) ppl43-211.
55 Rose & Page (1982a) p2. See also Rosenberg (1985b)
pl57.
56 Danziger (1978b) p210.
57 Honey (1979) p27. See also Stephen (1993).
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influence in many local authorities."58 Nonetheless, his 
argument still recognises that many limits on the options 
considered by local authorities are in fact determined by 
themselves. This self-inflicted limitation of examining 
options to cut spending may often be perpetuated by certain 
vested interests in the local authority. Professionals in 
service departments and councillors serving on service 
committees press the argument that there is little scope 
for finding spending cuts in their budgets because of these 
perceived external constraints, and therefore their budgets 
should be immune from any rounds of spending cuts. For 
example, in Kent CC the County Fire Officer argued more 
spending was needed to comply with the minimum standards of 
fire service provision laid down by the Home Office. This 
claim reinforced the belief of the Chairman of the Fire and 
Public Protection Committee that there were "very little 
margins" for cutting fire service spending, and 
consequently more spending cuts fell on the trading 
standards service. The perpetuation of the belief that much 
of a budget is uncontrollable is often advantageous to 
certain interests represented in a local authority. A final 
example of a constraint imposed upon local authorities in 
examining options to cut spending are their existing 
policies. Like many local authorities Bedfordshire CC 
operated a 'no redundancy policy7 which, in effect, 
restricted the options open to the local authority on what 
spending can be cut.59 The Council was unable, for example, 
to explore the option of contracting-out its services. 
Thus, other competing objectives pursued by a local 
authority restricts the range and type of options that can 
be considered in the pursuit of the objective to reduce 
spending.
58 Stewart (1983) pl46.
59 County Personnel Officer, Bedfordshire CC; and 
Convenor, Bedfordshire Joint Public Service Union 
Committee.
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Greenwood believed that in times of sustained fiscal
squeeze a local authority examines an increasing range of
options to cut spending, and that this examination forces
a review of the objectives and priorities of a local
authority. He argued:60
"In the early years of restraint the relative 
suddenness of the fiscal problem had taken 
authorities by surprise and forced them to adopt 
procedures that failed to discriminate between 
services. The need for quicker decisions, coupled 
with the absence of a managerial framework geared 
to the allocation of fewer resources, warranted 
the application of relatively crude and 
undifferentiated cuts 'across the board7.... But 
there were signs in 1976 that sustained fiscal 
pressure could not be dealt with by persistent 
failures to define priorities between services. 
Members and officers were beginning to criticize 
crude percentage cuts and make the case for 
setting priorities."
This move away from crude percentage cuts was not seen in
the four local authorities. Kent CC, Knowsley MBC and
Stockport MBC relied on across-the-board percentage cuts as
ways of reducing their spending though there was fine-
tuning made to these cuts towards the end of the budget
process.61 Even in Bedfordshire CC there was no attempt to
prioritise objectives corporately as a way of examining
options to cut spending. Priority setting was largely
confined to the service departments, and was a departmental
not a corporate process. Knowsley MBC attempted to set
priorities in its Policy Planning and Budgeting Process,
60 Greenwood (1983) pl61. See also Greenwood (1979) 
pp84-92; and Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1976) 
pp45-54.
61 The Conservative Group of Kent CC on changing its 
leadership abandoned this across-the-board approach for a 
more targeted approach in making spending cuts in 
subsequent years. The across-the-board approach, according 
to the Chairman of the Development and Transportation 
Committee, guaranteed an "equity of agony" between 
committees. But, in the words of the Chairman of the Social 
Services Committee, it only carried on the "mistakes made * 
in history". As the new Leader of the Conservative Group 
maintained, this across-the-board approach is only fair if 
the base is correct in the beginning.
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but its attempt failed largely because of departmental 
resistance. Greenwood's assertion that the range of option 
analysis was widened because of the increasing prevalence 
of priority setting was seen only in isolated pockets of 
the four local authorities. Generally option analysis was 
limited.
(d) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD EXAMINE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS 
CUTBACK OPTIONS
According to Haynes the rationalist ' model of decision­
making "requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of 
the consequences that will follow on each choice."62 The 
consequences of the limited range of options were assessed 
by the four local authorities. Professionals in service 
departments analysed the service consequences of the 
options to cut spending. They were generally concerned to 
protect existing levels of service provision. This concern 
explains why the Borough Education Officer of Knowsley MBC 
resisted attempts to cut education spending. The finance 
departments scrutinised the financial consequences of the 
options. They were generally concerned that the options 
proffered by the service departments yielded the required 
cost savings. They scanned the spending estimates prepared 
by the service departments to ensure they were not padded. 
But, as the Borough Treasurer of Knowsley MBC acknowledged, 
the finance department is often very dependent on 
information provided by service departments and therefore 
not always able to question their spending bids. The 
councillors considered the political consequences of the 
options. They were generally concerned to protect and 
indeed enhance their support. For example, the Liberal 
Group of Bedfordshire CC scrutinised the Conservative 
package of spending cuts and weeded out those cuts it 
believed would damage the electoral fortunes of the Liberal
62 Haynes (1980) p73.
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Party. The trade unions examined the personnel consequences 
of the options. They were concerned to protect the pay and 
conditions of employment of their members. For example, the 
National Union of Public Employees resisted successfully an 
option canvassed by Stockport MBC to reduce the school 
caretaking and cleaning budget because it threatened the 
pay and conditions of its members.
The feasibility of options was analysed by these key actors 
on the budgetary stage. However, the feasibility tests were 
disjointed exercises - actors were left to analyse the 
consequences of the options to cut spending from their own 
partisan standpoints. Only the consequences that affected 
these vested interests were examined. The examination of 
other consequences was largely ignored. Despite the rituals 
of corporate management displayed in local authorities, 
such as Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC, there was very 
little corporate analysis of the consequences of the 
options to reduce spending.63
(e) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD IMPLEMENT THE PACKAGE OF CUTS 
WHICH MINIMISES THE HARMFUL EFFECTS AND MAXIMISES THE 
BENEFICIAL EFFECTS UPON ITS OBJECTIVES
Under the rationalist model of decision-making the 
decision-maker implements the decision that best achieves 
the desired objectives. Following Pfiffner, this 
rationalist model assumes that "human beings respond to 
situations in such a manner as to maximize their own self- 
interests."64 The problem of testing this rationalist trait 
is that there is no objective way of concluding that the
63 The Bains Committee noted committee estimates "are 
cut all round . . ., with no attempt made to evaluate the 
relative consequences of cuts in the different services 
which those estimates represent" (Department Of The 
Environment (1972) pl3) .
64 Pfiffner (1960) pl30.
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decision made was, in fact, the best decision. The best 
decision is the one that achieves the desired objectives, 
but a decision-maker often pursues competing and 
conflicting objectives. The four local authorities wanted 
both to reduce their rate bills and thus reduce spending, 
and to provide services and thus increase spending.65 Their 
budget decisions could not decrease and increase spending 
at the same time. Thus the criteria used to decide how much 
to spend reflected the different but subjective values 
attached to these conflicting aims.
Though there is no objective test there are subjective 
tests of the 'best7 decision. The 'best' decision for each 
local authority is the one which most satisfies its 
preferred mix of goals. If more than one goal is being 
pursued Dahl and Lindblom argued that "an action is 
rational to the extent that it is correctly designed to 
maximize net goal achievement."66 However, each local 
authority is not a single decision-maker. There are many 
decision-makers both inside and outside the local 
authority, eg professionals, local politicians, trade 
unionists, national politicians, and civil servants. These 
actors possess their own interests and pursue their own 
goals. As a result there are competing rationalities in the 
making of spending cuts in a local authority.67
For example, Kent CC slashed its grant contributions given 
to district councils to promote provision of warden schemes 
in sheltered housing. In 1957 the then Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government issued a circular to encourage county
65 This dilemma confronts all budget-makers in local 
government despite the limited scope provided by additional 
grant-funding, creative accounting and 'efficiency savings' 
to mask it.
66 Dahl & Lindblom (1976) p38.
67 See Glennerster (1980a); Glennerster (1981); and 
Kelly (1989) p208.
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councils to finance such warden schemes.68 This provision 
has long been regarded by central government as part of its 
community care policy. In 1963 the county and district 
councils in Kent entered into an agreement which outlined 
the scheme and conditions of this grant funding.69 This 
agreement reflected the prevailing conventional wisdom by 
recognising that the provision of sheltered homes for the 
elderly is more than a housing function (a district council 
responsibility), but is also a social services function (a 
county council responsibility).70 In 1983 this joint 
approach towards community care was formally reaffirmed by 
Kent CC and the district councils in a joint report.71
Kent CC terminated its grant funding to the district 
councils for warden schemes in sheltered housing. This 
spending cut of £435,000 appealed to the ruling 
Conservative Group because it was a sizeable and an easy 
cut to make.72 The spending cut was, in effect, exported to 
the 14 district councils - they had to decide whether to 
make good the lost grant or to run down their warden 
services in sheltered housing.73 When the withdrawal of the
68 Ministry Of Housing And Local Government (1957).
69 See Kent CC's Accommodation And Care Of Old Persons.
1963 .
70 See Age Concern England (1980) pp39-40; and Lauerman
(1982) p50. The Audit Commission for Local Authorities in 
England and Wales questioned the usefulness of sheltered 
housing, and advised social services departments to 
consider "the overall budgetary implications" before 
embarking on such ventures ((1985b) p41).
71 Joint Working Group On Services For Elderly People 
And Their Families, Working Together: A New Deal For Older * 
People In Kent. 1983.
72 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC.
73 Wolman and Peterson predicted that in making 
spending cuts governments "will attempt to shift 
expenditure burdens to other levels of government"((1980) 
p77) . See also Glennerster (1980a) p375; Glennerster (1981) 
pi86; Jordan (1987) pi6; Jorgensen (1987a) pl99; Jorgensen
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grant contributions was announced Kent CC faced a hostile
reaction from the district councils. Two district councils,
Thanet DC and Ashford BC, threatened legal action to
reverse the decision. The Chairman of the Social Services
Committee consulted with the district councils before the
announcement to withdraw grant funding. He believed that
the district councils, who were "fairly flush" with money
from the sale of council houses, could easily take over the
warden services but though "privately no sweat" they
"publicly will have to make noise". Like Kent CC, all
district councils, except Maidstone BC, were Conservative-
controlled. The close party links between the county and
district councils diluted the reaction of the district
councils to little more than "sabre-rattling".74 The Policy
Officer of the Social Services Department confirmed that
there were some "political deals behind the scenes". On the
decision by Thanet DC not to take legal action, its
Director of Planning and Housing wrote:75
"... once the matter started to become a 
political issue there was a meeting called by the 
leader of the Kent County Council with leaders of 
all the District Councils in Kent . . . and it 
would appear . . . that a consensus view was 
arrived at which was that the Local Authorities 
involved would not seek to take action against 
each other."
The officers inside the Social Services Department were 
more alarmed at the withdrawal of grant funding for warden 
services than the Conservative Group of Kent CC. The Social 
Services Department was concerned this spending cut would 
alienate the district councils at the time joint action was
(1987b) p22; Levine, Rubin & Wolohojian (1981b) pl90; 
Pinkham & Platt (1980) pp21-22; and Wolman & Davis (1980) 
ppl7, 52-53.
74 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC.
75 Taken from a letter dated 19 August 1985.
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being urged by both the county and district councils.76 It 
was worried it would lose influence over sheltered housing 
placements because the grants that were given to the 
district councils were used as "leverage" in the 
discussions on placements.77 Also, the Department was 
concerned that sheltered housing service for the elderly 
would be run down, and that district councils would "dump 
them onto social services".78 Indeed, several district 
councils threatened to withdraw travelling warden schemes 
because they could no longer be afforded. The Social 
Services Department believed that with fewer sheltered 
housing placements provided by district councils there 
would be increased demand for the Department to provide 
more expensive residential care for the elderly.79
The district councils responded in two ways to the 
withdrawal of county council monies for the provision of 
warden services in sheltered housing. First, in the short 
term all district councils continued to provide the warden 
schemes, despite threats to withdraw them.80 The district
76 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC. The 
Director of Planning and Housing of Thanet DC believed this 
loss of grant funding would have a "quite catastrophic" 
effect on county-district relations, and cited an example 
where his Council refused to cooperate with the county 
council on another scheme because of Kent CC's "bad faith 
shown on the warden support" (taken from a letter dated 12 
April 1985).
77 Policy Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC.
78 Policy Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC.
79 The Audit Commission for Local Authorities in 
England and Wales questioned this belief when it noted that 
many elderly in sheltered housing do not need residential 
care ((1985b) p41).
80 Chief Health and Housing Officer, Shepway DC. Three 
district councils threatened to withdraw provision of 
warden services - Ashford BC, Dover DC, and Thanet DC. 
Another three district councils had never developed these 
warden services in the first place - Swale BC, Tonbridge 
and Mailing BC, and Tunbridge Wells BC.
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councils stepped in to provide such schemes by financing 
them from their housing revenue accounts. Furthermore, many 
tenants of sheltered homes receive housing benefit, and 
therefore any increased rents set by the district councils 
to offset the lost grant monies would not directly fall on 
these elderly persons but on central government.81 Second, 
in the longer-term several district councils, such as 
Shepway DC and Sevenoaks DC, developed centralised call 
alarm systems for the elderly to replace travelling 
wardens.82
This example demonstrates the competing rationalities of 
the interested parties in the making and implementation of 
the decision by Kent CC to terminate its subsidy for the 
provision of warden schemes in sheltered housing. These 
competing rationalities are summarised in the table below.
Table 6.1; Competing Rationalities of the Decision to 
Cut Spending on Warden Schemes in Sheltered 
Housing
Actor
Conservative Group, 
Kent CC
Social Services 
Department, Kent CC
District Councils
Obiective/interest 
Reduce Spending
Provide Services
Maintain Grant Funding
Department of Health Promote Community Care
Verdict on 
decision
Good
Bad
Bad
Bad
81 This example illustrates the ways in which local 
authorities attempt to shift expenditure burdens onto other 
bodies. The spending cut announced by Kent CC was in effect 
exported to the district councils, which in turn partially 
exported it to the Department of Health and Social Security 
(now the Department of Social Security).
82 Chief Health and Housing Officer, Shepway DC. See 
Butler, Oldman & Greve (1983) ppl54-155.
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Department of Social 
Security
Department of the 
Environment
Audit Commission
Administer Social Security 
Benefits
Reduce Local Government 
Spending
Promote Value-For-Money 
In Local Government
Bad
Good
Good
Age Concern Improve Welfare Of Elderly Bad
From this table the ruling Conservative Group of Kent CC 
wanted to reduce spending, and therefore terminating these 
grants to the district councils was a means to this end. 
The spending cut hit a "relatively soft target".83 The 
Social Services Department was concerned about the effects 
of this spending cut upon services for the elderly, and 
believed the Conservative councillors had "shut their eyes 
to the consequences".84 The district councils wanted to 
maintain grant funding but their opposition was muted 
because of a financial cushion and their close political 
links with the county council. They responded generally by 
either continuing the travelling warden service or 
replacing this service with new technology. Central 
government promoted a policy of community care on one hand, 
and a policy of curbing government spending on the other 
hand. The Audit Commission was established to promote 
value-for-money in local government. Though it would be 
perhaps concerned about its effects upon the effectiveness 
of services for the elderly, it would welcome the 
opportunity taken by some innovative district councils to 
develop a cheaper and effective alternative to travelling 
warden schemes. Age Concern is interested to promote the 
interests of the elderly, and would possibly regret the 
decision to cut grant funding because of the consequent
83 Borough Housing Officer, Gravesham BC.
84 Policy Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC.
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threat to the travelling warden service in Kent and to the 
prospects of joint action between the county and district 
councils in caring for the elderly.
Whether the decision by Kent CC to withdraw funding from
the provision of sheltered housing minimised the harmful
effects and maximised the beneficial effects upon
objectives depends on "whose side we are on."85 Different
actors have different interests and pursue different
objectives, and therefore make different judgements on the
rationality of a decision. Whether a decision minimises the
harmful effects and maximises the beneficial effects upon
objectives depends on where the decision-maker stands. The
Chief Executive of Kent CC commented:86
"The constant drive for efficiency is again 
reflected by a reduction in staff numbers during 
the year, this time by over 2,000 staff. This 
means that in the last five years the Council has 
shed over five thousand posts, or over 10% of its 
total workforce. While it has not been possible 
to make all of these savings without affecting 
some services and staff, few can doubt that there 
has been a very real improvement in productivity 
and efficiency during this period...."
His comments must be doubted because the 2,000 staff shed
were largely the school cleaners made redundant by the
Council's decision to contract-out school cleaning. As
argued in the previous chapter, assessment of the
consequences varied considerably depending on the interests
of the actors involved in the decision to privatise school
cleaning. The rationalist trait that local authorities
evaluate the consequences of spending cuts before and after
cutting spending raises critical political questions of
whose harm, whose benefit and whose objectives are being
considered.
85 Becker (1967) p239.
86 Taken from Kent CC's Annual Report 1984-85. 1985,
p3.
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(f) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD PLAN ITS FUTURE RESOURCE 
LEVELS, SERVICE DEMANDS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES
A local authority in making spending cuts would place its 
decisions within a planned framework of future resource 
levels, service demands and policy objectives. Stewart 
wrote:87
"The case for comprehensive planning in 
government is easily made. It rests upon the 
interrelationships between the problems, issues 
and needs confronted by government and upon the 
interrelationship between the activities 
undertaken by government.... The case for 
comprehensive planning is only frustrated by its 
impossibility. No planning process can encompass 
all the interrelationships."
This rationalist trait of building the future into the
decision made enhances the degree of comprehensiveness
achieved in the decision-making process.
In the four local authorities, however, there was little 
rationalist planning incorporated into budget-making. They 
encountered grave obstacles in planning their capital 
programmes, and even graver obstacles in planning their 
revenue budgets. Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC and Knowsley MBC 
made annual budgets, and decisions to cut spending were 
made for only one year in advance. The Chief Executive of 
Bedfordshire CC remarked that budget planning had become 
"distinctly more difficult".88 Only Stockport MBC regularly 
forecasted its spending. Each year it produced a one-year 
budget incorporating the policy changes made to the 
previous year's budget, and then projected this budget
87 Stewart (1977a) pl63. See also Booth (1988) p4; 
Department Of The Environment (1972); Eddison (1975); Self 
(1974); Skitt (1975); Stewart (1971) pp64-68; and Stewart 
(1974) pp9-71.
88 These difficulties in planning were echoed by the 
Education Spokesman of the Liberal Group. The Council 
attempted to plan its budget in the 'Getting Down To GREA' 
exercise but never implemented the plan because of the 
vagaries of planning, notably the 'hung' nature of the 
Council and repeated changes of central government policy.
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forward for a further two years taking into account 
changing demands upon existing services. This projection 
was adjusted for neither inflation nor future policy 
changes. It was a projection of how much existing policies 
of the Council would cost in the future at current prices.
The main obstacle experienced by local authorities in 
planning their spending was uncertainty created by central 
government. Central government announced grant settlements, 
expenditure targets and block allocations of local 
authorities for one year in advance only, which restricted 
effective policy planning. Financial uncertainty breeds 
policy uncertainty because there is no guarantee that 
existing policies, never mind new policies, can be financed 
in the future. Policy planning by local authorities became 
almost a redundant exercise. For example, the County 
Architect of Bedfordshire CC believed that its repairs and 
maintenance programme was made on an "annual crisis basis", 
and that there was only "planned neglect". Knowsley MBC 
embarked on a 'service developments' exercise as part of 
its Policy Planning and Budgetary Process, but soon 
disbanded this exercise when it was unable to adapt to the 
climate of financial restraint.
In general the four local authorities engaged in only 
short-term planning. They planned spending cuts for only 
one year in advance. This absence of longer-term planning 
is mirrored in other studies of local authority 
budgeting.89 The Audit Commission observed "few local 
authorities plan more than twelve months ahead at least so
89 See Adams (1986) ; Audit Commission For Local 
Authorities In England And Wales (1984g); Audit Commission 
For Local Authorities In England and Wales (1985a); Clapham 
(1983) pp29-30; Cope (1987); Elcock (1991) ppll7-119;
Elcock & Jordan (1987); Hepworth (1984) pp211-214; 
Midwinter (1988) p27; National Audit Office (1985) pp22-24; 
Pendlebury (1985) pp25-26; Personal Social Services Council 
(1979) pi; and Pinkham & Platt (1980) p22.
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far as current expenditure is concerned."90 However, a
discordant note was sounded by Greenwood who argued:91
"There is some evidence, therefore, that despite 
the absence in most authorities of a fiscal 
forecast local authorities were stretching their 
financial horizons beyond the traditional budget.
The annual budget may have retained its central 
(and legally enshrined) place within the resource 
allocation process but it was increasingly set 
within a forecast, however imperfect, of where 
the trend of expenditure was moving."
Only Stockport MBC approximated this observation of local
authorities increasingly forecasting their future spending
commitments. In the other three local authorities spending
was not forecasted beyond the traditional one-year horizon.
There was, however, a widespread assumption fuelled by 
noises from central government that resources available to 
local authorities were going to be further squeezed. As a 
result local authorities were reluctant to embark upon 
spending in the immediate year which committed them to 
heavy spending in future years. The four local authorities 
reviewed their capital programmes to minimise future 
revenue consequences of completed capital projects. Local 
authorities, therefore, avoided making decisions with 
longer-term financial implications. This assumption about 
the level of future resource availability in no way 
constitutes planning as Greenwood observed in his study of 
local authority budgeting. These four local authorities 
engaged in only short-term planning - that is, one-year 
planning of resource levels, service demands and policy 
objectives.
(g) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD SET UP CENTRALISED REVIEWS TO
90 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1984g) p9.
91 Greenwood (1983) pl57. Hepworth noted "there is an 
increasing emphasis on longer-term budgets" ((1984) p209). 
See also Webb & Wistow (1983).
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FORMULATE, COORDINATE AND OVERSEE ITS CUTBACK MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY
Under the rationalist model the local authority would
centralise budget-making in order to achieve a coherent set
of goals to be pursued and to make decisions which best
achieve those goals. In the words of Behn:92
"Retrenchment necessarily centralizes decision­
making. ... For retrenchment, ... allocating 
resources involves cuts, and the various 
organizational components cannot be expected to 
volunteer them. A central decision-making 
authority must both develop the alternatives and 
choose between them.... Thus, retrenchment 
necessitates not only centralized decision-making 
but also centralized leadership.1
The centre needs the analytical capacity to set objectives, 
determine priorities, collect information, consider 
options, make decisions and review policies if 
organisational rationality is to be achieved. Analysis, 
according to this rationalist trait, is centralised, 
corporate and strategic. In 1972 the Bains Committee, 
proclaiming the virtues of corporate management, urged 
local authorities "to adopt a corporate approach to their 
affairs in order to ensure that their resources are most 
effectively deployed."93 Similarly, Greenwood, Hinings, 
Ranson and Walsh argued that with corporate planning, 
"departments are allocated cuts based upon the results of 
strategic and issue analysis. . . . "94
In the context of central-local government relations the 
Widdicombe Committee believed retrenchment "can only be
92 Behn (1980) p619. See also Aucoin (1991) pl21; and 
Behn (1983) pp318-322.
93 Department Of The Environment (1972) pxv.
94 Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1980) p39.
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achieved by a drawing in of power to the centre."95 This 
centralisation of power has been widely observed in local 
authority budgeting in times of fiscal stress. In the 
United States local governments faced "marked pressures to 
centralize in order to carry out retrenchment."96 In 
Britain Elcock concluded that "budgeting is usually 
controlled by small numbers of leading politicians and 
senior officers."97
There are two significant elements in the formulation and 
coordination of a cutback management strategy - the making 
and implementation of the strategy. The making of the 
strategy involved questions of how much and how to cut 
spending; and its implementation involved questions of 
where to cut spending. The making of the cutback management 
strategy was more centralised than its implementation in 
the four local authorities. The political and 
administrative leadership of the local authorities, the 
centre, was more concerned in making the cutback management 
strategy; and committees and departments, the periphery, 
were more involved in its implementation.
In Kent CC the centre adopted an across-the-board strategy 
of making spending cuts, and the periphery was required to 
identify the required amount of spending reductions. In 
Stockport MBC the centre imposed a standstill budget upon 
the periphery, but also vetted the detailed budget changes 
made by the periphery. In Knowsley MBC the centre 
formulated a general strategy but was unable to implement 
it because of resistance from the periphery, and as a
95 Committee Of Inquiry Into The Conduct Of Local 
Authority Business (1986) p54.
96 Levine, Rubin & Wolohojian (1981b) p201. See also 
Glassberg (1978) p328; Levine, Rubin & Wolohojian (1981a).
97 Elcock (1987a) p255. See also Clapham (1983); Elcock
(1991) pl26; Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989); Greenwood
(1983); and Pendlebury (1985) pp28-29.
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result the centre intervened and more or less imposed 
spending cuts upon the periphery. In Bedfordshire CC there 
was no centre because the Council was 'hung'. There were 
several strategies formulated by the party groups - the 
Conservative Group preferred giving the periphery general 
guidelines within which it was to make spending cuts; and 
the Liberal Group intervened in the implementation of this 
strategy and modified where the spending cuts fell. The 
administrative centre played only a cameo role in 
formulating the cutback management strategy. On the capital 
side, the making of the capital programmes was centralised 
in all four local authorities.
Overall, the centre was more involved in the formulation of 
a cutback management strategy; and the periphery more 
involved in the detailed application of the general 
strategy. However, this generalised observation needs to be 
qualified on two counts. First, the centre influences and 
sometimes intervenes in determining the application of the 
cutback management strategy. In Knowsley MBC and Stockport 
MBC the centre intervened in decisions where spending cuts 
fell. Second, the periphery influences and sometimes 
resists the budget strategy drawn up by the centre. In 
Knowsley MBC the periphery resisted implementing the 
strategy formulated by the centre, which resulted in the 
collapse of the budget strategy. In Kent CC the Education 
and Police Committees faced difficulties in implementing 
the budget strategy, and as a result the centre modified 
the strategy to overcome these difficulties. The extent of 
centralisation involved in making the cutback management 
strategy not only varies between local authorities but also 
varies between the stages of making the strategy.
(h) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD RELY ON EXPERT ADVICE IN MAKING 
AND IMPLEMENTING ITS PACKAGE OF CUTS
The rationalist model of decision-making posits that
32.9
decisions are made in an analytical and comprehensive 
manner. Experts possess knowledge and experience which 
decision-makers require to make decisions in this 
rationalist way. They give both analysis and 
comprehensiveness to the decision-maker. The rationalist 
model of decision-making is very dependent upon 
expertise.98
The making of spending cuts in the four local authorities 
shows the prominent role of 'experts7 in deciding how and 
where to cut spending. The types of expertise used in the 
four local authorities were threefold. First, there is 
professional expertise based on knowledge of service 
provision. Professionals in service departments influenced 
decisions where to cut spending. Most of the decisions to 
reduce spending emanated from senior officers in service 
departments. Second, there is financial expertise based on 
knowledge of the complexities of local authority finance. 
The role of finance officers, and the finance department in 
particular, was central in making spending cuts. Finance 
departments reviewed the base budgets of the service
departments, translated political preferences into
budgetary strategies, suggested other ways of financing to 
avoid making spending cuts, and monitored the
implementation of revenue budgets and capital programmes.
The resource squeeze in local government greatly enhanced 
the power of finance professionals, and local authorities 
are increasingly reliant upon their financial expertise.99
98 Greenaway, Smith and Street noted the rationalist 
decision-maker "will tend to hold the expert in high 
esteem; the professional will be at a premium over the 
layperson" ( (1992) p20).
99 See Aucoin (1991) pl22; Barclay (1985); Chartered * 
Institute Of Public Finance And Accountancy (1992) ppl44- 
150; Clarke & Cochrane (1989); Cook (1993) pp25-27;
Danziger (1978b) ppl92-196; Elcock (1986b) ppl80-192;
Elcock & Jordan (1987); Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) 
ppl81-182; Humphrey & Scapens (1992); Parkinson (1985b) 
pp79-105; Rosenberg (1984); Rosenberg (1985b); Rosenberg
3.3.0
Third, there is managerial expertise based on knowledge of 
the administration of local authorities. Managers in 
service and central departments of local authorities were 
used extensively to identify cost savings. In Kent CC 
management consultants were widely commissioned to 
recommend cost savings. On the use of management 
consultants generally the Labour Research Department 
observed:100
"Management consultants are generally brought in 
for a number of reasons. At best they can provide 
some specialist technical information that the 
company may lack.... However, they are more 
likely to be asked to find ways of cutting costs 
and raising productivity."
Management experts, both local authority managers and
management consultants, often suggested the restructuring
of the organisation and management of local authorities -
their intention was invariably to find different but
cheaper ways of providing services. Overall, local
authorities were very dependent upon the professional,
financial and managerial expertise possessed by their
officers in the making of spending cuts.101
Though experts were very influential in making spending 
cuts in the four local authorities they were not
(1989); Rosenberg & Tomkins (1983); Rosenberg, Tomkins & 
Day (1982); Terry (1986); Tomkins (1982) p58; and Travers 
(1985b).
100 Labour Research Department (1988) p7. See also
Arthur Young (1987) ppl55-158; Aucoin (1991) ppl24-126;
Behn (1978a) pp402-403; Cope (1992) pp51-52; Henkel (1991) 
pp70-91; Herchert (1983); Kline (1983-4) pp97-98; Odling
(1984) ; Pattenaude (1979); and Transport And General 
Workers Union (1983).
101 The Audit Commission observed the "need for rapid 
decisions on what to cut from capital programmes means that 
members are forced to rely on their officers' judgement to 
an unhealthy extent" ((1985a) pp39-40). Similarly, Tomkins 
agreed with the view that councillors rely on officer 
advice in deciding where to cut spending but noted 
Conservative councillors tend to accept officer advice more 
readily than Labour councillors ((1982) pp57-58).
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omnipotent. In the words of Self:102
"Politicians are the ultimate controllers of 
administrative systems.... Control in this sense 
does not mean simply (or primarily) making sure 
that policies which have been made are faithfully 
executed. It has also the converse meaning of so 
holding the reins of office that the decisions of 
administration can always (if necessary) be over­
ruled or amended. It means also establishing an 
atmosphere in which administrators will 
continually be aware of political guidelines and 
constraints."
The many experts involved in making spending cuts were 
generally operating within guidelines laid down by local 
politicians. For example, the Director of Leisure Services 
of Knowsley MBC realised there was little gain in 
recommending the privatisation of leisure services to the 
ruling Labour Group because it was not politically
acceptable. The recommendations of experts needed to be 
politically feasible if they were to be acceptable to the 
controlling politicians. In Bedfordshire CC expert advice 
was rejected because it was not politically feasible when 
the County Treasurer cautioned the Liberal Group over its 
plans to use balances to avoid increasing the Council's 
precept. The County Treasurer was, in the words of the 
Deputy Leader of the Liberal Group, "semi-obstructive". His 
advice was rejected because of the Liberal Group's
commitment to hold down the precept. Experts were generally 
conditioned by the prevailing political climate to give 
politically feasible advice.
Expert advice is often conflicting. Experts operate in a 
competitive arena seeking political sanction for their 
proposals. Politicians often mediate between experts in 
conflict. In making spending cuts there are conflicts 
between professionals between and within departments -
service professionals, finance officers and managers have
102 Self (1977) pl61.
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competing interests and make competing demands.103 In 
Knowsley MBC there was the perennial conflict between the 
service departments (especially the Education Department) 
which wanted to spend more money on services and the 
central departments which wanted to trim their spending 
plans. The ruling Labour Group was forced to intervene in 
this dispute, and eventually sided with the 'trimmers' 
against the 'spenders'. In Stockport MBC the political 
leadership, assisted by the Chief Executive and the 
Director of Finance, intervened to adjudicate between the 
spending claims of the service departments.
In general, the four local authorities extensively deployed 
expert advice but this advice was shaped by the political 
environment. Experts had considerable influence within the 
general guidelines and constraints laid down by local 
politicians.
RATIONALIST THEORY OF CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
The rationalist model of decision-making is founded upon 
analysis and comprehensiveness. A series of eight 
rationalist traits of cutback management was deduced from 
this rationalist model, and then applied to the way in 
which the four local authorities made spending cuts.
The first rationalist trait suggests local authorities 
analyse the effects of their budgets upon their policies 
and plans. All four local authorities assessed how much 
money they had to spend before deciding how much they 
needed or wanted to spend on providing services. There was 
very little analysis of the impact upon service provision
103 See Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pp79-86; and 
Kingdom (1991) ppl37-154.
of their budgets. Analysis in the four local authorities 
was more financial than policy analysis. The second trait 
posits that local authorities review their objectives 
because of the financial squeeze. The four local 
authorities failed largely to review their objectives, and 
were concerned primarily to control their spending. The 
third trait assumes local authorities canvas systematically 
all options to achieve their objectives. In the four local 
authorities the analysis of proposed spending cuts was 
confined largely to departments, despite attempts by two 
local authorities to develop corporate analysis of their 
options to cut spending. The fourth trait argues local 
authorities examine the consequences of options to cut 
spending. Though the predicted consequences of spending 
cuts were assessed in the four local authorities, 
assessment was disjointed and partisan rather than 
coordinated and corporate. The fifth trait postulates that 
local authorities implement spending cuts that maximise 
achievement of their objectives. Each of the four local 
authorities comprised many actors possessing different 
interests and pursuing competing goals. Whether spending 
cuts maximised the achievement of objectives depends on the 
goals of the actors. The example of Kent CC's withdrawal of 
grant funding for sheltered housing placements illustrated 
the pursuit of competing and conflicting goals within local 
authorities. The sixth trait cites that local authorities 
plan their policies and resources. There was very little 
planning in the four local authorities. The only planning 
found was the minimal plan to set a budget for one year in 
advance. The seventh trait predicts that local authorities 
conduct centralised reviews to make and implement their 
cutback management strategies. The four local authorities 
generally centralised the making but not the implementation 
of their cutback management strategies. The political and 
administrative leadership within the local authorities was 
dominant in setting, and service committees and departments 
dominant in executing, the cutback management strategy. The
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eighth trait claims local authorities rely on expert advice 
in cutting spending. The four local authorities used 
considerable expert advice, provided that it was 
politically feasible.
Surveying the rationalist traits of cutback management 
suggests that the rationalist model of cutback management 
provides a weak basis on which to understand how local 
authorities make spending cuts. There are only a few 
rationalist traits which predicted how the four local 
authorities cut their spending. Generally there was very 
little analysis and comprehensiveness found in the local 
authorities when they made spending cuts. Wright noted 
"there is some evidence that suggests that local authority 
budgetary processes have become less incremental and more 
economically rational as a response to the restraint of 
public expenditure."104 The experience of cutback 
management in the four local authorities lends very little 
support to this observation, and suggests that the 
rationalist theory of cutback management in local 
government has a bleak future. The rationalist theory of 
cutback management will be tested in more detail in the 
concluding chapter.
104 Wright (1981) p21. See also Greenwood (1979) ;
Greenwood (1983); Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh
(1980); and Kelly (1989) p208.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CUTBACK MANAGEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: AN INCREMENTAL VIEW
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In the previous chapter the rationalist model of cutback 
management was developed and tested in light of the 
empirical findings surveyed in chapters three, four and 
five. The rationalist model of decision-making is one of 
the dominant paradigms within which decision-making is 
often understood. This chapter will explore the other 
dominant decision-making paradigm - namely, the incremental 
model of decision-making. The aim of the chapter is to 
develop and test the incremental model of cutback 
management. In the chapter the incremental model of 
decision-making will be examined to identify a series of 
incremental traits of cutback management. These traits will 
be surveyed to assess the extent to which they were found 
in the four local authorities when they cut spending. This 
survey will be used to develop an incremental theory of 
cutback management in local government.
INCREMENTAL MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING
In response to the limitations of the rationalist model of 
decision-making some writers were reluctant to abandon it, 
and instead offered a refined rationalist model grounded on 
a view of bounded rationality. However, other writers 
rejected outright the rationalist model, and preferred to 
develop other models of decision-making. The most robust of 
these models is the incremental model of decision-making. 
The theory of incrementalism was pioneered by Lindblom in 
the late 1950s, and later refined by Lindblom and other 
writers.1 It is not an easy model to capture, because there
1 See Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970); Dahl & Lindblom 
(1976) pp82-85; Lindblom (1959); Lindblom (1964) ; Lindblom 
(1965); Lindblom (1979); and Lindblom (1988) ppl37-259.
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are "numerous conceptions of incrementalism. 1,2 Berry argued 
that incrementalism "now means so many different things 
that it has lost its utility for academic research.1,3 This 
argument is misplaced, and ignores a rich tradition of 
research carried out within the framework of 
incrementalism.4 Incrementalism is rooted essentially in 
the philosophical and practical objections levelled at the 
rationalist model of decision-making.5 Whereas the 
rationalist model emphasises analysis and 
comprehensiveness, the incremental model stresses 
interaction and selectiveness. The incremental model of 
decision-making does not reject analysis and 
comprehensiveness, but maintains that their applicability 
is severely limited and often redundant.
Lindblom argued the rationalist model "often breaks down in 
its handling of values or objectives."6 This breakdown of 
analysis occurs because the rationalist model rests on the 
falsehood that there are objective criteria by which ends 
can be formulated and means devised to achieve them. 
Following Lindblom, the criteria by which decisions are 
made "have no universal validity other than they were 
agreed upon."7 A decision cannot be made on the basis of
2 Berry (1990) pl93. See also Goodin & Waldner (1979); 
Gregory (1989) pl40; and Jordan (1987) plO.
3 Berry (1990) pl93. See also Weiss & Woodhouse (1992)
p255.
4 For example, Wildavsky has undertaken some very 
influential work on budgeting, using the theory of 
incrementalism - see Davis, Dempster & Wildavsky (1966); 
Heclo Sc Wildavsky (1981) ; Wildavsky (1964) ; Wildavsky 
(1986) ; and Wildavsky (1988).
5 See Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) pll; and Jackson 
(1982b) pl46.
6 Lindblom (1959) p81. See also Ham & Hill (1993) p82; 
Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) pl2; and Simon (1957a) pp45-78.
7 Lindblom (1959) p83.
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objective analysis because this objectivity does not exist. 
The pursuit of objective rationality is a chimera. 
Rationality can only ever be subjective - that is, in the 
minds of those making the judgement. The values held by a 
person are not founded upon any abstract analysis, but are 
instead rooted in the concrete interests of that person. 
Each person holds different values and pursues different 
goals because each person has different interests. 
Therefore, there can be no absolute distinction between the 
ends and means of a decision because there is no objective 
rationality by which they can be distinguished. One 
person's rationality is often another person's 
irrationality.
The formulation of ends and means cannot be undertaken by
analysis alone if there are conflicting values held by
decision-makers. Analysis can be used only if there are
shared values held by decision-makers, without which it is
redundant. In the words of Lindblom:8
"Analytical solutions to policy questions thus 
require a harmony of interests or values among 
individuals and groups in society."
For incrementalists interaction is an alternative to
analysis in making decisions. Lindblom added:9
"As problem-solving and policy-making processes, 
interactions constitute an alternative to 
analysis. In governmental policy making,
political interactions can always replace
analysis and indeed often reach solutions when 
analysis cannot."
Interaction represents an effective way of reconciling 
different objectives, priorities and values of decision­
makers. It can take many forms. Lindblom defined 
interaction as partisan mutual adjustment, which involves 
"the mutual impact of groups upon each other even where
8 Lindblom (1980) pl9. See also Lindblom & Woodhouse 
(1993) pl9.
9 Lindblom (1980) p27. See also Lindblom & Woodhouse 
(1993) ppl5-22.
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they are not in communication."10 Interaction includes not 
only overt forms such as bargaining, but also covert forms 
of interaction such as anticipated reactions. Whenever more 
than one person is involved, which is usually the case, 
interaction is an effective way of securing agreement on 
the decision to be made. Interactive devices of decision­
making are more likely to shift decision-makers to an 
agreed line than analytical devices. Analysis, however, 
cannot be discounted. Decision-makers often use analysis to 
protect their interests. This partisan analysis is often 
used as a tool of persuasion, and thus can be regarded as 
an instrument of interaction.11
Under the rationalist model a decision cannot be made if 
there is no agreement on the ends to be achieved and the 
means to achieve the ends. However, under the incremental 
model there does not have to be agreement on the ends of a 
decision but only agreement on the decision itself. A 
decision can be made without agreement on its ends provided 
there is agreement on the means to achieve the conflicting 
ends. The key test in decision-making "is agreement on 
policy itself, which remains possible even when agreement 
on values is not."12 The incremental model avoids the 
analytical tangles of distinguishing between ends and means 
that bedevil the rationalist model of decision-making.
Incrementalists eschew any rationalist claim that decisions 
are made in a comprehensive manner. Instead, they advocate 
a selective approach to decision-making, recognising that 
there are too many constraints upon a decision-maker to
10 Lindblom (1959) p85. See also Ham & Hill (1993)
pp86-87; and Lindblom (1965) ppl9-84.
11 See Lindblom (1980) ppll-39.
12 Lindblom (1959) p83. See also Booth (1988) pp5-6; 
Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) pll; Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993) 
pp25-26; and Richardson & Jordan (1985) pp22-23.
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adopt a comprehensive approach.13 Lindblom argued decision­
makers "must use simplifying strategies."14 As a 
simplifying strategy analysis is "drastically limited".15 
A decision-maker cannot embark upon an analytical and • 
comprehensive tour of the ends and means of a decision. 
Ends and means are intertwined, and a decision-maker 
"chooses among values and among policies at one and the 
same time."16 A decision-maker ignores deliberately many 
areas of possible analysis because "an exhaustive search 
for the maximum, for the best of all possible policies, 
usually costs more than it is worth."17 Instead, a 
decision-maker selects only those areas for analysis which 
marginally vary from the existing policy. This process of 
decision-making is widely called the process of successive 
limited comparisons, which is the method of continuously 
comparing limited changes to the present position. As a 
result of this simplifying strategy the decision-maker 
makes only marginal adjustments to the existing policy.18
13 Wildavsky stated "time is in short supply, man's 
ability to calculate is limited, and there are few theories 
and no a priori bases that would enable . . . [budget-makers] 
... to predict the consequences of alternative actions" 
((1964) pl46). See also Hirschman & Lindblom (1962) p216.
14 Lindblom (1980) p37. Similarly, Wildavsky believed 
they "take short cuts" ((1964) pl47). See also Davis,
Dempster & Wildavsky (1966) p529; Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) 
ppll, 15-16; Jackson (1982b) ppl48-150; Lindblom &
Woodhouse (1993) pp26-30; Weiss & Woodhouse (1992); and
Wildavsky (1967) pll4.
15 Lindblom (1959) p81. See also Braybrooke & Lindblom 
(1970) pp88-93; and Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993) ppl5-22.
16 Lindblom (1959) p82. See also Braybrooke & Lindblom
(1970) pp93-98.
17 Lindblom (1980) p37.
18 In response to the Dror's criticism that 
incrementalism is inherently conservative Lindblom 
contended that it is possible to have large change through 
a rapid series of small changes - see Dror (1964) ; and
Lindblom (1964). Some academics claimed a defining
characteristic of incrementalism is decision-making that
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Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky argued "this year's budget is 
based on last year's budget, with special attention given 
to a narrow range of increases or decreases."19 In making 
its annual budget a local authority invariably considers 
only marginal changes to its previous year's budget rather 
than reviewing its entire budget each year. This limited 
analysis occurs because a local authority does not have the 
resources, such as staff and time, to appraise its whole 
budget. Also future conditions are likely to remain more or 
less the same as past conditions within which a local 
authority makes a budget, and therefore the previous year's ’ 
budget is likely to work again in future years.20 However, 
without such stability in the budgetary environment this 
simplifying strategy becomes less appropriate as a method 
of decision-making. Generally incrementalists maintain that 
there is a significant degree of stability to allow
produces only marginal change (see Alt (1977) pp86-88;
Burch & Wood (1989) pp27-28; Danziger (1976); Danziger
(1978b) ppl25-146; Dye (1992) pp34-36; Jones (1975); Jordan 
& Richardson (1987) pp224-225; Schulman (1975) pl354; and 
Wanat (1974) pl227). Burch and Wood believed that decision­
making is incremental if "policy makers do not wander far 
from the status quo" ( (1989) p27) . Danziger argued
incrementalism "is basically a theory about change"
((1978b) pl27). The degree of change cannot be used as a 
defining characteristic of incrementalism because it is 
possible that a decision made incrementally can produce 
large change, and a decision made non-incrementally can 
produce small change. Marginal change is not incremental 
change. Weiss and Woodhouse believed "the concept of 
incrementalism can be rescued from its unfortunate 
association with 'small steps'" ((1992) p270; see also
Gregory (1989) ppl44-145; and Lane (1993) p73) . Marginal 
change is only a descriptive trait and not a defining 
characteristic of incrementalism. Incrementalism as a 
theory of decision-making must be defined by the processes 
and not the outputs of decision-making.
19 Davis, Dempster & Wildavsky (1966) pp529-530. See 
also Downs (1967) pp249-251; Greenwood (1983) ppl50-151;
Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) pl6; LeLoup (1978) p509; Niskanen
(1971) p40; Wildavsky (1964) pl5; Wildavsky (1978); and
Wildavsky (1986) pplO-11.
20 See Downs (1967) pp250-251; and Ibrahim & Proctor 
(1992a) ppl4-15.
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decision-makers successfully to adopt this strategy. In the
words of Dahl and Lindblom:21
"Incrementalism is a method of social action that 
takes existing reality as one alternative and 
compares the probable gains and losses of closely 
related alternatives by making relatively small 
adjustments in existing reality, or making larger 
adjustments about whose consequences 
approximately as much is known as about the 
consequences of existing reality, or both."
Another simplifying strategy is deliberately to ignore 
analysing every possible consequence in advance of making 
a decision.22 This selectiveness can be justified on the 
grounds that any adverse consequences will soon become 
apparent when the decision is implemented, and the decision 
can then be modified or even reversed.23 This strategy runs 
the risk that any adverse effects of a decision may not be 
ameliorated, and that a decision may not be reversed. 
However, incrementalists argue that this risk is minimal 
because the decision is only a marginal adjustment of a 
previous policy. Lindblom maintained "given the limits on 
knowledge within which policy-makers are confined, 
simplifying by limiting the focus to small variations from 
present policy makes the most of available knowledge."24
Following this sketch of the incremental model of decision­
making it is possible to develop an incremental model of
21 Dahl & Lindblom (1976) p82. See also Banfield (1962) 
p76; Booth (1988) pp7-8; Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) pll; 
Jordan & Richardson (1987) pll; Lane (1993) p73; Lindblom 
(1959); Lindblom (1979) pp517, 519-520, 522; and Wildavsky 
(1964) pl47.
22 See Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) ppl24-127; Brown & 
Steel (1979) pl91; Ham & Hill (1993) p85; and Wildavsky 
(1967) ppl21-123.
23 See Booth (1988) p8; Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) 
ppl20-124; Dahl & Lindblom (1976) p83; Goodin (1982b) pp34- 
37; and Goodin & Waldner (1979) pp20-24.
24 Lindblom (1959) p85. See also Wildavsky (1964) 
pp!46-147.
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cutback management in local government. Cutback management 
in local government would comprise a high degree of 
interaction and selectiveness. In particular, it would be 
marked by the following series of incremental traits:
(a) a local authority would cut spending as a 
result of much interaction between different 
decision-makers
(b) a local authority would be riddled with
conflict between different decision-makers over 
what activities to cut
(c) a local authority would attempt to secure
agreement only on the decisions to cut spending 
not the objectives of these decisions
(d) a local authority would examine cutback
options that only marginally varied from existing 
activities
(e) a local authority would undertake only short­
term analysis of its cutback options
(f) a local authority would carry out only
limited and partisan analysis in cutting spending
These cutback management traits stem from the incremental 
model of decision-making. If these traits are exhibited in 
the four local authorities, then, the incremental view of 
cutback management provides a useful and robust 
understanding of how local authorities make spending cuts.
INCREMENTAL MODEL OF CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
The incremental model of cutback management, as 
characterised by the above set of cutback management 
traits, will be explored to assess the extent to which the 
four local authorities made spending cuts in an incremental 
way.
344
(a) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD CUT SPENDING AS A RESULT OF 
MUCH INTERACTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT DECISION-MAKERS
Under the incremental model of cutback management a local 
authority would not rely on analysis as a device for 
cutting its spending, but instead would display much 
interaction between actors in making spending cuts. 
Lindblom described this interaction between interested 
actors as partisan mutual adjustment, which "takes the form 
of fragmented or greatly decentralised political decision­
making in which the various somewhat autonomous 
participants mutually affect one another (as they always 
do)".25 Elcock, Jordan and Midwinter argued:26
"Budgeting is characterised by close interaction 
between Council leaders, committee chairmen or 
spokespersons interacting with officers."
There are two forms of interaction that can be found in a
local authority when cutting spending - overt and very
visible forms such as negotiation and persuasion, and
covert and less visible forms of interaction such as
accommodation and trust. These forms of interaction have
been well charted in many studies of local authority
budgeting.27 Elcock, Jordan and Midwinter noted:28
25 Lindblom (1979) p522.
26 Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) p67.
27 See Clapham (1983); Clarke & Cochrane (1989) ; 
Danziger (1978b); Elcock (1986a); Elcock (1986b) ppl80-192; 
Elcock (1987a) pp243-255; Elcock (1987b); Elcock, Jordan & 
Midwinter (1989); Greenwood (1979); Greenwood (1983) ;
Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1976) pp60-65; Hepworth
(1984) pp209-237; Hogwood (1987) ppl55-160; Marshall
(1974); Rawlinson & Tanner (1989); Rosenberg (1984) ;
Rosenberg (1985b); Rosenberg (1989); Rosenberg & Tomkins
(1983) ; Rosenberg, Tomkins & Day (1982); and Tomkins
(1982) .
28 Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) p84. However, they 
largely ignored the less visible forms of interaction in 
their study of local authority budgeting. This neglect is 
surprising given Heclo and Wildavsky's pioneering work on 
central government which stressed the importance of these 
forms of interaction ( (1981)) .
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"Invariably the budgeting process involves 
bargaining between departmental Chief Officers 
and their committee chairmen on the one hand, 
with the leading councillors and senior officers, 
especially the Treasurer, on the other."
The interaction displayed in the budgetary process took 
place in three main arenas in a local authority - the 
political, administrative and political-administrative 
arenas. These arenas were not self-contained because 
interactions taking place within them were mediated by 
outside actors (eg central government, political parties, 
professional associations, trade unions and interest 
groups). However, these wider influences were exercised 
upon the decision-makers in a local authority operating in 
these arenas. The three decision-making arenas will be 
examined to understand the extent and nature of the 
interaction found in the four local authorities.
In the political arena interaction took place between 
councillors in making decisions to cut spending.29 In 
'hung' Bedfordshire CC the decisions to cut spending were 
supported by the Conservative and Liberal Groups. Leach and 
Stewart argued "inter-party bargaining" is inherent in the 
budgetary process of 'hung' local authorities.30 However, 
in contrast to this conventional wisdom there was no 
bargaining between the two party groups in Bedfordshire CC 
in making the revenue budget of 1984/85. There was no overt 
interaction between party groups in agreeing upon the 
package of spending cuts. Instead there was covert 
interaction. Each Group was aware it depended on the 
support of the other to get its budget adopted. 
Furthermore, each Group was aware of the budget preferences
29 For a wider discussion on the impact of local 
politics upon budgeting see Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter 
(1989) pp49-67; and Sharpe & Newton (1984).
. 30 Leach & Stewart (1988) p44. See also Temple (1993). 
In Bedfordshire CC Blowers observed "a long process of 
negotiation" in its decision-making process ((1977) p309).
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of the other, and therefore its budget was made in such a 
way as to appeal to the other Group.31 Both the 
Conservative and Liberal Groups anticipated the reactions 
of each other, and accommodated these anticipated reactions 
into their budget plans. In Kent CC there was some 
interaction within the Conservative Group over the method 
of allocating spending cuts between committees. The 
Conservative Group adopted an across-the-board approach 
whereby committees had to reduce their spending by the same 
proportion. The Leader of the Conservative Group preferred 
the across-the-board method of cutting spending, and 
managed to secure sufficient support for this method from 
committee chairmen and the wider Group.32 In Knowsley MBC 
the Leader of the Labour Group was under pressure from some 
Labour councillors and local party members to confront the 
Conservative Government by overshooting the Council's 
expenditure target.33 The Labour Group, as a result of this 
pressure, decided to go deliberately into penalty to
31 This form of partisan mutual adjustment was 
lubricated by the friendship between the Deputy Leader of 
the Conservative Group and the Education Spokesman of the 
Liberal Group (Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, 
Bedfordshire CC).
32 Chairman, Property, Supplies and Services Group, 
Kent CC; Chairman, Finance and Review Group, Kent CC; 
Chairman, Police Committee, Kent CC; and Chairman, Fire and 
Public Protection Committee, Kent CC. The Conservative 
Group elected an advisory group, whose role was to advise 
the regular meetings of committee chairmen (Chairman, 
Property, Supplies and Services Group, Kent CC; and 
Chairman, Fire and Public Protection Committee, Kent CC). 
This advisory group provided an important conduit between 
the leadership and membership of the Conservative Group in 
which support was built for the across-the-board approach.
33 The Chief Executive believed this faction was 
"looking for a scrap" in light of the confrontation between 
Liverpool CC and the Conservative Government. On the 
influence of Militant Tendency upon the politics of the 
Labour Group of Knowsley MBC see Kilroy-Silk (1986); and 
Williams (1985). Derek Hatton, the former Deputy Leader of 
Liverpool CC at the time of the confrontation with the 
Conservative Government, was employed by Knowsley MBC.
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appease this faction within the local party.34 In Stockport 
MBC a 'sweat shop' was established by the Conservative 
leadership in which the committee chairmen had to defend 
their budget plans. The package of spending cuts emerged 
from this series of 'sweat shop7 negotiations.35
In the administrative arena the main lines of interaction 
were drawn between the service and finance departments of 
local authorities. In the wake of Wildavsky7 s work on 
budgeting these relations can be seen as between advocates 
of expenditure and guardians of revenue.36 The service 
departments generally advocate more spending on services, 
and finance departments generally stand guard and trim 
these spending bids. Though this distinction is simplistic, 
it is still useful because it defines the "underlying 
emphasis or boundaries of the relevant posts."37
These lines of interaction between the service and finance 
departments were etched over the process of making spending 
cuts in the four local authorities. Their base budgets were 
largely negotiated settlements between service and finance
34 Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
35 These informal meetings were more of a 'sweat shop7 
than a 'Spanish Inquisition7. A 'Spanish Inquisition7 
involves the scrutiny of the base budget. However, in 
practice the distinction between a 'sweat shop7 and a 
'Spanish Inquisition7 becomes blurred. See Elcock (1987a) 
pp252-253; Elcock (1987b) p2; Elcock (1991) p55; Elcock, 
Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pp88-91, 184; Greenwood (1979)
pp87-88; Greenwood (1983) ppl62-165; and Greenwood,
Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1976) pp66-67.
36 See Wildavsky (1964) ppl60-161; and Wildavsky (1986) 
ppll-14.
37 Rosenberg & Tomkins (1983) p63. See also Aucoin 
(1991) ppl26-127, 137; Elcock (1991) ppl21-124; Ibrahim & 
Proctor (1992a) pl4; Rosenberg (1984); Rosenberg (1985b); 
Rosenberg (1989); Rosenberg, Tomkins & Day (1982); Schick 
(1988) p524; Tarschys (1983) pp220-222; and Tomkins (1982).
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departments.38 As a result of these bilateral discussions 
some spending cuts were made in the budgets. In 
Bedfordshire CC the management team of chief officers 
identified many spending cuts contained in the budget of 
19 8 4 / 85 . 39 In Knowsley MBC the budgeted spending cuts were 
the outcome of a series of sometimes acrimonious 
negotiations between chief officers of service departments 
on one side, and the Chief Executive and the Borough 
Treasurer on the other side. In both local authorities 
spending cuts emerged from these inter-departmental 
negotiations sanctioned by councillors. Service and finance 
departments also haggled over inflation allowances, which • 
are the financial adjustments made to the base budgets to 
offset the changes in the cost of providing services.40 
Schick observed that a squeeze on inflation adjustments was 
a common budgetary technique to cut spending "by forcing 
agencies to absorb a portion of the inflationary increase 
in operating expenses."41
In addition to these overt forms there were covert forms of
38 Director of Social Services, Bedfordshire CC; Chief 
Arts and Recreation Officer, Bedfordshire CC; Assistant 
Director of Social Services, Bedfordshire CC; County 
Planning Officer, Kent CC; County Education Officer, Kent 
CC; Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC; 
Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC; Principal 
Administration Officer, Kent Fire Brigade, Kent CC; Chief 
Executive, Knowsley MBC; Borough Treasurer, Knowsley MBC; 
Borough Education Officer, Knowsley MBC; Director of 
Leisure Services, Knowsley MBC; Director of Education and 
Acting Director of Housing, Stockport MBC; Director of 
Development and Town Planning, Stockport MBC; Assistant 
Director of Finance, Stockport MBC; Assistant Director of 
Housing and Environmental Health, Stockport MBC; and 
Assistant Director of Recreation and Culture, Stockport 
MBC.
39 Bedfordshire CC's Getting Down To GREA. 1982.
40 Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC; Assistant 
Director of Finance, Stockport MBC; and Assistant Director 
of Recreation and Culture, Stockport MBC.
41 Schick (1988) p525. See also Rosenberg (1989) p235.
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interaction between service and finance departments. Each
side adjusted its position to take into account the
position of the other side. One classic example of this
form of partisan mutual adjustment is the practice of
padding budgets. Jordan noted:42
"Departments pad to protect themselves against 
automatic cuts; the centre automatically cuts 
because departments pad...."
In the four local authorities departments often padded
their budgets in anticipation of their budgets being
trimmed by the finance department.43 For example, the
County Trading Standards Officer of Kent CC admitted he
padded some budget headings after reorganising his
department. He realised the finance department was in a
weak position to challenge the spending estimates because
the reorganisation had left past spending as a poor guide
to future spending requirements. The chief officer adopted
this tactic in anticipation of future demands by the
finance department to trim spending.
This ritual game played between service, and finance 
departments sometimes gave way to relations based on trust. 
Departments reached shared understandings within agreed 
'rules of the game' which facilitated close and honest 
inter-departmental relations. On relations based on mutual 
trust Wildavsky wrote:44
42 Jordan (1987) p9. See also Cowart (1976); Cowart, 
Hansen & Brofoss (1975) p556; Goodin (1982a) p26; Jackson 
(1982b) pl53; and McLean (1987) p97.
43 Chief Arts and Recreation Officer, Bedfordshire CC; 
County Education Officer, Kent CC; County Trading Standards 
Officer, Kent CC; Assistant Director of Social Services, 
Kent CC; Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC; Leader, 
Conservative Group, Stockport MBC; Assistant Director of 
Recreation and Culture, Stockport MBC; and Assistant 
Director of Finance, Stockport MBC.
44 Wildavsky (1986) pp90-91. See also Heclo & Wildavsky 
(1981); and Jackson (1982b) pl50. Though Wildavsky's view 
was based on budgeting in central and federal governments 
his analysis has been applied to local government - see
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"The bedrock of British political administration 
is the importance of personal trust. By trust one 
means personal dependability, "soundness," and a 
feeling that here is a person in whom one can 
reliably place his confidence. Mutual trust is 
considered paramount by officials who know they 
will be doing business with each other year after 
year on issue after issue.... A Treasury man 
wants to know whether the department official can 
keep his side of the bargain."
Service and finance departments sometimes entered into a
'truce', and forged relations based on mutual trust about
how much money was required to provide services.45 This •
'truce' is a form of partisan mutual adjustment, and
emerged over a period of time between departments during
the routines of budgeting. Furthermore, relations between
departments changed in times of financial restraint. This
prevailing financial climate altered the expectations of
service departments because they anticipated successive
rounds of spending cuts and therefore were less likely to
obstruct the search for cuts by padding their budgets. The
fiscal squeeze of local authorities created a 'new realism'
in relations between departments at budget times. As a
result Tomkins argued that "the Treasury role as a guardian
against excessive spending actually became easier to
perform and advocates for expenditure from spending
departments became more moderate in their demands."46
Rosenberg (1984); Rosenberg (1985b); and Rosenberg (1989) .
45 Director of Social Services, Bedfordshire CC; 
Assistant Director of Social Services, Bedfordshire CC;
County Education Officer, Kent CC; County Planning Officer, 
Kent CC; Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC; 
Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC; Principal 
Administration Officer, Kent Fire Brigade, Kent CC; 
Director of Leisure Services, Knowsley MBC; Senior 
Assistant Education Officer, Lancashire CC; Director of 
Education and Acting Director of Housing, Stockport MBC; 
Director of Development and Town Planning, Stockport MBC; 
and Assistant Director of Housing and Environmental Health, 
Stockport MBC.
46 Tomkins (1982) plO.
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There are an array of overt and covert interactions in the
administrative arena mainly centred on the relationship
between service and finance departments of local
authorities. In the words of Rosenberg and Tomkins:47
"While guardianship is the underlying objective 
of the treasury budget liaison officer's 
function, and advocacy that of his spending 
department counterpart, the processes attached to 
each role involve aspects of mutual questioning, 
negotiation, gaming and support...."
In the political-administrative arena interaction took 
place largely between leading councillors and officers of 
the local authority on two fronts - first, between chief 
officers at the centre (most notably the chief executive 
and treasurer) and leading councillors; and second, between 
chief officers of service departments and leading 
councillors. Officers advise councillors - from the chief • 
executive and the treasurer, advice on how much to cut and 
how to cut spending; and from the chief officers of service 
departments, advice on what spending to cut. However, the 
leading councillors - that is, the leader of the ruling 
party group and committee chairpersons - give direction to 
the officers and set guidelines within which officers frame 
their advice.48 There is a mutual dependence between 
councillors and officers. Councillors depend upon officers
47 Rosenberg & Tomkins (1983) p62.
48 In 'hung' local authorities such as Bedfordshire CC 
the number of leading councillors expands to include the 
leaders of the main party groups and committee 
spokespersons of the party groups (see Temple (1993)) . But 
there are not surprisingly competing and conflicting 
directions and guidelines from these councillors to . 
officers. Relations between councillors and officers are 
fluid and uncertain (see Blowers (1977) ; Blowers (1982); 
Blowers (1986) ; Blowers (1987); and Temple (1991) p38) . 
Blowers argued that in 'hung' local authorities officers 
may "exert considerable influence, exploiting political 
divisions and using initiative confident of some support", 
or may "become more circumspect, anxious to influence 
affairs but unwilling to venture opinions and proposals 
that, if unheeded, will undermine their credibility with at 
least part of the council" ((1982) pl8).
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for expertise to advise and implement their decisions; and 
officers depend upon councillors for support to structure 
and sanction their advice. These mutually dependent 
relations were observed in Clarke and Cochrane's study of 
finance professionals in Labour-controlled local 
authorities. They found treasurers and Labour councillors 
"are able to reinforce each other's position: treasurers 
offer solutions to apparently insoluble problems, by 
squaring the circle of cuts in government grant and 
increased demand for services, while council leaders are 
able to offer support to detailed financial scrutiny of 
departmental spending budgets."49 The relations between 
treasurers and leading councillors have become more 
prominent in recent times because of the increasing number 
of central government controls upon local government 
spending. Treasurers have (or at least are perceived to 
have) the expertise to dilute the impact of these controls 
and even to bypass the controls. Central government 
controls have heralded an era of creative accounting in 
local government. Indeed, the former Leader of Sheffield 
CC, David Blunkett, praised the ingenuity of treasurers and 
believed "creative accounting has saved the day in many 
local authorities."50
Interaction between leading councillors and officers was 
largely conducted in informal groups and not formal 
committees. In Stockport MBC the Leader of the ruling 
Conservative Group, the Chief Executive and the Director of 
Finance presided over informal meetings during which 
committee chairmen and chief officers defended their 
budgets. These informal settings have been well documented 
in studies of local authority budgeting. Elcock, Jordan and
49 Clarke & Cochrane (1989) pp48-49.
50 Taken from Barclay (1985) p3.
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Midwinter argued:51
"Within the informal leadership groups which 
commonly effectively make budgets, leading 
councillors and senior ... officers7 roles tend 
to blur almost to vanishing point."
In addition to these overt forms there were covert forms of 
interaction. The relations between councillors and officers 
were shaped by a game of anticipated reactions played by 
officers in the local authorities. Officers often 
anticipated the reactions of councillors before 
recommending cuts in spending. There were two main ways in 
which officers anticipated the reactions of the ruling 
party group. In the first way, officers were usually aware 
of the prevailing views of the party group, and thus 
recommended spending cuts which fitted in with them. Many 
officers realised there was nothing to gain by putting 
forward recommendations that were politically 
unacceptable.52 Officers wanted to know what was and what 
was not acceptable to the controlling party group. These 
preferences then determined the parameters within which 
they advised the party group on how much, how and where to 
cut spending.53 Their advice was framed in anticipation of 
the reactions of the leading councillors. In the second 
way, some officers deliberately put forward spending cuts 
which conflicted with the views of the ruling party group 
in anticipation that these politically unacceptable 
spending cuts would not be implemented, and furthermore
51 Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pl84. See also 
Elcock & Jordan (1987).
52 County Secretary, Bedfordshire CC; Manager, Highways 
and Transportation Department, Kent CC; Finance Officer, 
Highways and Transportation Department, Kent CC; and 
Director of Leisure Services, Knowsley MBC.
53 For example, in Bedfordshire CC the Deputy Leader of 
the Conservative Group realised that by asking the 
management team of chief officers to undertake the 'Getting 
Down To GREA7 exercise the Conservative Group sent signals 
out to officers that spending cuts were on its agenda.
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that they would be relieved of finding other spending cuts
as replacements. On budgeting in central government Heclo
and Wildavsky observed:54
"Departments propose offsetting savings which 
they know must be put back. Some officials call 
this 'the sore thumb' or 'beggar's sores' 
technique (you don't want to hit or touch it) .
The skilled practitioner agrees to offer 
compensatory savings but chooses items which are 
sure to reawaken painful memories of the 
political consequences that allegedly occurred 
the last time a cut was applied or proposed in 
this area. Ministers are unlikely to agree to 
it. "
In the four local authorities there were several 
accusations that this 'sore thumb' trick was being used by 
officers. Officers generally denied the allegations of 
using this tactic, not least because anything other than a 
denial would diminish not only its effectiveness but also 
their credibility.55 The risk of using the 'sore thumb' 
technique is that what is anticipated as politically 
unacceptable is in fact politically acceptable.56 However, 
there was one confessed example of the 'sore thumb' 
technique found in the four local authorities.57 The police 
force in Kent was aware the ruling Conservative Group would • 
not cut police manpower levels (especially at the time of 
the miners' dispute). The Assistant Chief Constable 
anticipated this reaction, and claimed the police force was
54 Heclo & Wildavsky (1981) p91. See also Elcock,
Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pl78; Glennerster (1980a) p372; 
Glennerster (1981) pl83; and Jonsson (1984) pl37. Elcock, 
Jordan and Midwinter distinguished between the 'sore thumb' 
trick and 'shroud-waving' , in which "dire warnings of the 
consequences of persisting with demands for spending cuts 
are uttered: pointing out the 'sore thumbs' which result 
from cuts or ' shroud-waving' : warning of problems that will 
result from them" ((1989) ppl77-178).
55 Assistant Education Officer, Bedfordshire CC; and 
Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC.
56 Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC.
57 Principal Administration Officer, Kent County 
Constabulary, Kent CC.
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unable to find the required savings without cutting 
manpower levels. In the mistaken belief that the police 
force was at "the edge of a precipice" the Conservative 
Group, as anticipated, backed off from making the police 
force find its share of spending cuts.58 Overall, in the 
political-administrative arena interactions between 
councillors and officers were both overt and covert.
In the political, administrative and political- 
administrative decision-making arenas there was much overt 
and covert interaction in making spending cuts. Spending 
cuts were the outcome of interaction between key actors of 
the four local authorities. Spending was cut on the grounds 
of political and administrative feasibility rather than 
rationalist analysis. The notion of feasibility was 
determined by the interactions of the key actors in the 
budgetary process. Greenwood argued that local authorities 
"have increasingly sought to inform the process of 
budgetary choice through the use of rational rather than 
political analysis."59 This rationalist argument fails to 
understand that political analysis in the form of 
interaction is still dominant in making local authority 
budgets.
(b) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD BE RIDDLED WITH CONFLICT 
BETWEEN DIFFERENT DECISION-MAKERS OVER WHAT ACTIVITIES TO 
CUT
There are many significant actors involved in the making of 
spending cuts in local government. Inside local authorities 
there are the ruling party groups (or the coalition of 
party groups in 'hung' local authorities) on the councillor 
side, and departments on the officer side. Outside local
58 Principal Administration Officer, Kent County 
Constabulary, Kent CC.
59 Greenwood (1979) p94.
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authorities there are central government, political 
parties, trade unions, professional associations, pressure 
groups, business, voters, ratepayers, the media and other 
bodies (such as the Audit Commission).
These actors possess different interests and thus pursue
different goals. As a result there will be much conflict in
budgeting. Wildavsky argued:60
"Budgeting is translating financial resources 
into human purposes. Behind currencies stand 
human limitations; unless nations possess an 
alchemist's stone for turning base metals into 
gold, resources are limited. But human desires 
are not. Hence, some way must be found to 
apportion available funds among competing people 
and purposes. Behind every government budget - 
which necessarily takes revenues from some 
citizens and distributes them to others - lies 
conflict."
Budgeting is about choice - choosing between competing 
demands upon limited resources. It is about who gets and 
who does not get what they want. As Wildavsky wrote, if 
"politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose • 
preferences shall prevail in the determination of national 
policy, then the budget records the outcomes of this 
struggle."61 Conflict is inherent in the budgetary process.
In times of growth the likelihood of conflict is decreased 
because more spending demands can be financed from the 
growing pool of resources. In times of restraint, however, 
the likelihood of conflict is increased because fewer 
demands can be satisfied from the dwindling pool of 
resources. Stewart predicted:62
60 Wildavsky (1986) p7. See also Greenwood, Hinings & 
Ranson (1977) p25; Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) pl5; Natchez 
& Bupp (1973) p955; Schick (1983) p23; Schick (1988) p527; 
and Wildavsky (1964) ppl-5.
61 Wildavsky (1964) p4.
62 Stewart (1980) p22. See also Elcock (1986b) pl83; 
Gill Sc Frame (1990) p532; Gurr & King (1987) pl7; Schick
(1983) p23; Schick (1988) p527; and Tarschys (1983) pp219- 
220.
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"There are likely to be growing conflicts and 
difficulties in resource allocation. Consensus 
cannot be bought by growth."
The decision to cut spending exacerbates conflict within a
local authority. There is likely to be much resistance by
actors whose interests are threatened by the spending
cuts.63
In making spending cuts there was much conflict between 
central government and local authorities and also within 
local authorities. First, there was increased confrontation 
between central government and local government over 
cutting local authority spending. The Conservative 
Government wanted to curb the spending of local 
authorities. Kenneth Baker, the former Secretary of State 
for the Environment, noted that when "the first Thatcher 
Government came to power, a clash with local government 
became inevitable."64 Local authorities generally wanted to 
resist moves by central government to impose spending cuts 
upon them.65 Though none of the four local authorities
63 As Levine argued, when "confronting possible cuts, 
managers and political leaders will have to choose between 
resisting these cuts or smoothing them out by limiting 
their impact on the organization's most important 
functions, procedures and long-term capacity" ((1979) 
pl82) .
64 Baker (1993) pll2.
65 Local authorities may choose to comply with requests 
from central government to curb their spending either 
because they want to comply or because they have to comply 
despite their resistance. For a wider discussion on local 
government resistance to central government controls see 
Barnett (1986); Bassett (1982); Blunkett & Jackson (1987); 
Boddy & Fudge (1981); Boddy & Fudge (1984); Butcher, Law, 
Leach & Mullard (1990) pp55-77; Clarke & Cochrane (1989); 
Cochrane (1984-5) pp46-47; Cochrane (1993) pp28-47;
Community Action (1984a); Duncan & Goodwin (1988); Dunleavy 
& Rhodes (1986); The Economist (1983); Elcock (1986a); 
Elcock (1987a) pp250-252; Elcock (1987b); Elcock (1991)
ppl06-107; Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) ppl6-48, 95- 
105; Elliott & McCrone (1984); Glassberg (1980); Glassberg
(1981); Goldsmith (1986a); Goldsmith (1986b); Gyford (1985) 
pp28-33; Hampton (1991) pp93-113, 173-189; Hatton (1985);
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adopted 'brinkmanship' strategies, as Liverpool CC did 
against central government, Knowsley MBC went deliberately 
into grant penalty to support its Merseyside neighbour, and • 
Bedfordshire CC and Kent CC also incurred grant penalties.
Second, there was increased conflict within local 
authorities in making spending cuts. Conflict arose between 
councillors, between officers, and between councillors and 
officers. The most prevalent conflict was between the 
advocates of spending and guardians of revenue. Wildavsky 
argued:66
"... agencies are advocates of their own 
expenditures, not guardians of the nation's 
purse. They all want more. And the job of a 
finance ministry ... is to see that they don't 
get it."
This tension corresponds almost to that between 
'generalists' and 'specialists'.67 'Generalists' are more 
concerned with the whole of the local authority and its 
overall spending on services. 'Specialists' are more 
concerned with parts of the local authority and its 
spending on particular services. Stewart recognised these 
tensions, and noted:68
Jacobs (1979); Kingdom (1991) ppl72-193; Lansley, Goss & 
Wolmar (1989) pp23-46, 175-192; Midwinter (1984); Midwinter 
(1988) pp23-25; Militant (not dated); Newton (1980); Newton 
& Karran (1985); Parkinson (1985a); Parkinson (1985b); 
Parkinson (1987a); Parkinson (1987b); Preston (1984); 
Ranson, Jones & Walsh (1985); Rayner & Conway (1981-2) ; 
Rhodes (1984); Rhodes (1985a); Rhodes (1988) ; Rodrigues 
(1980) ; Saunders (1980); Saunders (1982); Saunders (1986a); 
Sharpe (1981c); Short (1984) pp88-89; Sondheimer (1986); 
and Stoker (1991) ppl40-204.
66 Wildavsky (1986) ppl2-13.
67 See Elcock (1991) pp27-28; and Elcock, Jordan & 
Midwinter (1989) pl82. It is important to understand that
these distinctions are aimed at 'moving targets'. For 
example, the director of social services can be seen as an 
advocate for spending and 'specialist' by a chief 
executive, but a guardian of revenues and 'generalist' by 
social workers.
68 Stewart (1983) p83.
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"There are lines of possible conflict between 
those with interests in the overall working of 
the authority (leader and chief executive) and 
those with interests in particular services 
(chairman and chief officers).... There are lines 
of possible conflict between those at the centre 
of the organisation (leading councillors and 
chief officers) and those at the periphery of the 
organisation (fieldworkers and backbenchers) with 
middle management bearing the pressure of that 
conflict."
'Generalists7 tend to guard revenues against the claims
advocated by 'specialists7.
The conflict between the guardians and the advocates was 
seen in the party groups of the four local authorities. 
There was much tension within party groups between the 
leader who was more concerned with the overall budget 
strategy on one side, and the committee spokespersons who 
were more concerned with their specific budgets on the 
other side. The 'sweat shop7 mechanism found in Stockport 
MBC was an arrangement to resolve these tensions.
This conflict of roles between guardians and advocates was
seen between and within departments of the four local
authorities. There were many disputes between the central
departments headed by the chief executive and the
treasurer, and the service departments. The central .
departments were concerned primarily with the overall
budget strategy whereas the service departments were far
more concerned to protect their share of the budget.
Rosenberg captured this tension when he wrote:69
"In an era where cuts in service departments7 
budgets ... are expected the Treasurer felt his 
organisational relationships with other Chief 
Officers; was both one of co-operation and one of 
conflict and tensions. He alone had to speak the 
language of accountancy and 'real cuts7 in those 
Chief Officers7 meetings in which other officers 
were protesting and speaking another language of 
services and clients."
69 Rosenberg (1985b) pl59.
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In Knowsley MBC bitter conflicts between the Chief 
Executive and the Borough Treasurer on one side, and the 
Borough Education Officer on the other side were 
symptomatic of this inherent tension between guardians of 
revenue and advocates of spending. This tension also 
prevailed within departments, as there were perennial 
conflicts between those concerned with the overall 
departmental budget and those more concerned with the 
details of the budget.70
Finally, this conflict was seen in relations between 
councillors and officers. Councillors in pressing for 
spending cuts often encountered 'shroud-waving' officers. 
A chief officer faced with demands to cut departmental 
spending sometimes resorted to special pleading in the hope 
that the axe fell upon other departments.71 In Kent CC the 
Education Department and the Social Services Department 
admitted to making a special case to be treated differently 
from other departments in the budget-making process.72 In 
Knowsley MBC the Education Department made a vigorous case 
to be exempt from making the required amount of spending 
cuts.73
In general, the conflicts between key actors in cutting 
local authority spending can be explained because of their 
competing and conflicting interests, and consequently their 
competing and conflicting objectives. In making spending 
cuts there is much conflict between the vested interests
70 Principal Administration Officer, Kent County . 
Constabulary, Kent CC; Manager, Highways and Transportation 
Department, Kent CC; and Finance Officer, Highways and 
Transportation Department, Kent CC.
71 See Cope (1987); and Elcock (1987a) pp253, 255.
72 County Education Officer, Kent CC; and Assistant 
Director of Social Services, Kent CC.
73 Borough Education Officer, Knowsley MBC.
represented in local authorities.74
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(c) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD ATTEMPT TO SECURE AGREEMENT 
ONLY ON THE DECISIONS TO CUT SPENDING NOT THE OBJECTIVES OF 
THESE DECISIONS
Agreement upon decisions to cut local authority spending is 
facilitated if the actors involved have interests that 
coincide, which does not necessarily mean that interests 
have to be shared. According to the incremental model of 
decision-making, decision-makers do not need to agree on 
the objectives of a decision but need only to agree on the 
decision itself.
A variety of creative accounting devices have been used by 
local authorities to bypass central government controls of 
their spending.75 Generally Conservative and Labour party 
groups in local authorities adopted these creative 
accounting measures but for very different reasons. The 
Conservatives wanted to keep down rates bills, and Labour 
wanted to protect spending on services. Though both sides 
disagreed on the objectives in making decisions on creative 
accounting, they agreed on the decisions themselves. For 
example, in Bedfordshire CC the Conservative and Liberal 
Groups agreed upon the budget even though each had 
different aims for this budget. Both did not want to 
increase the Council's precept, but the Liberal Group 
wanted to spend more on services than the Conservative 
Group. The Conservative Group wanted to keep spending close 
to central government's expenditure target and thus
74 In looking at spending cuts made by social services 
departments of local authorities Kelly reached a similar 
conclusion. He explained the incidence of spending cuts in 
terms of the "micro-political interests of politicians, 
managers, professionals and consumers" and "their capacity 
to mobilise power to pursue their competing rationalities" 
((1989) p208).
75 See chapter two, footnote 87.
restrict the Council's net spending. Both Groups had 
different aims, but both agreed on the budget because the 
decision taken to use special funds allowed their aims to 
be achieved - namely, the shared aim of holding down the 
precept, the Liberal aim of spending more on services, and 
the Conservative aim of reducing net spending. This example 
demonstrates that in making decisions what is required is 
agreement on the decision itself and not agreement on the 
objectives of the decision.
Wolman noted that spending reductions "will be made in 
activities . . . which will minimize conflict and 
disruption.1176 The pressures to cut spending require local 
authorities to make decisions on how much, how and where to 
cut spending. These decisions were made largely on the 
basis of agreements struck by key decision-makers in the 
local authorities. The need to secure agreement between 
decision-makers, thus, minimises the amount of conflict. 
Though conflict increased as local authorities made 
spending cuts, the process of agreeing only on the 
decisions made to cut spending facilitated the making of 
these decisions, whereas agreement on the objectives of a 
cutback management strategy would exacerbate conflict 
between decision-makers and reduce the likelihood of 
decisions being made. Agreement on objectives may 
facilitate but does not guarantee agreement on the means to 
achieve the objectives. The key actors of the four local 
authorities neither agreed nor attempted to agree upon the 
objectives of their budget containing spending cuts. They 
needed only to agree on the decisions to cut spending not 
the objectives of these decisions.
(d) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD EXAMINE CUTBACK OPTIONS THAT 
ONLY MARGINALLY VARIED FROM EXISTING ACTIVITIES
76 Wolman (1983) p259.
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In making spending cuts, according to the incrementalist
model, the local authority would not review its entire
budget, but would consider only marginal adjustments to its
existing budget. Wildavsky argued:77
"Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. The 
beginning of wisdom about an agency budget is 
that it is almost never actively reviewed as a 
whole every year in the sense of reconsidering 
the value of all existing programs as compared to 
all possible alternatives. Instead, it is based 
on last year's* budget with special attention 
given to a narrow range of increases and 
decreases. Thus the men who make the budget are 
concerned with relatively small increments to an 
existing base. Their attention is focused on a 
small number of items over which the budgetary 
battle is fought."
This budgetary practice is an example of what Lindblom has
called the method of successive limited comparisons whereby
policy change is limited to "those policies that differ in
relatively small degree from policies presently in
effect."78 The local authority would cut spending at the
margins of its budget; and would embark upon a process of
'decremental budgeting' .79
An understanding of the base and the margin are critical in 
examining this incremental trait of cutback management.80 
Wildavsky defined the concept of the base as the "commonly 
held expectations among participants in budgeting that 
programs will be carried out at close to the going level of 
expenditures."81 He argued the base "refers to accepted
77 Wildavsky (1964) pl5.
78 Lindblom (1959) p84. Later Lindblom referred to this 
process as "simple incremental analysis" ((1979) p517).
79 See Aucoin (1991) pl21; Burton (1985) pp85-86; Hood 
& Wright (1981a); Schick (1988) p524; Tarschys (1981);
Tarschys (1984); and Wright (1981) pl2.
80 See Gist (1977) .
81 Wildavsky (1986) pll. See also Davis, Dempster & 
Wildavsky (1966) p530.
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parts of programs that will not normally be subjected to 
intense scrutiny."82 The base is the past rolled into the 
future. In budgeting the base is the existing budget with 
the widespread expectation among budgetary actors that it 
will be almost automatically rolled forward into future 
budgets. The base budget is a standstill budget.
The concept of the margin is more difficult to define 
because it is a relative term. The margin can be measured 
only in relation to the base. A margin is relatively small 
compared to the whole base. This definition raises 
significant methodological questions of measuring the size 
of change and determining whether a change is marginal or 
not.83 The concept of the margin is difficult to delimit 
because, as Dempster and Wildavsky claimed, "there is no 
magic size for an increment".84 Without wanting to delve 
too deeply into this methodological jungle it is important 
to operationalise the concepts of the base and the margin 
in order to test the incremental model of cutback 
management in local government.
The base is easier to operationalise because all local 
authorities, including Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, Knowsley 
MBC and Stockport MBC, construct a base budget at the start 
of the budget process. Nicholson asserted:85
82 Wildavsky (1986) pll.
83 See Bailey & O'Connor (1975); Berry (1990); Booth
(1988) ppl3-14; Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) pp62-65; Burch 
& Wood (1989) p30; Dempster & Wildavsky (1979); Goodin
(1982b) p22; Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) ppl6-17; Kelly
(1989) p207; Lane (1993) pp72-73; and Wanat (1974).
84 Dempster & Wildavsky (1979) p371. They argued that 
"it is the regularity or irregularity of the changes in 
size that matter, not the absolute amount of the changes 
themselves" ((1979) p375). See also Burch & Wood (1989) 
p30.
85 Nicholson (1988) p243. See also chapter two, 
footnote 129.
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"Almost all local authority budgets take as their 
base the position of the previous year. There is 
an in-built preference for the status quo...."
The four local authorities did not systematically review
their base budgets. The political and administrative
leadership formulated a budget strategy which was
implemented (or sometimes not implemented) by the
committees and departments. Any detailed analysis of the
base budget was undertaken at the departmental not the
corporate level. Furthermore, most departments rarely
scrutinised their budgets, and only a handful of
departments scrutinised their budgets in a systematic way.
For example, in Kent CC the Highways and Transportation
Department introduced a budget planning process to assess
departmental priorities.86
The limited review of the base budget conducted by the four
local authorities is mirrored in other local authorities.
Greenwood observed:87
"Local authorities do not systematically re­
examine their expenditures. The pattern of 
service provision changes remarkably little from 
one year to the next, and only a small proportion 
of expenditures are reviewed at any time."
However, several writers observed that in an era of
financial restraint local authorities increasingly review
their base budget over time in their search for spending
cuts. Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson and Walsh noted "a
contraction in the supply of resources widens the
parameters of budgetary review".88 This observation needs
86 County Surveyor, Kent CC.
87 Greenwood (1979) p94. See also Elcock (1987a) p254; 
Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1980) pp25-26; 
Pendlebury (1985) p30; and Stewart (1983) ppl98-211.
88 Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1980) p46. See . 
chapter six, footnote 31. This research project is a study 
of how four local authorities cut spending in 1984/85, and 
is not therefore a longitudinal study of budgeting. It is 
not possible to test the hypothesis that the parameters of 
budgetary review widen over time.
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to be placed in perspective because though local 
authorities may increasingly review their budgets there is 
still, as witnessed in the four local authorities, little 
systematic review of budgets. Though there may be more 
scrutiny there is still little scrutiny of budgets.
Instead of reviewing their base budgets local authorities 
tended to scrutinise the proposed changes to their budgets. 
In Bedfordshire CC departments compiled a 'shopping list' 
of spending cuts as a result of several cost-cutting 
exercises. In Kent CC the ruling Conservative Group 
required committees to find across-the-board reductions to 
their budgets. In Knowsley MBC the Chief Executive and the 
Borough Treasurer scrutinised only the spending cuts 
identified by the departments in the 'lower expenditure 
options' exercise. In Stockport MBC the Conservative 
leadership scrutinised only the changes to committee 
budgets.
In all the local authorities scrutiny of budgets was 
focused on changes made to the base budget and not the base 
budget itself. Compared to their spending of the previous 
year the spending cuts made by the four local authorities 
ranged from 0.1 per cent in Stockport MBC to 2.3 per cent 
in Kent CC.89 In 1984/85 the four local authorities 
together cut their spending by 1.7 per cent from their 
spending in 1983/84. Notwithstanding the methodological 
problems of operationalising the concept of the margin, the 
amount of spending cuts extracted in the four local 
authorities was marginal relative to the size of their 
budgets. The local authorities examined only small changes 
to their existing budgets. There are three explanations of 
this incremental trait of budgeting in local government.
First, there are constraints in scrutinising each item of
89 See chapter three, tables 3.5, 3.9, 3.11 and 3.13.
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spending proposed in the annual budget made by a local 
authority. Danziger argued that the "decision-maker, 
constrained by his own cognitive capacity, by time 
pressures, by the availability of information and by the 
costs of analysis, responds by identifying only a few 
marginal alterations from the status quo and then by 
selecting one of these alternatives."90 The budget-maker 
rarely possesses the resources - time, money and 
information - to analyse the budget in a comprehensive 
manner, and must confine analysis to its margins.
Second, the base budget of a local authority is essentially 
a negotiated settlement between the service departments and 
finance department. It is unlikely to change much unless 
there are significant changes in the power-relations 
between these budgetary actors. Powerful actors will try to 
prevent any analysis of the budget threatening their 
interests. Service departments are often resistant to 
analyse their budgets if the outcome of such analysis is to 
be used by finance departments to trim their spending. For 
example, in Kent CC the newly-reorganised Trading Standards 
Department resisted successfully attempts by the County 
Treasurer's Department to scrutinise its budget, because 
the costs of running the department could not be directly 
compared with its costs before reorganisation.91 As 
Danziger argued, since "the cognitive costs of fundamental 
reassessments . . . and the political costs of eliminating 
the current programs are high, most existing allocations 
are taken as the starting point, the 'base'."92
Third, any rationale for the comprehensive analysis of the
90 Danziger (1976) pp335-336. See also Danziger (1978b) 
ppl25-126; Downs (1967) pp247-252; Lindblom & Woodhouse
(1993) p28; Tarschys (1981) p56; and Wildavsky (1964) 
ppl46-147.
91 County Trading Standards Officer, Kent CC.
92 Danziger (1976) p336.
3 68
budget is made redundant if the local authority has little
control over its spending. There is no point in
scrutinising an item of spending if that money has to be
spent in a prescribed way. Newton wrote:93
"The room for financial manoeuvre on the part of 
local government when it tries to adapt to 
increasingly tight financial circumstances is 
limited. The constraints to which it is subject 
are of four main kinds, namely: social and
demographic trends and pressures in society at 
large; economic and financial pressures created 
by the nature of its activities and the 
institutional structure within which it works; 
government laws and regulations which largely 
determine what local government does, and how it 
should finance these activities; and political 
pressures which mainly derive from the revolution 
of rising expectations."
In general, the four local authorities did not embark on a 
comprehensive, planned and systematic scrutiny of their 
budgets. Scrutiny focused on the margins of their budgets. 
As Elcock, Jordan and Midwinter intimated in the title of 
their book, budgeting in local government is all about 
"managing the margins".94
(e) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD UNDERTAKE ONLY SHORT-TERM 
ANALYSIS OF ITS CUTBACK OPTIONS
The incremental model of cutback management prefers short­
term over long-term analysis. The model "eschews any real 
attempt at long-range planning".95 This aversion to, or at
93 Newton (1980) pl85. See also chapter six, footnotes 
54 and 55.
94 Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989). See also Alt 
(1977) pp86-88; Arthur Young (1987) pp47-48; Danziger
(1976); Danziger (1978b) ppl25-146; Elcock (1986b) pl85;
Elcock (1987b) pll; Elcock (1991) pl26; Greenwood (1979) 
p94; and Ibrahim & Proctor (1992b) p58.
95 Leach (1982) p7. See also Brown & Steel (1979) pl91; 
and Spiers (1975) p!52.
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least discounting of, long-term planning stems from the 
high degree of uncertainty surrounding the budget-making 
process. Budget-makers can often neither control nor 
predict what is going to happen in the longer term, and 
therefore prefer to make budgets on the basis of short-term 
calculations. The high degree of uncertainty was the reason 
why local authorities did not look too far ahead beyond the 
traditional one-year budget. Central government in the way 
it calculated and distributed grants to local authorities, 
and in the way it set spending targets and block 
allocations for local authorities, created much of the 
uncertainty faced by local authorities in making budgets.96
As a result of this financial uncertainty the making of
spending cuts in the four local authorities was driven by
short-term considerations. Their revenue budgets were
annual budgets - only Stockport MBC attempted to project
its spending beyond this one-year horizon. Budget-making in
Bedfordshire CC was made even more difficult to plan
because the local authority was 'hung'. Its Chief Executive
remarked that he was "more concerned with keeping the
machinery running" than with planning ahead. The capital
budgets of the four local authorities were dominated by the
revenue consequences of their capital programmes. For
example, the County Treasurer of Kent CC noted:97
"The Policy and Budget Group and the Policy and 
Resources Committee in considering the capital 
programme expressed their concern at the County 
Council's ability to continue to sustain the 
programme at its present level and at the impact 
that resultant revenue commitments could have on 
future revenue budgets. The Policy and Resources 
Committee has therefore given approval in
96 See Adams (1986); Audit Commission For Local 
Authorities In England And Wales (1984g); Audit Commission 
For Local Authorities In England And Wales (1985a); Cope 
(1987) pp99-100; Elcock (1991) ppll7-119; National Audit
Office (1985) pp22-24; and Stewart (1983) p209.
97 Taken from Kent CC's Revenue Budget And Capital 
Programme 1984-85. 16 February 1984, p3.
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principle only to the 1984-85 programme...."
The Audit Commission observed that uncertainty facing local
authorities drove out any longer-term planning of budgets
and policies, and found that longer-term planning "has
remained in abeyance in many authorities".98 Pinkham and
Platt noted:99
"In many, if not most, authorities cuts exercises 
are an object lesson in the 'crisis style of 
management7. We don't ask "what do we want to 
cut?" so much as "what can we cut in the next few 
weeks"?"
This view was countered by Greenwood, who argued that in 
times of financial restraint local authorities increasingly 
plan their resources.100 The only significant form of 
planning found in the four local authorities was cash 
planning. Any policy planning was firmly driven by cash 
planning.101 Local authorities were increasingly concerned 
to identify future financial implications of any policy 
developments. The capital programmes of the four local 
authorities were scanned to calculate the financial 
implications for their revenue budgets. Furthermore, 
because of the fiscal uncertainty created by central 
government local authorities were forced to create several 
possible future scenarios of their revenues and 
expenditures rather than attempt to formulate a single 
detailed plan. Overall, the little planning undertaken in 
the four local authorities was concerned with spending not 
services, and with the short-term not the long-term. 
Planning was finance-driven in the four local authorities.
98 Audit Commission For Local Authorities In England 
And Wales (1984g) p27. See also chapter six, footnote 89.
99 Pinkham & Platt (1980) p22.
100 See Greenwood (1983) pl57. See also Hepworth (1984)
p209.
101 See Cope (1987) plOO; Elcock (1986b) pl84; and .
Elcock (1991) ppll8-119.
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(f) A LOCAL AUTHORITY WOULD CARRY OUT LIMITED AND PARTISAN 
ANALYSIS IN CUTTING SPENDING
The incremental model of cutback management suggests that 
if any analysis takes place it will be always limited and 
partisan. The limited nature of analysis is best understood 
with reference to Lindblom's threefold typology of 
incremental analysis.102 First, there is "simple 
incremental analysis" which involves the "consideration of 
alternative policies all of which are only incrementally 
different from the status quo."103 Second, there is 
"disjointed incrementalism" which is analysis "marked by a 
mutually supporting set of simplifying and focusing 
stratagems".104 Third, there is "strategic analysis" which 
is analysis of "any calculated or thoughtfully set of 
stratagems to simplify complex policy problems."105 These 
forms of incremental analysis all fall short of the 
comprehensive analysis assumed under the rationalist model.
The four local authorities tended to scrutinise only the 
margins of their budgets. They did not have the capacity 
nor the motivation to analyse their entire budgets. In 
Bedfordshire CC the Education Spokesman of the Liberal 
Group lamented the lack of information and time for the 
analysis of the budget. Similarly, the Chairman of the 
Police Committee of Kent CC regretted the lack of time to 
analyse the base budget of the police force. The scrutiny 
of only the margins of their budgets is simple incremental
102 See Ham & Hill (1993) pp92-93; and Lindblom (1979) 
pp517-518.
103 Lindblom (1979) p517. See also Lindblom & Woodhouse 
(1993) pp27-28. This form of analysis corresponds to the 
process of successive limited comparisons - see Lindblom 
(1959) .
104 Lindblom (1979) p517. See also Braybrooke & Lindblom 
(1970) pp81-110; and Hirschman & Lindblom (1962) pp215-216.
105 Lindblom (1979) p518.
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analysis.
The analysis of spending cuts made by the four local 
authorities was also disjointed. It involved many different 
actors, and took place at different times in the budgetary 
process. The political and administrative leadership of the 
four local authorities dominated the making of the budget 
strategy.; and service committees and departments dominated 
its implementation. Thus, the centre largely engaged in 
macro-analysis of the making of the budget strategy; and 
the periphery engaged in micro-analysis of the detailed 
spending cuts contained in the budget. In contrast to the 
rationalist trait of centralised analysis, much of the 
analysis carried out in the local authorities was 
decentralised and fragmented.106 The centre did not have 
the capacity to monopolise the scrutiny of the budget. Even 
in Knowsley MBC where the Chief Executive and the Borough 
Treasurer largely made the budget they relied heavily on 
departmental analysis emanating from the derailed 'lower 
expenditure options' exercise. Thus, the decentralised and 
fragmented analysis of spending cuts in the four local 
authorities is disjointed incrementalism.
Both disjointed incrementalism and strategic analysis 
involve the widespread use of simplifying strategies to 
make a complex task more manageable for decision-makers. 
There were many simplifying strategies used by the four 
local authorities in making spending cuts. For example, 
Kent CC adopted an across-the-board approach in 
apportioning spending cuts. Each committee had to find the 
same proportionate share of spending cuts. Furthermore, a 
'safety margin' was built into this exercise so that 
committees having difficulties in finding the required
106 See Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) ppl04-106, 120,
127-131; Burch & Wood (1989) pp29-30; Dryzek (1987) pp427- 
428; Greenaway, Smith & Street (1992) pp25-26; Lindblom & 
Woodhouse (1993) pp30-31; and Wildavsky (1964) pl47.
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spending cuts could be later cushioned from making such
cuts.107 This tactic is based on the assumption that all
committees have the same ability to protest about the cuts,
and to turn their protests into concessions of not making
spending cuts. Jorgensen argued that the tactic presupposes
that every actor "has the same ability to scream" and that
every "scream is equally legitimate."108 This technique is,
according to Glassberg, the "simplest way" to reduce
spending.109 It has the superficial appearance of fairness
and therefore reduces conflict amongst budget-makers, but
it assumes departments have equal capacity to make these
spending cuts.110 Levine argued:111
"Sharing the pain of cuts by allocating them 
across-the-board to all units may minimize pain, 
help to maintain morale, and build a good team 
spirit in the organization; but it is not 
responsible management. Not every unit in an 
organization or every agency in a government 
contributes equally to the goals, purposes, and 
basic functions of that organization or 
government."
107 Chairman, Education Committee, Kent CC; and Chief 
Executive, Kent CC.
108 Jorgensen (1987a) pl92.
109 Glassberg (1980) p3.
110 See Danziger (1976) pp339, 347; Danziger (1978b) 
ppl33, 139; Danziger (1991) ppl77-178; Glassberg (1980) p3; 
Glassberg (1981) pl83; Glennerster (1980a) p374;
Glennerster (1981) pl85; Greenwood (1979) pp81-85;
Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1976) pp46-49, 65-67; 
Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1980) p39; Hogwood & 
Peters (1985) ppl51-152; Hood & Wright (1981a) pp203-207; 
Ibrahim & Proctor (1992b) pp55-58; Jordan (1987) pl5;
Jorgensen (1987a) pl92; Jorgensen (1987b) pp21, 65-66; 
Levine (1978) p320; Levine (1979) pl82; Levine, Rubin & 
Wolohojian (1981b) p202; Rosenberg (1985b) pl73; Rosenberg 
(1985c) p204; Rosenberg (1989) p50; Schick (1983) pl9;
Schick (1988) p525; Tarschys (1983) pp216-217; Tarschys
(1984) p242; Wildavsky (1986) pp78-80; Wolman (1983) pp258- 
259; Wolman & Davis (1980) pp22-23; Wolman & Peterson
(1980) p79; Wolman & Peterson (1981) pp805-806; and Wright
(1981) pl5.
111 Levine (1979) pl82. See also Durham & Smith (1982) 
pp386-388.
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In Bedfordshire CC the Conservative Group wanted to 
apportion spending cuts between services using the Grant- 
Related Expenditure Assessment (GREA) calculated by central 
government. This method is another simplifying strategy 
because it avoided the complex and conflict-ridden task of 
deciding where spending cuts should fall, and enabled them 
to blame central government.
The relations between finance and service departments were
also governed by rules which simplified their complexity.
They were often founded upon mutual trust - the finance
department trusted service departments to prepare their
budgets in an honest way; and service departments trusted
the finance department to accept their spending estimates
without arbitrarily cutting them. This trust simplifies
decision-making. As Wildavsky argued:112
"Personal trust ... is one invaluable aid to 
calculation. With such trust, each sum need not 
be redone; many details can be confidently 
overlooked; advance warnings can reduce 
uncertainty; informal chats will distinguish the 
real fire from smokescreen issues; and political 
administrators more confidently can bypass most 
of what goes on."
Another, though more crude, simplifying strategy found in
relations between finance and service departments is the
practice of reducing the amount of monies that the finance
departments allocate to service departments to offset
inflation.113 Schick found that budget-makers have often
"saved money by forcing agencies to absorb a portion of the
inflationary increase in operating expenses."114
One simplifying strategy adopted in incremental analysis is
112 Wildavsky (1986) p91.
113 Assistant Director of Finance, Stockport MBC.
114 Schick (1988) p525. See also Glennerster (1980a) 
pp375-376, 381; Glennerster (1980b) ppl8-19; Glennerster
(1981) ppl86-188, 194; Wolman (1982a) p77; and Wolman &
Peterson (1980) p81.
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the application of "a sequence of trials, errors, and
revised trials."115 Incremental analysis is heuristic.
Lindblom argued:116
"Policy is not made once and for all; it is made 
and re-made endlessly. Policy-making is a process 
of successive approximation to some desired
objectives in which what is desired itself
continues to change under reconsideration."
An example of this 'trial and error' method is the decision
of Kent CC to enter into a partnership with Age Concern
Kent to run four day centres for the elderly as a two-year
pilot scheme. Kent CC believed considerable financial *
savings would be made by tapping into the resources of Age
Concern Kent rather than providing its own day centres.117
The Social Services Department calculated Age Concern Kent
would run day centres at less than one-third of the cost
than if the Department ran the centres.118 Hailed as an
"interesting experiment" by Age Concern England, Kent CC
hoped that if the partnership were successful the. scheme
115 Lindblom (1979) p517.
116 Lindblom (1959) p86. See also Booth (1988) p7;
Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) pp99-102; Burch & Wood (1989) 
p29; Danziger (1978b) pl27; Greenaway, Smith & Street
(1992) p25; Jackson (1982b) pl52; Lindblom & Woodhouse
(1993) pp29-3 0; and Wildavsky (1964) pl47.
117 For example, Age Concern Kent are able to use the 
assistance of unpaid volunteers and receive voluntary 
financial contributions from the elderly in their own day 
centres. Generally using voluntary bodies to provide local 
authority services has often been seen as a way of cutting 
spending. Elcock observed that "hard-pressed local 
authorities may find it cheaper to award a grant to a 
voluntary body to provide a service than to provide the 
service themselves" ((1987a) p249). See also Caulcott
(1985) pl4; Forsyth (1981) pp9-10; Glennerster (1980a)
p376; Glennerster (1981) pl88; Hadley & Hatch (1981) p94; 
Harman (1983) pp46-51; Jordan (1987) pl6; Lawrence (1982-3)
pl8; Pinkham & Platt (1980) pp21-22; Raine & Webster (1985)
pi7; and Rich (1981) p59.
118 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC; 
Policy Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC; and 
Development Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC.
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would be extended to cover other day centres.119 The pilot
scheme was monitored and evaluated by the Social Services
Department and Age Concern Kent separately; by them both
together as the County Partnership Forum; and by the
Department of Health and Social Security's Social Work
Service. Kemp of the Age Concern Institute of Gerontology
found there were mutual benefits for both Kent CC and Age
Concern. She stated:120
"Each agency has its own agenda, some items of 
which coincide, such as the wish to provide high 
quality and appropriate day services to the 
elderly population of Kent. For Age Concern, the 
elderly are their raison d'etre, whilst Social 
Services have to compete with other departments 
of the County Council, and even then the 
resources have to be shared amongst many 
differing groups of people. Social Services 
obviously have an interest in methods whereby 
services can be provided more cost effectively 
and Age Concern groups welcome an increase in 
resources, particularly where this lessens the 
uncertainty about continued provision of a 
service."
However, there were several problems which emerged from the 
pilot scheme. The £25,000 saving that Kent CC was hoping to 
realise never materialised in the financial year 1984-85, 
mainly because of 'teething problems' and over-optimistic 
budgeting - new schemes, such as this partnership scheme, 
often have to be justified on the grounds that they save 
money as well as improve services, which leads their 
proponents to exaggerate the savings likely to accrue from 
their implementation.121 As a result of these evaluation 
exercises both Kent CC and Age Concern Kent modified and
119 Director, Age Concern England.
120 Kemp (1987) pl27.
121 Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC. This 
'saving', which failed to materialise, illustrates the 
observation that though "the claim that voluntary services 
are cheaper is commonly made, there is little evidence to 
support the proposition" (Leat (1986) p310).
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extended the pilot scheme.122 The development of the 
partnership scheme is a clear example of the heuristic 
method of incremental analysis.
The analysis that took place in the four local authorities 
in making spending cuts corresponded to the threefold 
typology of incremental analysis devised by Lindblom - 
namely, simple incremental analysis, disjointed 
incrementalism, and strategic analysis. Analysis was thus 
limited.
According to the incremental model of cutback management
analysis is also partisan. Lindblom defined partisan
analysis in the following words:123
"In partisan mutual adjustment and all politics, 
participants make heavy use of persuasion to 
influence each other; hence they are constantly 
engaged in analysis designed to find grounds on 
which their political adversaries or indifferent 
participants might be converted to allies or 
acquiescents."
Analysis, according to the incremental model, is not 
neutral. It is commissioned by partisan actors; it is 
undertaken by partisan actors; and it is used by partisan 
actors.
For example, Kent CC made extensive use of management 
consultants as a way of restructuring its organisation and 
management. The Conservative-controlled Council 
commissioned management consultants partly to overcome 
officer resistance to change. The agenda of the 
Conservative Group included the incorporation of 'business7 
methods into the local authority and the pursuit of cost
122 Chairman, Social Services Committee, Kent CC; 
Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent CC; Policy 
Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC; Development 
Officer, Social Services Department, Kent CC; and County 
Organiser, Age Concern Kent. See Kemp (1987).
123 Lindblom (1979) p524. See also Simon (1957a) pp61-
78.
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savings. As a result the management consultants framed 
their analysis within the parameters of this agenda. Their 
analysis was used only if it suited the interests of the 
Conservative Group, and consequently their recommendations 
were implemented only if cost savings resulted. Analysis 
was commissioned, undertaken and used in a partisan way. 
This example illustrates the partisan nature of analysis.
Analysis, then, is built into decision-making. It is not a 
neutral exercise but very much a partisan activity - 
analysis takes sides.124 Analysis is always partisan. The 
incremental model of cutback management offers a very 
plausible view of the role of analysis in decision-making. 
Following Lindblom, analysis is "drastically limited" in 
its objectiveness and its comprehensiveness.125
INCREMENTAL THEORY OF CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
The incremental model of decision-making is based on 
interaction and selectiveness. A series of six incremental 
traits of cutback management was deduced from this 
incremental model, and then applied to the manner in which 
the four local authorities cut spending.
The first incremental trait assumes decision-makers within 
local authorities interact to make spending cuts. In all 
four local authorities there was much interaction between 
councillors and officers, and also between the local 
authorities and outside actors (eg central government and 
trade unions) in deciding how much should be cut, how
124 See Simon (1957a) pp61-78. See also Becker (1967);
Lindblom (1980) ppll-39; Meltsner (1972); and Young (1977).
125 Lindblom (1959) p81.
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spending should be cut and where spending cuts should fall. 
The second trait cites that cutback management in local 
authorities would be ridden with conflict between decision­
makers . There was much conflict between central government 
and local government, and between decision-makers in the 
four local authorities. The conflict centred largely around 
those actors who wanted to impose spending cuts and those * 
who wanted to resist spending cuts. The third trait 
suggests local authorities agree only on decisions to cut 
spending and not the objectives of decisions. In the four 
local authorities there was very little attempt to identify 
and agree upon objectives when making spending cuts. Though 
Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC embarked upon formal 
corporate exercises in setting their budgets, the budget 
process in Knowsley MBC collapsed and the budget process in 
Stockport MBC was dominated by the 'sweat shop' where 
changes in spending and not objectives of spending 
decisions were scrutinised. Spending cuts were made because 
key actors agreed to cut spending despite their different 
objectives in agreeing upon these decisions. The fourth 
trait claims that local authorities make spending cuts that 
only differ marginally from their previous year's spending. 
The four local authorities did not scrutinise their whole 
budgets, and scrutinised only the margins of their budgets. 
Spending cuts were marginal compared to their whole budget. 
The fifth trait predicts that local authorities would not 
engage in any significant planning of the process of 
cutback management. All four local authorities undertook 
very little planning, and at most planned one year ahead; 
and undertook financial rather than policy planning. The 
sixth trait argues local authorities would analyse 
decisions to cut spending in a limited and partisan manner. 
Analysis was confined to the margins of their budgets, and 
was structured, conducted and interpreted by partisan 
actors. The example of the partnership between Kent CC and 
Age Concern Kent to run day centres for the elderly 
emphasises both the limited and partisan nature of analysis *
in making spending cuts.
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Examining the incremental traits of cutback management
suggests that the incremental model of cutback management
offers a useful way of explaining how local authorities cut
spending. The experience of cutback management in the four
local authorities corresponded with the traits expected to
be displayed under the incremental model of cutback
management. In their study of local authority budgeting
Elcock, Jordan and Midwinter concluded:126
"For budgets do not lend themselves to 
technocratic or ideological solutions. Bargaining 
and negotiation, compromise and pragmatism, 
incrementalism and marginal changes remain the 
order of the day."
The incremental theory of cutback management appears to
provide a plausible basis on which to understand the making
of spending cuts in local government. The concluding
chapter will examine incrementalism as a theory of cutback
management in more detail.
126 Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pl88. See also 
Cope (1992); Elcock (1991) ppll9-121; Ibrahim & Proctor
(1992a); and Ibrahim & Proctor (1992b) pp54, 58.
CHAPTER EIGHT
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This concluding chapter assesses the plausibility of both 
the rationalist and incremental models of cutback 
management outlined in the previous two chapters. The 
examination of rationalist and incremental traits of 
cutback management suggests the incremental model provides 
a better basis than the rationalist model of cutback 
management in explaining how the four local authorities cut 
spending. However, cutback management traits, whether 
rationalist or incremental, do not constitute a theory of 
cutback management. They assist in describing and observing 
how local authorities made spending cuts without explaining 
why they cut spending in the way they did. This chapter 
compares the two models of decision-making in order to 
construct a framework of analysis. It then examines the 
strengths and weaknesses of the rationalist and incremental 
theories of cutback management. It argues that, though more 
plausible than the rationalist model, the incremental model 
faces significant shortcomings in explaining cutback 
management in local government. As a result a more robust 
and sophisticated theory of cutback management in local 
government is developed and examined. The chapter provides 
theoretical analysis to complement the preceding empirical 
analysis of cutback management in local government.
RATIONALIST AND INCREMENTAL DECISION-MAKING COMPARED
Theories of cutback management have been largely rooted in 
either rationalist or incremental theories of decision­
making. Much nonsense has been written on these two 
theories of decision-making. It is important this nonsense 
is exposed before assessing the viability of these two 
models of cutback management in local government. It is 
necessary to avoid the pitfalls into which others have 
fallen. There are three main areas of confusion in the
383
debate between the rationalist and incremental camps.
First, the rationalist model of decision-making is often 
presented in ideal terms of what should be the case, 
whereas the incremental model is often seen in terms of 
what is the case. As a result the two models are often not 
applied at the same level. The rationalist model is usually 
applied at a prescriptive level, and the incremental model 
at a descriptive level.1 It is widely argued budgeting in 
local authorities is best explained by the incremental 
model, but they should aspire to the rationalist model. The 
rationalist model of decision-making "may be a lot more 
useful in policy justification than in policy derivation."2 
It is important that the rationalist and incremental 
positions are presented in a comparable light. The
rationalist and incremental models of cutback management 
have been outlined and explored in the previous two
chapters. This chapter compares their viability in
explaining cutback management in local government in the 
light of empirical analysis.
Second, both rationalists and incrementalists claim 
rationality on their side. Rationalists, with a slip of 
their pen, often write about the rational model of 
decision-making as if they have a monopoly claim on the 
idea of rationality.3 The patent on the concept of 
rationality does not belong solely to the rationalists. 
Incrementalists, such as Dahl and Lindblom, talk about
"rational incrementalism", but are generally more modest
1 See Booth (1988) pl3; Brown & Steel (1979) ppl74-196; 
Hudson (1992) pl96; and Smith & May (1980) ppl54-156.
2 Leach (1982) p9.
3 For example, see Leach (1982).
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about their claims on the idea of rationality.4 A rational
action is widely regarded as an action designed to achieve
a purpose. Following Laver, rationality "is seen as trying
to get what you want, whatever that may be."5 According to
Dahl and Lindblom:6
"An action is rational to the extent that it is 
"correctly" designed to maximize goal
achievement, given the goal in question and the 
real world as it exists."
The label of rationality in a decision-making context is 
attached to the decision itself not to the way in which it • 
was made. A decision is rational in the sense that it 
achieves some given and desired purpose of the person 
making the judgement. Rationality is therefore concerned 
with the substance rather than the procedure of decision­
making. It is concerned with the outcome not the method of 
decision-making.
Both the rationalist and incremental models are methods of 
decision-making. Some writers, such as Simon, have made the 
distinction between substantive and procedural
4 Dahl & Lindblom (1976). p85. They argued that 
incrementalism is an important aid to rational calculation. 
((1976) pp57-92).
5 Laver (1981) p25.
6 Dahl Sc Lindblom (1976) p38. This view of rationality 
corresponds to the 'thin theory' of rationality which 
"leaves unexamined the beliefs and the desires that form 
the reasons for the action whose rationality we are 
assessing", unlike the 'broad theory' which requires that 
"the beliefs and desires be rational in a more substantive 
sense" (Elster (1983) pi). On rationality see, for example, 
Carley (1980) ppl0-20; Dahl & Lindblom (1976) pp38-40;
Dillon (1976) p52; Dowding (1991) ppl7-29; Downs (1957)
pp4-ll; Dryzek (1987); Elster (1986) p6; Harsanyi (1976) 
pp89-117; Harsanyi (1977); Hindess (1988); Hindess (1989) 
pp44-65, 122-140, 167-184; Laver (1981) pp21-38; Levine,
Musheno & Palumbo (1975) pp89-90; McLean (1987) pp3, 196; 
Oakeshott (1962) pp80-110; Self (1975) ppl96-197; Simon
(1955); Simon (1957a) pp75-77; Smith (1976) pp23-25; and 
Spiers (1975) ppl44-145.
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rationality.7 Substantive rationality is concerned with the 
decision itself, and procedural rationality with the way 
the decision was made. If this distinction is possible, the 
rationalist and incremental models of decision-making are 
perhaps forms of procedural rationality. But this claim 
falls down because the distinction between substantive and 
procedural rationality is artificial. The outcome of 
decision-making (its substance) cannot be separated from 
the method of decision-making (its procedure). Following 
Dowding:8
"Outcomes are the results of processes and 
processes are the outcomes of other processes. We 
cannot study one without the other."
A rational procedure can make only a rational decision. If
an irrational decision is made, the procedure itself cannot
be rational. The procedure of decision-making can be
rational only if it produces rational decisions. The test .
of rationality is the decision itself, that is, the
substance not the procedure of decision-making. Rationality
is a label attached to the outcome not to the method of
decision-making. The rationalist and incremental methods of
decision-making are not inherently rational, and can be
judged rational only to the extent that they produce
decisions which satisfy the desired goals. They are not
roads to the citadel of rationality, but simply different
ways of making decisions which may or may not be rational.
They are not guarantees of rational decision-making. Both
rationalists and incrementalists cannot therefore claim
rationality on their side in advance of the decisions being
made.
Third, the rationalist and incremental models are often . 
presented as static and contradictory views of decision­
7 See Simon (1976); and Simon (1982) .
8 Dowding (1994) pl!2.
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making.9 This presentation is misleading because the two 
models are only competing paradigms of decision-making. 
They are not mutually exclusive, though they are 
sufficiently distinctive to each form the basis of an 
analytical framework.10 The models are best understood by 
dissecting them along the lines of two critical dimensions 
- namely, the level of analysis and interaction and the 
level of comprehensiveness and selectiveness involved in 
making a decision. These two dimensions are portrayed in 
the diagram below.
Diagram 8.1; Dimensions of the Rationalist and
Incremental Models of Decision-Making
COMPREHENSIVENESS
incremental/
rationalist
rationalist
ANALYSIS INTERACTION
rationalist/
incremental
incremental
SELECTIVENESS
From this diagram a rationalist decision is characterised 
by a high level of analysis and comprehensiveness, and an 
incremental decision by a high level of interaction and 
selectiveness. Furthermore, if a decision is characterised 
b y ; a high level of analysis and selectiveness or a high 
level of interaction and comprehensiveness, the decision is 
part rationalist and part incremental. The rationalist and
9 See Booth (1988) pl3.
10 See Manzer (1984) .
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incremental models are not polarised views of decision­
making. Indeed, Simon wrote about 'bounded rationality', 
and Lindblom about 'incremental analysis'.11 The 
rationalist and incremental models are merely competing 
rather than contradictory views of decision-making. Both 
models will be tested as theories of cutback management in 
local government.
RATIONALIST AND INCREMENTAL CUTBACK MANAGEMENT COMPARED
In the previous two chapters the rationalist and 
incrementalist traits of cutback management were identified 
and applied in the way Bedfordshire CC, Kent CC, Knowsley 
MBC and Stockport MBC made spending cuts. Furthermore, 
existing research and literature on cutback management in 
local government were surveyed and tested in light of the 
empirical evidence collected from the four local 
authorities. This section compares and assesses the 
rationalist and incremental theories of cutback management 
in local government.
As argued, it is a mistake to see the rationalist and 
incremental models as two opposing views of cutback 
management. The two models are competing and alternative 
but not opposite views of cutback management. On one hand 
the rationalist model stresses the importance of analysis 
and comprehensiveness, and on the other hand the 
incremental model stresses the importance of interaction 
and selectiveness in decision-making. There are many links 
between the two models.
First, it is difficult if not impossible to make a rigid
11 See Simon (1957a) pp61-109 and Lindblom (1979)
respectively.
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separation between analysis and interaction in the 
decision-making process.12 Though analysis is often 
portrayed as a guarantee of rationality and interaction of 
feasibility, they are intertwined. The empirical 
examination of how the four local authorities cut spending 
illustrates the interplay between analysis and interaction. 
Analysis of spending cuts was never a technical exercise 
carried out in a neutral and objective manner. Analysis was 
always partisan. The interaction of actors in making 
spending cuts was invariably underpinned by analysis, 
especially analysis carried out by officers employed by the 
local authorities. However, the analysis used by the actors 
was incremental analysis, which fell short of the synoptic 
analysis assumed by the rationalist model.13 It never 
possessed the completeness of rationalist analysis.
Second, it is not very useful to make a distinction between
comprehensiveness and selectiveness because the ideal of
comprehensiveness can never be attained.14 The limited
pursuit of comprehensiveness is inherently recognised in
Simon's concept of 'bounded rationality'.15 Indeed,
Lindblom argued:16
"No person, committee, or research team, even 
with all the resources of modern electronic 
computation, can complete the analysis of a 
complex problem. Too many interacting values are 
at stake, too many possible alternatives, too 
many consequences to be traced through an 
uncertain future - the best we can do is achieve 
partial analysis or, in Herbert Simon's term, a 
"bounded rationality"."
Incrementalists, such as Lindblom, prefer realistic
12 See Gregory (1989) ppl40-146.
13 See Lindblom (1979) .
14 See Braybrooke & Lindblom (1970) p39; Holtham & 
Stewart (1981) pp21-23; and Leach (1982) ppl3-14.
15 Simon (1957a) pxxiv.
16 Lindblom (1979) p518. See also Wildavsky (1986) plO.
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selectiveness to idealistic comprehensiveness, and regard 
a variety of simplifying strategies as necessary ways of 
managing complexity in decision-making.
Third, the rationalist and incremental models of decision­
making both assume decision-makers are goal-directed. In 
the rationalist model decision-makers determine their goals 
before searching for and implementing the means that best 
achieves the desired ends. In the incremental model though 
decision-makers need not agree on the goals to be achieved 
they do pursue goals, often implicitly stated, in agreeing 
upon decisions. Many critics of incrementalism argue it 
discounts the pursuit of goals by decision-makers.17 
Forester believed "the incrementalist formulation could 
have us cross and recross intersections without knowing 
where we are going."18 However, Lindblom has always argued 
decision-makers are goal-directed. He noted "one 
simultaneously chooses a policy to attain certain 
objectives and chooses the objectives themselves."19 The 
incremental and rationalist models accept that goals direct 
the behaviour of decision-makers, but differ on how the 
goals are articulated in decision-making.
There is common ground between the rationalist and 
incremental models of decision-making. However, it is 
imperative to resist the temptation of constructing a fused 
model combining the facets of both models. Their fusion 
would represent only a conceptual nicety, because the two 
models are sufficiently distinctive in application.
According to Forester, the rationalist and incremental 
models are both applicable in different situations. He
17 For a review of the criticisms, see Weiss &
Woodhouse (1992) pp258-260.
18 Forester (1984) p23. See also Etzioni (1967) p387.
19 Lindblom (1959) p82.
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argued "what is practical - and rational - to do in a 
situation depends in part upon the structure of that 
situation."20 The rationalist model is applicable only when 
decision-making is "at its most simple."21 Forester 
explained:22
"Assume that there is only one agent to consider 
and that he or she is a utility-maximizing, 
economically rational actor, the decision-maker.
The setting is simply the decision-maker's 
office, by assumption a closed system unto 
itself. The problem is well-defined; its scope, 
time horizon, value dimensions, and chains of 
consequences are clearly given or available from 
the closest file drawer. Information is perfect, 
accessible and comprehensible. Time is infinitely 
available."
As a situation becomes increasingly complex, the 
rationalist model becomes increasingly redundant and the 
incremental model gains explanatory force. The rationalist 
model breaks down as a plausible explanation of decision­
making as the number of decision-makers increases, as the 
range of interests represented widens, as the issue becomes • 
more intricate to understand, as information is exhausted 
and as time runs out. Complexity is the enemy of the 
rationalist model of decision-making. The incremental model 
is better equipped to handle complexity in decision-making. 
Forester argued:23
"Thrown into situations of great complexity, 
decision makers need theories to simplify their 
worlds, to suggest what is most important to 
attend to, what can safely and decently be 
neglected."
The applicability of the two models is dependent on the
20 Forester (1984) p25.
21 Forester (1984) p25.
22 Forester (1984) p25.
23 Forester (1984) p30. See also Danziger (1978b)
ppl25-126; Frohock (1979) pp50-52; Ibrahim (1993) p35;
Ibrahim & Proctor (1992a) ppll, 13-14, 15; Jackson (1982b) 
p!48; and Wildavsky (1964) ppll-16.
391
context of the decision-making situation. A combined model 
would fail to understand the context-dependent nature of 
decision-making.
In comparing the traits of the rationalist and incremental 
models, the four local authorities cut spending in ways 
that approximated the incremental model more than the 
rationalist model of cutback management. The rationalist 
model has very little explanatory power. There was very 
little analysis and comprehensiveness as assumed by the 
rationalist model on display in the four local authorities. 
Its main contribution to understanding how local 
authorities cut spending is that decision-makers pursue 
goals, and that experts play a key role in making decisions 
to reduce spending. But both these rationalist traits 
contain only a superficial element of plausibility, and can 
be better explained within the incremental model.
The incremental model accepts decision-makers pursue goals, 
by stressing the process of interaction between decision­
makers representing different interests and thus pursuing 
different goals. But whereas the rationalist model focuses 
its attention upon these goals in the form of means-end 
analysis, the incremental model focuses on the decision 
itself and not the goals achieved by the decision. The 
incremental model explains the prominence of experts in 
decision-making by the process of interaction in which 
decision-makers make spending cuts. Experts, most notably 
the highly professionalised officers employed by local 
authorities, possess information upon which councillors are 
very dependent in making decisions. Experts, therefore, 
exercise much influence over decisions to cut spending. The 
two most plausible rationalist traits that decision-makers 
pursue goals and experts are prominent in making spending 
cuts are better explained by the incremental model of 
cutback management.
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The spending cuts made by the four local authorities were 
the outcome of interactions between different decision­
makers such as leading politicians and professionals in 
local authorities, ministers and civil servants in central 
government, and trade unionists. As watchdogs of particular 
interests they defended and promoted their interests. The 
decisions to cut spending reflected the balance of power 
between decision-makers. Their power varied widely from the 
more powerful ruling councillors and professional officers 
to the less powerful trade unionists and clients of local 
authority services. Clapham argued local authorities made 
spending cuts "where they were administratively and 
politically feasible, rather than where they could be most 
effectively made in terms of client need."24
None of the four local authorities assessed the needs and 
demands of its clients in making spending cuts. They 
claimed spending cuts would not significantly harm service 
provision and therefore hurt their clienteles, but these 
claims were largely made to legitimise the decisions made 
by vested interests in the local authorities. Clients of 
local authority services generally have little power to 
protect their interests in the rounds of spending cuts. In 
making budgets service departments frequently warn of the 
dire consequences of threatened spending cuts to warn off 
the preying eyes of finance departments and councillors 
searching for spending cuts. It is, according to Jorgensen, 
"a typical trait of retrenchment protest to parade the 
client consequences."25 However, after the budget has been 
spent the same departments often congratulate themselves on 
how they have managed to maintain service provision despite 
spending cuts.
24 Clapham (1983) p31.
25 Jorgensen (1987a) pl97. See also Burton (1985) pp89-
90.
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For example, the Chief Executive of Kent CC warned future 
spending cuts could not be made without affecting service 
provision because "the possibility of finding reductions by 
increased efficiency and savings - although not exhausted - 
will not be sufficient."26 But later the Chief Executive 
praised the Council's "constant drive for efficiency" which 
produced many of the savings required to restrain its
spending, and proclaimed "a very real improvement in 
productivity and efficiency" though acknowledging that "it 
has not been possible to make all of these savings without 
affecting some services and staff".27 These contrasting 
statements made by the Chief Executive illustrate the ways 
in which claims about 'looking after the interests of the 
client', 'putting the consumer first' and 'serving the
public' are manipulated to support the interests of more 
powerful actors. Officers flag up the interests of their 
clients when they defend their budgets, and flag them down 
when they account for their spending. The dominant 
decision-makers within local authorities in pursuing their 
interests need to legitimise their self-interested actions 
by sheltering behind altruism and ideology - the caring 
concern for client needs and the ideology of consumerism 
provide useful cloaks for shelter.
Budgeting is "the institutionalised form of bargaining for 
resources within councils".28 This process of bargaining, 
as seen in the four local authorities, was almost
monopolised by a few decision-makers. Stewart believed that
in budgeting the "most powerful influences lie inside the 
local authority, in the dominant interests and in the 
values, assumptions and beliefs written by those interests
26 Taken from Kent CC's Report And Accounts 1982-83,
p4.
27 Taken from Kent CC's Annual Report 1984-85. p3.
28 Clarke & Cochrane (1989) p43. See also Greenwood, 
Hinings & Ranson (1977) pp25, 27; and Natchez & Bupp (1973) 
p955.
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into the workings of the local authority."29 Budgets 
reflect the power-struggle between dominant decision­
makers, and the outcomes of these struggles depend on the 
structure of the budgetary arena. A useful comparison 
between Kent CC and Stockport MBC demonstrates that the 
budgetary arena shapes budgetary outcomes.
Both Kent CC and Stockport MBC wanted to reduce the school 
cleaning budget.30 In Kent CC the ruling Conservative Group 
overcame trade union resistance and privatised school 
cleaning to cut spending. In Stockport MBC the ruling 
Conservative Group wanted to negotiate a productivity deal 
with the trade unions to make cost savings. It failed to 
secure an agreement with them because the trade unions 
enlisted the support of the Labour Group and the Liberal 
Group. When the Council became 'hung' the decision to 
reduce the school cleaning budget was overturned. In Kent 
CC the Conservative Group was not dependent upon the 
support of trade unions and other party groups; in 
Stockport MBC the Conservative Group was dependent on the 
support of other party groups. Thus, the same decision to 
reduce the school cleaning budget, made by the same 
political party controlling the two local authorities, and 
opposed by the same trade union in both local authorities 
produced different budget outcomes because of the different 
structure of bargaining in the two local authorities.
The examination of how the four local authorities cut 
spending tends to support the thesis of incrementalism. The 
theory of incrementalism remains robust enough to explain 
how local authorities make decisions to cut spending. The 
robustness of incrementalism is not surprising given the 
complexity involved in making these kind of decisions.
29 Stewart (1983) p200.
30 On Kent CC's decision to contract-out school 
cleaning see chapter five; and on Stockport MBC's review of 
its school cleaning budget see chapter four, p229.
395
Competing actors, conflicting interests, information gaps, 
time pressures, resource constraints and statutory controls 
complicated decision-making in the local authorities. The 
rationalist model of decision-making cannot handle such 
complexity.31 Incrementalism is a way of simplifying the 
making of complex decisions. Danziger noted the 
"incremental approach characterizes the decision-maker's 
response to a complex problem."32 Faced with complexity 
decision-makers turn to incremental strategies of making 
decisions.
The incremental model of cutback management provides a 
plausible explanation of how local authorities made 
decisions to cut spending.33 This view sits uncomfortably 
with the conventional wisdom about the nature of local 
authority budgeting in times of fiscal stress. There is an 
emerging but dominant view that budgeting becomes less 
incremental and more rationalist in times of sustained 
financial restraint.34 The conventional wisdom pervading 
both American and European literature argues that though 
budgeting is still essentially incremental it is less 
incremental. According to Bozeman and Straussman, the 
"explanatory power of incrementalism is diminished" in 
times of shrinking budgets.35 Greenwood argued 
incrementalism has lost some of its potency in the era of 
cutback management. He concluded "fiscal pressure is 
commonly associated with a limited but discernible movement 
away from incrementalism."36 Similarly Greenwood, Hinings,
31 Forester (1984) .
32 Danziger (1976) p335.
33 See chapter seven, footnote 126.
34 See chapter six, footnote 104.
35 Bozeman & Straussman (1982) p514.
36 Greenwood (1983) pl68.
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Ranson and Walsh argued:37
"Budgetary famine . . . decreases the likelihood of 
incremental budgeting."
In Britain much of the conventional wisdom has stemmed from 
the work of the Institute of Local Government Studies 
(INLOGOV). Its rationalist leanings are not surprising 
given the 'INLOGOV camp' played a major role in promoting 
corporate management in local government in the 1970s, 
which was seen as the embodiment of the rationalist model 
of decision-making.38 The conventional wisdom has been 
bolstered by the theoretical work of Jorgensen, which has 
been applied by several writers on cutback management.39 
Jorgensen constructed a phasing model of cutback 
management, which assumes cutback management becomes less 
incremental and more rationalist over time. He outlined 
three phases of cutback management - the 'incrementalist 
phase', the 'management phase' and the 'strategic phase'.
In the 'incrementalist phase' the decision-maker
experiences retrenchment for the first time, and in the
belief that it is a temporary phenomenon the decision-maker
adopts the quick and easy methods of incrementalism in
making cutbacks. Jorgensen argued:40
"The retrenchment demand is experienced as an 
isolated occurence [sic], and it is thought, 
perhaps, that the problem can be solved by a 
little hike in next year's estimates. Thus the 
time horizon is narrow. There is no need,
37 Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1980) p46.
38 See Dearlove (1979) ppll3-259; Department of the 
Environment (1972); Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh 
(1976); Greenwood & Stewart (1974); Greenwood, Walsh, 
Hinings, and Ranson (1980); Stewart (1971); and Stewart
(1974) .
39 See Jorgensen (1984); and Jorgensen (1987b). On its 
application see Dunsire & Hood (1989) ppl70-186; Jordan
(1987) pp!6-17; and Midwinter (1988) p24.
40 Jorgensen (1987b) pp20-21.
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therefore, for drastic considerations about 
reprioritizing, the structure of the 
organization's objectives and the like. In such 
a situation it may be expected that the search 
process will be marginal, since the decision­
making costs are hereby rendered minimal."
In the 'management phase' the incremental search for
cutbacks has been exhausted, and the decision-maker looks
to greater managerial efficiency as a way of coping with
continuing retrenchment. Jorgensen noted:41
"Whereas in the incremental phase whittling away 
here and there at isolated objects, where the 
consequences are least felt, reflects a 
conception of the organization as consisting of 
a number of loosely connected and independent 
activities, the organization is conceived of in 
the management phase as a production system 
consisting of interlocking activities.... This 
means that the retrenchment search process is 
directed towards securing internal productivity.
This can be done in two ways. Firstly, internal 
conditions can be regulated to maintain the same 
production with fewer costs.... On the output 
side the service level can be "adjusted" by 
gradual reductions, standardization and the
like.... In both cases the search process is 
directed towards the organization's structure and 
processes."
In the 'strategic phase' the managerial search for greater
efficiency has become bogged down as actors defend their
budgets, the decision-maker then turns to the more
"troublesome" but "necessary" task of establishing "genuine
priorities among objectives."42 Jorgensen contended:43
"The retrenchment search process is now
characterized by two conditions: an increasing 
demand on the part of one or more interested 
parties for rational decision-making, and 
increased conflict. When the need to prioritize 
means chosing [sic] between activity X and 
activity Y, the tendency to use the "tools of 
rationality" (planning, cost-benefit analysis, 
information systems and the like) will be
fortified. ...1
41 Jorgensen (1987b) pp22-23.
42 Jorgensen (1987b) p23.
43 Jorgensen (1987b) p24.
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The examination of cutback management in Bedfordshire CC, 
Kent CC, Knowsley MBC and Stockport MBC does not support 
the rationalist view of cutback management even if 
expressed in the more sophisticated terms of Jorgensen's 
phasing model. Though the research was not a longitudinal 
study of cutback management, there was no discernible 
evidence that the four local authorities were entering into 
a 'management phase' or a 'strategic phase' after a 
sustained period of fiscal pressure going back to the 
1970s. Jordan also questioned the applicability of 
Jorgensen's model of cutback management.44 In applying this 
phasing model at the level of central government Dunsire 
and Hood concluded:45
"No great confidence can be placed in the
exercise."
The rationalist model of cutback management, however 
formulated, is a flawed view of how local authorities cut 
spending. It is built on comprehensiveness and analysis. In 
a local authority there are many competing decision-makers 
protecting their conflicting interests in the rounds of 
spending cuts. The rationalist model is both simplistic and 
apolitical. It is simplistic because comprehensiveness can 
never be achieved. A decision-maker is constrained by a 
lack of time, money, information and other resources.46 The 
rationalist model is apolitical because analysis is never 
confined to a single decision-maker with a single set of 
goals, objectives and priorities.47 There are many 
decision-makers representing different interests which
44 See Jordan (1987) ppl6-17.
45 Dunsire & Hood (1989) pl87.
46 At most a decision-maker can strive for a form of 
'bounded rationality' or 'selective rationality' . See Leach
(1982) pl3; and Simon (1957a) pxxiv.
47 For example, Spiers argued apolitically that "value 
systems . . . count as limits on the circumstances within 
which any choice may be made" ((1975) pl46).
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necessarily politicise the analysis underpinning decisions 
to cut spending. The proponents of the conventional wisdom 
do not dig deep enough for explanation. Moves towards a 
rationalist style of cutback management in local 
authorities, say, by increasing the analysis of the base 
budget and centralising the manner of decision-making, Were 
only moves by decision-makers to protect their interests by 
restructuring the decision-making process. Greenwood, 
Hinings, Ranson and Walsh witnessed the emergence of 
'corporate rationality' in their study of local authority 
decision-making.48 But, as Cockburn forcefully argued, 
moves towards corporate management were instituted by 
dominant interests in local government to "keep down costs" 
and "manage scarce resources".49
The incremental model, in contrast, provides a more robust
view of cutback management in local government. It captures
the essence of selectiveness and interaction prevalent in
cutback management. Tarschys acknowledged:50
"Classic incrementalism has shown great staying 
power and remains the dominant form of budgeting 
in virtually all political systems."
The incremental model offers the idea of 'cuttability' as
a useful way of understanding how and where spending cuts
fall - what is and what is not 'cuttable' depends on the
power-relations of the decision-makers making spending
cuts.51 'Cuttability' has an inverse correlation with the
power of the watchdog defending a particular item of
48 Greenwood, Hinings, Ranson & Walsh (1976).
49 Cockburn (1977) p65. See also Clapham (1983); and 
Dearlove (1979) ppll3-256.
50 Tarschys (1981) p52. See also Elcock, Jordan & 
Midwinter (1989) pll7; Greenwood (1984); Ibrahim & Proctor 
(1992a) pll; Kelly (1989) pl87; LeLoup (1978) p488; Schick .
(1983) ; Wildavsky (1964); Wildavsky (1978) ; Wildavsky
(1986) ; and Wildavsky (1988).
51 See Clapham (1983) p31; Pinkham & Platt (1980) p22; 
and Tarschys (1984) p255.
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spending. What is cut is not determined by any rationalist 
calculation of what needs to be cut but is determined by 
the interplay of decision-makers defending their interests. 
Glennerster argued the "first instinct of any service 
manager or spending department minister is to protect what 
exists."52 The more powerful decision-makers will deflect 
the axe to cut spending onto budgets defended by less
powerful decision-makers in the budget process.
This idea of 'cuttability7 explains why local authorities
cut capital spending far more drastically than revenue
spending.53 Wolman and Peterson predicted:54
"Expenditure reductions will be made in spending 
areas of least public visibility or whose
consequences can be deferred to the future. 
Expenditure reductions will come first in areas 
such as maintenance and capital outlays where the 
consequences of cutbacks are not immediately 
visible."
The County Architect of Bedfordshire CC conceded there was 
no lobby defending the repairs and maintenance budget 
unlike the social services, and as a result proportionally 
more cuts were made to his budget. There are no visible 
consumers of capital spending - there are no tenants
renting council houses not built, no motorists driving on 
roads not constructed, and no elderly living in residential 
homes not established. There are no visible producers of 
capital spending - there are no workers to sack nor 
contracts to terminate if future capital projects are
52 Glennerster (1980a) p373. See also Glennerster 
(1981) pl84.
53 The Audit Commission charted the massive cuts made 
in the capital spending of local authorities ((1985a) pi).
54 Wolman & Peterson (1980) p80. See also Glennerster 
(1980a) p373; Glennerster (1981) pl84; Kemp (1984) pl3;
Wildavsky (1964) pl03; Wolman & Davis (1980) p24; and
Wolman & Goldsmith (1987) pl81.
40.1
postponed or cancelled.55 Consequently, planned capital
schemes are prime targets for cutback because there are few
defenders and only potential, rather than actual,
beneficiaries of such schemes. Glennerster added:56
"Deferred building programmes do save real money 
now and will result in lower debt charges. They 
are certainly easiest to make in political terms, 
since no one need be sacked and few people will 
notice."
The determining factor in how local authorities make 
spending cuts is 'vulnerability' .57 Jorgensen formulated a 
useful typology of organisational vulnerability, which is 
reproduced in the diagram below.
Diagram 8.2: Organizational TvpoIoctv Based on 
Dimensions of Vulnerability
OPERATIONAL VULNERABILITY 
High Low
High squeezed broad-
shouldered
POLITICAL
VULNERABILITY
Low sensitive thriving
but secure
Source: Jorgensen (1987a) p200
55 Only in times of recession does the construction 
industry make calls on central government to undertake a 
major investment programme of the country's infrastructure 
and relax capital expenditure controls facing local • 
authorities.
56 Glennerster (1981) pl84. See also Glennerster 
(1980a) p373.
57 See Jorgensen (1987a) ppl93-201; Jorgensen (1987b) 
pp66-78; Rubin (1982) ppl21-124; Wolman (1982a) p77; and 
Wolman & Peterson (1980) p80.
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Political vulnerability refers to the political support
which organisations (or programmes) have, and operational
vulnerability refers to the consequences of cutback upon
organisations (or programmes). The thesis put forward by
Jorgensen is that spending cuts will fall on those
organisations (or programmes) that have the highest
political and operational vulnerability. The research on
how the four local authorities managed cutbacks largely
fits this thesis, though political vulnerability was
clearly more decisive than operational vulnerability in
determining where spending cuts fell in the local
authorities. In the words of Jorgensen:58
"If the budget authority takes a 'Machiavellian' 
approach, it will demand cut-backs where 
political vulnerability is highest. The screams 
will not be loud, the resistance will be modest, 
and the level of conflict will be low. From a 
politico-administrative viewpoint the task will 
be easy. It will affirm the so-called Matthew 
Effect: to those who have, more will be given; 
from those who have not, what little they have 
will be taken from them."
For example, Kent CC's decision to privatise school
cleaning confirmed the 'Matthew Effect',59 The money saved
from lower wages paid to the school cleaners employed by
the private contractors went ultimately to the private
contractors as higher profits and Kent ratepayers as lower
rates bills. Furthermore, in a survey of local authority
spending cuts in social services the Personal Social
Services Council found:60
"Little apparent attempt has been made to protect 
the most vulnerable groups."
The 'vulnerability' thesis is an extremely useful tool in
understanding cutback management, and fits with the
incremental view of cutback management.
58 Jorgensen (1987a) pl99.
59 See chapter five.
60 Personal Social Services Council (1979) p2.
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The incremental model provides a more plausible explanation
of how local authorities make spending cuts than the
rationalist model of cutback management. However,
Greenwood, Hinings and Ranson argued:61
"[Incrementalism] ... is depressingly weak as an 
explanatory theory, despite its considerable 
predictive force. There is no convincing 
narrative contained in the literature . . . that 
can explain either why incrementalism occurs at 
all, or why some systems are less incremental 
than others.... The implication is that 
incrementalism could be avoided, or reduced, by 
increasing the intellectual capacity of budgetary 
actors, or by reducing the complexity of the 
information at his disposal (e.g. by using a 
computer). That kind of explanation, however, 
simply will not do. Political theorists and 
organizational theorists are well aware that 
budgets are the outcome of clashes between 
entrenched interests.... A more adequate theory 
of budgeting, in other words, will have to be 
based upon the political features of 
organizational life, rather than upon the 
cognitive deficiencies of decision actors."
Though this critique contains a flawed conception of
incrementalism, it points to the weaknesses of the
incremental model in explaining decision-making.62 For
example, from within the incrementalist camp Elcock, Jordan
and Midwinter developed a 'cutback management ladder',
which is reproduced below.63
61 Greenwood, Hinings & Ranson (1977) pp26-27. See also 
Jackson (1982b) ppl57-164; Rosenberg (1985c) p205; and
Rosenberg (1989) p51.
62 This conception is flawed because it largely defines 
incrementalism as a response to the constraints upon a 
decision-maker to make decisions in a comprehensive manner. 
However, as argued in chapter seven, the incremental model 
of decision-making is characterised by interaction and 
selectiveness. Greenwood, Hinings and Ranson ignored 
interaction as a defining characteristic, which if included 
in their analysis, would have added a political dimension 
to their understanding of incrementalism.
63 Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) ppl77-179. See
also Danziger (1991); Elcock (1987b) pp7-9; Elcock (1991) 
ppl24-126; Glennerster (1980a) pp370-380; Glennerster
(1981) ppl81-193; Hogwood & Peters (1985) ppl50-152; Jordan 
(1987) ppl7-21; Midwinter (1988) p24; Newton (1980) p!85;
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Diagram 8.3: Ladder Of Cutback Management
Means adopted by local authorities to cope with 
financial pressure, in approximate order of severity.
SERVICE CUTS, COMPULSORY REDUNDANCIES 
SERVICE CUTS, VOLUNTARY REDUNDANCIES 
CASH LIMITS
USE PRIVATE SECTOR OR VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS TO SHIFT COSTS 
EFFICIENCY SAVINGS ('CUT BUREAUCRACY7)
CUT CAPITAL SPENDING 
CREATIVE ACCOUNTANCY 
'SORE THUMBS7/'SHROUD-WAVING7 
BUY TIME ('FAIRY GOLD7)
Source: Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pl78
According to Elcock, Jordan and Midwinter, "as financial 
pressure increases, local authorities will be driven more 
or less reluctantly up a 'ladder7 of actions which will 
cause progressively disruption and damage to the services 
they provide and the work conditions of their staff."64 
This approach provides only a superficial understanding of 
how local authorities cut spending. The empirical 
examination of cutback management in the four local 
authorities, though not constituting a longitudinal study, 
offers little supporting evidence for the existence of a 
'cutback management ladder7 in local government. All four 
local authorities restricted capital spending before 
adopting wholesale 'sore thumb7 and 'shroud-waving7 
tactics. Kent CC made many of its workers redundant in its 
decision to privatise school cleaning. Knowsley MBC used 
creative accounting in response to the 'shroud-waving7 of 
its Education Department and Education Committee. The
Tarschys (1983); Wolman (1982a) pp73-77; Wolman (1983) ;
Wolman & Davis (1980); Wolman & Peterson (1980); and Wolman 
& Peterson (1981).
64 Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pl77. See also *
Elcock (1991) pl24.
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'cutback management ladder' is too generalised to explain 
the considerable variations between and within local 
authorities in making spending cuts.
The incremental model of cutback management, as illustrated 
above, is vague on specifying the conditions within which 
decision-makers make decisions to cut spending. It is 
agnostic in explaining why decision-makers become involved, 
why they pursue their goals, and how power is distributed 
between them in making spending cuts. Nonetheless, 
incrementalism injects a necessary antidote to the 
rationalist trappings contained in much of the literature 
on cutback management. There is no science of cutback 
management; there is only politics of cutback management.
THEORISING ABOUT CUTBACK MANAGEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The theory of incrementalism is firmly part of the 
pluralist tradition.65 Another pluralist theory, the power- 
dependence model, has been extensively used to examine 
interorganisational relations, and especially relations 
between central and local government.66 This model, 
combined with the incremental model, provides the 
foundations of a more resilient model of cutback management 
in local government. According to Rhodes, the power-
65 See Brown & Steel (1979) pl91; Dahl & Lindblom
(1976); Dunleavy & O'Leary (1987) pp54-57; Greenaway, Smith 
& Street (1992) p27; Jordan (1990); Jordan & Richardson
(1987); Lindblom (1979) pp522-523; Lindblom (1980);
Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993); Low (1991) pp82-131;
Richardson & Jordan (1985); Rosenberg (1985c) p206;
Rosenberg (1989) p52; and Self (1985) pp95-98.
66 See Rhodes (1981); Rhodes (1985b); Rhodes (1986b); 
and Rhodes (1988) pp42-43.
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dependence model contains five propositions:67
"a) Any organisation is dependent upon other 
organisations for resources.
b) In order to achieve their goals. the
organisations have to exchange resources.
c) Although decision-making within the 
organisation is constrained by other 
organisations, the dominant coalition retains 
some discretion. The appreciative system of the 
dominant coalition influences which relationships 
are seen as a problem and which resources will be 
sought.
d) The dominant coalition employs strategies
within known rules of the game to regulate the 
process of exchange.
e) Variations in the degree of discretion are a
product of the goals and the relative power
potential of interacting organisations. This 
relative power potential is a product of the 
resources of each organisation, of the rules of 
the game and of the process of exchange between 
organisations."
These propositions of the power-dependence model, designed 
to analyse interorganisational relations generally and 
intergovernmental relations specifically, will be adapted 
to explain cutback management in local government. The 
refined model contains four main propositions:
1. Actors (either individuals or organisations) 
have interests and pursue goals that defend or 
promote their interests in making decisions. 
Actors without interests do not get involved in 
making decisions.
2. Actors possess resources that are used to 
protect their interests. Actors have resources of 
two kinds - resources that other actors want, and 
resources that other actors do not want. Actors 
with no resources cannot further their interests.
3. Actors are dependent upon other actors for 
their resources. Actors exchange resources to 
pursue their goals. Actors give resources that 
other actors want or do not give resources other 
actors do not want in exchange for resources.
67 Rhodes (1981) pp98-99.
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4. Actors make decisions. Decisions reflect the 
balance of power between the actors involved. 
Those actors whose interests coincide, and 
together possess sufficient resources, impose 
their decision on others outside this winning 
coalition. The outcome of decision-making is 
determined by the interests of the actors and the 
resources of the actors involved.
The first proposition states that actors possess interests, 
and therefore pursue goals to protect their interests. 
Polsby noted that "coming to an understanding of what the 
interests are of people in a community is not necessarily 
as easy as reading a gas meter."68 He summarised this 
complex debate by looking at two general views on what 
constitutes an interest. The first view is essentially 
liberal, which "accepts the choices or other revealed 
preferences of actors as defining their interests."69 This 
more conventional view assumes actors determine their own 
interests. The second and more radical view "maintains that 
observers are entitled to assert what conduct and what 
choices are in the interests of actors, regardless of the 
actors' own choice behavior."70 This view asserts that
68 Polsby (1980) p222. For a wider understanding of the 
concept of interest see, for example, Balbus (1971); Benton 
(1981); Blowers (1984) pp215-222, 240-242, 251-252;
Connolly (1972); Connolly (1983) pp45-83; Dowding (1991)
pp3 0 - 46; Gurr & King (1987) ppl3-20; Ham & Hill (1993)
pp72-78; Hindess (1989) pp36-41, 66-85; Lukes (1974) pp34- 
35; Polsby (1980) pp219-232; Saunders (1983) pp21-65; Self 
(1975) ppl08-112; Thomson (1987) pp63-76; and Wall (1975).
69 Polsby (1980) p222. Lukes argued this view "takes 
men as they are and applies want-regarding principles to 
them, relating their interests to what they actually want 
or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by 
their political participation" ((1974) p34). He adds a 
second more reformist but still liberal view by 
acknowledging that interests "may be revealed in more 
indirect and sub-political ways - in the form of deflected, 
submerged or concealed wants and preferences" ((1974) p34).
70 Polsby (1980) p222. Lukes argues that "men's wants 
may themselves be a product of a system which works against 
their interests, and in such cases, relates the latter to 
what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the
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actors cannot determine their own interests because of 
wider structural constraints preventing or manipulating 
their articulation.
Both views are useful in understanding what actors get 
involved in making spending cuts in local government. The 
liberal view is useful because actors become involved in 
decision-making when their self-determined interests are 
affected. Greenwood, Hinings and Ranson adopted this view 
when they defined an interest as "a motivation to defend or 
enhance particular organizational resources."71 In 
decision-making an interested actor thus has a disposition 
to act in one way over other ways in order to secure 
advantage. The key actors involved in making spending cuts 
in local authorities were the ruling party groups (or the 
coalition of party groups in 'hung' local authorities) on 
the councillor side, and departments on the officer side. 
These leading actors possessed different interests, which 
manifested themselves in the pursuit of different goals. 
The ruling party group was concerned primarily to preserve 
its rule. It therefore needed to secure sufficient 
electoral support to win elections, party support to retain 
the backing of the wider political party, and 
administrative support to provide services. The department 
was concerned primarily to provide services. It therefore 
needed to secure sufficient professional support to shape 
policy, bureaucratic support to deliver services, and 
political support to sanction service provision. The ruling 
party group and departments were dependent upon each other 
for support.72 Their power was dependent upon mutual 
support.
choice" ((1974) p34).
71 Greenwood, Hinings & Ranson (1977) p30.
72 Stoker labelled this coalition between leading 
councillors and officer as the 'joint elite' (see (1988) 
pp86-89; and (1991) pp92-95).
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These key actors were also dependent upon more distant but 
still influential actors, such as trade unions, 
professional associations, pressure groups, businesses, 
voters, ratepayers, local and national media, consumers of 
local authority services, school governors, local authority 
associations, political parties, courts, central government 
and other government agencies (eg the Audit Commission). 
This casting list constitutes what Dunleavy called the 
'national local government system', and what Rhodes called 
the 'national world of local government'.73 Dunleavy argued 
that local authorities "do not make decisions about most 
aspects of policy in isolation", and that they are part of 
"the complex web of inter- and supra-authority relations 
which can exert a strong influence on the policies pursued 
in particular localities."74 Thus, there were starring 
actors within local authorities who interacted over 
decisions to cut spending, and not-so-far behind the scenes 
there were other actors influencing the lines of the lead 
actors. Central government controls over local government 
spending unleashed rounds of spending cuts in local 
authorities. Professional associations, such as the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 
shaped the advice that officers gave to councillors on 
making spending cuts.75 As a result of the influence of 
these outside actors, their interests were represented 
inside the local authority.
73 See Dunleavy (1980) ppl05-110; Hampton (1991) ppl54- 
172; Rhodes (1983); Rhodes (1986c); and Rhodes (1988). 
These concepts though useful are limited because of 
international actors which increasingly impinge on local 
authorities, eg European Union, multinational companies.
74 Dunleavy (1980) pl05.
75 See Clarke & Cochrane (1989); Dunleavy (1980) ppllO- 
119, 146-147; Elcock (1983); Elcock (1986b) pp298-303;
Elcock, Jordan & Midwinter (1989) pp79-86; Kingdom (1991) 
ppl37-154; Laffin (1986a); Laffin (1986b); Laffin & Young 
(1990) ; Rhodes (1988) ppl87-191; Rosenberg (1984);
Rosenberg (1985b); and Rosenberg (1989).
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The radical view of what constitutes an interest is helpful 
in understanding who gets involved in decision-making. It 
recognises that some potential actors do not get involved 
because they are not aware of their 'real' interests. 
Notwithstanding the considerable methodological problems in 
identifying these budding actors and their 'real' 
interests, this view provides at least a useful counter to 
the more conventional liberal view by acknowledging that 
some actors did not participate in making decisions to cut 
local authority spending because they were unaware of their 
interests or their interests were affected by what was 
going on in the local authorities. This view is a necessary 
antidote to the sometimes complacent assumptions made by 
pluralist and other liberal writers. For example, Lindblom 
once observed "every important interest or value has its 
watchdog."76 Newton countered that pluralism "tends to work 
on the assumption that each and every interest is equally 
capable of organizing and defending itself."77 Though this 
observation has been qualified by many writers, including 
Lindblom later, there is still a tendency in much research 
on decision-making to focus solely on the actors involved 
in making decisions without understanding why some actors 
are involved and others are not.78 The exclusion of some 
actors is not simply a matter of powerlessness but also a 
matter of non-determination of interests. The radical view 
challenges the conventional view of what constitutes an 
interest, and suggests there are some actors whose 
interests are not articulated or represented in the 
decision-making process. Hence the perception of interests 
was a crucial determinant of who became involved in the
76 Lindblom (1959) p85.
77 Newton (1976) p228.
78 See Bachrach & Baratz (1963); Bachrach & Baratz 
(1970) PP39-51; Dunleavy & O'Leary (1987) ppl3-71, 271-318; 
Ham Sc Hill (1984) pp22-44, 61-75; Lindblom (1980) ; and
Saunders (1975).
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making of decisions to cut local authority spending.79
The perception of interests by the actors involved in 
making spending cuts often led to conflict. Generally 
conflicts between the key actors in cutting local authority 
spending can be explained because of their competing and 
conflicting interests, and consequently their competing and 
conflicting objectives they pursued. In making spending 
cuts there was much conflict (and latent conflict) between 
actors representing different interests in local 
authorities.80
The second proposition of the model suggests that actors 
deploy resources in their possession to protect their 
perceived interests and further their goals. Dahl defined 
resources as "anything that can be used to sway the 
specific choices or the strategies of another 
individual."81 There are many kinds of resources, such as 
force, money, expertise, skill, reputation, legal 
authority, organisational control and popular support.82 
Resources, however, are not fixed. They are what other 
actors want, and therefore can be deployed as inducements; 
or they are what other actors do not want, and therefore
79 In this research on making spending cuts in four 
local authorities it was not possible to operationalise the 
radical view by identifying actors who were not involved 
but perhaps should have been involved if they had realised 
their real interests. However, the radical view at least 
raises important questions about who gets involved even if 
it cannot provide answers.
80 In looking at spending cuts made by social services 
departments of local authorities Kelly reached a similar 
conclusion. He explained the incidence of spending cuts in 
terms of the "micro-political interests of politicians, 
managers, professionals and consumers" and "their capacity 
to mobilise power to pursue their competing rationalities" 
((1989) p208) .
81 Dahl (1961) p226.
82 See Burch & Wood (1989) pp53-83; Dowding (1991) p67; 
Rhodes (1981) ppl00-101; and Rhodes (1988) pp90-91.
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can be deployed as threats.83 Actors possess resources, 
though some have more resources at their disposal than 
others. Furthermore, actors can accumulate resources. Dahl 
noted:84
"Political man can use his resources to gain 
influence, and he can then use his influence to 
gain more resources. Political resources can be 
pyramided in much the same way that a man who 
starts out in business sometimes pyramids a small 
investment into a large corporate empire."
Resources were not distributed evenly between actors.
Councillors of the ruling party group controlled the
statutory authority to take decisions in council meetings,
and had a degree of electoral support to legitimise its
decisions. Chief officers of service departments possessed
professional expertise to provide services, exerted
managerial control within their departments, and had access
to councillors. Chief executives and treasurers possessed
expertise (notably financial expertise), and developed
links with service departments and party groups (with
privileged access to their leadership).
In a game of cards the players (actors) are dealt a hand of
cards (resources) . As the game progresses the cards that
the players hold changes to the advantage of some players
at the expense of others. Some players are more skilled in
playing the same hand of cards than others. The skill
involved in playing cards constitutes a resource possessed
by those players. Morriss stated:85
"When considering epistemic power we ... need to 
consider the skill with which the actor can 
handle his resources. Muscles alone do not make 
champion shot-putters; rich men can conduct take­
over bids stupidly; and large and well-equipped
83 Morriss noted most resources "are resources only if 
others recognize them as such; if the things that they can 
be used to provide are valued by the potential recipients" 
((1987) pl39).
84 Dahl (1961) p227.
85 Morriss (1987) p!38.
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armies . . . can be routed by far inferior forces." 
Actors possess different skills and choose different 
tactics in the way they deploy their resources to protect 
their interests. Furthermore, actors do not always know the 
tactics and resources of other actors.86 The leading actors 
involved in cutting spending of the four local authorities 
possessed different skills in deploying their resources. 
These tactical skills were another resource that was 
deployed in making spending cuts. For example, in Kent CC 
the skill of the trade unions representing the school 
cleaners must be questioned.87 Several councillors of the 
ruling Conservative Group, plus a few officers in the 
Education Department, wanted school cleaning to remain in- 
house. The trade unions, by withdrawing their bid, gave the 
Council little choice other than to award the school 
cleaning contracts to private contractors.
The third proposition of the model cites that actors are 
dependent upon each other for resources. No actor is 
entirely independent of others. The interdependence between 
actors is asymmetrical because of the unequal distribution 
of resources between actors. Heath argued:88
"The basis for exchange ... is that each side has
something that the other wants."
As a result of interdependence actors must interact with 
each other to defend and promote their interests. 
Councillors possessing the legal authority to make 
decisions relied upon officers to advise and implement 
their decisions - service departments possessed specialised 
knowledge to provide services, and central departments
86 Dowding noted "the actual importance of reputation 
in game theory arises from asymmetries in players' 
knowledge", and "if all players had complete and perfect 
information then reputation would no longer be important" 
((1991) p76).
87 See chapter five.
88 Heath (1976) pl9.
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possessed vision to make corporate strategy. Officers 
though possessing expertise depended upon councillors for 
authority to implement their schemes. As a result 
councillors and officers deployed and exchanged resources 
to achieve their goals. Each side traded resources that the 
other side wanted or did not exchange resources that the 
other side did not want in return for resources it wanted. 
When their interests coincided, councillors exchanged 
approval in return for expertise from officers; and 
officers exchanged expertise in return for approval from 
councillors. When interests clashed, councillors and 
officers exchanged resources to win such conflicts. 
Councillors denied approval of what officers wanted, and 
authorised a different course of action; and officers 
denied councillors their expertise, and implemented a 
different decision from what councillors wanted.
This simplistic scenario, however, was complicated by the 
presence of many different actors possessing different 
interests and pursuing different goals. For example, in 
Stockport MBC if the finance department suspected that 
service departments were inflating their budgets, it 
directed the attention of the ruling Conservative Group to 
this padding.89 In Knowsley MBC the Borough Education 
Officer sought support for his resistance to cut spending 
from the Education Committee. This committee with its 
statutory quota of co-opted representatives drawn from the 
education world supported the chief officer in his conflict 
with the Chief Executive and the Borough Treasurer. But the 
Education Committee was later overruled by the ruling 
Labour Group which instructed the Chief Executive and the 
Borough Treasurer to cut the education budget. These two 
examples show the exchange of resources between different 
actors protecting their different interests. The outcome of 
these exchanges reflected the distribution of resources
89 Assistant Director of Finance, Stockport MBC.
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between actors and their interests in trading resources.
The fourth proposition of the model argues that a decision
reflects the balance of power between the actors involved.
Understanding what power is remains ambiguous, elusive and *
contested.90 Dowding distinguished "between the ability of
one actor to bring about or help bring about an outcome and
the ability of someone else to stop them."91 He argued:92
"The distinction between 'power over' and 'power 
to' may be described as 'outcome power' and 
'social power': the first because it is the power 
to bring about outcomes; the second for it 
necessarily involves a social relation between at 
least two people. Both are a species of political 
power and may be defined:
'outcome power' = the ability of an actor to
bring about or help to bring 
about outcomes,
'social power' = the ability of an actor
deliberately to change the 
incentive structure of 
another actor or actors to 
bring about, or help bring 
about outcomes."
Power, whether outcome power or social power, cannot be
measured by measuring the resources of actors involved in
making decisions. Being powerful involves more than
mobilising resources; it also involves effecting and
securing intended outcomes of decision-making, shaping and
manipulating interests of other actors, controlling and
filtering agendas of decision-making, and creating and
maintaining structures of decision-making.93 Following
90 On power see, for example, Bachrach & Baratz (1970) 
pp3-38; Boulding (1989); Clegg (1989); Connolly (1983) 
pp85-137; Cox, Furlong & Page (1985); Crozier (1973); Dahl 
(1957); Dahl (1991) ppl2-48; Dowding (1991); Elcock (1991) 
ppl89-203; Ham & Hill (1993) pp65-79; Hindess (1989) pp25- 
43; Lukes (1974); Morriss (1987); Pfeffer (1981); Polsby 
(1980); Poulantzas (1978); and Wrong (1979).
91 Dowding (1991) p90.
92 Dowding (1991) p48.
93 See Lukes (1974) .
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Morriss:94
"One obvious way to start studying power is by 
cataloguing the actors' resources. Doubtless some 
sociologists who have tried this have carelessly 
claimed or implied that resources themselves were 
power, thus falling into the vehicle fallacy.... 
Wealth is not political power ... since, whilst 
some people use their wealth to collect 
politicians, others can only collect 
paintings.... But there is a big difference 
between committing the vehicle fallacy by 
identifying power with the resources that give 
rise to it and acknowledging that resources can 
be useful evidence in reaching assessments of 
power.... So power, as a dispositional concept, 
is neither a thing (a resource or vehicle) nor an 
event (an exercise of power): it is a capacity."
Decisions are made by powerful coalitions of interdependent
actors.95 Dowding argued:96
"... individuals within different coalitions may 
bargain across coalition lines, which is what 
makes solutions unstable. One coalition may try 
to entice an individual from another if this will 
strengthen the former coalition. That individual 
will be enticed only if she can get that 
coalition to adopt a policy closer to the one she 
prefers than the policy of the coalition she 
leaves."
Coalitions range from stable to unstable, though all are 
temporary. For example, in Stockport MBC there was a stable 
coalition comprising the political and administrative 
leadership, which successfully imposed its wishes upon
94 Morriss (1987) ppl8-19. See also Dowding (1991) 
pp54-55.
95 The idea of coalitions between interdependent actors 
is the micro-level equivalent of the meso-level concept of 
policy networks. Benson defined a policy sector as "a 
cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other 
by resource dependencies and distinguished from other 
clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of 
resource dependencies" ((1982) pl48). On policy networks 
see, for example, Atkinson & Coleman (1992); Benson (1975); 
Dowding (1991) ppll8-124; Jordan & Schubert (1992); Marsh 
& Rhodes (1992c); Rhodes (1986b); Rhodes (1988) pp77-87, 
235-366; Rhodes (1990); Smith (1993); and Wright (1988).
96 Dowding (1991) p80.
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other actors; whereas in Knowsley MBC the same coalition 
was less stable because the ruling Labour Group was divided 
over budget strategy. Coalitions form and change within 
party groups. In Kent CC a business-led faction of 
councillors took over the leadership of the ruling 
Conservative Group, which resulted in different budget 
tactics reflecting a more 'business-like7 management style. 
In Bedfordshire CC two Liberal councillors nearly defected 
to the Conservative fold, and only remained because of 
assurances given by the rest of the Liberal Group on budget 
strategy.
In general, decisions to cut spending in the four local 
authorities were made by the interactions of interdependent 
actors exchanging resources to protect their interests. 
Those actors able to agree on decisions formed coalitions, 
and the coalition with the most resources imposed its 
preferred decision upon actors outside the dominant 
coalition. The winning coalition was not dependent upon 
these actors, and therefore their agreement on the decision 
was not needed. Agreement on a decision was needed only 
from actors of a winning coalition. Decisions to cut local 
authority spending were made because there was sufficient 
agreement on these decisions between a sufficient number of 
interdependent actors possessing sufficient resources. An 
agreement is no more than a negotiated and temporary 
settlement between a dominant coalition of interdependent 
actors.
In conclusion, the model postulates that actors have 
interests, and possess resources to further their 
interests. Their resources are dependent upon other actors, 
and are therefore traded between interdependent actors. 
Actors then interact and exchange resources to forge 
agreements on decisions. Decisions to cut spending in the 
four local authorities were made only if sufficient 
interdependent actors mobilising sufficient resources
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agreed to make spending cuts. The model explains how the 
four local authorities made spending cuts given the 
interests of the actors involved, resources of the actors 
and structures of decision-making.97
97 This model is pitched at the micro-level, and thus 
requires both meso-level and macro-level analysis to 
understand the formation of interests, distribution of 
resources and configuration of structures. See Benson
(1975) ; Benson (1982); Crozier (1972); Dowding (1991) 
ppl47-163; Ham & Hill (1993) ppl74-188; Rhodes (1981) pp97- 
133; and Rhodes (1986b).
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROGRAMME
The following were interviewed in undertaking the research 
on making spending cuts in local government, the positions 
of whom were those held at the time of the interview.
Bedfordshire
Baimbridge C - Convenor, Bedfordshire Joint Public Service 
Union Committee 
Barley J F - Chairman, Education Committee, Bedfordshire CC 
Blowers A - Member, Labour Group, Bedfordshire CC 
Brown A W -  County Surveyor, Bedfordshire CC 
Browning D P J - Chief Education Officer, Bedfordshire CC 
Burnage A G -  Chairman, Social Services Committee, 
Bedfordshire CC 
Clifton D J - Director of Social Services, Bedfordshire CC 
Corder R F K - County Secretary, Bedfordshire CC 
Crabb E G -  County Personnel Officer, Bedfordshire CC 
Davies J - Social Services Spokeswoman, Liberal Group, 
Bedfordshire CC 
Dixon I L - Deputy Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire 
CC
Elven J W - Chief Executive, Bedfordshire CC 
Gibbons B K W - Leader, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC 
Griffin A M -  County Planning Officer, Bedfordshire CC 
Haley R A - Chief Fire Officer, Bedfordshire Fire Brigade 
Hendry A P - Leader, Conservative Group, Bedfordshire CC 
Hughes V - Administration Officer, Bedfordshire Police
Constabulary
Hurst J - Assistant Education Officer, Bedfordshire CC 
Lennon J V - Deputy Leader, Liberal Group, Bedfordshire CC
Lukes D - Assistant County Planning Officer, Bedfordshire
CC
Muris C - County Librarian, Bedfordshire CC 
Owen S H M - Education Spokesman, Liberal Group,
Bedfordshire CC 
Phillips K W County Trading Standards Officer,
Bedfordshire CC 
Phillips V F - County Treasurer, Bedfordshire CC 
Sell P - Area Officer (1) , National Union of Public
Employees
Shepherd M C - Chairwoman, Public Protection Committee, 
Bedfordshire CC 
Sloane A K - Chief Constable, Bedfordshire Police
Constabulary
Smith C - Principal Assistant, County Surveyor's
Department, Bedfordshire CC 
Smith P - Chief Arts and Recreation Officer, Bedfordshire 
CC
Sollars A R - Chairman, Leisure Committee, Bedfordshire CC
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Sutherland I - Assistant to the Chief Executive, 
Bedfordshire CC 
Tizard J N - Leader, Labour Group, Bedfordshire CC 
Waterhouse R - Assistant Director of Social Services, 
Bedfordshire CC 
White K - Chairman, Environmental Services Committee, 
Bedfordshire CC 
White N H - County Architect, Bedfordshire CC
Kent
Armstrong M - Chairman, Property, Supplies and Services 
Group, Kent CC
Barchi W A - Chief Health and Housing Officer, Shepway DC 
Bate C - Senior Partner, Arthur Young 
Bennett J R - Borough Housing Officer, Gravesham BC 
Bicker D - Area Trading Standards Officer, Kent CC 
Bignell A - Reporter, Kent Messenger Ltd
Bishop A - Policy Officer, Social Services Department, Kent 
CC
Bowden I A - Regional Manager, Provincial Cleaning Services 
Ltd
Bradley N - Area Officer (2) , National Union of Public 
Employees
Bryan R E -  Honorary Secretary (Kent Federation), National 
Association of Schoolmasters and Union of Women 
Teachers
Clark J R - Senior Trading Standards Inspector, Kent CC 
Clayton D F - Head, Property Services Department, Kent CC 
Cobb S M - Secretary (Kent Section), London Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 
Condon P L -  Assistant Chief Constable (Administration and 
Supply), Kent County Constabulary 
Corfield P - Principal Performance and Investigation
Officer, Computing and Management Services Unit, Kent 
CC
Cottell M N T - County Surveyor, Kent CC
Cousins J - Operations Director (1) , Pritchard Services 
Group pic
Deakin W H - County Planning Officer, Kent CC 
DeKnop J G P - County Supplies Officer, Kent CC 
Detheridge V - Officer-in-Charge, Glebelands Closed
Supervision Unit, Kent CC 
Dixon B - County Trading Standards Officer, Kent CC 
Edwards G - Area Trading Standards Officer, Kent CC 
Fitzgerald F - Operations Director (2), Pritchard Services 
Group pic
Freeman C - Management Consultant, Harold Whitehead &
Partners
Goldsmith W - Regional Manager, ICC Cleaning Services Ltd 
Green E - Marketing Director, ICC Cleaning Services Ltd* 
Greengross S - Director, Age Concern England*
Gregory S G - Convenor, Secondary Heads Association 
Griffiths J - Regional Organiser, General, Municipal,
Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union
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Hall J H Secretary General, Contract Cleaning and 
Maintenance Association 
Hart A H -  Leader, Conservative Group, Kent CC 
Hill R - Area Manager, Social Services Department, Kent CC 
Hillier A - Honorary Secretary (Kent Division), National 
Union of Teachers 
Hopkin W G - County Secretary and Solicitor, Kent CC 
Humphrey R - Branch Secretary, National and Local 
Government Officers Association 
Hunter D J - Chairman, Finance and Review Group, Kent CC 
Jackson W U - Chief Executive, Kent CC
Jenkinson R A - Head, Computing and Management Services 
Unit, Kent CC
Jones J A V - Secretary of Kent Liaison Committee, National 
Association of Teachers in Further and Higher 
Education
Lauerman M W -  Assistant Director of Social Services, Kent 
CC
Lee H W - Leader, Labour Group, Kent CC 
Light D R -  County Personnel Officer, Kent CC 
Little J F - Deputy Leader, Labour Group, Kent CC 
MacKichan I D S -  Director (South Eastern Region), 
Confederation of British Industry 
Mallett J - County Organiser, Age Concern Kent 
Martin P - Deputy County Treasurer, Kent CC 
McNeill W J - Chairman, Education Committee, Kent CC 
Mill T - Finance Officer, Highways and Transportation 
Department, Kent CC 
Neame R H B - Former Leader, Conservative Group, Kent CC 
Newman G - Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC 
Norman R S - Chairman, Social Services Committee, Kent CC 
Notman B - County Caretaking and Cleaning Services Officer, 
Kent CC
Oatley B - County Education Officer, Kent CC 
Odling M F - Chairman, Development and Transportation 
Committee, Kent CC 
Parker D - Finance Officer, Social Services Department, 
Kent CC
Percival R H - Manager, Highways and Transportation 
Department, Kent CC 
Pooley A R - Area Officer (3), National Union of Public 
Employees
Pounds H W - Principal Administration Officer, Kent County 
Constabulary
Rawlings-Smith S - Development Officer, Social Services 
Department, Kent CC 
Ritchie A - Senior Trading Standards Inspector, Kent CC 
Smith J - Principal Administration Officer, Kent Fire 
Brigade
Spence J A - Chairman, Police Committee, Kent CC 
Stevenson B - Member (Kent Branch), Assistant Masters and 
Mistresses Association 
Taylor W B - County Treasurer, Kent CC
Thomas J L - Chairman, Fire and Public Protection 
Committee, Kent CC 
Tolmie E M -  Honorary Secretary (Kent Branch), Assistant
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Masters and Mistresses Association 
Tuckey R - Assistant Education Officer, Kent CC 
Wheeler P - Policy Officer, Social Services Department, 
Kent CC
Whitworth G D N - County Fire Officer, Kent Fire Brigade 
Willcox B - Area Officer (4) , National Union of Public 
Employees
Williams N - Principal Assistant County Secretary, Kent CC 
Williamson R - Senior Assistant, Education Department, Kent 
CC
Knowslev
Brackley R - Director of Technical and Professional 
Services, Knowsley MBC 
Neafsey P M -  Borough Education Officer, Knowsley MBC 
Overland J - Deputy Director of Leisure Services, Knowsley 
MBC
Pearson A - Director of Leisure Services, Knowsley MBC 
Penn R - Chief Executive, Knowsley MBC 
Redmond A G -  Borough Treasurer, Knowsley MBC
Stockport
Ashworth J M - Leader, Liberal Group, Stockport MBC 
Beardmore D - Assistant Director of Housing and 
Environmental Health, Stockport MBC 
Bradbury B - Finance Spokesman, Labour Group, Stockport MBC 
Burgon V - Chairman, Recreation and Culture Committee, 
Stockport MBC
Cooke J H - Chairman, Education Committee, Stockport MBC 
Curley M - Assistant Director of Finance, Stockport MBC 
Dobson S A - Director of Administration, Stockport MBC 
Fitton N J - Director of Education and Acting Director of 
Housing, Stockport MBC 
Hargreave R - Director of Development and Town Planning, 
Stockport MBC
Hodgkinson C - Assistant Regional Director (North Western 
Region), Confederation of British Industry 
Howe J G - Chairman, Development Services Committee,
Stockport MBC
Jones D - Branch Administrator, National and Local
Government Officers Association 
Lawton J - Assistant Corporate Planner, Stockport MBC 
Lloyd J - Leader, Conservative Group, Stockport MBC 
MacCarron J A - Chairman, Finance Sub-Committee, Stockport 
MBC
Mobbs A - Leader, Labour Group, Stockport MBC 
Rupa S - Area Officer (5) , National Union of Public
Employees
Simpson N A - Assistant Director of Recreation and Culture, 
Stockport MBC
Whitehead H B - Chairman, Transportation and Works
Committee, Stockport MBC
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Williams C S Branch Secretary, National and Local 
Government Officers Association 
Wilson A L - Chief Executive, Stockport MBC 
Wroe D - Director of Works, Stockport MBC
Other
Astling A V - Chief Executive, Walsall MBC
Bennett J - Senior Assistant Education Officer, Lancashire 
CC
Groves R - Administration Officer, Lancashire CC
Hale R - Under-Secretary, Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy
Henig R - Vice-Chairwoman, Finance Sub-Committee, 
Lancashire CC
Ramsdale P - Statistician, Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy*
Rymer R - Principal Officer, County Treasurer's Department, 
Lancashire CC
Waring T H - Personnel and Management Services Officer, 
Lancashire CC
* Interview conducted by telephone
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